Counter-Terrorism
Expected Council Action
In January, Algeria plans to convene a meeting on counter-terrorism in Africa. Details regarding the meeting were still being finalised at the time of writing, however it appears that the meeting will be high-level and is likely to focus on terrorism and its impact on sustainable development. It also seems that Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed, African Union (AU) Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye, and former UN and AU official Said Djinnit will be requested to brief. This will be one of Algeria’s signature events during its presidency, and a presidential statement may be proposed in connection with the meeting.
Background
The threat posed by terrorism in Africa has risen significantly during recent years. In remarks delivered in April 2024, Mohammed said that “the epicentre of terrorism has shifted from the Middle East and North Africa into sub-Saharan Africa, concentrated largely in the Sahel region”.
While Africa has experienced protracted and expanding terrorist violence for many years, this trend began to accelerate notably earlier this decade. The 28th report of the Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (1267 Monitoring Team), which was published on 21 July 2021, noted that “the most striking development of the period under review was the emergence of Africa as the region most affected by terrorism”.
Since the publication of this report, the situation appears to have deteriorated further. The latest biannual strategic-level report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL/Da’esh, which was issued on 31 July 2024, says that the Secretary-General remains “concerned about the threat of terrorism in parts of Africa, in particular the risk that the continued expansion of terrorist groups results in an expanding area of instability across West Africa and the Sahel should Da’esh affiliates enjoy greater operational, financial and logistical autonomy”. It describes the magnitude and complexity of the problem as “alarming” and notes that “concerted action” is required.
During the open briefing on this report held on 8 August 2024, Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism and Head of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Vladimir Voronkov noted that two Da’esh affiliates in West Africa and the Sahel—Islamic State West Africa Province and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS)—have expanded and consolidated their areas of operation and highlighted the possibility that “a vast territory stretching from Mali to northern Nigeria could fall under their effective control”.
The situation is particularly serious in the central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where Al-Qaida affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and ISGS frequently attack security forces and civilians and have previously blockaded towns. The violence has contributed to the displacement of more than two million people and killed thousands more, and is also threatening neighbouring states. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have, for example, suffered attacks in their northern regions bordering Burkina Faso. Nigeria is another state in the region grappling with terrorist violence, particularly as a result of the long-running insurgency waged by Boko Haram and its splinter groups.
Efforts to respond to this threat are in a period of flux. Over the past two years, France’s decade-long counter-terrorism operations have ended in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, while the US has recently withdrawn its troops, which had been involved in counter-terrorism operations, from Niger. Against this backdrop, the three central Sahel states have also increased their military cooperation with Russia. As part of this geopolitical realignment, the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S), which was established in 2017 by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad to combat terrorism and organised crime, has dissolved. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—which are governed by military juntas that took power through coup d’état over recent years—in September 2023 formed the Alliance of Sahel States, or l’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), as an organisation of collective defence following their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African states in January 2024.
On 7 July 2024, the possibility of deploying a regional counter-terrorism force was discussed during the ECOWAS summit in Abuja. The final communiqué issued in connection with the summit instructed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to “facilitate further consultations on modalities and options for mobilising internal financial and material resources on a mandatory basis to support the activation of the regional counter-terrorism force”. It also directed him to explore “resource mobilisation opportunities” with the AU Commission, including within the framework of resolution 2719, which authorised support for AU-led peace support operations through UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. Subsequently, the panel’s report and recommendations were considered by the UN-AU High-Level Conference in Addis Ababa on 21 October, where the two organisations agreed to jointly advance the panel’s key recommendations through their respective organs and institutional mechanisms.
The deployment of a counter-terrorism force in the region was discussed in the latest report of the Secretary-General on the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, which called for “the acceleration and full operationalisation of the Accra Initiative and the ECOWAS Standby Force in line with its 2020-2024 action plan to combat terrorism in West Africa”.
Other security mechanisms in the region include the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, which was created to fight Boko Haram. Following a 28 October 2024 attack reportedly carried out by Boko Haram that killed 40 Chadian soldiers, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby reportedly threatened to withdraw from the MNJTF, which comprises troops from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.
Incoming Council member Somalia also continues to grapple with a serious terrorist threat. The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, dated 15 October 2024, noted that Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to the peace and security of Somalia and said that its ability to carry out complex attacks against the Somali government, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and international forces remains undiminished. Da’esh is also active in the country, as discussed in the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Da’esh, which notes that its affiliate in Somalia “grew stronger, expanding the number of recruits and enhancing its financial infrastructure”. On 27 December 2024, the Council adopted resolution 2767 endorsing the AU Peace and Security Council’s decision to replace ATMIS with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is expected to have an important role to play in responding to the terrorist threat in Somalia.
