Colombia
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to receive a briefing from Special Representative and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Carlos Ruiz Massieu on recent developments in Colombia and the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on the mission, which was circulated to Council members on 26 March (S/2025/188). A civil society representative is also expected to brief.
The verification mission’s mandate expires on 31 October.
Key Recent Developments
The first quarter of 2025 witnessed an escalation of hostilities in several departments in Colombia. The north-eastern region of Catatumbo in the Norte de Santander department, which borders Venezuela, experienced a particularly severe deterioration in the security situation, described by the UN as “the gravest escalation of violence the country” since the signing in 2016 of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the government of Colombia and the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP).
Starting on 15 January, violence intensified in Catatumbo between the guerrilla group Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the 33rd Front, a branch of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frentes (EMBF), which has splintered from the general staff of the dissident group of the former FARC-EP that identifies itself as the Estado Mayor Central Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (EMC). The armed groups have traditionally fought over control of coca crops and drug trafficking corridors in the area. Violence started after a truce between the groups that had held since 2018 broke down in early January.
According to an update from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published on 21 March, more than 80 civilians were killed, including social leaders and six former FARC-EP members. Approximately 80,800 people have been affected by the violence, including some 52,000 who have been displaced and more than 20,000 others who have faced restrictions on mobility, in what OCHA described as the largest humanitarian crisis in the region in three decades.
In a 20 March statement, several independent human rights experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) said that armed groups have also reportedly subjected civilians in Norte de Santander to “extrajudicial executions, acts tantamount to enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence particularly against women and girls, human trafficking, and the recruitment of children”, noting that such acts constitute grave violations of international law that must be investigated and perpetrators held accountable. OCHA has also warned that the persistence of actions by armed groups to exercise social control of the population, such as restrictions on mobility and recruitment, “creates a high risk of further episodes of mass violence”.
On 17 January, Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego announced the suspension of the dialogue process that the government had been holding with the ELN as part of his “total peace” policy. Talks with the group had already stalled in May 2024 following the government’s decision to conduct a regional dialogue with one of the ELN’s regional fronts. The government also declared a “state of internal commotion” for the Catatumbo region on 20 January for an initial period of 90 days, which aims to provide resources to mitigate the economic and social impacts of the escalation of violence and to ensure food security, among other issues. Additionally, on 3 March, Petro announced a plan for the voluntary and compensated eradication of 25,000 hectares of coca in the Catatumbo region within 140 days with the aim of decreasing violence and weakening armed groups that profit from the drug trade.
Violence has also persisted or intensified in other parts of the country in the first quarter of 2025. OCHA’s 21 March update reported humanitarian emergencies in the departments of Chocó, Cauca, Antioquia, Sur de Bolívar, Arauca, and Córdoba due to the actions of armed groups. It further stressed that the number of people displaced in mass events reported in the first two months of 2025 alone exceeded the total number of people displaced in all of 2024.
At the Council’s latest quarterly meeting on Colombia, held on 22 January, Ruiz Massieu noted that Catatumbo is like other regions in the country where lack of state presence has created a vacuum in which armed groups continue fighting for territorial and social control. He emphasised that the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement “is as central as ever to lasting solutions for preventing and resolving the causes of armed conflict”, highlighting the importance of bringing public services, legal economies, and development opportunities to conflict-affected areas.
Armando Wouriyu Valbuena—a representative of the Special High-Level Instance for Ethnic Groups (IEANPE), a body created by the 2016 agreement to monitor the implementation of provisions related to the agreement’s ethnic chapter—and Diego Tovar, a former FARC-EP combatant and signatory to the 2016 peace agreement, also delivered statements at the meeting. Among other issues, they called for the swift implementation of the security guarantees provisions of the 2016 agreement, including the public policy to dismantle illegal armed groups and criminal organisations, which the National Commission on Security Guarantees (NCSG)—a body established by the agreement—presented in September 2023. Wouriyu called on the NCSG to address the disproportionate targeting of ethnic communities, while Tovar also stressed the need for armed groups participating in “total peace” dialogues to commit to respecting international humanitarian law.
