Yemen
Expected Council Action
In November, the Security Council is expected to renew the Yemen financial and travel ban sanctions measures, which expire on 15 November, and the mandate of the Yemen Panel of Experts (PoE), which expires on 15 December. (The targeted arms embargo on the Houthi rebel group established by resolution 2216 in April 2015 is open-ended.)
The Council will also hold its monthly meeting on Yemen and receive a briefing from the chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (Republic of Korea).
The mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) expires on 14 July 2025.
Key Recent Developments
The ongoing tensions in the Middle East, including fallout from the Israel-Hamas war and the escalation between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, have had a negative effect on efforts to address Yemen’s political stalemate and humanitarian crisis.
The past month saw the intensification of direct conflict between the Houthis and Israel, as well as the continuation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and US-led retaliatory strikes. (For more information, see the brief on Yemen in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast and 14 October What’s in Blue story.) On 16 October, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted airstrikes in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, targeting “numerous Iran-backed Houthi weapons storage facilities”. The statement claimed that these “hardened underground facilities” contained weapons that were used to target US and international vessels in the Red Sea.
At the Council’s latest briefing on Yemen, held on 15 October, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg warned that the “cycle of retaliation” is pulling Yemen deeper into the regional conflict and distracts from the urgent need to address the country’s internal crises. He stressed that peace in Yemen is achievable despite the difficult regional context and outlined existing tools to achieve that end. These include the commitment made by the Yemeni parties towards “the establishment of a roadmap, including a nationwide ceasefire, addressing humanitarian and economic needs and preparing for an inclusive political process”, which serve as reference points in discussions with the sides.
In the context of these discussions, the Special Envoy has been holding consultations with political parties and civil society, including the Rashad Party, the Nasserite Party, and the Yemeni Socialist Party. According to a 23 October statement by the Office of the Special Envoy, participants in these consultations have emphasised the urgency of economic recovery and humanitarian relief while noting that issues such as the payment of salaries and the reopening of vital roads cannot be delayed until a political settlement is reached.
Humanitarian conditions in Yemen continue to worsen, including the spread of cholera and growing food insecurity. In her briefing at the 15 October Council meeting, Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya noted that more than 203,000 suspected cases of cholera have been reported and more than 720 people have died from the disease. She warned that the number of cases is expected to double by March 2025, noting that funding for the cholera response has run out. Unless urgent funding is received, 70 percent of the remaining diarrhoea treatment centres and 42 percent of the remaining oral rehydration centres will close by December, according to Msuya.
In a 24 October statement, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF warned about the outbreak of variant poliovirus type 2 (polio) in Yemen, noting that 273 cases have been reported over the last three years. The statement said that the outbreak persists amidst increasing health emergencies, further straining the country’s overburdened health system.
At the 15 October Council meeting, the briefers and many Council members reiterated their deep concern about the Houthis’ ongoing detention of several UN national staffers in Yemen as well as civil society personnel. Some speakers voiced alarm about reports that the Houthis had referred a significant number of detained personnel, including three UN staffers detained in 2021 and 2023, for “criminal prosecution”.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 19 September, the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee discussed its PoE’s final report, which was made public on 31 October. The report says that the “scale, nature and extent of transfers of diverse military materiel and technology provided to the Houthis from external sources, including financial support and training of its combatants, is unprecedented”. These sources include Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and Iraqi armed groups. The report makes several recommendations to the Security Council, including adding an expert to the panel to monitor maritime activities such as smuggling. It also suggests for the Security Council to call on regional armed groups to refrain from providing military and financial assistance to the Houthis and to express its intention to impose sanctions on those who commit such acts. At the 19 September committee meeting, it seems that many Council members welcomed the PoE’s report, but at least one permanent member accused the panel of going beyond its remit.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 11 October, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution without a vote on technical assistance and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights (A/HRC/RES/57/37). The HRC expressed deep concern at the serious violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict, including those involving sexual and gender-based violence, the continued recruitment of children, the abduction of political activists, the violations of human rights against journalists, and the killing of civilians. The HRC also requested all parties to the conflict to fully implement Security Council resolution 2216 of 14 April 2015—which established an arms embargo on the Houthis and demanded that they withdraw from all seized areas and relinquish all seized arms—while noting that this “will contribute to an improvement in the situation of human rights”.
Key Issues and Options
Insulating Yemen from destabilising regional tensions and reinvigorating the stalled intra-Yemeni political process are overarching priorities for the Council. Members are likely to continue to call on Yemeni parties to exercise restraint and to take confidence-building measures to create conditions conducive to the resumption of talks. In this regard, members could encourage implementation of the economic de-escalation agreement reached on 23 July between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. Although the agreement includes a pledge by the sides to hold meetings to discuss economic and humanitarian issues, no such meetings have taken place.
A key priority for the Council in November is renewing the Yemen sanctions regime and the mandate of the PoE supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee. One option would be to pursue a straightforward renewal. Another would be to consider whether adjustments are needed, including any based on recommendations contained in the PoE’s final report.
Council Dynamics
Council members have maintained general unity in support of UN mediation to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict in Yemen. The Red Sea crisis, however, has produced some notable divisions. The P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) have criticised the Houthis’ destabilising actions, while Council members such as Algeria, China, and Russia emphasise that ending the conflict in Gaza is critical to resolving the crisis in the Red Sea.
The UK and the US have been calling for the Council to take further action to impede Iran’s supply of arms to the Houthis, including by strengthening the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to ensure compliance with the arms embargo against the group.
Stronger Council action against the Houthis or Iran seems unlikely, however, given Council dynamics. Russia traditionally seeks to minimise references to the Houthis and is reluctant to single them out in Council products. A red line for Russia has also been language about Iran violating the arms embargo against the Houthis. At the 15 October Council meeting, the US referenced public reports alleging that Russia is considering providing the Houthis with anti-ship ballistic missiles and might be negotiating a deal to supply the group with small arms. These developments may further complicate Council dynamics on the issue. Therefore, members such as the UK and the US are instead seeking to enhance bilateral support to UNVIM, which relies on voluntary funding.
The Council has been unable to agree on a unified message calling for the release of the UN staff detained by the Houthis. Although Russia has expressed concern about the situation of the detained personnel, it has not called for their release, focusing instead on calls for access to the arrested staff. It has also accused Western countries of double standards, arguing that although they call on the Houthis to release the UN staff, they fail to hold Israel accountable for its actions against the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Given the complex dynamics on the file, members may opt to pursue a straightforward renewal of the Yemen sanctions regime in November. This would be consistent with the approach taken during the most recent renewal of UNMHA’s mandate through resolution 2742 of 8 July. In general, recent years have witnessed difficult Council negotiations on the renewal of sanctions regimes. A notable example is the recent termination of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee following a 28 March veto cast by Russia.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. The US and Japan have served as co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 15 October 2024S/PV.9748 | This was the Security Council’s monthly meeting on Yemen, held on 15 October 2024. |
