Briefing by the Outgoing Chairs of the Security Council’s Subsidiary Bodies
Expected Council Action
As is customary in December, the outgoing chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies are expected to provide a briefing on their experiences. The representatives of the five members completing their two-year terms on the Council at the end of 2024 and the subsidiary bodies they each chaired are:
- Ambassador Pedro Comissário Afonso (Mozambique)—the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa;
- Ambassador Pascale Baeriswyl (Switzerland)—the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee;
- Ambassador Vanessa Frazier (Malta)—the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict;
- Ambassador Andrés Montalvo Sosa (Ecuador)—the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee and the 1540 Committee (non-proliferation); and
- Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki (Japan)—the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, and the Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions.
Background
The practice of briefings by the outgoing chairs of subsidiary bodies was established during the Colombian presidency of the Council in December 2002. It is considered an important aspect of promoting transparency in the work of the sanctions committees and working groups. Since not all subsidiary bodies produce an annual report, this December briefing has also served over the years as a means of creating a publicly accessible institutional memory of these bodies’ activities.
Key Recent Developments
At this briefing, the chairs will be able to review developments within their committee or working group during their two-year term, assess their experience, suggest recommendations for improvements, and provide advice to their respective successors.
Ambassador Pedro Comissário Afonso (Mozambique) may highlight the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa in facilitating the annual consultative meeting between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council in the past two years. He may also mention the Working Group’s contribution to facilitating discussions in May and July on the implementation of resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations. Additionally, he may refer to the joint meeting with the Working Group on peacekeeping operations held in August to provide Council members with the opportunity to discuss the drawdown, reconfiguration and exit of UN peace operations.
As the chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Pascale Baeriswyl (Switzerland) is likely to mention that the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the Committee expired on 30 April after Russia vetoed a resolution that would have extended the mandate in late March. She could also refer to the Committee’s June 2023 decision to update its guidelines for obtaining exemptions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Ambassador Vanessa Frazier chaired two committees during Malta’s Council term. Regarding the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Frazier is likely to refer to the adoption of resolution 2734 of 10 June, which extended the mandates of the 1267 Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson for another three years, until June 2027. Frazier could also mention the findings of the latest report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, which was issued on 22 July. Among other matters, the report indicates that there is heightened concern among member states regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups based in Afghanistan. It also says that contiguous territorial gains by ISIL affiliates in the Sahel have continued to threaten regional security and stability and notes that groups in West Africa have improved their coordination.
In briefing about the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Ambassador Frazier might highlight the unprecedented levels of violence perpetrated against children in armed conflict in the past year. In this regard, the Secretary-General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 3 June, documented 32,990 grave violations against children, of which 30,705 were committed in 2023 and 2,285 were committed earlier but verified in 2023. Frazier might emphasise that the conclusions issued by the Working Group play an important role in encouraging conflict parties to take concrete action aimed at preventing and ending violations against children. The Working Group has adopted conclusions on 11 country situations during Malta’s two-year chairmanship. Frazier may stress the importance of the Working Group following up on the implementation of its conclusions, including through holding videoconference briefings with relevant UN Country Task Forces on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMRs) and by conducting country visits. In this regard, Frazier may note that the Working Group travelled to Nigeria in July 2023. At the time of writing, the Working Group was scheduled to conduct a visit to Colombia in early December.
As part of his briefing, Ambassador Andrés Montalvo Sosa (Ecuador) will cover the work of the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee. He might highlight the findings of the latest report of the Monitoring Team assisting the Committee, which was issued on 8 July. According to the report, member states remain concerned by the Taliban’s ability to manage the threat posed by ISIL-K and are also worried about Al-Qaida’s activities in the country.
Ambassador Montalvo has also chaired the 1540 Committee. He is expected to highlight the important role that resolution 1540 plays in the global non-proliferation architecture. (Adopted in 2004, resolution 1540 aims to prevent non-state actors from obtaining access to weapons of mass destruction and encourages enhanced cooperation in this regard.) He may refer to the importance of voluntary national implementation action plans, which are intended to help member states identify their priorities for implementing resolution 1540. During this year’s annual briefing from the chairs of the counter-terrorism-related committees, Montalvo said that 38 states had submitted a total of 47 national implementation plans to the 1540 Committee. He added that nine states had designated their national points of contact to the Committee this year, bringing the total number to 155 countries. Montalvo is also likely to cover the Committee’s outreach activities, such as the open briefing for member states mandated by resolution 2663 held on 9 and 10 October. (Resolution 2663 was adopted on 30 November 2022 and renewed the 1540 Committee’s mandate for ten years.) In 2024, the Committee participated in 32 outreach events organised by member states and international, regional and subregional organisations and relevant civil society.
Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki will speak about the three subsidiary bodies Japan has chaired. He may describe the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee‘s continued work in support of the Council’s overall objective of securing peace and stability in Libya, including through sustained engagement with the Libyan Investment Authority about the possible reallocation of the fund’s investments. Yamazaki may also offer his reflections on the upcoming renewal of the sanctions measures and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the Committee, which is expected to take place in January 2025.
Ambassador Yamazaki may also describe his experience serving as the chair of the Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023). He may note that the Committee met four times in informal consultations this year, including a meeting on 11 October to deliberate on the Panel of Experts’ final report, which was circulated to Council members on 25 October. The report noted that Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to the peace and security of Somalia and that its ability to carry out complex attacks against the Somali government, ATMIS, and international forces remains undiminished. Of the 18 recommendations provided in the report, 15 are under Committee consideration. Yamazaki is also likely to highlight the Committee’s decision to add three individuals to its sanctions list on 21 May.
Japan has also been the chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) since 1 January 2024. As part of his briefing, Ambassador Yamazaki is expected to cover the activities of the IWG over the last year. The IWG held formal meetings every four months or so, holding three meetings so far in 2024. Yamazaki is expected to brief on the progress made in updating Note 507 (this is the note of the Security Council containing the compendium of its working methods) to incorporate the presidential notes adopted since 2017. Members continue to negotiate the draft updated Note 507, and at press time it was unclear when the IWG would adopt the revised Note 507. Kazuyuki may also cover the debate on working methods held during Japan’s presidency in March, which focused on the implementation of Note 507.
Council Dynamics
The divide over sanctions is particularly stark between the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and others, on the one hand, and China, Russia, and African countries, on the other. The P3 often maintain that measures like arms embargoes and targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, are essential for mitigating violence and supporting the implementation of peace agreements. In contrast, China, Russia, and African members of the Council acknowledge sanctions as a useful tool but criticise cases where sanctions remain in place for years without adjustments to account for progress. Russia and others have also accused Western countries of downplaying the humanitarian impacts of both Security Council sanctions and those imposed outside the UN context.
In the past two years, the Council’s discussions on sanctions have been particularly challenging when major powers have strategic interests at stake. In March, negotiations to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Committee were long and contentious, with Russia advocating for annual renewals of the sanctions regime and China proposing changes including reduced reporting frequency—several of which other members found unacceptable. The draft resolution that would have extended the mandate of the Panel ultimately failed to pass due to Russia’s veto.
Several other sanctions-related draft resolutions also failed to achieve unanimous adoptions. On 31 May, a resolution extending the authorisation for inspecting vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya for an additional 12 months received six abstentions from Algeria, China, Guyana, Mozambique, Russia, and Sierra Leone. On 10 June, Russia abstained on a resolution reviewing and extending sanctions targeting ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida. Resolution 2731 of 30 May, which renewed the South Sudan sanctions regime until 31 May 2025, was also adopted with a vote of nine in favour and six abstentions (Algeria, China, Guyana, Mozambique, Russia, and Sierra Leone). However, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2745 of 30 July, lifting the arms embargo on the Central African Republic (CAR). The Security Council unanimously adopted resolutions renewing the sanctions regime on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, and Haiti for one year.
At the time of writing, the new appointments of chairs for the Council’s subsidiary bodies for 2025 had not been finalised. After the annual Security Council elections were moved forward from October to June in 2016, there have been significant changes in how chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies are appointed. In July 2016, Council members agreed on a presidential note concerning the preparation of newly elected members during the transitional period between the election and the beginning of their term, including the selection and preparation of chairs of subsidiary bodies. The note established a more consultative process for the chairs’ appointment, co-led by a permanent member and the chair of the IWG, and stipulated that the appointments should be completed by 1 October. That deadline has so far never been met, although in 2023, members were able to agree by mid-October. The Council agreed on a presidential note on 21 August 2023 (S/2023/615) that if the appointment of chairs and vice chairs have not been agreed to by before 1 January, “as a contingency measure, the responsibilities of Chairs of all of the subsidiary bodies of the Council during the month of January shall devolve to the President for the month of January”. While the permanent members hold the pen on most sanctions mandate renewals, elected members chair all sanctions committees and other formal and informal subsidiary bodies of the Council. Elected members have called for permanent members to share the responsibility of chairing these bodies.
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 14 December 2023S/PV.9508 | This was a briefing of the outgoing chairs of the subsidiary bodies. |