The Secretary-General’s report says that the crisis in Catatumbo has highlighted the challenging landscape for dialogues in the framework of “total peace”. It further notes that following the fragmentation of some groups involved in talks with the government, “the focus has shifted from national talks to dialogues with a narrower scope and more localized reach”. One such process is with the EMBF, which has remained in a dialogue process with the government after splitting from the EMC’s general staff. A ceasefire between the government and the EMBF, which was agreed in 2023, is in effect until 15 April.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 22 January, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights presented a report to the HRC on Colombia’s human rights situation. The report assesses the impact of territorial violence and the internal armed conflict on human rights and civic space in 2024, focusing on 26 situations in 96 municipalities. It describes actions by non-state armed groups to maintain social control, including recruitment of children, threats against the educational community, and gender-based violence. Among other findings, the report references 15 verified human rights violations by members of the security forces, including allegations of torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and arbitrary detentions and discrimination. In a press release issued on 24 February, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stressed the crucial need for the protection of civilians and “urged the authorities to take immediate measures to protect Indigenous Peoples, particularly those at extreme risk due to the ongoing internal armed conflicts”.
In a 27 February press release, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants Gehad Madi called for strengthened cooperation between Colombia and Panama to protect the human rights of all people on the move in the region, expressing concern over the use of the Darien jungle as a migratory route. In this regard, Madi called for joint responsibility to ensure protection for migrants and refugees, urging both countries to augment their asylum and human rights protection systems and to fulfil obligations under international human rights and refugee laws.
Key Issues and Options
An overarching priority for the Council remains supporting the full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. As Colombia prepares for presidential elections in 2026, members may wish to continue emphasising the importance of continued focus on that objective. Council members have welcomed Petro’s expressed commitment to accelerate implementation of the accord, including through the “rapid action response plan” that the president announced during an 11 July 2024 Security Council meeting. There appears to be some concern about future progress, including due to the recent departure from the government of key figures such as former Interior Minister Juan Fernando Cristo, who had overseen implementation of the “rapid action response plan”, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Gilberto Murillo Urrutia. Council members could meet informally with Colombia’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laura Sarabia, to receive more information about the government’s plans to advance the implementation of the peace agreement in the remainder of the president’s term, which ends in August 2026.
A key objective for the Council is supporting transitional justice efforts in the country, including the work of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), the judicial component of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition established by the 2016 agreement. While members continue emphasising the importance of upholding the SJP’s autonomy, they have also increasingly been encouraging the Court to begin issuing restorative sentences. Some members apparently feel that it will be opportune to commence this crucial—and potentially polarising—stage before the start of the electoral period in the country. An option would be for Council members to interact informally with the SJP’s new president, Judge Alejandro Ramelli, to discuss the challenges facing the SJP and the envisioned timelines for the handing down of restorative sentences.
How to support relief efforts for conflict-affected communities is another issue. OCHA’s 2025 Community Priorities Response Plan (CPRP) for Colombia requests $342 million to assist 13.5 million people, with needs being driven by “the escalating impacts of armed conflict, the rising frequency of climate-related disasters, and the growing displacement of vulnerable populations”. There are concerns regarding the effects of US funding cuts for foreign aid, since 70 percent of funding for Colombia’s 2024 CPRP came from the US. At the meeting on Colombia in April, some Council members may choose to call on donors to enhance their support for humanitarian efforts in the country.
Council Dynamics
Council members are generally united in their support for the peace process in Colombia and for the verification mission’s work.
It remains to be seen how the approach of the administration of US President Donald Trump to Colombia may affect Council dynamics on the file. On 26 January, shortly after the January Council session on Colombia, there was a tense exchange between Petro and Trump, when Petro criticised US treatment of deportees, refusing to allow two planes returning Colombian migrants to land in Colombia. In response, Trump threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on Colombian goods entering the US, eventually leading Petro to agree to the resumption of deportation flights from the US.
New elected member Panama shares a border with Colombia and has an interest in the cross-border effects of the activities of armed groups in Colombia. Panama also has a thematic focus on countering transnational crime. At the January Council meeting, it highlighted the significant risks faced by forcibly displaced persons and those in situations of irregular migration, including vulnerability to human trafficking, forced labour, or sexual exploitation.
Looking ahead, Colombia is running uncontested for a seat on the Security Council in 2026-2027, with elections scheduled to take place in June.
The UK is the penholder on Colombia.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 22 January 2025S/PV.9843 | This was the Council’s quarterly meeting on Colombia, held on 22 January 2025. |
