In Hindsight: The US Pivot on Ukraine and Shifting Security Council Dynamics
On 24 February, the Security Council adopted resolution 2774, a short US-authored text calling for a swift end to the Russia-Ukraine war and urging a lasting peace between the countries. Marking the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion, it was the first substantive resolution on Ukraine passed by the Council since the war began in February 2022. The resolution underscored a major shift in the geopolitical landscape, highlighting Washington’s evolving approach to the war and exposing fractures among the P3 (France, the UK, and the US). Earlier in the day, the General Assembly voted on competing resolutions—one authored by European Union (EU) member states and another by the US—after the US unexpectedly introduced its own text, omitting references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, triggering a diplomatic standoff with Kyiv and its European allies. The divisions that emerged during the votes in both the Security Council and the General Assembly could signal a broader realignment in global diplomacy—one that could potentially reshape transatlantic relations, Council dynamics, and the future of international engagement on Ukraine.
Efforts at the UN on Ukraine
From the outset of the war, Ukraine’s Western allies, led largely by the US, promoted a two-pronged strategy: providing hefty military and economic aid to Ukraine while seeking to isolate Russia diplomatically and through sanctions. At the General Assembly, they framed their support as a defence of the UN Charter’s core principles, especially Article 2 (4), which states that members “shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. Early General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression and its attempted annexation of occupied territories received overwhelming support. On 23 February 2023, Ukraine and its allies tabled a General Assembly resolution marking the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that reaffirmed the need for a settlement based on the UN Charter’s principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. It was adopted with 141 votes in favour.
However, even by the first anniversary, calls for a ceasefire were intensifying. A large number of countries (especially in the Global South) had begun to view the continuing war as a European security issue that had detrimental economic repercussions for them, particularly in the form of rising food prices. Some also expressed concern that the war in Ukraine was diverting global attention and humanitarian aid from other pressing crises, contributing to their decision to prioritise promoting an immediate cessation of hostilities.
As the war continued, Ukraine’s partners continued to furnish generous military and financial support, while maintaining Russia’s diplomatic isolation. They opposed calls for a ceasefire, arguing that it would freeze the front lines, leaving Russia in control of occupied Ukrainian territory. Instead, they insisted that the only “just” peace required Russia’s full withdrawal from Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders, pledging continued support to achieve that outcome.
US Strategic Recalibration
The inauguration of US President Donald Trump in January marked a sharp shift in Washington’s Ukraine policy. On the campaign trail, Trump had criticised US military aid and pledged to end the war within 24 hours. Once in office, he called for an immediate ceasefire, underscoring a decisive break from the stance of his predecessor, Joe Biden.
The Trump administration swiftly moved to shift responsibility for Ukraine’s security onto Europe, downplaying the prospects of NATO membership for Kyiv and questioning the feasibility of restoring its pre-2014 borders—positions seen by many in Europe as major concessions to Moscow. The administration also echoed the Russian position at times, with Trump labelling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a dictator (although he later appeared to question this comment) and calling for elections in Ukraine. At the same time, he sought a natural resources agreement with Kyiv, which would involve rare earth minerals. During a 28 February visit to the White House—where the deal was expected to be signed—Zelenskyy and Trump clashed publicly during a press conference, and Zelenskyy left the White House without signing the deal.
Simultaneously, the US has pursued a rapprochement with Russia. On 18 February, a high-level US-Russia summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, signalled a broader reset in the relationship between the two countries. This raised concerns that Washington and Moscow might negotiate Ukraine’s fate without Kyiv or its European allies. Analysts drew parallels to the Yalta Conference of 1945, where the Soviet Union, the UK, and the US divided postwar Europe into spheres of influence. The fear was that Ukraine could now be subject to a similar agreement, sidelining European security interests.
Adding to European unease, the Trump administration’s position towards some traditional US allies also appears to be shifting. US officials have pressed Europe to take greater responsibility for Ukraine’s security, while at the Munich Security Conference on 14 February, US Vice President JD Vance downplayed Russia and China as Europe’s primary security threats. Instead, he framed the biggest challenge as Europe’s own retreat from “some of its most fundamental values”, including free speech and democracy, hinting at a potential shift in Washington’s approach to its traditional transatlantic alliances.
Diplomatic Showdown at the UN
The shift in US policy culminated in a high-stakes confrontation at the UN on 24 February, the war’s third anniversary. Kyiv and its European allies appear to have been caught off guard when Washington introduced its own draft resolution for consideration by both the General Assembly and the Security Council, despite ongoing negotiations on a Ukrainian- and European-led text to be tabled only in the General Assembly. The US proposal notably omitted references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and avoided condemning Russia’s invasion.
