Yemen
Expected Council Action
In January 2025, the Security Council will hold its monthly briefing and consultations on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief.
Council members may also consider extending the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General contained in resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024 on attacks by the Houthi rebel group on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Resolution 2739 of 27 June 2024 most recently extended the reporting obligation until 15 January 2025.
The mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) expires on 14 July 2025.
Key Recent Developments
The situation in Yemen remains complex as the Middle East experiences seismic shifts, including the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, a fragile cessation of hostilities agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon, and the 8 December 2024 ousting of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Briefing at the Security Council’s latest meeting on Yemen on 11 December 2024, Grundberg stated that the dramatic events in Lebanon and Syria demonstrate the urgent need for stabilisation across the region, including in Yemen. Some Council members, like the Republic of Korea (ROK), expressed hope that the recent developments will have a positive catalytic effect on Yemen. Other members, such as China, cautioned that these developments could create shockwaves that will further undermine peace efforts in the country.
December 2024 also saw the intensification of direct conflict between the Houthis and Israel, as well as the continuation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The Houthis launched more than eight attacks against Israel involving ballistic missiles and drones, three of which were not intercepted by Israeli air defence systems and hit civilian areas. On 9 December, a drone launched by the Houthis struck a residential building in the central Israeli city of Yavneh, causing no casualties. A 19 December Houthi missile attack damaged a school in the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan, with at least three people sustaining injuries. In the early hours of 21 December, a Houthi missile hit a playground in Tel Aviv’s southern Jaffa area, reportedly injuring 16 people.
On 19 December, Israel carried out airstrikes in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, reportedly targeting Houthi infrastructure at the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and the Ras Isa oil terminal on the Red Sea as well as Houthi energy infrastructure in the city of Sana’a. This was the third time that Israel claimed responsibility for direct strikes in Yemen, after carrying out attacks on 20 July and 29 September in response to Houthi assaults against Israel. On 26 December, Israel carried out another significant air assault against Yemen, targeting the Sana’a airport and two power stations.
In a 19 December statement, Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern about the Israeli strikes, noting that initial reports indicate that they resulted in civilian casualties, including nine killed, and “considerable damage to the Red Sea ports that will lead to the immediate and significant reduction in port capacity”. He added that the strikes followed approximately a year of “escalatory actions by the Houthis in the Red Sea and the region that threaten civilians, regional stability and freedom of maritime navigation” and expressed concern about the 19 December Houthi attack against Israel. Guterres called on all actors to exercise restraint and to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law by protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure. On 30 December 2024, the Security Council held a meeting under the “Threats to international peace and security” agenda item to discuss these developments, following a request from Israel in a 24 December letter to the Council. (For more information, see our 29 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
During the 11 December Council meeting, Grundberg called on the Yemeni parties to re-engage on his efforts to promote a roadmap under UN auspices, which would “deliver a ceasefire, economic measures such as the sustainable payment of salaries and preparing for an inclusive political process”. The Special Envoy has continued working on such issues. Most recently, his office convened a meeting between 10 and 12 December 2024 with representatives from the Yemeni government in Amman, Jordan, to discuss the planning and management of ceasefires and transitional security arrangements. The participants reflected on “global examples of ceasefires and explored their relevance for a future nationwide ceasefire in Yemen”, according to a statement by the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 30 September, the Human Rights Council adopted the report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Yemen. During the UPR, the government of Yemen stated that the continued control of parts of the country by the Houthis, which affects the lives of more than ten million citizens, is causing political, security, and social turmoil. It identified this as the primary obstacle to advancing human rights. The government also reported launching “livelihood” programmes to support girls’ education in rural areas. These programmes provide cash incentives to families on the condition that they send their daughters to school and include the distribution of food baskets to participating families.
Key Issues and Options
Minimising the effects of the destabilising regional tensions on Yemen and reinvigorating the stalled intra-Yemeni political process are overarching priorities for the Council. It is yet unclear what, if any, direct effect the fall of the Assad government in Syria may have on Yemen. Some analysts have argued that the changes in regional dynamics could weaken the Houthis’ hand, which might compel the group to recommit to intra-Yemeni negotiations. In contrast, others have commented that it could cause Iran to increase its support for the Houthis and reignite the fighting in Yemen after almost three years of relative calm.
The Council may seek to demonstrate its sustained attention to the Yemen file at this critical juncture. An option would be for Council members to issue a presidential statement or press statement encouraging the Yemeni parties to create conditions conducive to the resumption of talks. In this regard, members could urge implementation of the economic de-escalation agreement reached on 23 July between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.
Addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the country is another pressing priority. OCHA’s Global Humanitarian Overview for 2025, published on 4 December 2024, estimated that 19.5 million people in Yemen will require aid in 2025 and anticipated requiring $2.5 billion to assist 10.5 million people. Council members could consider ways to increase attention on humanitarian funding shortfalls, including by encouraging member states to convene a pledging conference.
The global humanitarian overview noted that Yemen ranks as the world’s third most vulnerable country to climate change and that the country lacks the capacity to mitigate or adapt to the effects of climate change. An option would be for the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Climate, Peace and Security to visit Yemen to discuss strategies for building climate resilience.
Council Dynamics
Although Council members remain united in their support for Grundberg’s efforts to achieve a solution to the crisis in Yemen, dynamics on the file have become more complicated since the eruption of the Red Sea crisis in November 2023. Some of the Council’s permanent members have exchanged recriminations during Council meetings on Yemen, with the US alleging that Russia is considering transferring weapons to the Houthis and Russia saying that retaliatory strikes by the UK and the US against the Houthis were destabilising the situation in Yemen.
It remains to be seen how the upcoming US presidential transition may affect Council dynamics on the file. The current administration of US President Joe Biden has taken a strong position, advocating for further Council action to impede Iran’s supply of arms to the Houthis and to deter the rebel group from destabilising the region. This includes suggesting the enhancement of Council sanctions measures against the Houthis and calling for strengthening the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to ensure compliance with the arms embargo against the group. On 11 December 2024, US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking visited Djibouti, where UNVIM is based, and was quoted by media outlets as saying that the mechanism is currently not equipped for or given the mandate to carry out interdictions, and that the US was “working with partners to look at a change to the mandate”. Such a move appears difficult, however, given that Russia opposes stronger Council action against the Houthis or Iran.
US President-elect Donald Trump has historically taken a strong stance against Iran and its allies. During his previous administration (2016-2020), Trump designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT). While both designations trigger economic sanctions, only an FTO designation authorises sanctions on those who provide the designated group with “material support”. The Biden administration lifted these designations in February 2021, citing concerns that they may impede humanitarian aid from reaching Yemen. In January 2024, the Biden administration re-designated the Houthis as an SDGT. On 22 December, Trump’s pick for national security adviser, Mike Waltz, said in a podcast interview that the incoming administration will reinstate the Houthis’ FTO designation.
Vessels owned or operated by companies from Denmark, Greece, and Panama—elected members that are starting their two-year Council term in 2025—have been attacked by the Houthis in the Red Sea, as documented by the Secretary-General’s monthly reports on the matter. This aspect of the Yemen file is therefore expected to be of particular interest to these members.
Incoming member Somalia may have an interest in the issue of the alleged cooperation between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab. The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, dated 11 October, said that the groups are reportedly deepening their cooperation, indicating increased smuggling activities between them, mostly involving small arms and light weapons.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 11 December 2024S/PV.9806 | This was the Council’s monthly meeting on Yemen, held on 11 December 2024. |
