Syria
Expected Council Action
In January, the Security Council will hold a meeting on the political process and the humanitarian situation in Syria.
Key Recent Developments
On 27 November 2024, rebel forces launched a major offensive that included Security Council-listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army, a coalition of armed groups allegedly backed by Türkiye, resulting in the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad. The offensive, which began in the northwestern Aleppo governorate, quickly advanced southward towards the capital Damascus with little resistance from the Syrian armed forces. Concurrently, opposition groups in the south launched attacks in the Daraa governorate and As-Suwayda city, creating a multi-front push toward Damascus. The offensive culminated with the fall of Damascus on 8 December, forcing Assad to flee the country. Russia granted asylum to Assad and his family, citing “humanitarian considerations”. (For background and more information, see our 9, 16, and 26 December What’s in Blue stories.)
On 10 December, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), HTS’ leader and commander of the new administration, installed Mohammed al-Bashir to lead a caretaker government through March 2025. (Bashir had previously headed the Syrian Salvation Government [SSG] in Idlib, a body established by HTS in 2017 to govern the territory it controlled.) In the following days, the transitional government announced its ministerial portfolios, which reportedly included individuals affiliated with the SSG. On 12 December, the transitional authorities announced that the Syrian parliament and former constitution would be suspended for the interim transitional period, and a new legal and human rights committee would be established to examine and introduce amendments to the constitution.
On 14 December, the Arab ministerial contact group on Syria—comprising Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and League of Arab States (LAS) Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit—convened in Aqaba, Jordan. The meeting was also attended by the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In a statement released following the meeting, the representatives expressed support for a peaceful and inclusive political transitional process that will be “sponsored” by the UN and the LAS, and follow the principles and objectives of resolution 2254. They stressed the need for an inclusive transitional period leading to a new political system through UN-supervised free and fair elections based on a new constitution and within specific timeframes in accordance with the mechanisms adopted by resolution 2254. They also requested the UN Secretary-General to begin working on establishing a UN mission to assist Syria in achieving a political process. On the margins, the Arab contact group and other countries that participated in the 14 December meeting held a joint meeting with Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen and representatives of France, Germany, Türkiye, the UK, the US, and the European Union (EU), and adopted a joint statement.
Pedersen travelled to Damascus from 15 to 18 December, engaging with a range of key stakeholders. These included Sharaa, Bashir, and members of other armed factions, as well as representatives of the Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC), which was formed as the political opposition to the Assad government and includes military representatives involved in the recent military offensive. During his visit, Pedersen also visited Sednaya Prison, a facility located north of Damascus notorious for its use by the Assad government for carrying out torture and executions, and met with families of those who had been detained and missing, as well as representatives from civil society.
In his remarks at the 17 December 2024 Council meeting on the situation in Syria, Pedersen outlined the challenges facing the country, notably prevailing insecurity in some parts, particularly north-east Syria where front lines remain active. He stressed the need for de-escalation towards a nationwide ceasefire, as well as efforts to address tensions between military factions. He emphasised the importance of advancing efforts towards economic development, reconstruction, and addressing and ultimately lifting sanctions. Regarding the political process, Pedersen noted the broad understanding that, under the current circumstances, resolution 2254 cannot be applied mechanically, although its core principles enjoy widespread consensus among Syrians. Pedersen stressed the need for drafting a new constitution and conducting free and fair elections, in line with resolution 2254. Furthermore, he underscored the importance of transitional justice, including clarifying the fate of missing and disappeared persons and ensuring due process in criminal prosecutions to prevent acts of revenge. (For more information, see our 16 December What’s in Blue story.)
The security situation in northern Syria remains fragile. In the days following Assad’s ousting, hostilities escalated significantly, with various factions competing for control and influence. Turkish backed-SNA forces launched an offensive in the territories controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), capturing strategic locations such as Manbij and initiating operations in Kobani. (The SDF has been a crucial security partner for the US in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL\Da’esh]. Türkiye, however, views the SDF as closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK], pointing to the dominant role of YPG, a Kurdish militia, within the SDF and its overlapping leadership with the PKK.) The factions agreed to a short-term ceasefire brokered by the US, largely focusing on Manjib; however, conflicting reports raised doubts about its effectiveness and longevity.
