Haiti
Expected Council Action
In March, the members of the Security Council may discuss the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter containing strategic recommendations on the UN role in support of Haiti. Members might evaluate options for Council action to implement the Secretary-General’s recommendations.
The mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) expires on 15 July, and the authorisation of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti ends on 2 October.
Background and Key Recent Developments
After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun an estimated 85 percent of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics such as murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence against the civilian population amid widespread impunity. The country also continues to suffer from a governance crisis as elections have not taken place since 2016.
According to the Human Rights Service (HRS) of BINUH, in 2024, a total of 5,626 people were killed and 2,213 injured as a result of gang violence, self-defence groups, and operations by the Haitian National Police (HNP), representing a 26 percent increase in the number of casualties compared to 2023. The HRS also recorded 1,494 kidnappings for ransom by gangs in 2024.
The instability has caused widespread displacement and acute food insecurity. In a 14 January update based on data collected from 1 November to 30 December 2024, the International Organization for Migration recorded over 1,041,000 internally displaced people in Haiti, equivalent to 9 percent of the country’s population.
The situation of children in Haiti remains critical. In a 7 February statement, UNICEF spokesperson James Elder reported a “staggering” 1,000 percent rise in sexual violence against children from 2023 to 2024. He also cited a 70 percent increase in child recruitment into armed groups in 2024, noting that up to half of the gangs’ members are children, some as young as eight. Elder added that many children are forcibly recruited while others “are manipulated or driven by extreme poverty”. A recent Amnesty International report on the impact of gang violence on children documented the recruitment and use of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and killings and injuries of children—three of the six grave violations determined by the Security Council—noting that these abuses have been perpetrated primarily by gang members. The report also highlighted concerns expressed by interviewees in Haiti about being targeted by self-defence groups and the police because of perceived affiliation with gangs.
The Secretary-General added Haiti as a situation of concern in his 2023 annual report on children and armed conflict. The 2024 annual report subsequently contained, for the first time, information on violations committed against children in the country.
In October 2022, the Haitian government appealed for the immediate deployment of an “international specialised force” to temporarily reinforce the efforts of the HNP to combat gangs. Secretary-General António Guterres endorsed the request, recommending that “[o]ne or several Member States, acting bilaterally at the invitation of and in cooperation with the Government of Haiti”, deploy a rapid action force to support the HNP. In July 2023, Kenya agreed to lead a multinational force to the country, and several other countries—primarily from Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean—subsequently stated their intention to participate in the force.
Although the UN would not be administering the proposed mission, Kenya, Haiti, and other stakeholders sought Security Council authorisation for the deployment. In October 2023, the Council adopted resolution 2699, authorising member states to form and deploy the MSS mission to Haiti under Kenya’s leadership. The resolution, which authorised the mission for an initial period of 12 months, specified that the cost of the operation would be borne by voluntary contributions and support from individual countries and regional organisations. In September 2024, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2751, renewing the mission’s authorisation for one year.
Funding for the MSS has, however, regularly failed to meet the mission’s estimated annual cost of approximately $600 million. The number of deployed personnel has also fallen short of the 2,500 officers envisaged in its Concept of Operations, with approximately 1,000 officers deployed at the time of writing.
On the ground, violence and insecurity remain pervasive, with the HNP and the MSS reportedly being “stretched thin on several simultaneous battle fronts” against gangs. The first MSS casualty was registered on 23 February when a Kenyan soldier died from injuries sustained in an operation in the Artibonite region.
In October 2024, the president of Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council, Leslie Voltaire, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General requesting that the MSS be transformed into a UN peacekeeping mission “as soon as possible”.
In October and November 2024, Council members negotiated a draft resolution proposed by the US and then-Council member Ecuador—the Council’s co-penholders on Haiti at the time—that would have directed the Secretary-General to initiate planning to transform the MSS mission into a UN peacekeeping operation. The draft resolution was opposed by China and Russia, however, which referred to, among other issues, the chequered history of past UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti and reiterated their position that the country’s political and security conditions were not conducive to a new operation. As a compromise, the Council sent a letter on 29 November 2024 requesting the Secretary-General to provide strategic recommendations on the full range of options for UN support for Haiti, incorporating lessons learned from previous UN missions, political developments in Haiti, and the MSS mission.
The Secretary-General responded to the Council’s request in a letter dated 24 February. He noted that transforming the MSS into a peacekeeping operation is not currently a feasible option. The Secretary-General added, however, that such an option “could be considered” once gang control has been substantially reduced.
The letter said that the medium-term focus should be to “substantially reduce gangs’ territorial control in the capital, the Artibonite Department, and over critical infrastructure—ports, airports, and national roads”. To achieve this goal, the Secretary-General suggested adopting a two-pronged strategy: the first would focus on enabling the MSS with UN logistical and operational support, and the second would focus on enhancing BINUH’s capacity to implement its mandate and take on new responsibilities.
