Iran
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council is expected to convene a briefing on the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme.
The Council will also receive reports from its 2231 facilitator, Ambassador Vanessa Frazier (Malta), and the Joint Commission, which was established to oversee the implementation of the JCPOA and comprises the current parties to the agreement: China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and Iran. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo, Frazier, and a representative of the European Union (EU) in its capacity as coordinator of the Joint Commission are expected to brief the Council.
Background
In May 2018, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the US, which was originally a signatory to the JCPOA, was withdrawing from the agreement and went on to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran. Although Iran formally remained in the JCPOA, it took steps that directly contravene its terms, including enriching uranium to levels beyond the JCPOA-mandated limits and removing cameras and monitoring equipment required by the agreement.
In August 2020, referring to those violations, the US tabled a draft Security Council resolution that would have indefinitely extended the arms-related restrictions on Iran that were set to expire later that year under resolution 2231. After the draft resolution failed to garner the requisite number of votes for adoption, the US claimed that it had triggered the “snapback mechanism”, which is a provision in resolution 2231 that allows any party to the agreement to reinstate the UN sanctions against Iran that were in place prior to the JCPOA. Other Council members argued that this move was invalid because of the US withdrawal from the agreement, however.
Following the election of current US President Joseph Biden, the US, Iran, and other parties to the JCPOA began talks in April 2021 in Vienna to revive the agreement. Those discussions progressed until August 2022, when the EU circulated what it described as a final draft agreement. Iran reportedly insisted as a condition for accepting the deal that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) close its investigation into traces of enriched uranium that it had discovered at three undeclared sites in Iran in 2019. The US and European parties to the JCPOA objected to this demand, which they viewed as a separate issue related to Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the country’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, which every non-nuclear NPT state party is required to conclude with the IAEA to ensure that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. In a November 2022 resolution, the IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran and directed it to comply with the IAEA’s investigation. In response, Iran announced that it had started enriching uranium to 60 percent purity at its Fordow nuclear facility, approaching the roughly 90 percent level required to produce a nuclear weapon and well above the 3.67 percent limit imposed by the JCPOA.
With negotiations to revive the JCPOA stalled, Iran has continued to expand its production of highly enriched uranium and its cooperation with the IAEA has grown increasingly strained. After the IAEA’s February 2023 quarterly verification and monitoring report said that the agency had detected traces of uranium enriched to 83.7 percent at the Fordow facility—a near weapons-grade level that Iran claimed was accidental—the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran issued a 4 March 2023 joint statement permitting the IAEA to conduct additional “verification and monitoring activities”, but little progress has been made since then in implementing those commitments. Additionally, in September 2023, Iran withdrew the designation of several IAEA inspectors assigned to conduct verification activities in Iran under the NPT Safeguards Agreement.
Key Recent Developments
At its June quarterly meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a new resolution censuring Iran, put forward by France, Germany, and the UK (known within the Joint Commission as the “E3” countries). Referring to the above disputes, the resolution called on Iran to fulfil its NPT-required safeguards obligations, implement the 4 March 2023 joint statement, and re-certify IAEA inspectors, among other actions.
The IAEA’s most recent verification and monitoring report, dated 19 November, documented a further increase in Iran’s uranium stockpiles. It estimated that the country held a total of 182.3 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium, an increase of 17.6 kilograms from the agency’s previous report and enough to reduce the country’s “breakout capacity”—the amount of time that it would take to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon—to “one week or less”, according to a 21 November technical analysis of the IAEA’s findings by the non-partisan Institute for Science and International Security. However, the IAEA report also noted that during high-level discussions between the agency and Iran in mid-November, Iranian officials discussed the possibility of halting the country’s production of 60-percent enriched uranium and later took preparatory steps to do so at two of the country’s nuclear facilities.
In a joint statement at the November meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, the E3 described Iran’s proposed concession as “long overdue” yet still insufficient and called on Iran to also “immediately dispose” of its existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium and to comply with its obligations under the NPT, JCPOA, and 4 March 2023 joint statement. The E3 then introduced another resolution censuring Iran, which referred to the country’s “continued failure” to cooperate with the IAEA and requested the agency to produce a “comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme”. The resolution was adopted with 19 votes in favour, three against (Burkina Faso, China, and Russia), and 12 abstentions.
On 28 July, Masoud Pezeshkian assumed office as President of Iran, following elections to succeed former president Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a 28 May helicopter crash. A former surgeon and lawmaker who is considered a political moderate, Pezeshkian has expressed greater interest than his predecessor in resuming nuclear talks with the West. In his 24 September address at the general debate of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, he said that his country was “ready to engage” on the issue, and that “[i]f JCPOA commitments are implemented fully and in good faith, dialogue on other issues can follow”. In response to the November resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, however, Iranian officials announced that they would launch a new series of advanced centrifuges, which would further increase the country’s enrichment capacity. It remained unclear at the time of writing whether Iranian authorities still intended to implement their commitment to halt production of 60-percent enriched uranium.
