West Africa and the Sahel
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will hold a briefing on West Africa and the Sahel. The Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Leonardo Santos Simão, is expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
Simão’s latest briefing to the Council on the situation in West Africa was on 12 July. During the session, he expressed concern about rising insecurity and humanitarian crises in West Africa, as well as a lack of cooperation among countries in the region to address these challenges. He referred in particular to the difficult relations between some countries in the region and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this regard, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—three countries led by military juntas that came to power through coups d’état—created the Alliance of Sahel States or l’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) in September 2023 and jointly announced on 28 January that they were withdrawing from ECOWAS. The decision reflected deteriorating relations between the three countries and ECOWAS in recent years, as the regional bloc sought to pressure military authorities to restore constitutional order. On 6 July, the leaders of the three AES countries convened in Niamey for their first summit, during which they signed a treaty designed to strengthen military and economic ties among them.
Terrorist attacks continue to undermine stability in the Sahel. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a non-profit research organisation which gathers and assesses data on political violence globally, reported fatalities across the AES countries “reached a record-high 7,620 in the first half of 2024—an increase of 9% compared to the same period in 2023, 37% compared to 2022, and a staggering 190% compared to 2021.” The AES countries are also losing large swaths of territories to terrorist groups. This appears to be the case in the Malian regions of Gao and Menaka and in Burkina Faso, which has reportedly lost almost half of its territory to terrorist groups. Al-Qaida affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) killed approximately 200 people in Barsalogho, Burkina Faso, on 24 August. On 17 September, JNIM attacked a police academy and the international airport in Bamako, Mali, killing scores of people. Council members condemned these attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali in press statements issued on 29 August and 20 September, respectively. At least seven military personnel from Russia’s Africa Corps reportedly died in clashes with JNIM in central Mali on 22 November.
Mali continues to face political instability. On 20 November, President Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, fired his prime minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, following a 16 November speech in which Maïga criticised the government for postponing the holding of elections to return Mali to democratic rule. Goïta appointed Major General Abdoulaye Maïga as the new prime minister on 21 November. Some analysts see the appointment of General Maïga, a Goïta ally unrelated to his predecessor, as a sign that the military is consolidating its control over the country. Issa Kaou N’Djim, a Malian politician, was detained on 13 November after he claimed that the military leaders in neighbouring Burkina Faso had fabricated evidence of a failed coup attempt in that country. He was reportedly charged with disparaging the leader of a foreign state.
On 25 May, Burkina Faso’s military leaders extended the country’s transition to civilian government by an additional five years, starting on 2 July 2024, following a national consultation in Ouagadougou—which most political parties boycotted. When the head of the country’s military junta, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, took power in a September 2022 coup, he had promised to return Burkina Faso to civilian rule by 1 July 2024.
In keeping with Niger’s announcement in March that it was ending its military cooperation with the US, the US completed the withdrawal of its 1,100 military personnel in Niger in mid-September. The US had operated two airbases in the country, conducting counter-terrorism operations. At the same time, the Nigerien government has established military ties with Moscow, with Russian forces arriving in Niamey in April.
On 7 July, the possibility of deploying a regional counter-terrorism force was discussed during the ECOWAS summit in Abuja. In this regard, the summit directed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to consult with the AU, particularly within the framework of resolution 2719 (on financial support for AU peace support operations through UN- assessed contributions) and the outcomes of the review conducted by the Issoufou panel that was launched in 2022 to conduct a strategic assessment of “the underlying challenges in the Sahel”. Subsequently, the panel’s report and recommendations were considered by the UN-AU High-Level Conference in Addis Ababa on 21 October, where the two organisations agreed to jointly advance the panel’s key recommendations through their respective organs and institutional mechanisms.
Key Issues and Options
The threat of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel region is a key issue. There seems to be growing concern about the stability of the AES countries in the face of terrorist groups intensifying their attacks and expanding control of territories. There is also the risk that Sahel-based terrorist groups will expand into coastal West African states. How the Council might support counter-terrorism security mechanisms—such as the AES, the Accra Initiative, and the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin—to counter this threat is a key issue.
The political transitions and restoration of constitutional order in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger is another key issue, as is the region’s surge in attempted coups d’état.
Addressing structural conflict drivers in the Sahel, such as poor governance, under-development, and climate change, through the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) or other avenues remains a key issue.
The humanitarian situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin and violations against civilians by Sahel countries’ militaries also remain significant concerns.
One option for the Council would be to request a briefing from the Secretary-General on options for enhancing security in the Sahel region. This could include, for example, proposals for the deployment of an AU peace support operation largely funded through resolution 2719 or developing a mechanism for the provision of logistical and operational support for regional counter-terrorism initiatives (such as the Accra Initiative or the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin). The Secretary-General could convey to Council members the contents of the report of the Independent High-level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel (that is, the Issoufou Panel), which focuses on strategies for tackling security and development challenges in the Sahel. The report has been shared with the UN Secretariat, but Council members have not had access to it.
Council members could also consider holding a closed Arria-formula meeting or an informal interactive dialogue with ECOWAS representatives to discuss strategies for how the Council can most effectively collaborate with this sub-regional body to enhance security in West Africa and the Sahel.
Given that the Council meets less frequently on the Sahel region since the closure of the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the termination of the Mali sanctions regime in 2024, another option is for members to request ad hoc briefings when developments in the Sahel warrant Council attention.
Council Dynamics
There is broad concern in the Council about the threat of terrorism and the dire humanitarian crises affecting West Africa and the Sahel. However, Council discussion on this region has become increasingly divisive in recent years. The US and European members are worried about Russia’s growing influence in the region and its ties with the military juntas. While Russia supports the views of the AES states in the Council, several members are troubled by the unconstitutional changes of government in the region. Sierra Leone, a West African country, is among those members who believe it is important for the Council to maintain attention to the region, including how it might support regional efforts to prevent terrorist violence from expanding into coastal countries.
Sierra Leone and Switzerland are co-penholders on UNOWAS.
| Security Council Presidential Statement | |
| 24 May 2024S/PRST/2024/3 | This presidential statement welcomed the appointment in May 2023 of Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão; highlighted the importance of addressing the underlying conditions conducive to terrorism; and underscored the importance of the timely, nationally owned transition processes and restoration of constitutional order in concerned regional countries. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 12 July 2024S/PV.9685 | This was a meeting record on “Peace consolidation in West Africa”. |
