In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2024 and Looking Ahead to 2025
In 2024, the Security Council was confronted with a world beset by multiple crises, including continuing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, severe deterioration of the situation in Sudan, and a sudden shift in the political situation in Syria. Differing strategic interests and irreconcilable world views among the major powers restricted the Council’s ability to address these crises. The tensions among the major powers were frequently in evidence in the Council chamber, where members clashed on a range of issues. The efforts of the elected members were a bright spot during the year, as they drafted several important outcomes and attempted to break impasses, albeit with limited success. The Council faces numerous ongoing and potential new crises as it enters 2025 in the context of an unstable and fluid international peace and security environment.
A Divided Council: Understanding the Numbers
The Council’s statistics provide insight into the difficulty the Council has had carrying out its responsibilities this year.
The decline in the number of resolutions continued: 46 resolutions were adopted in 2024—compared to 50 in 2023, 54 in 2022, and 57 in 2021. This is the lowest number since 1991 (42). In 2024, 65.2 percent of the resolutions adopted had the support of all 15 members—comparable to the proportion of unanimous adoptions in 2023 (70 percent) and 2022 (66.7 percent), but low for the post-Cold War period. In this regard, between the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s, it was not uncommon for more than 90 percent of adoptions to be unanimous in any given year. Significantly, non-unanimous adoptions may make it more difficult to implement resolutions, particularly in relation to the mandates of peace operations.
In total, there were 34 abstentions on the 16 resolutions that were not adopted unanimously in 2024. On these resolutions, Russia abstained the most times (14). Other members that abstained on non-unanimous resolutions were China (six), Algeria (four), Mozambique (four), Sierra Leone (two), Guyana (two) and the US (two). Of these 34 abstentions, 15 were cast on four sanctions-related resolutions, including eight abstentions by the three African members and Guyana (the A3 plus grouping), four by Russia, and three by China.
In 2024, there were seven draft resolutions that failed to be adopted due to a veto, the highest since 1986. A total of eight vetoes were cast on these failed drafts, including four by Russia, three by the US, and one by China. Russia vetoed draft resolutions on each of the following issues: the war in Gaza; weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the panel of experts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) sanctions committee; and the conflict in Sudan. China joined Russia in vetoing a draft on the war in Gaza. The US vetoed two draft resolutions on the war in Gaza as well as one on the application of the State of Palestine for admission to the UN. The General Assembly met following each use of the veto in line with the 2022 veto initiative.
The difficulty in obtaining consensus in 2024 was also illustrated by the low number of presidential statements. The Council adopted seven presidential statements in 2024. This is only one more than the six adopted in 2023, which was the lowest number since the Council began using its current documentation for presidential statements in 1994. The 2024 statements were on the following: the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals; the role of African states in addressing security and development challenges; the UN Office in West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS); the protection of civilians in armed conflict; the importance of international law, including the UN Charter; the role of science and technology in the UN’s work; and the UN Office in Central Africa.
The UNOWAS and UNOCA adoptions marked the first presidential statements on these files since 2021 and 2019, respectively, following several years in which the Council would typically adopt, in any one year, two presidential statements on UNOWAS and one on UNOCA. Switzerland and Sierra Leone were the co-penholders on the UNOWAS presidential statement, while Mozambique and the UK drafted the UNOCA presidential statement. As penholders, these countries not only led the drafting process but also guided the negotiations that broke the years-long impasse—which in both cases was primarily caused by climate-related language—and resulted in the adoption of these texts.
Key Working Methods Developments
There were several notable working methods developments in 2024. On 13 December, the Council adopted a revised Note 507, a compilation of all the Council’s working methods documents into a single document. Japan, as chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG), led the year-long negotiations. This is the fourth version of Note 507, which was initially adopted during Japan’s chairmanship of the IWG in 2006 (S/2006/507). New versions of Note 507 were released under Japan’s chairmanship of the IWG during its subsequent terms on the Council in 2010 and 2017.
