Somalia
Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council is expected to renew the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, including the provision for maritime interdiction, which expires on 28 February.
In addition, the Council will decide on the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, which was last renewed by resolution 2762 of 13 December 2024 and is set to expire on 31 March. The resolution expressed the Council’s intention to review the Panel’s mandate and take appropriate actions regarding its further extension by 28 February.
Key Recent Developments
On 27 December, the Council adopted resolution 2767, endorsing the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The resolution authorised AU members to take all necessary measures in this regard for 12 months, beginning 1 January. It also authorised AU members to deploy up to 12,626 uniformed personnel, including 1,040 police personnel, to AUSSOM until 30 June, and to complete by this date the realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM. (For more information, see our 26 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
It appears that the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) decided to extend the tour of duty of the military and civilian personnel deployed as part of ATMIS until 31 March 2025, citing the need to prevent a security vacuum and preserve institutional memory. Although Somalia had announced the finalisation of consultations with Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) participating in AUSSOM in November 2024, recent developments appear to have complicated the process.
Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, which had escalated last year after Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland—a breakaway region in northern Somalia—appear to be subsiding. The agreement reportedly provided Ethiopia, a landlocked country, with access to the Gulf of Aden in exchange for formal recognition of Somaliland. Türkiye’s mediation efforts resulted in a breakthrough, culminating in the signing of the Ankara Declaration by the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia on 11 December 2024. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to each other’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity. They agreed to finalise commercial arrangements through bilateral agreements, granting Ethiopia access to the sea under Somalia’s sovereign authority. To this end, they decided to initiate technical negotiations by the end of February, with Türkiye’s facilitation, aiming for completion and signing within four months. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in our December 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
On 11 January, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled to Addis Ababa for talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In a communiqué adopted following the meeting, both sides agreed to restore and enhance their bilateral ties and for the respective security agencies to bolster cooperation against threats posed by extremist militant groups and promote regional peace and security. Media reports quoted Somali Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar Balcad as saying that the primary obstacle to Ethiopia’s participation in AUSSOM, pertaining to the MoU agreement, has been resolved. However, he noted the challenge in reallocating the number of troops assigned to AUSSOM, which had been distributed to other TCCs.
This issue also appears to have affected Burundi, one of the major TCCs. In late December 2024, Somalia’s Defense Ministry announced that no consensus had been reached on troop allocations for the Burundi National Defense Forces (BNDF) in AUSSOM, expressing regret over the BNDF’s decision not to participate in the mission.
Meanwhile, Somalia has been strengthening military ties with Egypt, which has offered to contribute to AUSSOM. Following the signing of a defence cooperation agreement in August 2024, Egypt has provided military support to Somalia, including heavy weaponry, on multiple occasions. On 26 January, Somalia and Egypt concluded technical discussions on Egypt’s participation in the mission; however, specific details remain undisclosed.
On 11 January, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia met in Cairo for a tripartite summit, following up on the Asmara Summit held on 10 October 2024 at the heads of state level. The discussions, among other things, highlighted the importance of strategic partnerships to enhance security and stability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, while also addressing the regional impact of the situation in Sudan. During the press conference following the meeting, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reportedly said that the security of the Red Sea is the sole responsibility of its coastal nations, emphasising that any presence of non-littoral states, whether military, naval, or otherwise, is unacceptable.
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia (ISIL-Somalia) gaining a foothold in Somalia has been a matter of growing concern, a development reflected in past reports of the Secretary-General on the threats posed by the group. In recent weeks, Puntland forces have intensified military offensives against ISIL-Somalia in the Bari region of north-eastern Somalia. These operations reportedly have resulted in significant territorial gains, successfully driving the group out of its stronghold areas. Media reports indicate that Puntland forces have successfully neutralised numerous ISIL-Somalia militants, though casualties have also been reported among Puntland troops. At the same time, clashes have also been reported between Somali forces and Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida, in the Galgaduud and Hiran regions.
Sanctions-Related Developments
The PoE assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee submitted its final report on 15 October. The report said that Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to the peace and security of Somalia, with the capacity to carry out complex attacks against the Somali government, AU forces, and international forces. The report highlighted that the key sources of resupply for Al-Shabaab are the group’s overrunning of the Somali National Army and ATMIS bases and the diversion of weapons from these bases, spillovers from regional conflicts, and illicit trafficking networks.
