February 2025 Monthly Forecast

Posted 30 January 2025
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MIDDLE EAST

Yemen

Expected Council Action

In February, the Security Council will hold its monthly briefing and consultations on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher (via videoconference) are expected to brief.

The mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) expires on 14 July.

Key Recent Developments

The situation in Yemen remains fluid, reflecting recent consequential developments in the Middle East. Following the 19 January Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Iran-backed Houthi rebel group in Yemen announced that it would limit its attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea to ships with links to Israel, pending the full implementation of all phases of the Gaza ceasefire agreement. Since November 2023, the Houthis have repeatedly attacked ships navigating the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, severely disrupting global maritime trade.

On 22 January, the Houthis released the crew of the MV Galaxy Leader, a Japanese-operated ship affiliated with an Israeli businessman. The rebel group detained the vessel and its crew over a year ago, on 19 November 2023, soon after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. They announced that “the release of the Galaxy Leader crew comes within the framework of our solidarity with Gaza and in support of the ceasefire agreement”.

The Houthis and Israel have also engaged in frequent hostilities, with Houthi-launched drones and ballistic missiles (most of which have been intercepted) targeting Israeli territory and Israeli airstrikes hitting Houthi sites in Yemen—which have included infrastructure such as Hodeidah port, Sana’a airport, and the Hezyaz power plant. Most recently, on 18 January, the Houthis launched two ballistic missiles targeting Israel’s Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv, which were intercepted by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). These attacks came hours after the hostage release and ceasefire deal in Gaza was approved by the Israeli government.

During his briefing at the Security Council’s latest meeting on Yemen on 15 January, Grundberg stressed that the context has become increasingly internationalised and that recent cycles of strikes between the Houthis and Israel have hindered the prospects of peace for Yemen. At that meeting, several Council members condemned Houthi attacks on Israel and called on Israel to safeguard Yemeni civilian infrastructure in its attacks on Houthi targets, in line with its obligations under international humanitarian law.

In a subsequent meeting that day, the Security Council adopted resolution 2768, extending until 15 July the monthly requirement for the Secretary-General to report on attacks by the Houthis on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, initially established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. The resolution was adopted with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (Algeria, China, and Russia). (For more information, see our 15 January 2025 What’s In Blue story.)

For over a year, efforts to promote a roadmap under UN auspices and to advance an inclusive political process in Yemen have been paralysed because of the Houthi escalations in the Red Sea and beyond. A truce established in 2022 between the Yemeni government and the Houthis has largely held. However, recent regional tensions have tested the truce’s stability and endangered progress towards de-escalation. During the 15 January Council meeting, Grundberg highlighted his extensive diplomatic engagement—including visits in recent weeks to Muscat, Sana’a, Tehran, and Riyadh—aimed at promoting de-escalation, addressing the economic deterioration in Yemen, facilitating political dialogue, and advancing steps towards a nationwide ceasefire. In the subsequent closed consultations, the Special Envoy apparently informed Council members that the parties remain committed to establishing a roadmap. He stressed, however, that the situation remains challenging and that for peace efforts to be successful, the full support of the international community, including a unified Security Council, is needed.

Meanwhile, Yemen’s humanitarian situation remains dire. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ 2025 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), the country’s deteriorating economy, the protracted conflict, and crumbling basic services are exacerbating humanitarian needs across the country. An estimated 19.5 million people require humanitarian assistance and protection services in 2025, an increase of 1.3 million people from last year. An estimated $2.47 billion is required to fulfil the plan outlined by the HNRP and provide humanitarian assistance and protection services to over 10.5 million people.

During the 15 January Council meeting, the briefers and many Council members reiterated their call for the Houthis to release the more than 50 UN, non-governmental organisation, diplomatic mission, and civil society personnel, whom they have detained for over six months. On 24 January, the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Yemen reported that the Houthis had detained seven additional UN personnel and that the UN will consequently be suspending all official movements into and within areas under Houthi control until further notice. The Secretary-General condemned the detention of these seven personnel and demanded their release. On 25 January, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that the Houthis unilaterally released 153 “conflict-related detainees”, an act that the Houthis claimed was an effort to ease tensions following the Gaza ceasefire.

Key Issues and Options

Minimising the effects of the destabilising regional tensions on Yemen and reinvigorating the stalled intra-Yemeni political process are overarching priorities for the Council.

Recent major developments in the Middle East, particularly regarding the situation in Gaza, continue to influence discussions on the file. Following the Gaza ceasefire, Council members may choose to concentrate on mobilising pressure for a resumption of Yemeni peace talks and advancing the political process. An option for the Council would be to issue a presidential statement or press statement encouraging the Yemeni parties to resume concrete discussions towards establishing a roadmap under UN auspices.

Council members may also consider focusing attention on the worsening humanitarian situation in the country. There is a sense that the prioritisation of other urgent crises on the Council’s agenda has left the Yemen humanitarian situation facing severe funding shortfalls, which the Council may seek to address by encouraging member states to mobilise funding to meet the requirements of the 2025 HRNP, including through a potential pledging conference.

Council Dynamics

Council members are largely aligned on support for an intra-Yemeni political process, the need to improve humanitarian conditions in Yemen, and on their calls for the Houthis to cease attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. Many members appear to hope that the ceasefire in Gaza can provide the momentum, conditions, and space for restoring the political process and de-escalating the situation in the Red Sea. It seems that some members may also be inclined to encourage Grundberg to seize the opportunity to advance mediation efforts towards the establishment of a roadmap for inclusive peace in Yemen, especially if the fragile ceasefire in Gaza continues to hold in the coming weeks.

Nevertheless, Council members, particularly the permanent members, have divergent views on what is fuelling the political stalemate and insecurity in Yemen. Russia has been clear that it views Israel’s military operations in the Middle East as a core destabilising factor in the region, including for Yemen. It also continues to accuse the UK and the US of undermining security in Yemen through their retaliatory strikes on the Houthis. On the other hand, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have been critical of Iran’s role in supporting the Houthis, including militarily. During the 15 January Council meeting, the US stressed that “the time has come to hold Iran to account for enabling the Houthis’ long-range missile attacks on international shipping and on Israel”. Denmark and the Republic of Korea also stressed the need to strengthen and fully implement the arms embargo on the Houthis established through resolution 2216 of 14 April 2015 to curb the flow of weapons to the group.

It remains to be seen how the new US administration will approach the Yemen file and how that will affect the wider Council dynamics. On 22 January, US President Donald Trump moved to relist the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). This reverses the decision of the administration of former President Joe Biden to lift this designation because of humanitarian concerns and to support Yemeni peace efforts. An FTO designation authorises sanctions on those who provide the designated group with “material support”.

Several Council members also continue to have a significant interest in maritime security and in de-escalating the Red Sea crisis. Three of the Council’s new elected members—Denmark, Greece, and Panama—have suffered Houthi attacks on their commercial vessels. During the 15 January Council meeting, Panama highlighted that since the attacks began in November 2023, “there have been 136 attacks on commercial vessels, more than a dozen of them on ships sailing under the Panama flag, including oil tankers”.

The UK is the penholder on Yemen.

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UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN

Security Council Resolution
15 January 2025S/RES/2768 This resolution extended the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
Security Council Meeting Record
15 January 2025S/PV.9835 This was a Council meeting on Yemen.

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