Haiti
Expected Council Action
In April, the Council will hold its 90-day briefing on the situation in Haiti. Special Representative and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) María Isabel Salvador will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country and on the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH. The report is expected on 11 April.
Council members might call for an additional meeting to discuss the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter containing strategic recommendations on the UN’s role in support of Haiti and evaluate options for Council action to implement the Secretary-General’s recommendations.
BINUH’s mandate expires on 15 July, and the authorisation of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti ends on 2 October.
Key Recent Developments
After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun an estimated 85 percent of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics such as murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence on the civilian population amid widespread impunity.
In March, gangs continued to extend and consolidate their hold within and beyond Port-au-Prince, prompting warnings of the possible imminent fall of the capital. On 25 March, an MSS soldier was killed in an attack by gang members during an operation in the Artibonite region. Among other attacks, gangs recently targeted several local media outlets. In a 20 March statement, UNESCO representative in Haiti Eric Voli Bi expressed alarm at these attacks, noting that they are part of a strategy to silence journalists and “prevent Haitians from getting information about the situation in a transparent manner”.
The situation of children is particularly concerning. In a recent report, Amnesty International highlighted violations, including the recruitment of children by gangs, killings and injuries of children, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.
The instability has caused widespread displacement. According to an 18 March International Organization for Migration statement, intense violence has forced nearly 60,000 people to flee in just one month, with over one million internally displaced people across the country overall.
The humanitarian situation remains dire. In a 20 March update, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that new suspected cases of cholera in Haiti are reported daily. The statement warned about the chronic underfunding of the humanitarian response for Haiti, noting that funding for water, sanitation, and hygiene remained particularly low.
As part of larger cuts to development aid programmes undertaken by the new US administration of President Donald Trump, the US has partially frozen funding to Haiti. During a 21 March media briefing, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq said that the recent US funding freeze was “having a devastating impact on the overall HIV response, including treatment and prevention” in Haiti.
On 7 March, Fritz Alphonse Jean replaced Leslie Voltaire in the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) rotating presidency. April will mark one year since the creation of the TPC pursuant to a March 2024 agreement facilitated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) following a dramatic surge in gang violence in February 2024. According to the 10 April 2024 Decree which created the TPC, this transitional body will exercise presidential powers until a new president is elected by 7 February 2026. This date marks the expiration of the TPC’s mandate which, as established by a May 2024 Decree, cannot be extended. In January, Voltaire declared that elections would be held by the end of 2025. Transitional authorities have also committed to holding a constitutional referendum, which is currently scheduled for May.
Elections have not been held in Haiti since 2016. In a 19 February report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted the importance of Haiti establishing a legitimate governance. At the same time, the ICG stressed that key benchmarks for election preparation had not been met and warned that carrying out elections without the necessary security conditions could have detrimental consequences for Haiti, including “allowing gangs to play a deciding role in the vote and entrenching their power”.
In October 2023, the Security Council adopted resolution 2699, authorising member states to form and deploy the MSS mission to Haiti. The resolution followed Haiti’s request a year earlier for the immediate deployment of an “international specialised force” to temporarily reinforce the efforts of the HNP to combat gangs and Kenya’s voluntary commitment in July 2023 to lead the mission. Resolution 2699 authorised the MSS mission for an initial period of 12 months, specifying that the cost of the operation would be borne by voluntary contributions and support from individual countries and regional organisations. In September 2024, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2751, renewing the mission’s authorisation for one year.
Funding for the MSS has, however, regularly failed to meet the mission’s estimated annual cost of approximately $600 million. The number of deployed personnel has also fallen short of the 2,500 officers envisaged in its Concept of Operations, with approximately 1,000 officers deployed at the time of writing.
In an October 2024 letter to the Secretary-General, Haiti requested that the MSS be transformed into a UN peacekeeping mission “as soon as possible”.
In October and November 2024, Council members negotiated a draft resolution proposed by the US and then-Council member Ecuador—the Council’s co-penholders on Haiti at the time—that would have directed the Secretary-General to initiate planning to transform the MSS mission into a UN peacekeeping operation. The draft resolution, which was ultimately withdrawn, was opposed by China and Russia, which referred to, among other issues, the chequered history of past UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti and reiterated their position that the country’s political and security conditions were not conducive to a new operation. As a compromise, the Council sent a letter on 29 November 2024 requesting the Secretary-General to provide strategic recommendations on the full range of options for UN support for Haiti.
The Secretary-General responded to the Council’s request in a letter dated 24 February. He noted that transforming the MSS into a peacekeeping operation is not currently a feasible option. Instead, the letter suggested focusing on substantially reducing gangs’ territorial control in Port-au-Prince, the Artibonite Department, and over critical infrastructure as a medium-term goal. To achieve this objective, the Secretary-General proposed a two-pronged strategy: the first would focus on enabling the MSS with UN logistical and operational support, and the second would focus on enhancing BINUH’s capacity to implement its mandate and take on new responsibilities.
