Sudan
Expected Council Action
In March, the Council is expected to hold a briefing on the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. One or more additional meetings on Sudan could be held in March depending on developments, given the unstable situation in the country.
Key Recent Developments
Heavy fighting continues in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Since launching its offensive in late September 2024, the SAF has made progress in reclaiming strategic locations in Khartoum and surrounding areas from the RSF. The SAF has also intensified its military operations in other parts of the country, including Al Jazira and Sennar states, achieving notable successes. On 11 January, the SAF recaptured Wad Madani, the capital of Al Jazira and a strategically significant city south of Khartoum, located at the crossroads of key supply routes connecting several states. On 23 February, the SAF announced that it had broken the RSF’s siege of El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state and an important commercial and transportation centre, and that it had retaken Al-Qutaynah city, which is located roughly 73 kilometres south of Khartoum.
On 9 February, Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press statement indicating that it was initiating a road map to pave the way for an “inclusive political process that will culminate in holding free and fair elections” and include the establishment of an “all-inclusive national dialogue” and a technocratic cabinet.
On 22 February, the Rapid Support Forces signed a political charter in Nairobi with affiliated armed groups and other anti-government political actors to establish a parallel government in the territories it controls in Sudan. In a 24 February statement attributable to his spokesperson, Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep concern about the political charter, maintaining that it constitutes a “further escalation in the conflict…[that] deepens the fragmentation of the country and risks further entrenching the crisis”. He further asserted that preserving Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity “remains key for a sustainable resolution of the conflict and the long-term stability of the country and the wider region”.
The RSF has continued its siege of El-Fasher in North Darfur. Fighting in and around the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people, which is located near El-Fasher and is home to nearly 500,000 people, has been particularly intense. On 25 February, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders) announced that it was forced to halt its operations in the Zamzam camp, saying that the current escalation of attacks and fighting is “making it impossible” for MSF to continue providing medical assistance in “such dangerous conditions”, notwithstanding the “widespread starvation and immense humanitarian needs” in the IDP camp.
On 26 February, Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu briefed the Council in the open chamber. She gave a dire assessment of the humanitarian situation in Sudan: 12 million people are currently displaced; 24.6 million people are experiencing acute hunger; health services have collapsed; and children are being deprived of formal education. Wosornu called on the Council to take immediate action to protect civilians in Sudan and ensure that international humanitarian law is adhered to by the parties. She also called for funds to support the humanitarian needs of Sudan, underscoring that the “scale of Sudan’s needs is unprecedented and requires an equally unprecedented mobilization of international support”.
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra briefed members in the closed consultations that followed Wosornu’s briefing. During the consultations, Lamamra apparently underscored the need for a political solution to the conflict, noting the need for coordinated international and regional efforts in this regard. He also highlighted the need for the protection of civilians and unfettered humanitarian access.
On 23 December 2024, Council members received the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, which had not been published at the time of writing. At the time of writing, the appointment of subsidiary body chairs had not been finalised among Council members, preventing the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee from discussing the findings and recommendations of the Panel of Experts’ 20 December 2024 final report. As a matter of practice, final reports are published only after being discussed in a committee meeting.
The report apparently provides an account of various aspects of the conflict, including its dynamics, the financing of the armed groups, the humanitarian impact and violations of international humanitarian law, recruitment patterns of the warring parties, the proliferation of weapons and violations of the sanctions regime, and the conflict’s impact on regional security and stability, among other things.
On 17 February, the Security Council adopted resolution 2772 extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2026.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue is for members related to sanctions to build trust and develop a common understanding on how to most effectively manage the Sudan sanctions regime. Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion in an informal meeting about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, the geographic scope of the sanctions (which are currently limited to Darfur), the designation criteria, and potential adjustments to the sanctions measures.
An overarching issue for the Council remains how to support efforts to achieve a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan. As hostilities persist, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs.
To address the ongoing crisis, the Council could consider adopting a product that:
- Strongly condemns the ongoing violence across the country and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure;
- Demands an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities;
- Reiterates the Council’s demand that the RSF halt its siege of El Fasher;
- Expresses deep concern about the dire humanitarian situation and urges the parties to the conflict to ensure rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access for the delivery of life-saving assistance for civilians in need;
- Demands that all parties to the conflict ensure the protection of civilians, including by fully implementing the 11 May 2023 Jeddah declaration; and
- Builds on the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the protection of civilians, contained in his 21 October 2024 report, and expresses support for establishing a monitoring and verification mechanism in case of a ceasefire and to ensure compliance with the Jeddah declaration.
Council Dynamics
Several Council members have emphasised the need for a ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access, respect for international humanitarian law, and the importance of protecting civilians in the conflict. In the 26 February Council meeting, many members expressed concern about the RSF’s political declaration calling for a parallel government in Sudan. Algeria, speaking on behalf of the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Guyana) said this declaration was detrimental to peace, calling it a “dangerous step that fuels further fragmentation” of Sudan. In addition, some members, such as Algeria (on behalf of the A3 plus) and Russia, welcomed the roadmap announced by the Sudan government during the meeting. Although some members, such as the US and UK, are highly critical of both the SAF and the RSF for violating international law in the conflict, members such as China and Russia tend to be more sympathetic to the Burhan-led government, underscoring its sovereign authority and its efforts to protect civilians and coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
The Sudanese government has criticised Kenya for hosting an RSF meeting on 18 February and the subsequent signing ceremony on 22 February. Critics have suggested that the Kenyan government’s decision to provide a venue for the RSF may have been influenced by a $1.5 billion loan agreement that it is expected to receive from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has reportedly provided military support to the RSF during the conflict.
Council members have differing views on the use of sanctions in Sudan. This was reflected during the negotiations on resolution 2772 of 17 February. Similar to 2024, the most contentious part of the negotiations was the duration of the mandate. The A3 plus—together with China, Russia, and Pakistan—supported a request by Sudan to extend the Panel’s mandate for six months, in order to align its mandate with the renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, which occurs in September. While the mandate was ultimately renewed for one year, the resolution was not unanimously adopted, as China and Russia both abstained.
The US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions, while the UK is the penholder on Sudan more broadly.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 17 February 2025S/RES/2772 | This resolution extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2026. |
