Kosovo
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold its first briefing this year on the situation in Kosovo. Special Representative and Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Caroline Ziadeh will brief on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s latest report.
Key Recent Developments
There has been no meaningful progress in the EU-facilitated dialogue on normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina. On 28 October 2024, Serbia adopted a draft law designating Kosovo as an “area of special social protection”, establishing a framework for providing financial assistance to certain groups in Kosovo with the stated aim of preventing social exclusion and supporting their survival. On the same day, the Serbian government adopted a separate bill on the organisation and jurisdiction of its judicial authorities, extending the competence of the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office and the High Court in Belgrade to prosecute criminal offences committed in Kosovo. Pristina condemned the measures, viewing them as an infringement on Kosovo’s sovereignty.
Meanwhile, efforts to implement prior agreements have stalled. On 17 December 2024, former EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák hosted talks in Brussels with Kosovo and Serbian negotiators, who reaffirmed their commitment to implement the 2023 Declaration on Missing Persons. However, Serbia’s chief negotiator, Petar Petković, reportedly walked out of a meeting of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons scheduled for 15 January in protest against Pristina’s closure of several parallel institutions in Kosovo earlier that day. (Parallel institutions refer to a network of administrative, educational, and healthcare structures in Kosovo administered and funded by Serbia that operate alongside structures affiliated with Pristina, often in areas with a significant ethnic Serbian population.)
According to Kosovo police, the closures—targeting post offices and banks—were carried out to establish “order and legality”. The EU criticised the move for being inconsistent with Kosovo’s obligations under the EU-facilitated dialogue and emphasised that the status of Serbia-supported structures should be resolved through dialogue. Ziadeh also expressed concern about the action’s impact on the daily lives of non-majority communities dependent on these institutions and urged a renewed commitment to the EU-facilitated dialogue.
The security situation in northern Kosovo has remained fragile. On 29 November 2024, a powerful explosion damaged a water canal in the northern municipality of Zubin Potok. Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti reportedly accused Belgrade of orchestrating the attack, which Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić dismissed as baseless. The Kosovo Security Council responded by approving emergency measures to increase security around strategic infrastructure while police announced arrests connected to the attack. Ziadeh condemned the attack, noting that it caused critical damage to essential civilian infrastructure and interrupted the water supply. She described the incident as deeply concerning and warned that it risks undermining stability. Ziadeh underscored the need for a comprehensive and transparent investigation to identify those responsible and hold them accountable.
Amid these developments, the European Council appointed Peter Sørensen on 27 January as the new EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. Sørensen assumed this role on 1 February with an initial mandate of 13 months. On 6 February, he spoke separately with the Serbian and Kosovar chief negotiators and welcomed their invitation to visit Kosovo and Serbia.
On 9 February, Kosovo held parliamentary elections. Kurti’s Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) party won approximately 42.3 percent of the vote, according to preliminary results, ahead of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which secured 20.95 percent and 18.27 percent, respectively. Despite securing a clear plurality, LVV fell short of an outright majority and will need to form a coalition to govern. This contrasts with the party’s previous term, during which it ruled alone following its 2021 electoral victory. In Serb-majority areas, Srpska Lista (Serbian List) claimed all ten parliamentary mandates reserved for the Serb community. Serbian President Vučić welcomed the result. Coalition negotiations remain ongoing in the aftermath of the election.
On 18 March, Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo signed a joint declaration on defence cooperation. In response to this agreement, Belgrade issued a statement criticising the pact as “a security threat to the Serbian people and the entire region” and a “direct contradiction to international law and UN Security Council Resolution 1244”. The following day, Pristina responded by condemning Belgrade’s remarks as “aggressive and threatening,” further characterising them as “a blatant violation of the Brussels Agreements”.
Key Issues and Options
The Council’s priority is to maintain stability in Kosovo and promote the de-escalation of tensions in the north. It will continue to monitor diplomatic efforts to advance the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and achieve the normalisation of relations between the two parties. To this end, the Council may wish to consider pursuing a presidential statement calling for restraint and reiterating support for the EU-facilitated dialogue as the primary framework for resolving outstanding issues. The Council could also express support for the newly appointed EU Special Representative and urge both Belgrade and Pristina to engage in good faith toward the resumption of normalisation talks. In addition, the Council could request the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of UNMIK to consider how to enhance the effectiveness of the mission.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Most Council members support the EU-facilitated dialogue to establish conditions for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Deep divisions among permanent members, however, continue to characterise the Council’s approach to the issue.
Among the five permanent Council members, France, the UK, and the US recognise Kosovo’s independence and tend to be supportive of its government; China and Russia do not recognise its independence and strongly support Serbia’s position and its claim to territorial integrity. Six elected members (Denmark, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, the Republic of Korea [ROK], and Slovenia) recognise Kosovo’s independence, while two (Algeria and Greece) do not.
Regarding the other two elected members, Kosovo maintains that Sierra Leone officially recognised its independence in June 2008. According to media reports, however, Serbia claimed in March 2020 that Sierra Leone had withdrawn its recognition, citing a note verbale on the matter from Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kosovo disputes the validity of the withdrawal. Somalia recognised Kosovo on 19 May 2010. On 4 January 2023, however, Vučić reportedly claimed that Somalia—along with eight other countries—had rescinded recognition. Kosovar authorities have also contested these claims.
The issue of modifying UNMIK’s mandate with a view to its possible drawdown is another point of contention among Council members. The US has been the most vocal advocate for reviewing UNMIK’s operations and ultimately phasing out the mission. Several other Council members, including the ROK and the UK, have expressed support for a strategic review and potential modification of UNMIK’s mandate, arguing that the situation on the ground has changed significantly since the mission was established in 1999. Russia has opposed any changes to UNMIK’s mandate or budget reduction, maintaining that the mission continues to play a crucial role.
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 14 October 2024S/2024/741 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIK. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 30 October 2024S/PV.9765 | This was the second regular briefing of 2024 on the situation in Kosovo. |