The latest Note 507 incorporates the 15 presidential notes that were adopted since the last revision of Note 507 in August 2017 (S/2017/507). At a 20 December press stakeout, Ambassador Yamazaki Kazuyuki (Japan) underscored key elements of the new Note 507, including the importance of mitigating threats and risks of reprisals against briefers, recognition of the principle that all Council members should receive full access to relevant documents, and strengthened language on the collaboration between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.
While the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) still hold or co-hold the pen on most files, in 2024, the trend of elected members (E10) being penholders or sharing the pen with the P3 became further entrenched. Co-penholderships between permanent and elected members included: Slovenia and the US on political matters related to Ukraine; Ecuador and France on humanitarian issues related to Ukraine; Ecuador and the US on Haiti, including on sanctions; Sierra Leone and France on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including on sanctions; and Mozambique and the UK on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).
There were other examples of co-penholding between E10 and P3 members during the year. Japan and the US cooperated in drafting Council products in response to attacks by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen against commercial vessels in the Red Sea. In July, Malta and the US co-penned resolution 2744, which strengthened the mandate of the Focal Point for Delisting and established an Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General UN Sanctions Issues. Sierra Leone and the UK co-authored a draft resolution on the protection of civilians in Sudan that was vetoed by Russia in late November. Finally, Switzerland and the US co-authored resolution 2761, which was adopted in December and extended the application of the humanitarian carve-out established by resolution 2664 to the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime for an indefinite period.
As has been customary in recent years, E10 members served as sole penholders or co-penholders on Afghanistan (Japan), the Syria humanitarian file (Switzerland), and West Africa and the Sahel in 2024 (Sierra Leone and Switzerland). In addition, Guyana and Switzerland served as the informal co-focal points on conflict and hunger in 2024.
The E10’s contribution as a penholder was particularly significant in relation to the war in Gaza. Elected members were responsible for three of the five draft resolutions tabled for a vote on this situation: one was penned by Algeria in February and vetoed by the US, and two draft resolutions collectively were authored by the E10, one adopted in March and the other vetoed by the US in November. While the February and November drafts were vetoed by the US, the March draft—which was adopted as resolution 2728 and demanded an immediate ceasefire for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, leading to a “lasting sustainable ceasefire”—marked the first time that the E10 collectively penned a resolution.
The Council conducted one formal visiting mission in 2024 to Colombia in February. The goal of the four-day visit was to reaffirm the Council’s commitment to the peace process in the country. Three to five such trips were the norm in the years before the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Difficulty agreeing on the destination, a heavy workload, and possible reluctance to the visits by host governments appear to have contributed to fewer visiting missions.
Nonetheless, a new development since late 2023 has been the informal visiting mission. Unlike official visiting missions, which require unanimous agreement among Council members and are funded by the UN, informal visits have been initiated by a specific member state, with the organising or participating countries covering all or some of the costs. Switzerland organised an informal visit of 14 Council members to Geneva on 25-26 August 2024 to mark the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions and enhance the members’ understanding of their meaning and purpose.
The informal visiting mission appears to be a useful innovation at a time of significant division in the Council, although this tool is in its nascent stages. The first such visit occurred when 11 members of the Security Council and four incoming members travelled on 11 December 2023 to the Rafah crossing, which connects Gaza with Egypt, at the initiative of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The Commitments Continue and Expand
Council members Ecuador, France, Guyana, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and the US have given continuity to the Shared Commitments on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) initiative, which was started in 2021 by Ireland, Kenya, and Mexico. In this context, in 2024, some members participating in this initiative—Malta, ROK, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the US—included a WPS focus during meetings on a country situation on the Council’s agenda, on the Great Lakes in April, Sudan in June, Libya in August, and Afghanistan in September and December, respectively. In addition, 15 joint press stakeouts on the WPS commitments were held in the context of various issues in 2024, including Colombia (11 January and 15 October), Sudan (29 January and 18 June), Afghanistan (26 February, 18 September and 11 December), conflict prevention (13 March), conflict-related sexual violence (23 April), the Great Lakes region (24 April), drawdowns of peacekeeping operations (7 August), Libya (20 August), “Women building peace in a changing environment” (24 October), South Sudan (7 November), and intergenerational leadership (3 December).