In remarks made to journalists on 20 December, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Ankara expects countries to withdraw support for Kurdish fighters in Syria. Following her visit to Damascus, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf reportedly said that the US was working with Türkiye and the SDF to find “a managed transition in terms of SDF’s role in that part of the country”. She added that “the conditions which led Kurds in northeast Syria to organise themselves and to defend themselves…were one set of conditions and things have really changed in a very dramatic fashion”.
Meanwhile, Israel continued its airstrikes on positions within Syria, targeting strategic military capabilities. Following the announcement of Assad’s overthrow, Israeli forces launched a series of intensive airstrikes across various locations, targeting naval assets, air bases, ammunition depots, and other military infrastructure. Reports indicate that Israel has carried out as many as 450 strikes during this period. In a 19 December press stakeout, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on Israel to halt the airstrikes, calling them violations of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel reportedly has argued that its actions were aimed at destroying strategic weapons and military infrastructure to prevent them from being used by rebel groups. (For more information, see our 9 and 16 December What’s in Blue stories.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 16 December statement, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Syria urged all parties to the conflict in Syria to protect civilians, treat former combatants humanely, and preserve evidence and crime scenes, including mass grave sites, to ensure accountability in the future. The COI underlined the importance of allowing the victims and survivors to pursue their demands for truth, reparations, and legal and institutional reforms. It reiterated the findings of its report dated 11 March 2021, which found that the Assad government committed crimes against humanity of extermination, murder, rape, or other forms of sexual violence, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and other inhuman acts.
Women, Peace, and Security
In a 20 December statement, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten said that while a new chapter is unfolding in Syria following the fall of the Assad government, over a decade of conflict, mass displacement, and economic devastation have generated “a catastrophic humanitarian emergency in which the needs of women and girls remain unmet”. Patten underscored the critical need to address “the sexual violence that has marred the country’s history” as a foundation for durable peace and reconciliation. She called on the caretaker government to adopt a robust survivor-centred framework, including access to counselling, mental health services, and medical care. Additionally, Patten highlighted the importance of establishing a legal framework to hold perpetrators accountable, noting that survivors have long been denied avenues for accountability and redress. She appealed to the international community to provide financial and technical support to “amplify survivors’ voices, meet their needs and safeguard their rights”.
Key Issues and Options
The most pressing issue before the Council is how to ensure a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process, guided by the principles of resolution 2254, that can prioritise the needs and aspirations of all Syrians, prevent fragmentation of the country, preserve state institutions, and result in establishing a non-sectarian and representative governance structure. During the 17 December closed consultations, Pedersen apparently cautioned that the coordination between HTS and other armed groups from the offensive might not have transitioned into political collaboration. It seems that he alluded to differing expectations among armed factions regarding the implementation of resolution 2254 and the role of UN facilitation. He called on Council members to stand united in reinforcing the message from the 14 December meeting in Aqaba.
A related issue is addressing the prevailing insecurity in the country, ensuring the protection of civilians, including religious and ethnic minorities, addressing human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, and preventing the resurgence of terrorist and extremist elements such as ISIL. The Council needs to navigate the competing interests of regional and international actors, who continue to shape Syria’s political and security landscape, while underscoring the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria.
The Council is expected to continue monitoring the developments on the ground closely. In addition to regular briefings from Pedersen, the Council could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with interested regional and international stakeholders and invite Syrian representatives to deliberate, among other things, how to adapt the political process to the new realities on the ground and formulate an appropriate response strategy.
Another key issue is how to alleviate the growing humanitarian needs throughout the country and address the challenges associated with the recent hostilities. Since 27 November, almost 1.1 million people have been displaced across the country, the majority of whom are women and children. According to OCHA, humanitarian activities continued where security conditions allowed, with limited operations resuming in Damascus, Tartous, Lattakia, and Ar-Raqqa. Humanitarian access and aid delivery, however, remain challenging in parts of north-east Syria, where movement is restricted across Ar-Raqqa, Tabqa, Hassakeh, and Derik due to checkpoints. (For more information, see our 16 December What’s in Blue story.)
