Libya
Expected Council Action
In January 2025, the Security Council is expected to renew the authorisation of measures contained in resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. It is also expected to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. Through resolution 2701 of 19 October 2023, the Council renewed the authorisation of petroleum-related measures until 1 February 2025 and extended the PoE’s mandate until 15 February, to be reviewed by 15 January.
Additionally, the Council may renew the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) this month. Resolution 2755 of 31 October 2024 extended the mission’s mandate until 31 January 2025, with a “further automatic extension” of an additional nine months, until 31 October, if a new Special Representative and head of UNSMIL has been appointed by 31 January.
Key Recent Developments
The political impasse in Libya continues between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over proposed legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention concerns the formation of a unified interim government to organise the elections, a move favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments—which has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections—is one of the root causes of Libya’s political, security, and economic instability.
In a 4 December 2024 statement, UNSMIL announced that Deputy Special Representative and Political Officer-in-Charge of UNSMIL Stephanie Koury had recently intensified consultations with Libyan actors to “revitalise the political process” towards the holding of national elections, in line with resolution 2755. As part of this effort, Koury met with HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh, acting GNU Foreign Minister Taher Baour, and Presidential Council President Mohammed Al-Menfi. (The Presidential Council was established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement to serve as the country’s head of state.)
In a subsequent 15 December 2024 statement, Koury provided additional details about this UNSMIL-facilitated process, which will comprise two stages. First, the mission intends to convene a technical committee of Libyan experts to develop options to overcome “contentious issues” in the electoral laws and reach elections “in the shortest possible time including with proposed guarantees, assurances and a timeframe”. Second, the mission will facilitate a national dialogue to “expand consensus” for the resolution of long-standing drivers of conflict. The dialogue will include all segments of Libyan society, including political parties, women, youth, social leaders, and “cultural components”. In her 16 December 2024 bimonthly briefing to the Security Council, Koury reiterated the details of this initiative.
While Libya’s rival governments remain deadlocked over national elections, Libya’s High National Election Commission (HNEC) organised the first round of municipal elections on 16 November 2024. Polls were held in 58 municipalities, with voter participation reaching 77 percent, according to the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNSMIL, dated 10 December 2024 and covering developments from 9 August 2024. In a 24 November 2024 statement, UNSMIL welcomed the successful holding of municipal elections—which were the first since 2014 to be held simultaneously across the western and eastern parts of the country—as a “crucial opportunity for the Libyan people to exercise their right to choose their representatives and foster accountable and responsive governance”. Similarly, in his most recent report on UNSMIL, the Secretary-General welcomed the municipal elections but cautioned that they “should not be seen as a substitute for the national elections which have been delayed for far too long and are essential to restore the legitimacy of the main State institutions”. At the time of writing, HNEC was expected to begin the electoral process for a second group of 59 municipalities later this month.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 5 December 2024, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee met to discuss the PoE’s final report. As requested by resolution 2701, which most recently renewed the panel’s mandate and extended the petroleum-related sanctions measures, the report made recommendations on possible actions that the committee could take to allow the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) to re-invest its frozen assets. The LIA is Libya’s sovereign wealth fund and has previously requested permission from the committee to re-invest its assets to preserve their value, which has reportedly declined under the asset freeze. On 12 December 2024, the committee met with representatives of the LIA to discuss its request.
Women, Peace and Security
Hala Bugaighis, a representative of the Libyan Women, Peace and Security Advisory Group, briefed the Security Council during the 9 October 2024 meeting on Libya. Among other issues, she stressed the importance of women’s meaningful participation in the peace and political processes in Libya. She highlighted significant challenges women face in this respect, including movement limitations, restrictions on civil society organisations, and “the systematic targeting of women human rights defenders, particularly online”. Bugaighis called on the Security Council to demand that all actors end intimidation, attacks and reprisals against women civil society representatives and politically active women. Calling for UNSMIL’s mandate to be renewed for twelve months, Bugaighis urged the Council to task UNSMIL with monitoring and reporting on violations against women human rights defenders and providing support to those at risk. She stressed the importance of the mission prioritising the women, peace and security components of its mandate and working closely with Libyan actors to address the human rights situation in the country.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Security Council in January is to renew the PoE’s mandate and extend the authorisation of measures contained in resolution 2146, which allowed member states to inspect designated vessels on the high seas suspected of facilitating the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. In connection with these renewals, the Council may also act on the LIA’s request to re-invest its frozen assets based on the panel’s recommendations.
If the Secretary-General has not appointed a new Special Representative and head of UNSMIL by 31 January 2025, the mission’s current mandate will end on that date. In that case, another issue for the Council is renewing UNSMIL’s mandate, which it would most likely do through another short-term extension.
A related issue for the Council is the appointment of a new Special Representative. Filling this position—which has been vacant since then-Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily stepped down in April 2024—is an important condition for maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of the UN’s mediation role in Libya, in part because resolution 2755 made a full one-year renewal of the mission’s mandate contingent on the appointment. Council members have urged the Secretary-General to take swift action on this issue, although positions diverge on the appropriate candidate for the position, which has delayed the appointment process.
More broadly, supporting political momentum towards national elections to unify Libya’s divided governments remains a key issue for the Council. In this context, an important objective for the Council is to help foster common political ground between the country’s rival governments to reach an inclusive agreement on electoral laws, including the possible establishment of a unified interim government to organise the elections. In this regard, Council members could consider issuing a presidential statement or press statement in support of Koury’s revitalised efforts to facilitate dialogue between the Libyan political stakeholders.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country. They also remain broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role towards this end.
However, the recent extension of UNSMIL’s mandate in the absence of a Special Representative rekindled older disagreements. When former Special Envoy Ján Kubiš resigned in November 2021, it took nearly a year to identify a successor, eventually leading to Bathily’s appointment in September 2022. (Resolution 2629 of 29 April 2022 changed UNSMIL’s leadership position from a Special Envoy to a Special Representative.) During this impasse, the Council renewed UNSMIL’s mandate five times between September 2021 and July 2022 through short-term extensions, in part because Russia opposed a regular one-year renewal in the absence of appointed mission leadership. During negotiations on last year’s renewal under similar circumstances, Russia again opposed a one-year extension, citing the previous short-term extensions as precedent. This resulted in the compromise solution whereby resolution 2755 renewed the mandate for a three-month period that may be automatically extended by an additional nine months upon the appointment of a new Special Representative.
Regarding sanctions, Council members may have differing positions on possible actions to accommodate the LIA’s request to re-invest its frozen assets. During negotiations on resolution 2701, there was some disagreement among certain Council members—including China, Mozambique, Russia, and then-members Gabon, Ghana, and the United Arab Emirates—that wanted the Council to accommodate the LIA’s request, and other—primarily Western—members that were more reticent in light of the LIA’s management challenges and Libya’s unstable political environment. The resolution’s request for recommendations from the PoE on this issue was a compromise between those two positions.
More broadly, geopolitical tensions influence Council dynamics with respect to Libya. The US and other Western members remain concerned about Russia’s growing presence in the eastern part of the country that is under Haftar’s control, while Russia routinely blames Libya’s current instability on the NATO-led military intervention in 2011 and accuses Western countries of seeking to exploit Libya’s oil reserves for economic gain.
The UK is the penholder on Libya.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 31 October 2024S/RES/2755 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate for three months, until 31 January 2025, with a “further automatic extension” of an additional nine months, until 31 October 2025, if a new Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL has been appointed by 31 January 2025. |
| 19 October 2023S/RES/2701 | This resolution renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the authorisation of measures contained in resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 10 December 2024S/2024/895 | This was the 120-day report on UNSMIL. |