The report acknowledged a significant shift in the strength and disposition of ISIL-Somalia. It noted that the group, led by a cadre of former Al-Shabaab militants based in the Bari region of Puntland, has recently seen an influx of foreign fighters, which has expanded and enhanced the group’s capabilities against Al-Shabaab. The report estimated that the group has likely doubled in size, partly due to the influx of foreign fighters, with current estimates placing the group’s size between 600 and 700 fighters. Additionally, the report highlighted an increase in piracy incidents, with more than 25 attacks, including hijackings, reported on commercial vessels and dhows since 24 November 2023. (For more information, see our 12 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
On 15 October, the Secretary-General submitted a report pursuant to resolution 2713 providing an update on progress in achieving the indicators outlined in the ten benchmarks contained in his 15 September 2022 technical assessment report on Somalia’s weapons and ammunition capacity. The 15 October report indicated that progress had been incremental at the federal government level. It also noted that an urgent challenge is extending the weapons and ammunition management frameworks, processes, and structures to the federal member state level, considering the different needs, priorities, and perspectives of each state. The report added that countering the illicit flow of arms and ammunition into Somalia also remains a critical issue. Another challenge is to apply the weapons and ammunition management frameworks to the weapons held by clan militias, “community defence forces”, and civilians.
Key Issues and Options
One of the key issues for Council members in February is the extension of the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime and the mandate renewal of the PoE supporting the committee. In extending the sanctions measures and renewing the Panel’s mandate, Council members are likely to be guided by the findings of the 15 October progress report and the recommendations contained in the Panel’s 15 October final report.
In December, Council members agreed on a short-term technical extension of the measures and the Panel’s mandate. This approach, proposed by the penholder (the UK), apparently intended to allow the Council the necessary time to hold detailed and structured discussions on the issue, considering the Council’s focus on post-ATMIS security arrangement negotiations and the need to delink both discussions. (For more information, see our 12 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
One option for Council members would be to renew the measures outlined in resolution 2713 and extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another year. Some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanction’s measures, including, but not limited to, the scope of the measures, exemptions, and reporting and notification requirements. Resolution 2713 affirmed the Council’s commitment to reviewing the procedures outlined in the resolution regarding exemptions and notifications, including through potential modification, suspension, or lifting of the measures.
Council Dynamics
Council members support the Somali government’s priorities and recognise the many challenges the country faces, including the persistent insecurity caused by the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. They also support ongoing efforts to fight the group, including the implementation of sanctions to degrade Al-Shabaab. In December 2023, Council members were united in their decision to lift the arms embargo on the Somali government, including the provision for advance notification by the Somali government of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somali security and police institutions. At the same time, resolution 2713 reflected a clear focus on countering the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. (For background, see our 1 December 2023 What’s in Blue story.)
During the negotiations on resolution 2762, Russia apparently expressed reservations about extending the term of the Panel’s current membership. It suggested that the composition of the Panel could be decided by mid-January, when the mandate of the PoE’s current membership was supposed to end pursuant to resolution 2713.
Earlier this year, the Council members agreed on the composition of the Panel of Experts, as appointed subsequently by the Secretary-General via a letter dated 14 January. However, at press time, discussions on the future of the sanctions measures and the panel’s mandate appear to be ongoing behind the scenes. Somalia, which has strongly advocated national ownership in recent years and joined the Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2025-26 term, is well-positioned to push for adjustments to the sanctions regime that align with its national priorities. However, it remains uncertain how these discussions will evolve and influence the dynamics within the Council.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 27 December 2024S/RES/2767 | This resolution endorsed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), beginning 1 January 2025. |
| 1 December 2023S/RES/2713 | This resolution renewed for one year the sanctions regime on Al-Shabaab, including the authorisation for maritime interdiction to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports, the charcoal exports ban, and the improvised explosive device components ban. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 14 January 2025S/2025/35 | This was the letter from the Secretary-General regarding the appointment of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 15 October 2024S/2024/748 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions committee. |
| 15 October 2024S/2024/751 | This was the progress report on the benchmarks set out in the 15 September 2022 technical assessment report. |