Outgoing Council member Mozambique is battling an insurgency by Da’esh affiliate Ahl al-Sunna Wal-Jama’a (ASWJ) in its northern Cabo Delgado Province. The latest report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, which was issued on 22 July 2024, says that ASWJ has sought to broaden the theatre of conflict and is facing “much less resistance given the drawdown of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). (First authorised in July 2021, SAMIM comprised up to 2,000 troops from eight SADC member states and withdrew from Mozambique in July 2024. Rwanda, which is not a member of SADC, has also sent soldiers to fight against ASWJ, who remain in the country.) The report further notes that ASWJ’s tactics are more sophisticated, calculated and well-executed.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), authorities are dealing with violent attacks carried out by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). According to the July 2024 report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, there was a dramatic increase in ADF attacks during the first half of 2024, with 260 civilians killed in the months of May and June alone.
From 22 to 23 April 2024, Nigeria hosted the “High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting” in Abuja. The meeting was attended by senior UN officials, representatives of regional organisations, member states—including the permanent members of the Security Council—and civil society organisations. The “Abuja process”, an initiative designed to coordinate and mobilise resources for counter-terrorism in the African region, was launched in connection with this meeting.
Several African member states have held signature events on counter-terrorism in recent years. In March 2023, Mozambique organised a high-level debate on “Countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism by strengthening cooperation between the UN and regional organisations and mechanisms”. In November 2022, Ghana held a high-level debate on “Counter-terrorism in Africa—an imperative for peace, security, and development”. In October 2022, Gabon organised a high-level debate on “Strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources”. Sierra Leone also organised an Arria-formula meeting on “Combatting the rise of terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel” in June 2024.
Key Issues and Options
The spread of terrorist groups in Africa and the significant rise in terrorist violence on the continent, including in many of the African files on the Council’s agenda, have created a major issue for the Council. There is growing concern, in particular, about the stability of the AES countries as they grapple with terrorist groups intensifying their attacks and expanding their territorial control. The growth in terrorist activity in these countries has also raised concerns among Council members that these groups will expand into coastal West African states.
One option would be to request a briefing on options for enhancing security and responding to the terrorist threat in the Sahel region. This could include, for example, proposals for the deployment of an AU peace support operation largely funded through resolution 2719 or developing a mechanism for the provision of logistical and operational support for regional counter-terrorism initiatives. Council members could also request that this briefing include information on the contents of the report of the Independent High-level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel (that is, the Issoufou Panel), which focuses on strategies for tackling security and development challenges in the Sahel. The report has been shared with the UN Secretariat, but Council members have not had access to it.
Many African member states are also confronted by the need to allocate part of their national budgets to counter-terrorism, which diverts much-needed funds from social services and government programmes intended to facilitate development.
In March 2020, the Council adopted a presidential statement on the threat posed by terrorism in Africa. Among other matters, the presidential statement emphasised that the presence of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism can undermine social and economic development in affected states. It also underscored the importance of a holistic approach to counter-terrorism and efforts to address the development and socioeconomic dimensions of the challenge posed by terrorist groups.
The relationship between sustainable development and counter-terrorism was also highlighted in General Assembly resolution 77/298 on the eighth review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted on 22 June 2023. The preambular part of this resolution recognised, for example, that achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can contribute to the implementation of the strategy and noted that development has a role to play in the prevention of terrorism.
Council members could choose to highlight the points regarding counter-terrorism and development raised in these products in their statements during the meeting. If a presidential statement is pursued, it could build on these points and elaborate them further. A briefing from UN entities working on these issues, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), could also be requested in connection with the meeting.
Council Dynamics
Council members share concerns about the spread of terrorism in Africa, including to previously unaffected sub-regions, and its impact on civilians. Members are also generally supportive of efforts to combat terrorism, however there are some differences among members regarding the best approach to managing the response to the terrorist threat. Some Council members favour an approach that is founded on human rights, addressing the root causes of terrorism and the involvement of civil society, while other members focus more closely on security and law enforcement.
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 31 July 2024S/2024/583 | This was the Secretary-General’s 19th report on the threat posed by ISIL/Da’esh to international peace and security. |
| 2 December 2024S/2024/871 | This was a report on West Africa and the Sahel and the activities of UNOWAS. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 21 July 2021S/2021/655 | This letter transmitted the 28th report of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. |
| 15 October 2024S/2024/748 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions committee. |
| 22 July 2024S/2024/556 | This letter transmitted the 34th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) sanctions committee. |
