February 2025 Monthly Forecast

Posted 30 January 2025
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AFRICA

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In February, the Security Council is expected to receive the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan. The Council is also expected to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

The 1591 Sudan sanctions regime—including targeted sanctions (assets freeze and travel bans) and an arms embargo—expires on 12 September.

Key Recent Developments

Since launching its offensive in late September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has made progress in reclaiming strategic locations in Khartoum and surrounding areas from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Despite these advances, the conflict remains intense, with both sides engaged in fierce urban warfare in these areas. Meanwhile, the SAF also intensified its military operations in other parts of the country, including Al Jazira and Sennar states, achieving notable successes. On 11 January, the SAF recaptured Wad Madani, the capital of Al Jazira and a strategically significant city south of Khartoum, located at the crossroads of key supply routes connecting several states. (For more information, see our 30 January What’s In Blue story.)

The fighting has been accompanied by reports of mass civilian casualties, including revenge killings and torture, targeting individuals based on alleged affiliation or ethnicity. Following the capture of Wad Madani, media reports indicated that the SAF and allied forces committed widespread violations against civilians, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and destruction of property across several areas in Al Jazira. The RSF has also been reported to have carried out attacks on villages in the south and east of Al Jazira, resulting in the deaths of at least 21 civilians.

In a 15 January statement, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Clementine Nkweta-Salami, expressed deep concern about reports of recent attacks on civilians. She highlighted reports indicating significant civilian casualties, destruction of property, and further displacement of vulnerable people because of continued shelling and aerial attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure in many parts of the country, including western Omdurman, Merowe in Northern State, Atbara in River Nile State, and the Darfur region.

In a 7 January statement, then  US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the US had determined that the RSF and its allied militias were responsible for committing genocide in Sudan. On the same day, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemeti), as well as seven RSF-owned companies located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and one individual for their roles in procuring weapons for the RSF.

On 16 January, OFAC also sanctioned the SAF’s leader and the head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, along with one company and one individual involved in weapons procurement for the SAF. The same day, a New York Times article, citing US officials, reported that the SAF had used chemical weapons on at least two occasions against the RSF, which played a key factor in the decision to sanction Burhan. The article further stated that US officials who were briefed on the matter believed the chemical used was likely chlorine gas. However, the exact details of the use of these weapons remain unclear.

Council members have been closely monitoring the food insecurity situation in Sudan. On 6 January, the Council held an open briefing on the 24 December 2024 report of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee. The report confirmed that famine conditions in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in North Darfur persisted between October and November 2024 and had spread to other IDP sites in North Darfur, including Al Salam and Abu Shouk camps, as well as the Western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State. The report projected famine conditions in five more areas between December 2024 and May, with a confirmed risk of famine in 17 additional areas during the same period. (For background, see our 5 August 2024 and 4 January What’s In Blue stories.)

Efforts to resolve the ongoing conflict continued but without any significant breakthrough. On 18 December 2024, Mauritania hosted the third consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among various peace initiatives on Sudan. Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States, Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the US, and Saudi Arabia. In a communiqué adopted following the meeting, the participants agreed on the operational details of a technical task force of the consultative group for the purpose of exchanging information and ensuring harmonisation of efforts.

Lamamra visited Port Sudan from 22-24 December 2024, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Burhan, to discuss UN-led peace efforts. During his visit, he also engaged with several senior diplomats from various countries to discuss regional and international support for the peace process. On 25 December 2024, Lamamra travelled to Addis Ababa, where he met with a delegation from the RSF. The discussions focused on implementing the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s 21 October 2024 report for the protection of civilians in Sudan. Among other things, the report recommended that the warring parties establish a robust and transparent compliance mechanism, as a critical step to ensure implementation of the 11 May 2023 Jeddah declaration.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 20 December 2024, the Sudan country office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on the human rights situation in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State, which has been under siege by the RSF and allied Arab militias since May 2024. The report noted that, during this period, more than 782 civilians were killed and 1,143 injured because of intense shelling by the RSF, recurring airstrikes by the SAF, and artillery shelling by both the SAF and allied joint forces. The report also documented repeated RSF attacks on camps hosting IDPs, in particular Zamzam and Abu Shouk. In a press release, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed deep concern over the continuing siege, urged all parties to the conflict to stop attacks on civilians and civilian objects, and called on them to comply with their obligations under international law.

In a 17 January press release, Türk warned that direct and ethnically motivated attacks on civilians were becoming increasingly common amid the ongoing hostilities. Over a two-week period, OHCHR documented at least 21 deaths in the southeastern state of Al Jazira, although the actual number of deaths is likely much higher. The press release cited reports indicating that these attacks were carried out by the Sudan Shield Forces, led by Abu Aqla Keikal, a former RSF commander who defected to the SAF in October 2024. It also raised serious concerns about the situation in North Darfur, where ethnically motivated attacks by the RSF and allied Arab militias against African ethnic groups—particularly the Zaghawa and the Fur—continue to inflict devastating harm.

Sanctions-Related Developments

On 23 December 2024, Council members received the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, which had not been published at press time. The report apparently provides an account of various aspects of the conflict, including its dynamics, the financing of the armed groups, the humanitarian impact and violations of international humanitarian law, recruitment patterns of the warring parties, the proliferation of weapons and violations of the sanctions regime, and the conflict’s impact on regional security and stability, among other things.

