Somalia
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold a private meeting to discuss the situation in Somalia. James Swan, the Special Representative for Somalia and Head of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), is expected to brief.
The African Union (AU) is also expected to update the Council on the implementation of the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) mandate in accordance with resolution 2767 of 27 December 2024. The resolution expressed the Council’s intention to invite the AU, the UN Secretariat, and relevant international stakeholders to participate in a joint meeting on AUSSOM and UNTMIS.
Key Recent Developments
In recent months, Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida, has launched a series of deadly attacks across Somalia, continuing its violent campaign to destabilise the country and undermine government authority. These attacks have reportedly targeted both military and civilian sites, including military bases, government institutions, and civilian gatherings, as part of its efforts to consolidate its presence in central and southern Somalia. Recent media reports indicate a surge in Al-Shabaab’s activities in towns and villages near Mogadishu, with the group increasingly targeting Somali military positions and patrolling the surrounding areas.
On 20 February, Al-Shabaab launched a coordinated offensive in the Middle Shabelle region, where the Somali federal government (FGS) has had the most success over the past three years. The group captured several villages but was driven out by Somali forces in the following days. Somali forces claimed to have killed 130 Al-Shabaab fighters during the operation. Some media reports suggested that Al-Shabaab captured military vehicles and weapons while also killing 93 people in the assault. On 27 February, Al-Shabaab launched another offensive in Balad, Middle Shabelle. Heavy fighting ensued as Al-Shabaab temporarily captured the town before Somali forces reclaimed it.
On 11 March, Al-Shabaab attacked a hotel in Beledweyne, central Somalia, targeting traditional elders and military officers involved in coordinating the government’s offensive against the group. The militants laid siege to the hotel for 24 hours, resulting in ten fatalities, including both civilians and military personnel.
On 18 March, the militant group targeted Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade with a bomb attack in Mogadishu. While the president escaped unharmed, the attack resulted in four deaths. It drew widespread condemnation from the international community, including from Secretary-General António Guterres. The next day (19 March), a mortar attack struck the heavily fortified Halane compound near Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, which houses UN and AU officials and multiple foreign embassies.
On 20 March, two Al-Shabaab attacks were reported in the Lower Shabelle region. The militants launched an attack on Sabiid village, approximately 30 kilometres southwest of Mogadishu, and ambushed a reinforcement convoy travelling to Sabiid, killing a senior military official.
In response to the security threats, the Somali National Army has launched multiple retaliatory operations against Al-Shabaab, aiming to repel the militants, degrade their capabilities, and reclaim strategic territories. These operations have been supported by AUSSOM troops, local clan forces, and international security partners, with airstrikes and ground operations conducted across several districts in central and southern Somalia. Somali officials claim that these efforts have resulted in the deaths of over 400 Al-Shabaab militants as at mid-March.
International security partners have been instrumental in the Somali offensive against Al-Shabaab. The Ethiopian Air Force, in coordination with the Somali government, struck multiple Al-Shabaab positions in Middle Shabelle in March, while Ethiopian National Defense Forces were deployed near Ferfer for planned operations. Since US President Donald Trump assumed office in January, there has been a significant increase in US airstrikes targeting Al-Shabaab militants. Additionally, the US and the United Arab Emirates have carried out multiple airstrikes on IS-Somalia strongholds, supporting operations led by Puntland state forces.
In late February, the AU and Somalia reached an agreement on the troop allocation for AUSSOM. The Concept of Operations for AUSSOM outlines a total mission strength of up to 11,911 personnel. According to media reports, the agreement allocates 4,500 soldiers to Uganda, 2,500 to Ethiopia, 1,520 to Djibouti, 1,410 to Kenya, and 1,091 to Egypt. Additionally, several hundred police personnel from Egypt, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone are set to be deployed in Mogadishu, Jowhar, and Baidoa. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in our February 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
On 4 March, a joint AU-UN delegation conducting the independent strategic review of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) concluded a visit to Mogadishu. During the visit, the delegation engaged with key stakeholders, including officials from the Somali federal government, troop- and police-contributing countries, AUSSOM, and UNSOS. The discussions focused on assessing and recommending ways to optimise the efficiency, performance, management, and structure of UNSOS while ensuring its continued effectiveness in supporting AUSSOM’s mandate. At the time of writing, the UNSOS review was expected to be circulated to Council members by 1 April.