Another notable development has been the “climate pledges” among Council members who would like to see more systematic integration of climate, peace and security matters into the Council’s work. On 22 March 2023, four members—Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, and the UAE—launched the “Joint Pledges related to climate, peace and security”. During 2024, the number of joint pledgers expanded to 11 Council members—France, Guyana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, ROK, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, the UK, and the US. In 2024, the climate pledgers held eight press stakeouts in connection with meetings on relevant country/regional and thematic files. These stakeouts highlighted the connections among climate, peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel and the activities of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) (11 January and 20 December), food Insecurity (13 February), Yemen (15 April and 13 November), Afghanistan (21 June), UN peacekeeping (9 September), and UN-AU Cooperation (2 October).
In 2024, the presidency trio for conflict prevention was launched by Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and Switzerland during their August, September, and October Council presidencies. Through this initiative, these countries committed to joint action for conflict prevention based on trust, solidarity, and universality—principles that must be reinvigorated for an effective collective security system, according to A New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General’s July 2023 report outlining ideas to prevent conflict and advance peace. In the coming year, Council members might expand this initiative to promote a more systematic approach by the Council to preventive action.
Challenges in the Year Ahead
In 2025, the Council will continue to face several difficult challenges around the world at a time when the body is more divided than at any time in the post-Cold War period. Major crises in Gaza and Ukraine are expected to continue to garner international attention. But they are only two of the often intractable, interconnected conflicts that will require skilful engagement and creative problem-solving from Council members.
The situation in the Middle East is particularly fluid. The Council will need to rethink its approach to Syria following the fall of the Assad government. This may provide opportunities to use Chapter VI tools to bring the parties together to help Syrians create a better future for their country. Restraining Iran’s nuclear activities will be on the minds of many members. The fragile peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon and the impact of the war in Gaza on Yemen will also need the Council’s attention.
The implementation of resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations may be a major focus of the Council in the upcoming year; the newly authorised AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) will be the first test case for the implementation of resolution 2719. In addition, the rising threat of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel should be a focus of the Council in 2025.
The Council’s work on peace operations and peacebuilding will likely be informed by the Secretary-General’s review of the future of all forms of UN peace operations and the Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR)—both scheduled for 2025. In this regard, it is possible that the Council will consider transforming the underfunded Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a UN peacekeeping operation. If the Council were to do this, it would be the first new peace operation in more than a decade.
The five new members—Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia—will hopefully bring new energy and ideas into the Council at a time of heightened geopolitical friction. They enter shortly before Donald J. Trump’s return to the White House on 20 January, which will likely be accompanied by a perceptible change in US policy. The new administration is likely to question the Council’s work on climate, peace and security, and object to certain aspects of the women, peace and security file. In addition, it is unclear what its approach to the war in Ukraine will be, while it is likely to be as supportive, if not more so, of the positions of the Israeli government than the Biden administration. In addition, it may question the value of US support for UN peace operations, and for the UN in general.
As they grapple with the challenges in the year ahead, members need to find ways of rebuilding trust and finding common ground. In this regard, the revival since late 2023 of “sofa talks”, which take place in a very informal setting and are meant to allow for frank discussion of difficult issues, is a promising development.
In the current difficult environment, Council members may also wish to seek ideas and inspiration from A Pact for the Future agreed through inter-governmental negotiations in September 2024, particularly its action points relevant to international peace and security. In this regard, Security Council Report recently released a policy paper that analyses the peace and security elements of the Pact and offers recommendations that they can pursue in implementing the Pact. We hope that Council members find it useful in 2025 and the years beyond.
