Syria
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold a meeting on the political and humanitarian developments in Syria.
Key Recent Developments
On 13 March, Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration covering a five-year transitional period. The declaration stipulates that Islam must be the religion of the president and that Islamic jurisprudence is the main source of legislation. It also mandates an independent judiciary, freedom of expression, media freedoms, and guarantees for women’s political, educational and working rights.
After the signing of the constitutional declaration, UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen welcomed “moves towards restoring the rule of law” and noted that “this development potentially fills an important legal vacuum”. He added that implementation will be “key”, along with efforts to ensure transitional governance. The constitutional declaration, however, was rejected by Kurdish political entities that have criticised the document for granting too much power to the executive and for failing to guarantee the rights of Syria’s various national and religious groups.
On 29 March, Sharaa announced the formation of Syria’s new transitional government. The cabinet comprises 23 ministers from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds—including members from Alawite, Christian, Druze and Kurdish backgrounds. Only one woman is in the cabinet, the minister of social affairs and labour. The transitional government does not have a prime minister, and Sharaa is expected to lead the executive branch in his role as interim president. Sharaa said that the new government will strive to rebuild a united Syria during the transitional period, which is expected to last around five years until elections can be held.
The caretaker authorities continue to face significant challenges in rebuilding Syria and fostering social unity. From 6 to 10 March, sectarian violence between the caretaker authorities and their affiliates on the one hand and Alawite fighters loyal to Assad on the other hand reportedly left around 1,000 civilians dead—including due to revenge killings—in Syria’s coastal governates of Latakia and Tartous.
In response to this violence, on 9 March, Sharaa announced the formation of an independent fact-finding committee to identify those responsible for the mass killings and bring them to justice. The committee was mandated to submit a report to the interim presidency within 30 days. He also announced the formation of an additional committee to maintain public peace and reconciliation towards national unity. According to media reports, Sharaa has stressed that he is ready to punish “even among those closest” to him for complicity in the killings and alluded to a lack of coordination between Syria’s military forces and “outside groups” loyal to the military, which led to “many violations”.
On 10 March, Council members met in closed consultations to discuss these developments, during which Pedersen briefed on the situation. Council members apparently urged the caretaker authorities to swiftly ensure that violence ended, to protect civilians, and to pursue accountability for those responsible for the violence.
During the consultations, Russia and the US announced that they would be circulating a draft Security Council presidential statement to address the escalation in violence. Adopted on 14 March, the statement condemned the violence, called on all parties to cease any further violence or inflammatory activities to ensure accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. It also reaffirmed the Council’s “strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria” and highlighted the importance of implementing “an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, facilitated by the United Nations and based on the key principles listed in resolution 2254”. (Adopted on 18 December 2015, resolution 2254 focused on a political solution to the Syria crisis.) (For more information, see our 14 March What’s in Blue story.)
In a 13 March statement marking 14 years since the start of the Syrian people’s peaceful protests against Assad, the Secretary-General noted that despite renewed hope following the fall of Assad, a “brighter future hangs in the balance”. He stressed the need for the caretaker authorities to make good on their commitments to build a new Syria based on inclusive and credible foundations for all Syrians and asserted that the UN stood ready to support an inclusive political transition.
On the security front, the caretaker authorities signed an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) group on 10 March, integrating its military and civil institutions into those of the Syrian state as part of the authorities’ aim to establish control over the entire country. The SDF militarily controls most of the territory in Syria’s northeast and poses a significant obstacle to Syria’s unity. They were a crucial partner for the US in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) in the region. Türkiye, however, views the SDF as a terrorist organisation because of its close links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has conducted a decades-long secessionist insurgency against Türkiye.
The agreement came just weeks after the PKK declared a ceasefire with Türkiye. While Ankara welcomed the deal between the SDF and the Syrian caretaker authorities, military clashes between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces—as well as Turkish airstrikes—have continued in northeast Syria, raising questions about the implementation of the agreement.
Along the Syria-Lebanon border, seven Lebanese civilians, including a young girl, were killed in two days of clashes that started on 15 March after Syria’s caretaker authorities accused Hezbollah of abducting three Syrian soldiers, taking them into Lebanon, and then killing them. As a result, Syrian forces targeted positions along the border, leading to retaliatory fire from the Lebanese army. Hezbollah denied the claims that they were responsible for the abductions. Syrian and Lebanese authorities announced a ceasefire agreement on 17 March, and on 27 March, they signed an agreement for cooperation on border demarcation.
In his briefing to the Security Council on 25 March, Pedersen stressed that comprehensive security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are needed, and he encouraged the caretaker authorities to seek the UN’s support on these issues. He also called on the caretaker authorities to “robustly” address the issue of foreign fighters in their senior ranks. This point was also raised by China, France, Russia, the US and other Council members during the meeting and in the Council’s 14 March presidential statement.
In March, Israel reportedly continued to conduct various military operations in the occupied Golan, as well as airstrikes targeting military infrastructure formerly held by ousted Assad forces as far into Syrian territory as Damascus and Homs. Israel has said that it will continue to operate against any threat to its security and has made clear that it distrusts the caretaker authorities because of Sharaa’s past involvement with terrorist groups. Despite continued calls from the international community for Israel to withdraw from the demilitarised buffer zone established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, they continue to reinforce positions in the area.