At press time, the appointment of subsidiary body chairs had not been finalised among Council members, preventing the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee from discussing the findings and recommendations of the Panel of Experts’ 20 December 2024 final report. As a matter of practice, final reports are published only after being discussed in a committee meeting.

Women, Peace and Security

In a recent update on patterns of gender-based violence (GBV) in the war in Sudan, UN Women reported a 288 percent increase between December 2023 and December 2024 in the number of GBV survivors seeking support services in the country. According to the update, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) has been perpetrated by all conflict parties and has affected mainly women and girls, but also men and boys. The update noted that ethnic minority groups have been deliberately targeted with rape and other forms of sexual violence and cited reports of attacks against women human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and humanitarian workers to “silence documentation and reporting of GBV incidents and the scale of atrocities”.

The update added that similar deliberate attacks against women health workers and the staff of women-led organisations, which have been “at the forefront of providing services to GBV survivors”, have also been observed. It stressed that the lack of “a monitoring, reporting, and accountability mechanism to hold perpetrators to account has meant that violence continues unabated amidst a culture of impunity”. It added that this undermines international commitments such as those outlined in Security Council resolution 1820 of 2008 which, among other things, stressed the importance of ending impunity for CRSV as part of a “comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation”.

Key Issues and Options

The key issue for the Council in February is renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime is a related issue. One option for Council members is to extend the panel’s mandate for one year.

Some members may suggest extending the panel’s mandate until September to align it with the mandate cycle of the sanctions measures and facilitate a broader discussion on the sanctions regime and the panel in September. This was also raised during last year’s negotiations on resolution 2725, which most recently extended the panel’s mandate. (For background, see our 8 March 2024 What’s In Blue story.)

Based on the panel’s 23 December 2024 report and its recommendations, Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, expanding the geographic scope of the sanctions measures to the rest of the country, the designation criteria, and additional listing of individuals and entities under the current regime.

The levels of intercommunal violence and insecurity throughout the country are a major concern. In this regard, the overarching issue for the Security Council remains how to halt the ongoing fighting and support efforts to achieve a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan. As hostilities persist, however, Security Council resolutions remain unimplemented, and mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our December 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

Nonetheless, Council members could consider adopting a product that:

  • strongly condemns the ongoing violence across the country and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure;
  • demands an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities;
  • reiterates the Council’s demand that the RSF halt its siege of El Fasher;
  • expresses deep concern about the dire humanitarian situation and urges the parties to the conflict to ensure rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access for the delivery of life-saving assistance for civilians in need;
  • demands that all parties to the conflict ensure the protection of civilians, including by fully implementing the 11 May 2023 Jeddah declaration; and
  • builds on the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the protection of civilians, contained in his 21 October 2024 report, and expresses support for establishing a monitoring and verification mechanism in case of a ceasefire and to ensure compliance with the Jeddah declaration.

In addition to Lamamra, the Chinese Presidency in February could consider inviting OCHA to brief on the humanitarian situation in the country and efforts to address the crisis.

Another option for Council members could be a visiting mission to Sudan to assess the situation on the ground and engage with relevant stakeholders. This mission could also provide an opportunity for Council members to visit the refugee camps in neighbouring countries, particularly Chad.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Despite the underlying differences among Council members, such as on the utility of the sanctions regime, members were able to unanimously adopt resolution 2750 of 11 September 2024, extending the sanctions regime for one year. While members agreed on the necessity of extending the regime, the discussions underscored differing views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to Sudan’s evolving situation. For instance, France apparently proposed language expressing the Council’s intention to consider the relevance of extending sanctions measures to other regions of Sudan. Although some members seem to have been willing to discuss this proposal, the “A3 plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Guyana, and then-Council member Mozambique), China, and Russia strongly objected to it. (For more information, see our 8 March 2024 What’s In Blue story.)

On the situation in general, critical divisions exist within the Council, shaped by differing priorities and approaches to key issues, including protection of civilians, implementation of ceasefire mechanisms, and addressing accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. Several Council members, such as Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia, recognise Sudan’s TSC, led by Burhan, as the legitimate authority, which remains responsible for, among other things, protection of civilians and coordinating the delivery of humanitarian aid. Other Council members, such as the US, however, consider both the RSF and SAF to be responsible for the atrocities being committed in Sudan and unfit to govern. Following the imposition of sanctions on both warring sides, Blinken said that “[t]aken together, these sanctions underscore the US view that neither man is fit to govern a future, peaceful Sudan”. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 4 January What’s In Blue story.)

It remains to be seen whether, under US President Donald Trump’s administration, these US policy positions will be maintained. In 2020, Sudan joined the Abraham Accords, normalising ties with Israel, as part of an agreement with the first Trump administration, which involved removing Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Following this, Burhan met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Kampala.

Burhan’s relations with the UAE have deteriorated because of the UAE’s reported military support for the RSF during the ongoing conflict. Furthermore, in October 2023, Sudan restored diplomatic ties with Iran, which has reportedly been supplying arms to the SAF since the outbreak of hostilities.

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UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN

Security Council Resolutions
13 June 2024S/RES/2736 The resolution demanded that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) halt the siege of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and further called for an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher.
Security Council Meeting Records
6 January 2025S/PV.9831 This was a meeting to consider the report of the Famine Review Committee, dated 24 December 2024.
Other
18 November 2024S/2024/826 This was the draft resolution, proposed by the UK and Sierra Leone, aiming to advance measures to protect civilians in Sudan.

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