Regarding the first prong, the Secretary-General suggested establishing a UN Support Office, funded by peacekeeping assessed contributions. A key function handled by the Support Office would be the provision of comprehensive logistic and operational support to the MSS, such as accommodation, life support (food, fuel, and water), mobility support, medical capability, and IT support. Assessed funding would cover the MSS’ logistical and operational support, while scaled-up bilateral voluntary contributions from UN member states would cover forms of support for the MSS that the UN cannot provide, such as stipends, military-grade capabilities, and lethal equipment.
The letter proposes the following other functions for the UN Support Office:
- Provision of “a limited, non-lethal support package” to the HNP that would be funded mostly through voluntary contributions;
- Strengthened intelligence and analytical capabilities for the MSS and HNP in conducting joint operations, such as a joint operations centre and unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance, that would be financed by peacekeeping assessed contributions;
- Establishing implementation capacity for the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, to be funded through peacekeeping assessed funds.
Regarding the second prong, the Secretary-General proposed that BINUH focuses on such priorities as the design and support of “defection and safe exit programmes” including for children, youth, and women forcibly recruited by gangs; supporting the Haitian authorities in handling the detention of high-risk individuals; and enabling the Haitian authorities to “implement UN sanctions, notably the arms embargo”, including through the creation of a UN Integrated Sanctions Support Unit within BINUH.
In his letter, the Secretary-General acknowledges that the proposed UN support options are based on a set of “[a]ssumptions and [r]equirements”, including “significant investment from the peacekeeping budget” as well as scaled-up voluntary contributions. Specifically, the letter says that the “viability of UN logistical and operational support depends on whether Member States provide sufficient voluntary contributions to address the MSS mission’s gaps in personnel, military-grade equipment, and lethal assets”. In this regard, the Secretary-General called for strengthened member state leadership through the establishment of “a standing group of partners” that could, among other things, secure voluntary contributions required to procure the support that the UN cannot provide.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 3 January press release, the UN Designated Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, William O’Neill, expressed deep concern over attacks by gangs on hospitals and healthcare workers perpetrated in December 2024. Noting that only 37 percent of health facilities in Port-au-Prince are fully functional, he underscored that the attacks “debilitated a system that was already near collapse”. O’Neill said that gang members’ “repeated threats to attack health premises indicate that these are intentional assaults on the health care system” and appealed to the international community to do “everything it can” to support the Haitian authorities to combat insecurity and guarantee the right to health.
In a 7 January press release, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk identified impunity for human rights violations, corruption, and entrenched economic and social inequalities as among the drivers of Haiti’s multidimensional crisis, and called on the national authorities, with the support of the international community, to undertake “[a]dditional efforts” to address these issues. Türk emphasised the need for logistical and financial support for the MSS mission and called on the HNP to reinforce its oversight mechanisms for human rights violations by the police. Noting that “[w]eapons flowing into Haiti often end up in the hands of the criminal gangs”, he called for the full implementation of the Security Council’s sanctions regime—including the arms embargo—as a crucial tool to prevent the supply of firearms and ammunition to Haiti.
Key Issues and Options
The Security Council’s overarching objective in Haiti is to support the country’s political transition and assist international and domestic efforts to stem the surge in gang violence, with the ultimate aim of restoring security conditions conducive to holding elections and addressing the root causes of the country’s instability.
How to respond to the proposals contained in the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter is likely to be the key issue for the Security Council in March. The Council may convene a meeting to discuss the appropriate course of action. One option would be to adopt a resolution operationalising the Secretary-General’s proposals for the creation of a Support Office and for enabling BINUH to better implement its mandate and assume new responsibilities.
When addressing the situation in Haiti during his 19 February remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the Caribbean Community’s 48th Regular Meeting of Heads of Government, Guterres stressed the importance of tackling “the weapons and drug trafficking that is fuelling violence across the region”, including through “address[ing] the countries of origin and the countries of destination”. The resolution could also demand that UN member states, in particular countries in the region, step up their efforts to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo.
Additionally, the Council could invite O’Neill and a representative of Haitian civil society to provide an update on the human rights situation in the country in a closed Arria-formula meeting format to allow for frank discussion.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on civilians. Views also converge on the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges.
Views have varied, however, on appropriate Council responses to address the situation. Proposals to transform the MSS into a UN peacekeeping operation have been contentious, with France, the UK and the US expressing support for this course of action at different points. Panama also noted the “advisability of considering the possible transformation” of the MSS into a peacekeeping operation during the most recent Council meeting on Haiti, which was held on 22 January. Conversely, China and Russia have opposed this option during past negotiations on Haiti.
As part of larger cuts to development aid programmes undertaken by the new US administration of President Donald Trump, the US has partially frozen funding to Haiti, including its contribution to the UN-administered trust fund for the MSS. (The trust fund, which was established pursuant to resolution 2699, collects voluntary contributions for the overall support for the MSS.)
The US and Panama are the co-penholders on Haiti.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 18 October 2024S/RES/2752 | This resolution renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti imposed by resolution 2653 of 21 October 2022. |
| 30 September 2024S/RES/2751 | This resolution renewed for one year the authorisation for member states to deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti to help re-establish security in the country and build conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. |
| 12 July 2024S/RES/2743 | This resolution renewed BINUH’s mandate for one year, until 15 July 2025. |
