Yemen
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will hold its monthly meeting on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief.
The mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) expires on 14 July 2025.
Key Recent Developments
On 13 November, Council members held their monthly meeting on Yemen in closed consultations. Grundberg and OCHA Head in Geneva and Director of the Coordination Division Ramesh Rajasingham briefed. It seems that the Special Envoy reiterated his concerns about the escalating regional tensions amid fallout from the Israel-Hamas war and their negative effects on his mediation efforts. One permanent Council member apparently argued that the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebel group were willing to sign a political roadmap and questioned the link between the regional escalation and the internal political process. Grundberg is said to have responded that even if a political roadmap is signed, its implementation would be difficult given the situation in the wider region. At the same time, he emphasised that an agreement between the sides was still possible, while reiterating that support from the region and the international community more broadly was needed in order to re-open the space for mediation.
As the political process stalls, the economic situation in the country continues to deteriorate, pushing many Yemenis into poverty. A 31 October World Bank report noted that the Houthis’ ongoing blockade of oil exports had contributed to a 42 percent drop in fiscal revenues for the Yemeni government in the first half of 2024, preventing the government from providing essential services to the population. In light of the volatile environment in Yemen—including the effects of the regional escalation and the economic warfare waged by both sides against each other—the prospects for resuming oil exports and restoring unrestricted internal transport, trade, and finance “appear remote”, according to the report. It emphasised, however, that “a durable truce and peace agreement could pave the way for swift economic recovery, supported by external assistance, reconstruction efforts, and post conflict reforms”. At the 13 November meeting, Grundberg apparently referenced his efforts to prepare the groundwork for potential progress on economic recovery in the future, including the resumption of oil and gas exports and the resumption of pension distributions to civil servants.
Another area of discussion during the 13 November meeting was the Houthis’ ongoing detention of national UN staff and other personnel from civil society organisations. The briefers and many Council members apparently reiterated calls for the immediate and unconditional release of the detained staff and expressed concern regarding the reported referral of some personnel for “criminal prosecution”. It seems that Rajasingham updated members about OCHA’s programme prioritisation exercise that aims to minimise staff exposure to risk in Houthi-controlled areas. He is said to have noted that OCHA and the UN Country Team in Yemen are reviewing the programming in Houthi-controlled areas with utmost care to ensure that life-saving assistance continues to reach all in need. Rajasingham apparently also reported that OCHA is consulting extensively with donors to finalise the list of activities that will be de-prioritised, while noting that some programmes have already been suspended.
Prior to the closed consultations on 13 November, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2758, a straightforward renewal of the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 15 November 2025. (The targeted arms embargo on the Houthis established through resolution 2216 in April 2015 is open-ended.)
On 18 November, Council members issued a press statement marking one year since the 19 November 2023 Houthi attack and seizure of the MV Galaxy Leader, a Japanese-operated vessel affiliated with an Israeli businessman. The statement demanded the immediate release of the vessel and its 25 crew members. Among other things, members condemned the continued Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and stressed the importance of the UN targeted arms embargo in “curbing risks to the maritime security of vessels along the coast of Yemen”. The text was authored by Japan and the US, the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
Key Issues and Options
Insulating Yemen from destabilising regional tensions and reinvigorating the stalled intra-Yemeni political process are overarching priorities for the Council. Members are likely to continue to call on Yemeni parties to exercise restraint and to take confidence-building measures to create conditions conducive to the resumption of talks. In this regard, members could encourage implementation of the economic de-escalation agreement reached on 23 July between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.
The conflict’s harmful effects on children in Yemen are another matter of concern. The final report of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, dated 11 October, said that the Houthis had recruited large numbers of Yemeni youth and children, with confidential sources reporting 142 cases of recruitment and use in Yemen between 15 September 2023 and 31 July. The report also noted the Houthis’ use of “summer camps”, where children “are indoctrinated with jihad ideology and trained in combat skills”. It referenced reports of children being shot by Houthi forces in or near these camps and incidents of sexual violence against children in the camps. An option for the Council would be to invite to its next Yemen meeting a briefer who can discuss ways to address violations committed against children, such as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Virginia Gamba or a UNICEF representative. This session could be held in closed consultations to allow for a frank exchange. The 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee could also invite Gamba to brief the committee. Her last such briefing took place in June 2022.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united in their support for achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen. However, some divisions have deepened since the eruption of the Red Sea crisis in November 2023. The P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have criticised the Houthis’ destabilising actions, while Council members such as Algeria, China, and Russia have emphasised that ending the conflict in Gaza is critical to resolving the crisis in the Red Sea.
Some of the Council’s permanent members have exchanged recriminations during Council meetings on Yemen, with the US alleging that Russia is considering transferring weapons to the Houthis and Russia saying that retaliatory strikes by the UK and the US against the Houthis were destabilising the situation in Yemen. The UK and the US have also been calling for the Council to take further action to impede Iran’s supply of arms to the Houthis, including by strengthening the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to ensure compliance with the arms embargo against the group.
The UK, the penholder on Yemen, apparently chose to pursue a straightforward renewal of the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime because of the complex Council dynamics on the file in the past year. After the adoption of resolution 2758, Russia argued that a straightforward renewal was “optimal in the current circumstances”, since it helped to preserve Council unity against the backdrop of heightened regional instability. Some aspects of the negotiations were apparently difficult, as the US made several proposals aimed at strengthening the text that were unpalatable to some other members. These included a provision imposing an assets freeze on the Houthis as an entity. Speaking after the vote, the US regretted the Council’s inability to adopt further measures that could help curtail the Houthis’ destabilising activities in the region and urged the Council to use all the tools at its disposal, including targeted sanctions, to address the threat posed by the group. (For more information, see our 12 November What’s in Blue story.)
It seems that some members have opted to pursue options outside the Council to strengthen support for Yemen. For instance, the US has noted that it has provided one million dollars to UNVIM and has called on other member states to make additional contributions to the mechanism. Additionally, on 19 November, the Permanent Mission of the UK to the UN hosted an event to launch the “Yemen Maritime Security Partnership”, a multinational body chaired by the Yemeni government through which member states could support the Yemeni Coast Guard. As part of this initiative, the UK announced that it will provide boats, training, and assistance to the Yemeni Coast Guard to help it protect Yemen’s coasts, which will help guarantee the freedom of navigation and “contribute to the limitation” of the UK’s involvement in the Red Sea.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 13 November 2024S/RES/2758 | This resolution renewed the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 15 November 2025. It also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2025. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 18 November 2024SC/15904 | This press statement marked one year since the Houthis’ seizure of MV Galaxy Leader and called for the release of the vessel and its crew. |
