Great Lakes Region (DRC)
Expected Council Action
In April, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Huang Xia, is expected to provide the biannual briefing to the Council on the implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region.
Key Recent Developments
Since the Council’s last meeting on the Great Lakes region on 8 October 2024, the security situation in eastern DRC has deteriorated significantly. The rebel group Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) has more than doubled its control of territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, capturing strategic cities such as Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of these two provinces, respectively. On 19 March, the M23 captured W8alikale, a mining town along a major highway leading to Kisangani, the provincial capital of Tshopo province. However, on 22 March, the group announced its decision to “reposition” its forces from the town and surrounding areas to foster conditions favourable for dialogue.
On 18 March, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame met in Doha under the facilitation of the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. According to a joint statement released after their meeting, the two leaders “reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire” as decided by a joint summit of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 8 February. (For more, see our 19 February What’s in Blue story.)
The DRC and M23 had apparently agreed to send delegations to Luanda for direct talks also on 18 March under the auspices of Angolan President João Lourenço. Announced following Tshisekedi’s meeting with Lourenço in Luanda on 11 March, the talks would have marked an encouraging step forward, as the DRC had not engaged directly with M23, preferring instead to talk to Rwanda, which has been accused of supporting the M23. However, the M23 reportedly pulled out of the talks following a 17 March decision by the European Council to impose restrictive measures on nine individuals and one entity, including M23 President Bertrand Bisimwa, who was supposed to lead the group’s delegation to Luanda.
Angola appears not to have been aware of the Doha initiative. Nonetheless, its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tete António, has reportedly said that his country would continue its efforts to convene direct talks between the DRC and M23 at an opportune moment. On 24 March, Lourenço announced his intention to step down from his mediation role in order to focus on his new responsibilities as the current Chair of the African Union (AU).
At the 8 February EAC/SADC summit, leaders decided to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes aimed at facilitating dialogue between the DRC and armed groups operating in eastern DRC, including the M23, and easing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. Technical experts and Chiefs of Defence from the EAC and SADC met in Dar es Salaam on 23 and 24 February, respectively, to discuss the implementation of the joint EAC/SADC summit decisions: securing an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, providing humanitarian assistance (including the repatriation of the deceased and evacuation of the injured), developing a “securitisation plan” for Goma and its surrounding areas, and opening airports and key supply routes. The technical experts had apparently assessed that the SADC Mission in the DRC’s (SAMIDRC) situation had become untenable, given the significant challenges it faced in implementing its mandate and floated the idea of deploying a hybrid force composed of the EAC, SADC, and the AU. However, the Congolese delegation rejected the proposal, and it was eventually dropped.
On 17 March, the EAC and SADC Council of Ministers met in Harare, Zimbabwe, to discuss the report of the technical experts and chiefs of defence meetings. The ministers, among other things, called on the UN to enhance the capacity of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to support the implementation of a “securitisation plan” for North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. They also underscored the need to develop a political framework to expedite the establishment of the merged process by the end of March. The outcome of their meeting was discussed at a second EAC and SADC joint summit held virtually on 24 March. The summit appointed five co-facilitators for the merged process considering gender, regional and language balance: former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya), Kgalema Motlanthe (South Africa), Catherine Samba-Panza (the Central African Republic), and Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia).
On 6 March, the SADC Organ Troika Plus—comprising the current, incoming, and outgoing chairs of the SADC Organ (Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia)—held a virtual extraordinary summit with the participation of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) of SAMIDRC deployed since December 2023. These TCCs (South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania) and the DRC discussed the situation in eastern DRC and reviewed SAMIDRC’s mandate. Several SAMIDRC soldiers were killed and others wounded during the M23’s offensive in North Kivu. At the meeting, the leaders recommended the withdrawal of SAMIDRC soldiers and equipment from eastern DRC. Subsequently, a SADC extraordinary summit, held virtually on 13 March, accepted the recommendations of the SADC Organ Troika Plus and decided to terminate SAMIDRC’s mandate, directing the troops to commence a phased withdrawal from the DRC.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 3 March press release, OHCHR voiced alarm for the wellbeing of at least 130 sick and wounded men following their abduction by the M23 rebels from CBCA Ndosho and Heal Africa Hospitals in Goma on the night of 28 February. In response to the attacks, they called for their immediate release and return and stressed that the group must take prompt, concrete steps to ensure an end to such arbitrary and abusive raids.
