West Africa and the Sahel
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council will hold a briefing on West Africa and the Sahel. The Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Leonardo Santos Simão, is expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
On 29 January, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), concluding a year-long process following their announcement in 2024 of their intention to leave the sub-regional bloc. The three countries, led by military juntas that seized power through coups d’état, established the l’Alliance des États du Sahel (Alliance of Sahel States, or AES) in September 2023 as an organisation of collective defence. In March, the AES countries announced their withdrawal from Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (International Organisation of Francophonie), an organisation that promotes the French language and fosters cooperation among French-speaking nations.
In a communiqué adopted at the conclusion of its 66th Ordinary Session in Abuja in December 2024, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government established a transitional period until 29 July, during which the three countries could rejoin the bloc. Moreover, it directed the Council of Ministers to convene an Extraordinary Session in the second quarter of 2025 to determine the modalities of separation and to develop a contingency plan outlining the future political and economic relations between ECOWAS and the AES states.
The rise of terrorism and violent extremism continues to undermine security and stability in the Sahel. The region remains a hotspot for extremist groups, including al-Qaida affiliates and factions linked to the Islamic State and the Levant, which exploit weak governance, intercommunal tensions, and economic hardships to expand their influence and destabilise local communities. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Sahel accounted for 19 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide and 51 percent of global terrorism-related deaths in 2024, up from 48 percent in 2023. Five of the ten countries most affected by terrorism are in the Sahel.
On 21 March, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants attacked the Fambita Mosque in southwestern Niger, killing at least 44 people and setting fire to a market and several homes. Council members condemned the attack in a 27 March press statement.
Beyond the Sahel, terrorist activity is increasing in coastal West Africa, with Benin and Togo witnessing an increase in attacks. Togo recorded ten attacks resulting in 52 deaths in 2024, with Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) claiming responsibility for four of these attacks, which accounted for 41 fatalities—up from 12 in 2023. The group also claimed responsibility for three attacks in Benin last year. In early January, terrorist attacks claimed by JNIM in northern Benin, near its border with Burkina Faso and Niger, resulted in the deaths of 28 Beninese soldiers. The attacks were strongly condemned by Council members in a 24 January press statement.
Several countries in West Africa are undergoing political transitions and preparing for key elections in 2025. In Guinea, the military junta led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, which seized power in a 2021 coup, agreed with ECOWAS on a ten-point roadmap for civilian rule and elections by late 2024. However, delays, lack of transparency, and insufficient funding have hindered progress. The junta’s announcement of a constitutional referendum in the first half of 2025 has raised tensions, with the opposition accusing the junta of undermining the transition and escalating crackdowns on dissent.
On 26 March, Niger’s military leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who seized power in a coup d’état in July 2023, was sworn in as president for a five-year transition period under a new charter that replaces the country’s constitution. He was also promoted to the country’s highest military rank of an army general and signed a decree dissolving all political parties. The new charter reportedly states that the five-year transition period is “flexible” and may be adjusted based on the country’s security situation.
Côte d’Ivoire is set to hold presidential elections on 25 October. President Alassane Ouattara is currently serving a third term, which the opposition claims violates the constitution’s two-term limit. Tensions escalated on 17 March when the electoral commission released the provisional voter list, excluding former President Laurent Gbagbo, former Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, and former Minister Charles Blé Goudé. Their disqualification, reportedly due to past criminal convictions, has sparked accusations of political exclusion, with opposition figures expected to challenge the decision.
In Togo, constitutional amendments introduced in 2024 are set to take effect on 6 May, transitioning the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system and consolidating executive authority under President Faure Gnassingbé, who will assume the new executive position of “President of the Council of Ministers”. These changes, which allow him to extend his rule indefinitely as long as his party maintains parliamentary control, have sparked controversy. Gnassingbé has been in power since 2005, following the death of his father, President Gnassingbé Eyadéma.
Guinea-Bissau’s presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for 30 November; however, the country has been embroiled in political turmoil. President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dissolved parliament in December 2023 following an alleged coup attempt and postponed elections originally planned for 2024. While the opposition contends that Embaló’s term ended on 27 February, the Supreme Court ruled that it extends until 4 September, the date it validated his victory in 2020. ECOWAS’ efforts to mediate have faltered, with a joint ECOWAS-UNOWAS diplomatic mission, deployed from 21 to 28 February, forced to leave on 1 March after Embaló threatened its expulsion, rejecting regional interference. The opposition’s boycott of the joint mission, citing bias, further hindered mediation.