On the humanitarian front, Syria remains one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, with approximately 16.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. While ongoing hostilities in various regions, dire economic conditions, and critical underfunding hamper humanitarian efforts, there are increased demands due to massive numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees returning to their homes. According to UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria Adam Abdelmoula, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported around 1.2 million IDPs and refugees had already returned since December 2024 and projects up to 3.5 million more in the coming months. Abdelmoula also highlighted, however, that humanitarian access has improved significantly since December 2024, and the UN is now able to coordinate the delivery of aid in areas that had been previously inaccessible to it, such as northeast Syria.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 9 March press release, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called for an immediate end to civilian killings in coastal areas in northwest Syria. Following serious escalations of violent attacks reportedly launched by elements of the former government and other local armed men, the UN Human Rights Office has also received alarming reports of entire families, including women, children and hors de combat fighters, being killed. The High Commissioner urged “prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all the killings and other violations, and accountability for those responsible, in line with international law norms and standards”. Among other recommendations, Türk emphasised the urgent need for a comprehensive transitional justice process that is nationally-owned, inclusive and centred on truth, justice and accountability.
Key Issues and Options
The most pressing issue before the Council remains how to ensure a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, guided by the principles of resolution 2254, that can prioritise the needs and aspirations of all Syrians, prevent fragmentation of the country, support the formation of credible state institutions, and establish a non-sectarian and representative governance structure. An important aim for the Council is to maintain a unified approach to addressing these issues and to promote a constructive role for the UN in this process.
Another key issue for the Council is how to improve the security situation in Syria. In this regard, Israel’s continued presence in the Golan buffer zone and its airstrikes into Syrian territory undermine the caretaker authorities’ control over the territory and their attempts to foster stability. Similarly, clashes in northeast Syria, sectarian violence, the threat of an ISIS resurgence and foreign terrorist fighters, and any perceived threat by Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah may all be issues that the Council could seek to address through a dedicated meeting or outcome document on Syria’s security and territorial integrity.
Another key issue is how to alleviate the growing humanitarian needs throughout the country and ensure suitable conditions for the safe return of Syrian refugees and IDPs, particularly given the dire forecast of funding shortfalls. During the Council’s 25 March meeting on Syria, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher appealed for urgent investment in Syria’s recovery, reconstruction and development amid a situation in which 16 million Syrians are lacking sufficient food, water, shelter and medicine. Council members could consider calling for an international conference to mobilise support for Syria, including by securing additional funding for a humanitarian response and addressing key issues such as economic development and reconstruction.
In this context, the Council could also request the UNHCR to brief on the humanitarian challenges of repatriating Syrian refugees. Council members could also encourage UN member states to support the humanitarian response plan for Syria of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Council’s monthly meetings on the file.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Since the ouster of Assad in December 2024, Council members have adopted a “wait-and-see” approach to allow the caretaker authorities the time and space necessary to steer the transitional process. The international community has generally welcomed commitments made by the caretaker authorities on their vision for transition and Syria’s future.
The mass killings in Syria’s coastal regions in early March, however, have served as a signal that commitments made need to be followed by tangible action and implementation to ensure that such violent escalations are not repeated. In the context of escalations in sectarian violence and persistent challenges regarding Syrian unity, such as those in the Alawite, Kurdish, and Druze communities, the actions of the new transitional government will determine the Security Council’s approach to the dossier in the coming weeks. Several Council members are likely to look positively at the diverse religious and ethnic composition of the transitional government and closely monitor its progress on Council priorities, such as the protection of all civilians and the promotion of accountability for all violations of international law. During the Council’s 25 March meeting on Syria, the US called for “genuine efforts at reconciliation” with the Alawite community and criticised the caretaker authorities for not having “meaningfully” engaged in a political process that includes all Syrian sects. It also raised concerns regarding the constitutional declaration and noted that it will be “watching closely who is selected for cabinet positions”.
On its part, at the 25 March meeting, Russia suggested that OCHA consider expanding its presence in the coastal region, including through opening a suboffice, to keep the situation under control and assess the situation more closely. Members may begin to intensify demands that the transitional government increase its coordination with the UN—including with the Special Envoy’s office—such as by seeking further support on matters pertaining to an inclusive political process and transitional justice.
A known obstacle for the authorities in Damascus is heavy sanctions, which hamper the country’s economic progress and foster instability. Many members agree that lifting sanctions and providing financial support to the caretaker authorities during this period are critical. The European Union and the UK have already taken steps to gradually lift the sanctions and restrictions previously imposed on the Assad government. Furthermore, on 17 March, the 2025 Brussels IX Conference on “Supporting the future of Syria and the region” convened with the objectives of mobilising humanitarian and financial aid for Syria and to rally political support for a comprehensive, credible political solution. The conference amassed $6.3 billion in pledges from donor countries; however, the US refrained from making any pledges in line with the Trump administration’s wider decision to freeze international aid. The US has also not taken any decision to lift its sanctions on Syria and seems to have adopted a more wary diplomatic approach to the caretaker authorities.
Israel’s presence and military activities in Syria are also a point of contention between Council members. During the Council’s closed consultations on 10 March, there were different views between some Council members and the US on the need for the Council to push back against Israel’s actions in Syria, and this dynamic also featured in negotiations on the draft presidential statement. Many members believe Israel’s actions are fostering tensions and instability in an already fragile Syria, but the US sees its actions are defensive in nature and tied to ensuring its national security, in line with Israel’s position.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 14 March 2025S/PRST/2025/4 | This was a presidential statement condemning sectarian violence perpetrated in Latakia and Tartous and calling for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 17 December 2024SC/15943 | The press statement called for the implementation of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles listed in the resolution 2254. |