In a 5 March press release, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders Mary Lawlor expressed concern over the safety of human rights defenders in the eastern DRC. Amidst the ongoing entrenchment of M23 in the region since their offensive began earlier this year, those who have documented and denounced their violations are under greater risks of reprisals from both the government and armed groups, with many having been directly targeted. As Lawlor remarked, she had received credible reports of human rights defenders being detained incommunicado, forcibly disappeared and tortured in Rutshuru and Masisi in North Kivu. Emphasising the need for urgent, practical support for human rights defenders in the region, Lawlor called upon the international community to “recognise their collective responsibility towards the human rights defenders and urged Member States to seek them out and explore all avenues for rapid assistance to prevent the situation from further deteriorating”.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for Council members in April is how to stop the fighting in eastern DRC, which continues to be a source of tension among countries of the Great Lakes region. They may choose to issue a press statement welcoming the Doha joint statement, urging the implementation of commitments by all parties for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
The other major issue for Council members is how to ensure coordination among the various regional initiatives in the Great Lakes region. The quadripartite process initiated by the AU at a summit in June 2023 involving the EAC, the Economic Community of Central African States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and SADC is of particular interest to members. In its 28 January communiqué, the AU Peace and Security Council directed the AU Commission to urgently convene a follow-up quadripartite meeting.
The revitalisation of the 2013 PSC-F to address the root causes of instability in the DRC and the Great Lakes region has been an ongoing issue. In light of the security situation in eastern DRC and its implications for regional peace and security, Council members may call for the urgent convening of the 12th meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the PSC-F, which is expected to be hosted by Uganda, but no date has been set.
Another issue is the implementation of resolution 2746, which authorised MONUSCO to provide logistical and operational support to SAMIDRC. During the meeting, Council members may note SADC’s decision to withdraw SAMIDRC and call on MONUSCO to continue supporting the mission during its phased withdrawal.
Council and Broader Dynamics
The unanimous adoption of resolution 2773 on 21 February—which condemned the ongoing offensive by the M23 in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces and called on the group to immediately cease hostilities, withdraw from areas it controls, and fully reverse the establishment of illegitimate parallel administrations—was considered a major development. However, its implementation faces serious challenges as the M23 offensive continues to advance.
International pressure seems to be steadily increasing on the M23 and Rwanda. On 20 February, the US imposed sanctions on James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration; Lawrence Kanyuka Kingston, an M23 spokesperson; and two of Kanyuka’s companies registered in France and the UK. The UK, Canada, and Germany also announced a range of measures on 25 February, 3 March, and 4 March, respectively, which include restricting or suspending bilateral financial aid and development cooperation with Rwanda. Kigali has criticised these decisions, arguing that such measures will not help solve the situation in eastern DRC.
The DRC has reportedly offered the US a “minerals deal” to help secure critical minerals in exchange for US support in its fight against the M23. Tshisekedi appeared on US news channel Fox News on 19 March to explain this offer, which he argued “will give strategic advantage to both countries”. US President Donald Trump has appointed Massad Boulos, a businessman who is the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, as his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 6 August 2024S/RES/2746 | This resolution authorised MONUSCO to provide logistical and operational support to SAMIDRC and requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution and SAMIDRC to report on its activities, including coordination with MONUSCO, by 15 November. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 30 September 2024S/2024/700 | This report was on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F). |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 8 October 2024S/PV.9742 | This was a briefing on the situation in the Great Lakes region. |
