Syria
Expected Council Action
In February, the Council is expected to hold a meeting on the political and humanitarian developments in Syria.
Key Recent Developments
Following the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the caretaker authorities focused on structuring a governance framework and consolidating their power, appointing individuals close to Ahmed al-Sharaa (leader of the new administration and head of Council-listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)) to key positions. The authorities announced agreements with some armed rebel factions to disband and integrate into the unified Syrian national army; however, specific details remain unclear. They have also initiated a reconciliation process with former army officials. Recent media reports suggest that several foreign Islamist fighters have been appointed to senior military positions. Sharaa has reportedly also proposed granting citizenship to foreign fighters and their families for their role in the fight against Assad. (For background, see the brief on Syria in our January 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
In late December 2024, the caretaker authorities announced plans to convene a national dialogue conference aimed at bringing together Syria’s diverse political and sectarian groups to discuss the country’s political transition. While initial media reports suggested the conference might take place in early January, the foreign minister of the Syrian caretaker government, Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, announced on 7 January that additional preparation time was required. He also outlined plans to establish an expanded preparatory committee to ensure broader representation from all segments and governorates of Syria. At press time, no date had been set for the conference. (For more information, see our 7 January What’s In Blue story.)
The past few weeks have witnessed a flurry of high-level engagements among key stakeholders aimed at addressing Syria’s evolving political and security landscape. On 9 January, an informal group of five states—France, Germany, Italy, the US, and the UK, referred to as “the Quintet”—and European Commission High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President Kaja Kallas met in Rome. Media reports quoted Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani as describing the meeting as critical in initiating discussions about potential changes to EU sanctions on Syria.
On 12 January, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting of key regional and international interlocutors on Syria, bringing together representatives from 17 countries, including Syria. The meeting, which built on the ministerial discussions held in Aqaba on 14 December 2024, was attended by Kallas, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States Ahmed Aboul-Gheit, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi, and UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen. Also on 12 January, Riyadh hosted a ministerial meeting of the Arab countries, attended by Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, as well as Aboul-Gheit and Budaiwi.
In a 13 January media interview, Pedersen noted the relative stability in many parts of the country while acknowledging some security incidents, including attacks on minority groups. During the meeting in Riyadh, Pedersen mentioned receiving assurances from Syrian caretaker authorities about plans to establish a new transitional body following the national dialogue conference. He underscored the relevance of resolution 2254 adopted in 2015, particularly the provisions relating to a Syrian-led transitional process aimed at drafting a new constitution, holding free and fair elections, and safeguarding Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. He underlined the importance of lifting sanctions for rebuilding Syria, emphasising the need for the transition process to advance and for the international community to respond appropriately.
On 20 January, Pedersen arrived in Damascus for his second visit since 8 December 2024 and held meetings with key Syrian stakeholders, including Sharaa and Shibani. Council members convened in closed consultations on 30 January to receive an update from Pedersen on the latest developments in the country. (For more information, see our 29 January What’s in Blue story.)
The security situation in northern Syria remains fragile, with various factions competing for control and influence. Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) forces launched an offensive in the territories controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), capturing strategic locations around Manbij and Tal Rifat. The clashes intensified near Tishrin dam on the Euphrates River in Manbij countryside in eastern Aleppo, which remains a critical source of water and electricity for SDF-controlled territories. Türkiye has reportedly conducted airstrikes in the area, raising concerns about potential damage to the dam. Additionally, it has also targeted several locations in the Kobani countryside and Aleppo’s eastern countryside. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), more than 420 people have been killed, including 41 civilians, since 12 December 2024. Media reports have said that fighting has erupted between tribal factions and the SDF while the Syrian caretaker authorities have deployed forces close to the Tishrin dam area.
Negotiations reportedly are underway between HTS and the SDF to determine the future of Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Media reports suggest that the SDF had proposed maintaining its autonomy as a military bloc within the Syrian army, which the caretaker authorities rejected. In parallel, the US has been engaging Türkiye, HTS, and the SDF, while discussions continued between Türkiye and HTS, according to a 19 January Reuters article. Previously, the US had expressed support for “a managed transition” for SDF’s role in the region. Meanwhile, Türkiye seeks to disarm the SDF and dismantle any structures supporting Kurdish autonomy in Syria as well as eliminating elements linked to YPG, a Kurdish militia.
Furthermore, since Assad’s ousting, Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes across Syria, targeting its air bases, ammunition depots, military equipment, and positions of forces loyal to the new administration. Israel has also launched a ground incursion extending deeper into the Golan and Syrian territory. (For background and more information, see the brief on Syria in our January 2025 Monthly Forecast and 17 January What’s In Blue story.)