Regarding the first prong, the Secretary-General suggested establishing a UN Support Office, funded by peacekeeping assessed contributions. A key function of the Support Office would be to provide comprehensive logistic and operational support to the MSS, such as accommodation, medical capability, and support for mobility and information technology. Assessed funding would cover the MSS’ logistical and operational support, while scaled-up voluntary contributions from UN member states would cover forms of support for the MSS that the UN cannot provide, such as stipends, military-grade capabilities, and lethal equipment. In addition, the letter proposes that the UN Support Office provide “a limited, non-lethal support package” to the HNP that would be funded mostly through voluntary contributions; and strengthened intelligence and analytical capabilities for the MSS and HNP in conducting joint operations that would be financed by peacekeeping assessed contributions. The letter also proposed establishing implementation capacity for the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces, to be funded through peacekeeping assessed funds.
Regarding BINUH, the Secretary-General suggested that the mission should focus on such priorities as the design and support of “defection and safe exit programmes”, including for children, youth, and women forcibly recruited by gangs; supporting the Haitian authorities in handling the detention of “high-risk individuals”; and enabling the Haitian authorities to implement UN sanctions, “notably the arms embargo”, including through the creation of a UN Integrated Sanctions Support Unit within BINUH.
In his letter, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the proposed UN support options were based on a set of “[a]ssumptions and [r]equirements”, including “significant investment from the peacekeeping budget” as well as scaled-up voluntary contributions. Specifically, the letter said that the viability of UN logistical and operational support “depends on whether Member States provide sufficient voluntary contributions” to address the MSS mission’s gaps in “personnel, military-grade equipment, and lethal assets”. In this regard, the Secretary-General called for strengthened member state leadership through the establishment of “a standing group of partners” that could, among other things, secure voluntary contributions required to procure the support that the UN cannot provide.
In a 6 March letter, Voltaire expressed support for the Secretary-General’s proposal.
Human Rights-Related Developments
During a recent visit to Haiti, the UN Designated Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, William O’Neill, met with Haitian authorities, civil society representatives, and UN officials to discuss the human rights situation in the country. He also visited the Centre de Rééducation des Mineurs, a juvenile prison in Port-au-Prince, where he heard testimonies from Haitians affected by the crisis. In an 11 March press release, O’Neill said that “the risk of the capital falling under gang control is palpable” and appealed to the international community to “act without delay” to implement the commitments it has undertaken regarding the sanctions regime, the arms embargo and the reinforcement of the MSS.
Women, Peace and Security
In an update on the situation in Haiti, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security stressed that violations of women’s and girls’ rights in Haiti “continue with impunity”. The update highlights the gender dimension of violence perpetrated by armed gangs in the country, noting that most people targeted for killing are men while “diverse women and girls comprise the majority of individuals targeted for sexual violence as a means through which criminal groups seek to control and subjugate the population”. The update identifies the scarcity of access to healthcare, including sexual and reproductive care; the lack of funding for the humanitarian response; and Haiti’s total ban on abortion as negatively impacting the situation of women and girls in the country. Among other recommendations, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security urged Security Council members to guarantee the necessary resources for the MSS and to take “all measures” to prevent any unlawful use of force and harm to local populations by establishing “clear, mandatory and enforceable parameters that detail the operational and oversight measures for protection of civilians, including against sexual exploitation and abuse”. Noting the marginalisation of Haitian women in the political transition, the update also urged Council members to ensure the full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation and leadership of diverse women in all peace, security, and political processes in Haiti.
Key Issues and Options
The Security Council’s overarching objective in Haiti is to support the country’s political transition and assist international and domestic efforts to stem the surge in gang violence, with the ultimate aim of restoring security conditions conducive to holding elections and addressing the root causes of the country’s instability.
How to respond to the proposals in the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter is likely to be a key issue for the Security Council in April. One option would be to adopt a resolution operationalising the Secretary-General’s proposals for the creation of a Support Office and for enabling BINUH to carry out its mandate more effectively and assume new responsibilities. If agreement on both the Support Office and BINUH proves difficult to achieve, members may opt to postpone consideration of the Secretary-General’s recommendations regarding BINUH until July, when the Council is expected to renew the mission’s mandate.
The influx of weapons in the country, mainly coming from the US, is another significant issue. The resolution could also demand that UN member states, in particular countries in the region, step up their efforts to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo.
At its regular April meeting, the Council could invite O’Neill and a representative of Haitian civil society to focus the Council’s attention on the deteriorating human rights situation in the country.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on civilians. Views also converge on the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges.
At the same time, positions have varied among Council members on how to appropriately respond to the security situation in Haiti. Before the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter proposing the creation of a UN Support Office for the MSS, France, the UK, and the US expressed support for the MSS’ transformation into a peacekeeping operation. Conversely, China and Russia have opposed this option during past negotiations on Haiti.
With the Council’s attention focused on other crises and with adjustments in US policy following the inauguration of the new administration still underway, it seems that Council members are still determining how to respond to the Secretary-General’s proposal.
The US and Panama are the co-penholders on Haiti.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 18 October 2024S/RES/2752 | This resolution renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti imposed by resolution 2653 of 21 October 2022. |
| 30 September 2024S/RES/2751 | This resolution renewed for one year the authorisation for member states to deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti to help re-establish security in the country and build conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. |
| 12 July 2024S/RES/2743 | This resolution renewed BINUH’s mandate for one year, until 15 July 2025. |
| Security Council Letter | |
| 24 February 2025S/2025/122 | This was a letter from the Secretary-General detailing options for the future role that the UN could play in Haiti, focusing in particular on the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission and the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). |
