DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In February, Security Council members are scheduled to discuss the 90-day report on the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in closed consultations.
Ordinarily, the Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee briefs Council members on the report. At the time of writing, the Chair had not yet been appointed as Council members continue to negotiate this year’s allocation of subsidiary bodies. If the Chair is not appointed before the end of February, then the meeting may be postponed.
Key Recent Developments
The DPRK has continued to carry out missile tests in recent months. On 31 October 2024, it announced that it had tested a new solid-fuel “Hwasong-19” intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and claimed that it flew higher than any of its previous missiles. According to Japanese officials, the missile flew for approximately 86 minutes and reached a possible altitude of 7,000 kilometres before falling into the Sea of Japan. The launch, which took place just days before the US presidential election, was the country’s first ICBM test since December 2023. On 4 November 2024, Council members convened for an open briefing to discuss the test, following a request from France, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, the UK, and the US. Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific Mohamed Khaled Khiari briefed. The US, the penholder on the DPRK, proposed a draft press statement in connection with this meeting, which was opposed by China and Russia.
On 7 January, DPRK state media reported that the DPRK had launched an “intermediate-range hypersonic missile”. The test took place while then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in Seoul for a meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul. Although these reports claimed that the missile travelled approximately 1,500 kilometres at 12 times the speed of sound before descending to a second peak and reaching its target, ROK officials later said that they were likely exaggerated. Council members discussed the test during an open briefing on 8 January. The meeting was requested by France, Denmark, the ROK, Slovenia, the UK, and the US, and members received a briefing from Khiari.
The DPRK has also recently conducted tests of short-range missiles, including on 14 January, when it fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles into waters off its east coast.
In addition to carrying out several missile tests in recent months, the DPRK has ramped up its rhetoric against the US and its allies in the region. During the most recent plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which took place in late December 2024, Kim Jong-un reportedly promised to introduce the DPRK’s “toughest” US strategy and described the partnership between Japan, the ROK, and the US as a “nuclear military bloc”.
On 29 January, DRPK state media reported that Kim Jong-un had inspected nuclear facilities in the country and called for bolstering its nuclear capability.
Against this backdrop, reports regarding the deployment of DPRK troops to the Kursk region in Russia have continued to emerge. On 13 January, ROK lawmakers told reporters that approximately 300 DPRK troops had been killed and about 2,700 injured while fighting Ukrainian soldiers. Two days earlier, on 11 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine had captured DPRK soldiers in Kursk for the first time. Both US and ROK officials have also told reporters that they believe the DPRK is preparing to send more troops to Russia in the coming months. On 30 January, however, media outlets reported that DRPK troops had been withdrawn from the frontline in Kursk after suffering heavy casualties. In addition, Ukrainian officials have publicly claimed that the DPRK has continued to send weapons to Russia and said that they expect it will continue doing so.
The increasingly close ties between the DPRK and Russia appear to have prompted both Japan and the ROK to explore options for strengthening their ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). From 14 to 16 January, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Boris Ruge met with senior officials in Seoul and Tokyo. The day before Ruge met with Japanese officials, Japan announced the inauguration of an independent mission to NATO in Brussels.
On 20 January, newly inaugurated US President Donald Trump reportedly referred to the DPRK as a “nuclear power”, days after his Secretary of Defense nominee Peter Hegseth (who has since been confirmed by the US Senate) used the same term in a written response to questions from the US Senate Armed Services Committee. According to media reports, on 21 January, a spokesperson for the ROK foreign ministry issued a statement saying that the DPRK “can never be recognised as a nuclear-armed state” and that “denuclearisation remains a consistent principle upheld by the international community, including [the ROK] and the US”.
In a 24 January interview, Trump appeared to suggest that he would attempt to rekindle the direct diplomacy with Kim Jong-un that he pursued during his first term, reportedly telling Fox News that he plans to “reach out” to the DPRK leader and saying, “he liked me and I got along with him”.
Key Issues and Options
The reported deployment of DPRK troops on Russian territory, together with reports of ongoing arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia, has created a major issue for Council members. As more information comes to light, the Council could choose to hold a meeting to discuss relevant developments. Given the direct involvement of a permanent member, a more substantive response is likely to be difficult.
The expiry of the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee is another major issue for the Council. (For more information on the expiration of the Panel’s mandate, see our 22 March 2024 What’s in Blue story). Members are currently considering how the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, which was first announced on 16 October 2024, could assist both the Council and the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. Council members could request a briefing on the work of this mechanism once it is operational, either at the Council or Committee level, including in relation to any information it obtains regarding apparent violations of the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime. Members could also ask for a briefing in an informal format, such as a closed-Arria meeting.
The DPRK’s weapons tests, many of which violate Council resolutions, are also a serious issue for Council members. Sanctions evasion is another important issue, as is the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime, particularly given that the DPRK is widely believed to have continued to develop nuclear weapons since the regime was first introduced. The DPRK’s ongoing refusal to engage in denuclearisation dialogue and the country’s humanitarian situation are also problems for the Council.
The Council could adopt a product that condemns the DPRK’s ongoing missile tests, urges member states to comply with existing resolutions, and calls on the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. It could also update and strengthen the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime to exert further pressure on the DPRK.
Council Dynamics
The Council is deeply divided over the DPRK, and this dynamic appears to have worsened as the DPRK and Russia have sought to bolster their ties. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded countries, including the ROK, generally favour using sanctions to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK and regularly call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the DPRK to engage in dialogue and abandon its weapons programmes, while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some of these members have called for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened the DPRK by blocking Council action on the file. They have also highlighted evidence of arms transfers between the DPRK and Russia and noted that these transfers violate Council resolutions.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US for heightening tensions and have accused it of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have also contended that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation and have expressed their support for a draft resolution circulated by China in October 2021 that would provide sanctions relief to the DPRK if adopted.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |
