In Hindsight: Ensuring Effective Peace Operations in an Uncertain World
Introduction
This year, peace operations are expected to receive increased attention in the Council, with three elected members—Denmark, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—forming a “peacekeeping trio” initiative. On 24 March, Denmark hosted an open debate on “Ensuring adaptability in UN Peace Operations”. Pakistan and the ROK may follow suit during their upcoming presidencies in July and September, respectively. This is a change from recent years, where the annual meeting on peacekeeping reform, held each September in line with resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017, has been the only formal platform in the Council for such thematic discussions.
In addition, the Secretary-General is expected to begin conducting a review of UN peace operations, as requested by the Pact for the Future—the outcome document of the September 2024 Summit of the Future—against the backdrop of expectations that there may be a strong push from the US to cut costs and do more for less.
This month’s In Hindsight explores emerging trends and ongoing reform efforts in UN peace operations amidst shifting and challenging geopolitical dynamics. It also previews upcoming discussions at the 2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin and the review of UN peace operations.
The State of UN Peace Operations
The last time the Council created a new peacekeeping operation was in 2014. A decade ago, the UN had 16 peacekeeping operations with 107,088 peacekeepers. However, following the drawdown and exit of several peacekeeping missions, this number has decreased to 11 peacekeeping operations with 61,197 peacekeepers in 2025. Large multidimensional missions, such as the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), closed in 2020 and 2024, respectively. The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), one of two remaining large UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations, is implementing a disengagement plan agreed upon with the Congolese government in November 2023.[1] With the dramatic deterioration of the security situation in eastern DRC since January, the future of the mission appears to be uncertain. Some Council members have expressed concern about the future of the mission, and the US apparently requested a strategic review of options for MONUSCO during the 11 March closed consultations on the DRC.
Some of the more traditional and longstanding UN peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) in the Golan and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), are also facing difficulties in fulfilling their respective mandates in the face of active hostilities in their areas of operation. (For more, see our 17 January What’s in Blue story.) With rare exceptions, renewing the mandate of these missions has traditionally been a routine affair as Council members have generally been supportive.[2] Nonetheless, addressing the obstacles preventing these missions from fully implementing their mandates is a major challenge, and developments in their areas of operation could affect Council dynamics.
The number of Special Political Missions (SPMs) has not changed from a decade ago. While four have closed, SPMs have been established in Colombia, Haiti, Yemen, and Sudan. However, there are signs of a downward trend. The UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) closed in February 2024 and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is set to leave the country by the end of this year. Similarly, the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), which replaced the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in November 2024, is expected to transfer responsibilities to the UN country team by October 2026 and be phased out.
In recent years, there has been growing pressure during mandate renewal negotiations for the removal of thematic and cross-cutting language on human rights; women, peace and security (WPS); and climate, peace and security, among other matters. In this regard, China and Russia have maintained that certain thematic issues are not relevant to the Council’s work and that their inclusion in the mandates of peace operations is unwarranted or even problematic. This trend could become even more pronounced in the coming period, with the new US administration possibly assuming positions that align more closely with China and Russia on these issues.
During this year’s annual negotiations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C34), the US apparently proposed several changes related to WPS, international humanitarian law, and mis- and disinformation, while other members opposed altering agreed language that had been negotiated over many years. As a result, C34 concluded its work this year without reaching an agreement on its annual report, which serves as a repository of language on peace operations. Although there have been instances of failure to adopt an annual C-34 report in the past (for example, in 2019 and 2022), this latest setback is likely to make the work of the C34 more difficult in the coming years.
A New Generation of Action for Peacekeeping
Since 2018, the UN has been implementing the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P), a set of commitments agreed by UN member states to reform and strengthen UN peacekeeping. In 2021, marking the third anniversary of A4P, the UN launched A4P+, which was meant to accelerate the implementation of A4P across seven key priority areas and two cross-cutting themes.[3] The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has so far released six biannual reports to highlight progress and challenges in implementing A4P+.
Its latest report, published in February, highlights the difficult environment in which UN peace operations are operating amid ongoing geopolitical tensions. Peacekeepers also continue to face increasing risks to their safety and security, although, according to the report, fatalities have remained relatively low in recent years partly because of measures to mitigate the impact of explosive ordinances and enhance casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures, among others. Last year, five UN personnel—four military personnel and one civilian staff—were killed in targeted attacks.
UN peace operations have also increasingly become targets of mis- and disinformation and hate speech, according to the A4P+ report. At a 19 February Council meeting, for instance, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita explained how anti-MONUSCO sentiment in eastern DRC is being stirred up through such means. This underscores the need for enhanced strategic communications in UN peace operations, a means to create better awareness of their role and mandate among local populations. Additionally, missions continue to engage with host countries to improve their operating environment and address various restrictions against them in violation of Status of Force Agreements, which have been an issue in recent years.
These and other A4P+ priorities have been a major focus of the UN Secretariat in the last seven years. While implementation of some A4P+ priorities has been encouraging— including the increase in the percentage of women in senior mission leadership, the decline in the number of fatalities, and the improvement in mission coordination with host governments—peacekeeping operations are also facing other broad, systemic challenges. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix described these challenges in a 2 September article in Foreign Affairs Magazine. First, the nature of conflicts has changed, which underscores the need for UN peace operations to adapt to evolving peace and security threats. Second, UN peace operations are not getting the necessary support from UN member states. This is even more so in the Security Council, whose members are increasingly polarised. “Without more coordinated support from member states, missions are often limited to doing damage control—preventing conflicts from spiralling out of control rather than resolving them”, Lacroix underscored.