Key Issues and Options
The rise of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel region—particularly in the AES countries, which have been the epicentre of intensified terrorist attacks in the region—is a major concern for Council members. Over the years, terrorist groups have become more aggressive, leveraging increasingly sophisticated weaponry, including drones. The terrorist threat has progressively spread southward toward coastal states, raising alarm about potential spillover into previously unaffected regions. The growing link between terrorism and maritime crime is also a challenge that threatens to further destabilise the region.
Another significant issue for Council members is how to support the regional counter-terrorism security mechanisms—such as the Accra Initiative and the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin—in countering this threat. These mechanisms grapple with formidable challenges, including political instability, fragmented security coordination, and persistent funding deficits. Compounding these difficulties has been the withdrawal of Western military assistance, coupled with a shift toward alternative security partnerships—most notably with Russia.
Council members have also been concerned about the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government, and they continue to closely follow ongoing political transitions in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. In this connection, addressing structural conflict drivers in the Sahel, such as poor governance, under-development, and climate change, remains a major issue.
One option for the Council would be to request a briefing from the Secretary-General on possible avenues for enhancing security and governance in the Sahel region. He could brief Council members on the outcome of the assessment by the Independent High-level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel (that is, the Issoufou Panel). The Panel was jointly launched by the UN, the African Union, ECOWAS, and the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) in September 2022 under the leadership of the former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to undertake a strategic assessment of “the underlying challenges in the Sahel, including the surge in violent extremism, growing fragility of the economies of the region due to the impact of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as complex political transitions”. The Panel’s report was discussed at the 8th UN-AU annual conference in October 2024, but Council members have not had the opportunity to be briefed about the report.
Council members may further consider organising an informal briefing to examine the inter-linkages between terrorism and maritime crime in the region, along with their implications for regional peace and security. The briefing could also address the growing use of sophisticated technology by terrorist groups in the region. The Council could also be briefed on security threats posed by climate change and the role of youth in addressing key regional challenges, including conflict, environmental changes, and political instability. This would offer an opportunity for Council members to gain a deeper understanding of these issues and explore potential strategies for addressing them effectively.
The humanitarian crisis in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, along with human rights violations by state and non-state actors, are also a major concern. Additionally, several Council members are troubled by ongoing restrictions on civic space and other human rights abuses. Council members could use the briefing as an opportunity to underscore the need for countries in the region to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law.
Council Dynamics
There is broad concern in the Council about the threat of terrorism and the dire humanitarian crises affecting West Africa and the Sahel. However, Council discussion on this region has been increasingly divisive in recent years. The US and European members are worried about Russia’s growing influence in the region and its ties with the military juntas. While Russia supports the views of the AES countries in the Council, several members are concerned about developments in these countries. Sierra Leone, a West African country, and several other members believe it is important for the Council to maintain attention on the region, including how it might support regional efforts to combat the threat of terrorism and violent extremism.
A significant trend shaping regional dynamics in the Sahel is the growing political divide between Sahelian countries and Western powers, coupled with increasing reliance on non-traditional military partnerships, including mercenary groups like the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group), to combat insurgencies and consolidate power. In late 2024, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal requested the withdrawal of French military forces from their respective territories, reflecting a pivotal shift in a region where France has long maintained a military presence.
The wars in Ukraine and Syria have also had implications for the Sahel. In 2024, reports surfaced that Ukraine’s intelligence agency played a role in an ambush targeting Malian forces and Russia’s Wagner Group, resulting in heavy casualties. Ukrainian intelligence later acknowledged its involvement. The attack reportedly involved Tuareg rebels and JNIM militants. In response, the AES countries severed diplomatic ties with Ukraine. In August 2024, Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region reportedly prompted Russia to recall around 100 paramilitary personnel from Burkina Faso to reinforce its domestic defences.
The collapse of Assad’s government in Syria in December 2024 disrupted Russia’s logistical operations, as it had relied on Syrian military bases as a key hub for its activities in Africa. In response, Russia shifted military assets from Syria to other regions, including eastern Libya. At the same time, it strengthened its military partnership with Mali’s junta, delivering over 100 military assets earlier this year, including armoured vehicles, tanks, and weapon systems, reinforcing its influence in the Sahel.
Denmark and Sierra Leone are co-penholders on UNOWAS.
UN DOCUMENT ON WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 27 March 2025SC/16032 | This press statement condemned the 21 March terrorist attack in Niger. |
| 24 January 2025SC/15980 | This press statement condemned 8 January press statements in Benin. |
