Bosnia and Herzegovina
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The current authorisation for the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) expires on 1 November.
Key Recent Developments
The trial against Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik for failing to implement the High Representative’s decisions began on February 2024 following the filing of charges in August 2023 by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Prosecutor’s Office. (For background and earlier political developments, see our brief on BiH in the November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
On 26 February, the BiH state court sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and banned him from holding office as RS president for six years for defying the decisions of the High Representative. The decision was a first-instance verdict, meaning that both sides can appeal; a second-instance verdict is expected to be delivered by the end of this year. In response to the sentencing, Dodik vowed to ignore the verdict, and the RS National Assembly (RSNA) banned BiH’s state-level court and prosecutor’s office, as well as the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and State Intelligence Agency from exercising jurisdiction in RS.
On 26 February, the RSNA also adopted a statement claiming that the state court decision was “rendered on the basis of a decision imposed by a foreign national, contrary to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as such, constitutes a breach of the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In a 27 February statement, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Dodik’s sentencing was politically motivated, expressed support for RS authorities, and added that Russia was using all political means to prevent the situation from “developing into a negative track”. Hungary and Serbia also voiced support for Dodik.
On 6 March, Security Council members held closed consultations on BiH, during which Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo briefed. In requesting the meeting, Russia apparently said that the court’s decision had drastically worsened the internal situation in BiH, increased tensions, and posed a serious threat to the Dayton Agreement. (For more information, see our 6 March What’s In Blue story.)
On 12 March, the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH issued arrest warrants for Dodik, RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković, and RSNA Speaker Nenad Stevandić. The three faced accusations of undermining the constitutional order by enacting legislation that barred state-level judicial and police institutions from operating within RS territory.
On 13 March, the RSNA adopted a new draft constitution and a draft Law on the Protection of the Constitutional Order of RS, asserting the entity’s right to greater autonomy and establishing separate institutions, including its own army and judiciary. The draft constitution and law also proposed the authority for RS to enter into alliances with other states. At Slovenia’s request, Council members discussed these developments on 21 March under the “any other business” agenda item during consultations. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Miroslav Jenča briefed.
In a 28 March press statement, the Security Council expressed deep concern over recent developments in BiH. The statement reaffirmed the Council’s full support for the GFAP and its annexes, underscoring the importance of adherence to BiH’s constitution. It called on all political actors, including both entities and the three constituent peoples, to engage in sincere, open, and constructive dialogue aimed at preserving the country’s unity and political stability. The Council also emphasised the need to avoid confrontational approaches and refrain from provocative and divisive rhetoric and actions.
On 23 April, SIPA officers reportedly attempted to arrest Dodik in East Sarajevo, but were prevented from doing so by RS police. The following day, High Representative for BiH Christian Schmidt issued a decree suspending all disbursements of budgetary funds for the ruling political parties in RS—Ujedinjena Srpska and Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD).
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 7 February press release, independent human rights experts voiced alarm over the reintroduction of draft legislation on registering non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in RS after it was withdrawn in May 2024. Titled “Republika Srpska Law on the Special Registry and Publicity of the Work on Non-Profit Organisations”, it aims to create a register of non-profit groups receiving foreign funding or other assistance of foreign origin in RS.
According to the experts, in its current form, the bill would “impose severe restrictions on [NGOs] and grant disproportionate government control over their operations” and would “likely lead to unnecessary impingements on civil society and the work of human rights defenders”. The experts called for RS authorities to take into account the concerns of all sectors of civil society and refrain from approving the draft legislation as it was inconsistent with BiH’s international human rights obligations. They likewise urged “political leaders to refrain from stigmatising NGOs by calling them pejorative names and designating them as ‘foreign agents’”.
Key Issues and Options
The role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) remains a key divisive issue for the Council. At the Council’s last regular meeting on BiH, held on 1 November 2024, China expressed concerns about the appointment of Schmidt to the position of High Representative and claimed that he “has frequently used the Bonn powers to amend the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving rise to tensions and divisions within the country”. Russia has expressed similar concerns over Schmidt’s actions and has repeatedly challenged his legitimacy and mandate. During the same Council meeting, Russia reiterated its call for the OHR’s closure, accusing it of interfering in BiH’s internal affairs and damaging the country’s post-conflict settlement process.
Western Council members, including the P3 (France, the UK, and the US), have opposed imposing a time frame for the OHR’s closure without referencing the 5+2 Agenda, which is a set of five objectives and two conditions established by the PIC that need to be fulfilled prior to the OHR’s closure.
One option the Council could consider is to request the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and UN Legal Counsel, Elinor Jane Britt Hammarskjöld, to provide a legal opinion on the procedures for designating High Representatives under Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement and on whether the PIC Steering Board’s decision of 27 May 2021 designating Christian Schmidt complied with those procedures. Such an opinion would have to analyse the Council’s own record of acting on earlier designations—normally by “welcoming and agreeing” through resolutions (from resolution 1031 of 1995 through resolution 1869 of 2009), but on one occasion, in 2006, by a presidential letter that endorsed Christian Schwarz-Schilling’s appointment (S/2006/61)—and assess whether endorsement by the Council, unanimity in the Steering Board, or consent of the Bosnian parties is legally required. By providing an authoritative legal baseline, the request could provide a common point of reference for future Council discussions on the OHR. There is a precedent: at the Council’s request, then-Legal Counsel Hans Corell issued a public opinion on 29 January 2002 concerning Moroccan mineral resources contracts in Western Sahara (S/2002/161).
Another option would be for the Council to request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the procedures and modalities for appointing High Representatives of BiH under the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Council Dynamics
Council members broadly agree on the risks posed by BiH’s entrenched ethnic divisions and political polarisation. Most are also critical of Dodik’s rhetoric and his continued threats of dissolution, which they view as challenging BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia, however, tends to be supportive of Dodik’s positions and frames international oversight—particularly by the High Representative—as illegitimate.
Deep divisions related to BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration and possible accession to NATO—particularly between Russia on the one hand and the US and Council members from Europe on the other—have long coloured Council dynamics on BiH. However, under the Trump administration, there has been a lack of clarity about the US position on this issue, adding further uncertainty to the process.
As part of the separate EU enlargement process, the European Council agreed to open accession talks with BiH on 21 March 2024 after having unanimously voted to grant BiH candidate status in December 2022. This milestone was welcomed by many Council members as a positive step toward strengthening BiH’s institutions and promoting long-term stability. This development has raised the stakes in Council dynamics, as Russia’s support for Dodik—whose actions have challenged state institutions and the authority of the OHR—runs counter to the EU’s requirement for full implementation of the Dayton Agreement, a key condition for BiH’s accession.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 1 November 2024S/PV.9774 | This was the semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 28 March 2025SC/16033 | This was a press statement on BiH. |