Key Issues and Options
One of the key issues for the Council in April is the transition process of UNTMIS. In resolution 2753 of 30 October 2024, which authorised UNTMIS’ mandate until 31 October 2025, the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with the FGS, a roadmap for completing the first phase of the transition of UNTMIS’s tasks to the FGS, the UN country team, and other stakeholders. The resolution asked the Secretary-General to incorporate the roadmap in his report, which was circulated to members on 28 March.
A related issue for Council members is how to continue supporting the Somali government in achieving its national priorities, including the constitutional review and electoral processes. Additionally, addressing the ongoing tension between the federal government and some federal member states is a matter of concern for Council members.
The persistent insecurity in Somalia remains a critical issue for Council members. Al-Shabaab continues to demonstrate its ability to conduct attacks, with the group’s reach extending to Mogadishu. Despite efforts by Somali forces, which have carried out robust offensive operations across multiple fronts, Al-Shabaab remains a potent force posing serious security threats to Somalia and the region. Recent media reports attribute Al-Shabaab’s resurgence to deepening societal divisions, particularly ongoing clan rivalries, and political disarray, including President Mohamud’s strained relations with various factions and some federal member states. These fractures reportedly have weakened the government’s defences, allowing Al-Shabaab to exploit internal divisions and expand its influence.
Another critical issue before Council members is the financing of AUSSOM. Resolution 2767 requested the Secretary-General to implement the framework established under resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 regarding the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) in a “hybrid” format starting 1 July. This implementation, however, is contingent on the Council confirming the request through a decision by 15 May. Ahead of this decision, the Council is expected to consider the independent strategic review of UNSOS and a report detailing the progress made in preparations for the implementation of the 2719 framework to AUSSOM under the “hybrid” model, to be submitted by the Secretary-General by 1 May. (For background and more information, see our 26 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.) There seems to be a strong push to delay the progress report on the application for the 2719 framework to AUSSOM, which is critical for upcoming discussions on the financing of the mission.
In light of the challenging Council dynamics regarding AUSSOM’s financing, an international donor conference could be instrumental in mobilising additional funds for sustaining peace support operations in Somalia and consolidating security gains. One option for Council members would be to explore contingency plans in the face of strong opposition from the US regarding the use of the 2719 framework for Somalia. Without a clear financing mechanism, the mission could be jeopardised, leading to a security vacuum and the loss of hard-earned security gains.
Council Dynamics
Council members support the Somali federal government’s priorities and recognise the many challenges the country faces, including the persistent insecurity caused by the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. They also support ongoing efforts to fight the group, including the implementation of sanctions to degrade Al-Shabaab.
Council members reached an agreement in December 2024 to establish AUSSOM, albeit with considerable difficulty. The critical issue of its long-term financing, however, remains unresolved, and divisions among Council members have deepened in this regard. On 11 February, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James Risch posted on X that resolution 2719 should not be used to finance AUSSOM, arguing that doing so “would lock the US into perpetual funding through its dues to the UN”. He instead urged the European Union (EU) to work with US President Donald Trump to develop an alternative funding solution.
In contrast, Somalia—having joined the Council as an elected member for the 2025-26 term—along with all other Council members, except the US, supports financing AUSSOM through the framework established under resolution 2719. The EU, a key financial contributor to AU operations in Somalia, advocates for a sustainable financing model based on diversified contributions and cost-sharing. While the EU remains committed to supporting the AU’s efforts in Somalia, it has increasingly focused on providing direct financial assistance to Somali security forces.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 27 December 2024S/RES/2767 | This resolution endorsed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), beginning 1 January 2025. |
| 30 October 2024S/RES/2753 | This resolution authorised the transition of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to the UN Country Team (UNCT) over a two-year period, starting on 1 November. |
| 21 December 2023S/RES/2719 | This was a resolution on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). |