On 24 December 2024, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) released the monthly report on the implementation of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, which required the verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. The report highlighted that the evolving political and security dynamics in Syria present a crucial opportunity for the OPCW to clarify the full extent and scope of Syria’s chemical weapons programme. It emphasised that the immediate priority is to prevent proliferation and any further use of chemical weapons. To achieve this, the OPCW Secretariat must identify, access, and verify all relevant chemical weapons sites and facilities as soon as conditions permit. The second priority, the report added, is to protect and preserve documents, evidence, and witnesses related to the Syrian chemical weapons programme, with the goal of achieving its complete elimination.
Key Issues and Options
The most pressing issue before the Council is how to ensure a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, guided by the principles of resolution 2254, that can prioritise the needs and aspirations of all Syrians, prevent fragmentation of the country, preserve state institutions, and establish a non-sectarian and representative governance structure.
A related issue is tackling the prevailing insecurity in the country, ensuring the protection of civilians (particularly religious and ethnic minorities), addressing human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, seeking accountability for past crimes and atrocities, and preventing the resurgence of terrorist and extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL\Da’esh). Recent reports have highlighted arrests, detentions, and incidents of extrajudicial and revenge killings in some parts of the country, particularly targeting the Alawite community and supporters of the former Assad government.
Across Syria, multiple armed groups maintain influence and territorial control. One of the pertinent issues before the international community remains how to ensure an orderly security transition in the country. The Council needs to navigate the competing interests of regional and international actors that continue to shape Syria’s political and security landscape, while underscoring respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria.
The Council is expected to continue monitoring the developments on the ground closely. In addition to regular briefings from Pedersen, the Council could consider holding a private meeting with interested regional and international stakeholders and invite Syrian representatives to discuss, among other things, how to adapt the political process to the new realities on the ground and hear their views on an appropriate strategy for the way forward.
The Council could consider issuing a presidential statement to express support for a Syrian-led political transition and key provisions of resolution 2254, stressing the importance of an inclusive, transparent, and credible transitional process that would pave the way for constitution-making and elections. The statement could reinforce the Council’s backing for Pedersen’s efforts in facilitating this process.
Another key issue is how to alleviate the growing humanitarian needs throughout the country and ensure suitable conditions for the safe return of Syrian refugees. Council members could consider calling for an international conference to mobilise support for Syria, including through securing additional funding for a humanitarian response and addressing key issues such as economic development and reconstruction.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council and the broader UN membership appear to be adapting their responses to keep pace with the rapidly unfolding developments and determine the appropriate path forward. While there is acknowledgment of positive messaging from Damascus on a range of issues, including governance, many countries are likely to evaluate their stance based on the caretaker authorities’ concrete actions in the months ahead. Key regional and international stakeholders have initiated high-level engagements on Syria, which are likely to continue in the coming months. The active outreach of Western members to Damascus and the absence of Iran and Russia, Assad’s key allies, from these engagements reinforces the shifting geopolitical landscape. Russia, which had maintained a significant military presence in the country over the years, has reportedly been transferring military equipment out of Syria, including to eastern Libya. (For more information, see the brief on Syria in our January 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Sanctions on Syria have been a long-standing and contentious issue, causing divisions among Council members for years. Members do not appear to have started discussing the impact of UN sanctions on the current situation although the US has moved quickly on this front. (Both Jolani and HTS are included under the 1267/1989/2253 sanctions regime targeting ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida.) Following the ousting of Assad, the administration of then-US President Joe Biden seemed flexible in offering some concessions on this front. For instance, on 6 January, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a general license for six months, authorising transactions with governing institutions in Syria, including those relating to energy, petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. According to media reports, the Biden administration also issued a limited sanctions waiver for regional countries and Ukraine to provide assistance to Syria. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen how US foreign policy will evolve regarding developments in Syria and the broader region under the administration of President Donald Trump.
Council members have displayed starkly different views over the years on a range of issues related to the chemical weapons track, including responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the credibility of the work of the OPCW, and numerous procedural aspects of the OPCW’s decision-making bodies. Several members have consistently expressed support for the OPCW’s work, maintaining that it is credible and essential, but other members, such as China and Russia, have claimed that its work is biased and politicised. It remains unclear how the new realities on the ground will affect the work of the OPCW and the dynamics in the Council.
Denmark is the penholder on the Syria humanitarian file.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 17 December 2024SC/15943 | The press statement called for the implementation of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles listed in the resolution 2254. |
