Syria
Expected Council Action
In March, the Council expects to hold two meetings on Syria: one on political and humanitarian issues, and another on the chemical weapons track.
Key Recent Developments
Since the December 2024 ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, led by the Security Council-listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Syria’s caretaker authorities have been focused on unifying Syria, building state structures, and reviving the country’s struggling economy. While trying to deal with a multitude of challenges due to years of conflict, including on the security and humanitarian fronts, the caretaker authorities have announced steps toward a transitional process that will lead to elections in four to five years.
Following the 29 January declaration in which HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was named Syria’s interim president, the caretaker leadership pledged to create an inclusive transitional government representing Syria’s diversity. On 12 February, Sharaa announced the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference. The committee, which is made up of five men and two women from diverse backgrounds (including law, governance, civil society, and political science), reportedly conducted consultations across various Syrian provinces leading up to the 25 February National Dialogue Conference, which concluded with a final statement laying the groundwork for a new constitution. Reportedly, the statement inter alia called for a “temporary constitutional declaration”, the preservation of Syrian unity and sovereignty, respect for human rights, including support for the role of women in all fields, advancing transitional justice and accountability, and economic development policies. During the conference, Sharaa also announced the formation of a transitional justice body. The conference, however, was met with some criticism for being hastily organised and underrepresented, raising questions about how comprehensive it was.
On 14 February, at a conference on Syria in Paris, caretaker foreign minister Assad al-Shaibani reiterated the pledge that the new Syrian government, scheduled to take office on 1 March, would reflect the diversity of the country. During the conference, multiple countries pledged to help rebuild Syria and signed a declaration stating their intent to work together to ensure “the success of the post-Assad transition in the framework of a process that must be Syrian-led”. Syria, Lebanon, Türkiye, multiple European nations (including France, Germany, Greece, and Italy), and G7 members Canada, Japan, and the UK signed the declaration. The US did not sign it, reportedly because Washington has yet to form its policy regarding the new Syrian authorities and may have reservations about Sharaa and HTS, both under US sanctions.
Briefing the Council on 12 February, UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen noted that the roadmap being laid out by the caretaker leadership “shows considerable overlap with the key principles of resolution 2254”. (Adopted on 18 December 2015, resolution 2254 focused on a political solution to the Syria crisis.) Pedersen informed the Council that the caretaker authorities have committed to consulting with the UN on all steps of a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition and expressed the hope that this commitment would translate into follow-up action. (For more information, see our 11 February What’s in Blue story.)
The security landscape in Syria remains fragmented, with many armed groups still maintaining various levels of autonomy. In his 12 February briefing, Pedersen warned that the situation in northeastern Syria is “extremely concerning” with “daily front-line hostilities impacting civilians”. Clashes between the Turkish forces and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) forces on the one hand and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the other continue. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 627 people have been killed in Syria, including 56 civilians, since 12 December 2024.
In an apparent breakthrough in negotiations between Syria’s caretaker authorities and the SDF, the commander of the SDF’s Northern Brigade announced on 18 February that an agreement had been reached to integrate their forces into the Syrian government’s army. One of the key elements of the agreement reportedly includes the departure of foreign fighters linked with the Kurdistan Workers Party, which Türkiye considers a terrorist organisation. Subsequent statements from the SDF, however, did not corroborate the announcement, as negotiations are reportedly still facing disagreements on how the SDF’s forces would be integrated into the national army.
Following Assad’s ouster, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positioned forces within the demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan, citing security risks. According to media reports, Israel has built at least seven new military outposts in the demilitarised buffer zone—which was established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria—since December 2024, including in Syrian Mount Hermon. Although Israel had initially indicated that its incursions into the area would be temporary, Defence Minister Israel Katz said on 28 January that the IDF would remain in the buffer zone “indefinitely”. The IDF’s presence violates the 1974 Agreement, and Special Envoy Pedersen has called on Israel to withdraw. Commenting on Israel’s presence in the buffer zone, Sharaa has emphasised that Syria remains committed to the 1974 Agreement and is ready to welcome UN forces to “restore conditions to their prior state”. (For more information, see the brief on the UN Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] in our March 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
On 24 February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu further demanded the complete demilitarisation of southern Syria and affirmed that Israel would not allow any HTS or Syrian forces to enter the area south of Damascus. Following reported Israeli airstrikes in southern Syria on 25 February, Katz stressed that “any attempt by the Syrian regime forces and the country’s terrorist organizations to establish themselves in the security zone in southern Syria – will be met with fire.” That same day, the statement adopted at the Syrian National Dialogue Conference condemned Israel’s infiltration into Syrian territory as a blatant violation of Syria’s sovereignty, demanded a complete withdrawal, and rejected Netanyahu’s statements referring to them as “provocative”.
On 8 February, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fernando Arias visited Syria and met with Syrian caretaker authorities to discuss the next steps towards the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons. The OPCW described the meetings as “long, productive and very open, with an in-depth exchange of information, which will serve as a basis to reach tangible results and break the stalemate that has lasted for over eleven years”. The Director-General presented the caretaker authorities with a 9-point Action Plan for Syria. On 24 February, the OPCW published its monthly report on the implementation of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, which required the verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 27 January, the UN Human Rights Council-mandated Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Syria published a comprehensive report that uncovered the depth of the Assad regime’s use of arbitrary detention to suppress public dissent during the first decade of the Syrian war. Drawing on extensive investigations since the conflict’s start, Web of Agony: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Ill-Treatment in the Syrian Arab Republic based its findings on more than 2,000 witness testimonies, including over 550 interviews with survivors of torture. This is the Commission’s most extensive analysis to date of detention-related violations by the former regime.