The move rattled European diplomats, particularly as Washington had been engaging in negotiations without expressing any obvious concerns with the Ukrainian-EU text. Breaking from transatlantic unity, the US pressed Ukraine to withdraw its draft resolution in favour of its own draft and urged member states to withhold support. It even threatened to vote against the Ukrainian-EU resolution. However, Ukraine and the EU members proceeded, setting the stage for a diplomatic showdown in the General Assembly framed as a contest between pragmatism and principle.
The US argued that achieving peace requires a forward-looking approach rather than assigning blame. France, speaking on behalf of EU member states, countered that any settlement must be rooted in international law to avoid legitimising aggression and paving the way for “the wars of tomorrow”. France further warned that failing to hold Russia accountable would enshrine “the primacy of force over law”, effectively endorsing the concept of spheres of influence and undermining sovereign equality.
The General Assembly vote revealed deep divisions among member states. The Ukrainian-EU resolution secured 93 votes in favour—48 fewer than a similar 2023 resolution—with notable shifts in African votes.[1] The US voted against it, together with Russia and 16 other countries, while 65 members abstained. Meanwhile, Russia proposed an amendment to the US resolution, adding language on the “root causes” of the conflict, while France, on behalf of EU member states, introduced three amendments that referenced Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s sovereignty, and the need for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on the UN Charter. Russia’s amendment failed due to insufficient support, whereas France’s amendments were adopted, leading the US to abstain on its own resolution. The US resolution was adopted with 93 votes in favour, eight against and 73 abstentions.
Fractures among the P3
Events in the Security Council that afternoon mirrored the tensions at the General Assembly. After the US announced on 21 February its intention to table a Security Council resolution nearly identical to its General Assembly text, discussions apparently took place among the P3, during which France and the UK proposed amendments to the US draft. While the US appears to have discussed proposals with Russia and Ukraine, it ultimately rejected European modifications and proceeded with its original draft.
It seems that, after proposing its General Assembly draft resolution, the US had also asked China, February’s Council President, to schedule the Security Council vote ahead of the General Assembly’s vote on the Ukrainian-EU resolution. There was some speculation that this could lead to a member invoking Article 12 of the UN Charter[2] to try to stop the General Assembly vote. There were also concerns that holding the Security Council vote ahead of the General Assembly vote could undermine support for the Ukrainian-EU resolution. A Council vote on the US draft—which notably diverged from the Ukrainian-EU text by omitting references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—risked shaping perceptions ahead of the General Assembly vote. Some worried that this sequence could influence undecided member states, potentially leading to fewer votes in favour of the Ukrainian-EU resolution and more abstentions.
At the start of the Security Council meeting, France, on behalf of Denmark, France, Greece, and the UK, proposed a motion to postpone the meeting. France argued that the US draft had been introduced “without real negotiations” and required further revisions. The US opposed the motion, which led to a procedural vote to adjourn the meeting until 3 pm the following day.[3] The motion failed to pass, receiving six votes in favour (China, Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK), three against (Panama, Somalia, and the US), and six abstentions (Algeria, Guyana, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and Sierra Leone).
The Council then voted on five amendments—three from the five European Council members (E5) and two from Russia. The E5’s proposal to replace the “Russia-Ukraine conflict” with “the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation” failed to secure the required nine votes. Russia vetoed two other E5 amendments that sought to reaffirm Ukraine’s sovereignty and call for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based on the principles of the UN Charter, including state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia’s vetoes are expected to trigger a General Assembly meeting within ten days under the veto initiative.
Meanwhile, Russia’s amendments—one introducing language on the “root causes” of the conflict and another removing all references to Russia—also failed. The US abstained on all amendments, while China voted in favour of Russia’s proposal to address the “root causes” of the conflict and the E5 amendment calling for peace in line with the Charter. This reflects China’s view that the conflict’s origins are in part tied to broader issues, such as NATO expansion, as well as its firm commitment to the principle of state sovereignty.
With no amendments adopted, the Council proceeded to vote on the US text in its original form. The E5 abstained, while all other members voted in favour. There appears to have been speculation around whether France and the UK were considering voting against the resolution, which may have encouraged others not to support it. In such a scenario, if the draft had failed to garner the requisite nine or more votes for adoption, negative votes from France and the UK would not have constituted vetoes, which neither country has used since 1989, when these members, together with the US, blocked a draft resolution condemning the US intervention in Panama.
Ultimately, France and the UK abstained, apparently viewing the resolution as acceptable but flawed. While both voted against the Russian amendments, their negative votes did not constitute a veto, as the amendments failed to gain the necessary support for adoption. However, had Russia’s amendments secured enough votes for adoption, it seems that France and the UK may have considered using their veto.
The timing of the vote was also significant. It coincided with the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Washington for discussions on security guarantees for Ukraine and took place only days before UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s trip to Washington on 27 February—both reflecting broader strategic calculations in Paris’ and London’s approach at the Security Council.