In recognition of these factors, the Department of Peace Operations is in the early stages of working on new ideas for peacekeeping. It seems that DPO intends to gather input from member states, including during the 2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial.
2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial
This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, a high-level meeting held in September 2015 to discuss the challenges of peacekeeping in which several UN member states pledged to reform and strengthen peacekeeping efforts by committing troops, police, and other resources. The peacekeeping Ministerial was initiated in 2016 as a follow-up to the Leaders’ Summit, with London, Vancouver, New York, Seoul, and Accra hosting the peacekeeping ministerial in 2016, 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2023, respectively.
This year, Germany will host the peacekeeping ministerial in Berlin from 13-14 May. In the lead-up to the Berlin ministerial, two preparatory meetings took place in Montevideo and Jakarta in December 2024 and February, respectively, and a third preparatory meeting is scheduled for April in Islamabad. An independent study commissioned by DPO on the Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities was produced to inform the meeting. Released in November 2024, the study presents 30 different models for the future of peacekeeping, covering a broad spectrum of both traditional and emerging tasks.
Aside from member states making substantial pledges to address capability gaps, the Berlin meeting is expected to provide an opportunity to explore the models proposed by the independent study on shaping the future of UN peace operations. The study has garnered mixed reactions from member states, with some expressing scepticism about the feasibility of some of the proposed models, such as cybersecurity and maritime security. However, others see it as a good basis for discussions of potential new missions and how these models would be implemented in practical terms.
Review of Peace Operations
A decade after the latest review of UN peace operations, the UN is expected to embark on another review process this year. Unlike the last review, this one will be done in-house by the UN Secretariat. The review is expected to begin soon and is likely to involve a series of consultations with all the relevant stakeholders, including the Security Council, the relevant intergovernmental bodies of the General Assembly, the wider UN membership, troop and police contributing countries, host countries and civil society organisations. The 24 March Security Council debate provided an opportunity for the wider membership to share their views on what they expect from the review.
It seems that the Secretary-General would like to submit the outcome of the review before the end of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly next year. The ongoing Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) is expected to be completed by the end of 2025 with the adoption of twin resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly. There are likely to be overlapping elements in the two reviews, given that peacebuilding is an integral part of many peace operations, and members may be interested in how this will be handled going into the peace operations review.
Observations
Peace operations are among the Council’s most crucial tools, serving as a visible demonstration of its efforts to promote international peace and security. However, ensuring their continued relevance requires addressing several key issues. In this regard, restoring the necessary trust and consensus within the Council, especially among the permanent members, appears to be paramount. While this is easier said than done in the current geopolitical environment, it remains essential to provide political support to peace operations to enable them to fulfil their mandates effectively.
Another key issue is how to address the gap between expectations and what peace operations can realistically deliver on the ground. This gap seems to be one of the factors behind the crisis of host state consent and the frustration felt by local communities in recent years. Council members may need to enhance their efforts towards adopting realistic and achievable mandates that align with the needs and expectations of host states and their communities. In addition, enhancing strategic communications remains crucial to address the challenges posed by misinformation and disinformation targeting peace operations while also fostering a better understanding of their mandate among host states and their communities.
Aligning mandates with the resources and capabilities available to peace operations has also been a persistent challenge, which will be more pronounced with the increasing calls for cost efficiency and effectiveness. This could potentially create some convergence between the US, which under the current administration is likely to emphasise the “need to find value, not just financial value,” and China, the second-largest financial contributor to the peacekeeping budget, which has been advocating for the rationalisation and optimisation of resources in peace operations. This means that the coming period could be more challenging for peace operations to fulfil their mandates in a significantly resource-constrained environment.
The discussion on the future of peace operations remains a major preoccupation in light of the Peacekeeping Ministerial and the upcoming review of peace operations. While the large multidimensional models may not be totally obsolete, discussions have focused on the idea of more nimble models that can adapt quickly to changing circumstances. This could include starting with smaller, more traditional peace operations with narrow mandates that include such tasks as monitoring ceasefires or cessation of hostilities agreements and adding on tasks as needed, as suggested in the independent study.
In spite of these challenges, ongoing efforts to resolve some of the most intractable conflicts of our time could lead to an opportunity to test some of the ideas about the future of peacekeeping. It appears that the Secretariat is quietly exploring possible scenarios in the event that peace operations become an option in certain conflicts. It would be useful for Council members to seriously reflect on what sort of models might be most relevant and efficient in today’s world. Members have a number of formats where they could express their views, including the Informal Working Group on Peacekeeping, the regular meetings of troop- and police-contributing countries ahead of mandate renewals, the Military Staff Committee, and the Group of Friends on Peace Operations.
UN peace operations are at a critical juncture, with significant decisions required regarding their future direction, as they face increasing scrutiny of their effectiveness and disagreements about their objectives. If peace operations are to have a positive future, Council members need to actively chart a path forward that continues to demonstrate the value of this crucial tool in the maintenance of international peace and security.
[1] The others are the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).
[2] China and Russia abstained on resolution 2695 which renewed UNIFIL’s mandate on 31 August 2023.
[3] A4P+ has seven key priority areas—collective coherence behind a political strategy, strategic and operational integration, capabilities and mindsets, accountability to peacekeepers, accountability of peacekeepers, strategic communication, and cooperation with host countries—and two cross-cutting themes—women, peace and security, and innovative, data-driven, and technology-enabled peacekeeping.