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Chair of the Commission, expressed hope that such findings would help end impunity following patterns of abuse—underscoring that “they stand at a critical juncture wherein the caretaker government and future Syrian authorities can now ensure these crimes are never repeated”. The report furthermore stressed the urgent need for decisive action to safeguard evidence and crime sites, including mass graves, until they can be examined by experts.
Women, Peace and Security
In an update on the situation of women in Syria, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security highlighted that, despite the ouster of Assad in December 2024, significant challenges remain in achieving peace, stability, and respect for human rights in the country. Spotlighting the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the update noted that although women-led and women’s rights organisations have been instrumental to the humanitarian response, they continue to face “chronic underfunding and operating restrictions”. Among other recommendations, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security urged the Security Council to prioritise the “full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of diverse women in a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition, and demand respect by all parties for the human rights of diverse women and girls”. It also urged the Council to call on UN member states to fund the humanitarian response in Syria and provide direct, flexible and consistent funding to local women-led organisations.
Key Issues and Options
The most pressing issue before the Council remains how to ensure a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, guided by the principles of resolution 2254, that can prioritise the needs and aspirations of all Syrians, prevent fragmentation of the country, support the formation of credible state institutions, and establish a non-sectarian and representative governance structure.
In the event of the formation of a credible Syrian caretaker government in March, the Council could consider issuing a presidential statement welcoming the step and expressing support for a Syrian-led inclusive, transparent and credible political transition, in the spirit of the key principles of resolution 2254. The statement could also reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and reinforce the Council’s backing for the UN to have a role in the transitional process.
In light of recent reports about concerns that extrajudicial and revenge killings are increasing, the Council could also consider including elements in the statement that call on the Syrian caretaker authorities to prioritise transitional justice, encourage cooperation with independent investigative mechanisms, and urge international support for the caretaker authorities in preventing the resurgence of terrorism in Syria.
Another key issue is how to alleviate the growing humanitarian needs throughout the country and ensure suitable conditions for the safe return of Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons. During her Council briefing on 12 February, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya outlined the country’s immense humanitarian crisis and called for “generous funding pledges” in the face of shortfalls impacting life-saving aid and access to essential services. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi has similarly appealed to the international community to help support hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees to return to their homes, rebuild their lives, and reduce poverty. Council members could consider calling for an international conference to mobilise support for Syria, including through securing additional funding for a humanitarian response and addressing key issues such as economic development and reconstruction.
The Council could request the UN Refugees Agency (UNHCR) to brief on the humanitarian challenges of repatriating Syrian refugees. Council members could also encourage UN member states to support the OCHA’s humanitarian response plan for Syria in the Council’s monthly meetings on the file.
Council and Wider Dynamics
While there is acknowledgement of the positive messaging from the authorities in Damascus on a range of issues, including governance, many countries are likely to evaluate their stance and support based on the authorities’ concrete actions and implementation of commitments in the months ahead.
Key regional and international stakeholders, including several Council members, have held high-level meetings with the caretaker leadership. French President Emmanuel Macron has reportedly invited Sharaa to visit Paris, and Shaibani similarly received an invitation to Brussels from the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President Kaja Kallas. This shows a clear willingness to constructively engage with the interim leadership on the part of key European powers, which may sense an opportunity to enhance their relationship with Syria in the wake of significantly reduced Iranian and Russian influence.
Russia, which had maintained a significant military presence in the country over the years and was a staunch ally of the Assad government, has recently also bolstered its efforts to engage with the new caretaker authorities, including through a reported phone call between Sharaa and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 12 February. Moscow may be seeking to retain its air base in Hmeimim and naval base in Tartous, which afford it strategic access to the Mediterranean. Furthermore, according to media reports, Syria’s central bank received a consignment of Syrian currency from Russia on 14 February.
Meanwhile Washington, under the new Trump administration, has yet to clarify its policy or approach to Syria’s caretaker authorities. In early February, Sharaa said he had not had any contact with the Trump administration. A recent media report has indicated that Washington has expressed interest in pulling US troops out of northeast Syria. In a 14 February statement, Secretary of State Marco Rubio vaguely referred to the need to pursue an opportunity to create stability in Syria, and during the 12 February Council meeting on Syria, the US Ambassador said that Rubio has underscored the need to prevent Syria from becoming a safe haven for terrorism.
Council members seem to be in agreement with regard to a credible, transparent and inclusive transitional process, but there may be divergences related to the question of sanctions. The European Union (EU) lifted sanctions on 24 February impacting Syria’s oil, gas, electricity and transport sectors as part of its effort to support Syria’s transition, economic recovery and reconstruction. According to the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas, the sanctions relief will be contingent on a political transition that is inclusive and considers all of Syria’s different groups. At the beginning of January the US, under the Biden administration, had eased some restrictions on humanitarian aid but did not lift sanctions. There may also be differences over Israel’s presence in the Golan Heights and its military activities in Syrian territory.
Council members have also displayed starkly different views over the years on a range of issues related to the chemical weapons track, including responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the credibility of the work of the OPCW, and numerous procedural aspects of the OPCW’s decision-making bodies. Several members have consistently expressed support for the OPCW’s work, maintaining that it is credible and essential, but other members, such as China and Russia, have claimed that its work is biased and politicised. It remains unclear how the new realities on the ground will affect the work of the OPCW and the dynamics in the Council.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 17 December 2024SC/15943 | The press statement called for the implementation of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles listed in the resolution 2254. |