Implications on Security Council Dynamics
The proceedings marked a major shift in Ukraine-related diplomacy, exposing a deepening fracture among the P3. While the full repercussions remain to be seen, the effects are likely to extend well beyond the Ukraine dossier.
Relations among the P3 may deteriorate further as US-Russia talks progress. Should Washington and Moscow reach a bilateral deal on Ukraine, the implications for European security could be profound. A settlement that redraws borders or weakens NATO’s commitments to Eastern Europe, for example, could validate long-standing fears of a “new Yalta”. Consequently, France and the UK may find themselves aligning with China, which has consistently emphasised that any settlement should be consistent with the UN Charter. In its 24 February explanation of vote, China stressed that “Europe ought to play its part for peace”, signalling that it sees European involvement as essential in any future negotiations.
For now, P3 divisions are likely to continue shaping the Council’s engagement on Ukraine. France, as a penholder on humanitarian issues in Ukraine, is expected to push for regular Council discussions on humanitarian developments, as has been the practice for the last three years, while the US may prefer to avoid contentious meetings that risk derailing diplomatic efforts.
These divergences could be more visible if new Security Council resolutions on Ukraine are tabled. The long-standing reluctance to propose products on this issue—because of Western Council members’ insistence on using condemnatory language against Russia and the near certainty of a Russian veto—has now been broken, and the precedent set by the recent vote could invite further minimalistic drafts aimed at securing the consent of all permanent members. Whether such texts succeed in forging genuine consensus or merely exacerbate existing tensions remains to be seen, but they underscore the shifting dynamics at play in the Council’s evolving approach to the Ukrainian conflict.
Beyond Ukraine, US-Russia coordination could reshape European security debates at the UN, particularly on long-standing disputes in the Balkans, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In this respect, attention is turning to Trump’s trio for the Balkans—Richard Grenell, now Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions, who previously brokered economic agreements between Belgrade and Pristina; Rod Blagojevich, who has ties to the Serbian-American community and is rumoured as a possible candidate for US ambassador to Serbia; and Jared Kushner, who has business ventures in the region. Regional observers are closely monitoring the actions of this trio to assess potential shifts towards a more adaptable US policy in the Balkans. This could significantly weaken Europe’s position and reshape the Council’s approach to these long-standing disputes.
Yet a US-Russia rapprochement could also create opportunities for cooperation on other conflicts. Russia has historically used the Security Council to challenge the US on Middle East issues like Gaza. However, at a 25 February Security Council briefing on the file, Russia—departing from its usual rhetoric—said in reference to the role played by the new US administration in securing the recent ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas that its “intervention at the final stage made it possible to achieve tangible results”.
This suggests that a pragmatic thaw between Washington and Moscow could soften their respective stances in some diplomatic arenas. Whether this translates into substantive cooperation remains to be seen, but it could recalibrate multilateral diplomacy on key global crises where both powers hold influence. Agreement between the US and Russia in the past has helped achieve substantial progress on some files. For instance, in December 2015, after many months of deadlock over the Syria file, high-level US-Russia engagement secured the adoption of resolution 2254, that focused on a political solution to the Syrian crisis.
Despite these shifts, significant limits to a US-Russia partnership remain. One major flashpoint is Iran. Western countries continue to express deep concerns over Iran’s violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), its lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its military support for both Middle Eastern proxies and Russia in Ukraine. By contrast, China and Russia remain strong backers of Tehran. This divide could resurface as the JCPOA’s sunset provisions approach their expiration in October 2025, with Council members weighing whether to trigger the snapback mechanism to restore UN sanctions.
Moreover, while Trump’s first presidency featured friendly rhetoric towards Russia, his administration’s actions often contradicted this tone. In 2018, for example, although he invited Russia to rejoin the G7 and engaged in Syria deconfliction talks, he also expanded the European Deterrence Initiative by 41 percent and imposed sanctions on Russian oligarchs and officials. It remains possible that his second term will follow a similar pattern. While Trump’s rhetoric on Ukraine has been favourable to Russia, key officials—including Vice President JD Vance—have suggested that military and economic tools remain on the table should Moscow not negotiate in good faith.
At the same time, the US decision to table a resolution competing with Ukraine and EU members at the General Assembly, and its unwillingness to negotiate the draft it brought to the Security Council, signals a shift from rhetoric to a more assertive—and potentially disruptive—diplomatic style, one that is likely to have significant repercussions for the Security Council’s work.
[1] 22 countries from the African Regional Group and 16 from the Asia-Pacific Regional Group that had previously voted in favour of the Ukrainian-EU text in 2023 either voted against, abstained, or did not participate in the vote this time.
[2] Article 12 stipulates that the General Assembly may not make recommendations on a dispute or situation in which the Security Council is actively exercising its functions under the Charter, unless the Council specifically requests it.
[3] This was in line with rule 33 (3) of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, which allows the Council to suspend a meeting to a certain day or hour.