Council members could consider calling for an international conference to mobilise support for Syria, including through securing additional funding for a humanitarian response and addressing key issues such as economic development and reconstruction. With the growing humanitarian needs across the country, there is an urgent need to ensure adequate funding for humanitarian operations. At the time of writing, Syria’s 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan, which required $4.07 billion, was only 33.1 percent funded. On 17 December, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) launched an appeal for $310 million to address the critical needs of up to one million Syrian refugee returnees expected to arrive in Syria between January and June 2025 as part of spontaneous and host government organised movements from neighbouring countries.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council and the broader membership appear to be adjusting their responses to keep pace with the rapidly unfolding developments and determine the appropriate path forward. The developments in Syria so far have already brought about a pivotal shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape. Iran and Russia, Assad’s close allies who had maintained a military presence in the country over the years, are recalibrating their political and military engagement in the region.
Russia, for instance, has reportedly evacuated 400 soldiers from Damascus in coordination with HTS. It has confirmed its contacts with HTS and has expressed hope that it would be able to retain two key bases in Syria, a naval base in Tartous and the Khmeimim air base near Lattakia. Media reports suggest that Russia has been transferring military equipment from Syria to eastern Libya, which is largely under the control of General Khalifa Haftar.
In recent weeks, several countries, including Western nations, have opened diplomatic channels to engage with the transitional authorities, including HTS leadership. Türkiye and Qatar have announced the reopening of their embassies in Damascus, marking the first time diplomatic relations have resumed since ties were severed during the Assad government’s violent crackdown on civil unrest in the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, France, Germany, the UK, the US, and the EU, among others, have dispatched diplomatic contingents to engage with the de facto authorities. Senior officials from Jordan, Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have also visited Damascus in recent days.
On 20 December, a diplomatic mission led by US Assistant Secretary Leaf arrived in Damascus and met with interim authorities, including Sharaa. In a press briefing following the visit, Leaf described the discussions as “productive” and announced that the US would no longer pursue the Rewards for Justice offer of $10 million for information on Sharaa. She also acknowledged Türkiye’s role in shaping discussions on Syria’s future, noting its influence and national security interests. On 19 December, Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder announced that there are approximately 2,000 US troops stationed in Syria, which is roughly 1,100 more than had been reported in the past. At the time of writing, it remains unclear how US foreign policy will evolve regarding developments in Syria and the broader region under the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump, who will assume office on 20 January 2025.
Following the start of the offensive, Council members met on 3 December to receive a briefing from Pedersen on the evolving security landscape. However, the dynamics within the Council remained marked by long-standing divisions. Russia condemned the rebel offensive, describing it as an “unprecedented terrorist attack”, and accused the US and its allies of providing support to the “terrorists” to varying degrees. Meanwhile, the US criticised the Assad government for its refusal to engage in a genuine political process and its reliance on Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, citing these factors as contributing to the conditions unfolding in the country.
Despite persistent underlying divisions, Council members managed to find a common voice following Assad’s ouster in their 17 December press statement. In it, members showed unity in calling for the implementation of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles listed in resolution 2254. They also showed support for Pedersen’s efforts in this regard and called for the political process to meet the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians, protect civilians and enable them to peacefully, independently and democratically determine their own futures. Members also reaffirmed their commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria and called on all states to respect these principles. They also underlined the need for Syria and its neighbours to mutually refrain from any action or interference that could undermine each other’s security. Other areas of agreement were the importance of combating terrorism in Syria, the need to prevent ISIL/Da’esh and other terrorist groups from re-establishing their capabilities, and Syria abiding by all relevant Council resolutions regarding non-conventional weapons and cooperating with international efforts.
It remains unclear which Council member will assume the role of penholder on the humanitarian file, thereby replacing outgoing Council member Switzerland, which served as co-penholder with Brazil in 2023 and a sole penholder in 2024.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 17 December 2024SC/15943 | The press statement called for the implementation of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles listed in the resolution 2254. |