While JCPOA negotiations remain dormant, continued regional fall-out from the Israel-Hamas war has sharply raised geopolitical tensions and further weakened prospects for reviving the deal. In April, Iran and Israel engaged in direct military confrontation for the first time when Iran launched drone and missile strikes against Israel in response to the latter’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Israel retaliated by striking an air defence battery in Iran. Subsequently, following Israel’s assassinations of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut in September, Iran conducted another attack against Israel on 1 October, launching approximately 200 ballistic missiles at the country, most of which were intercepted by Israeli and US air defence systems. On 25 October, in retaliation for that assault, Israel launched airstrikes that hit Iranian missile manufacturing plants and air defence systems, as well as an undeclared nuclear research facility, according to media reports. The Security Council held meetings on 14 April, 2 October, and 25 October to discuss the exchange of attacks.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 1 November, Mai Sato, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, presented her first report to the Third Committee of the General Assembly, identifying three priority areas for her mandate: transparency, gender, and the right to life. Sato emphasised her commitment to adopting a gendered and intersectional approach in assessing the human rights of all Iranians. She also voiced concern over the state’s response to the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement and over the Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab. Regarding the right to life, she stated that her examination would focus on “not only the use of the death penalty, but also on the lethal use of force by State agencies, deaths in custody, laws that condone or excuse the killings, and practices that fail to properly investigate potential unlawful deaths”. The Special Rapporteur called on Iran to engage in direct communications and grant her unhindered access to the country.
In a 13 September press release, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Iran warned that the Iranian government had escalated its suppression of the fundamental rights and activism of women and girls—two years after the unlawful death in custody of 22-year-old Jina Mahsa Amini sparked the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement. The FFM stated that security forces had intensified entrenched patterns of physical violence, “including beating, kicking, and slapping women and girls who are perceived as failing to comply with the mandatory hijab laws”.
On 2 September, UN experts raised alarm over a surge in executions in Iran, with at least 93 individuals executed in August—double the 45 executions reported in July. The experts noted that 41 of these executions were for drug offences, contravening international standards that limit the use of the death penalty to the “most serious crimes”. They urged Iran to immediately stop the execution of individuals sentenced to death.
Key Issues and Options
As the prospects for reviving the JCPOA grow increasingly remote, the key issue for the Security Council is how to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Analysts have suggested that Iran’s actions since the US withdrawal from the agreement, including its uranium enrichment activities, are likely to make a return to the original terms of the agreement and full compliance with those terms difficult. This is in part because of the institutional knowledge acquired by Iran’s nuclear programme and the IAEA’s diminished monitoring capabilities, which prevent it from establishing a new baseline against which to measure compliance with a future agreement. The Iranian government’s apparent support for Hamas in Gaza and the Russian war effort in Ukraine have also made reviving the JCPOA politically difficult—if not impossible—for Western countries.
In this context, it appears that a scaled-back deal offering Iran more limited sanctions relief in exchange for more modest restrictions on its nuclear activities may be the most plausible negotiated option currently under consideration by JCPOA parties.
Alternatively, if Council members decide that no agreement is viable, they could initiate the snapback mechanism. The P3 countries—France, the UK, and the US under President Biden—have typically maintained that their “red line” for initiating the snapback is the detection of weapons-grade uranium in Iran, but that calculus may change if geopolitical tensions continue to rise and as the October 2025 expiration of the JCPOA approaches.
The comprehensive report on Iran’s nuclear activities requested by the IAEA Board of Governors at its November meeting could inform Council members’ decision on whether to pursue a new agreement or initiate the snapback.
Council Dynamics
The P3 and other Western countries remain concerned about Iranian activities that contravene the JCPOA, the country’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and what they consider to be its destabilising support for its proxy groups in the Middle East and for Russia in Ukraine. While these countries assert that they remain committed to a negotiated deal if Iran takes steps to alter its behaviour, Western unity could fracture upon Trump’s return as US president next year, as his administration may be less willing than the current one to consider diplomatic efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear activities.
China and Russia, for their part, remain supportive of Iran. Both countries have previously blamed the US for the collapse of the JCPOA, criticising it for withdrawing from the deal and imposing unilateral sanctions on the Iranian regime. They have alsoconsistently voted against the censure resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 20 July 2015S/RES/2231 | This was a resolution that endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 19 June 2024S/2024/471 | This was the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231. |
