Libya
Expected Council Action
In November, the Security Council will receive the biannual briefing of the ICC Prosecutor, Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, on the ICC’s Libya-related activities.
Background and Key Recent Developments
Libya is not a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. The Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC through the unanimous adoption of resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, which invited the ICC Prosecutor to update the Council every six months. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes listed in the Rome Statute committed on Libya’s territory or by its nationals from 15 February 2011 onwards. The ICC opened investigations in March 2011 related to alleged crimes against humanity (including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts) and war crimes (including murder, torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity). The court has investigated these alleged crimes in relation to four priority lines of inquiry: 1) the 2011 Libyan Civil War; 2) military operations conducted between 2014 and 2020; 3) crimes committed in detention facilities; and 4) crimes committed against migrants.
There is currently one open case before the court related to the first line of inquiry. It is centred on Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the son of deposed Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. In June 2011, the court charged him with two counts of alleged crimes against humanity and issued a warrant for his arrest. He remains at large.
Regarding the second line of inquiry, on 4 October, the ICC unsealed arrest warrants for six individuals allegedly affiliated with the Al Kaniyat militia, which controlled Tarhuna—a city of approximately 150,000 people located 90 kilometres southeast of Tripoli—from 2015 to 2020. The militia was allied with General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) during its failed 2019-2020 military campaign to take Tripoli from the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), the predecessor to the current Government of National Unity (GNU). Since GNA forces ousted the militia from Tarhuna in June 2020, hundreds of bodies have been exhumed from mass graves in the town. The ICC’s arrest warrants accuse the six individuals of war crimes, including murder, outrages upon personal dignity, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, and rape. In a statement announcing the unsealing of the warrants—which were issued in April and July 2023—Khan said that his office is “seeking to work closely with Libyan authorities so that these individuals can face the charges against them in a court of law”. (For more information on Al Kaniyat’s alleged atrocities in Tarhuna, see the 30 August joint report by the UN Support Mission in Libya [UNSMIL] and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR].)
Khan’s previous biannual report to the Council, dated 14 May, outlined a roadmap for the completion of the ICC’s investigative activities in relation to the situation in Libya. The roadmap foresees applications for additional arrest warrants across several of the priority lines of inquiry, combined with renewed efforts with respect to “arrest strategy, fugitive tracking and preservation of evidence” to enable a transition to the judicial phase of the court’s activities by the end of 2025. Following this transition, the prosecutor’s office would not seek additional arrest warrants, focusing instead on supporting trials before the court. At this stage, Khan’s report notes, Council members may “consider how they would wish to mark the completion of the investigation phase, including with respect to the reporting requirements of the Office in relation to this situation”.
Regarding the broader situation in Libya, the political impasse continues between the GNU, based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), which splintered from the GNU and is led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the LNA. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNSMIL, dated 8 August and covering events since 9 April, the parties have not achieved any progress in resolving disagreements about proposed electoral legislation that would allow national elections to be held and reconcile the country’s divided government. Among other issues, a key point of contention concerns the formation of a unified interim government to organise the elections, a move favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments—which has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections—is a root cause of Libya’s political, security, and economic instability.
In August and September, the stand-off further escalated due to a dispute between the GNU and GNS over the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL)—the country’s sole depository for public revenues and one of the few state institutions servicing both governments. The disagreement, which affected Libya’s domestic oil production and access to foreign currencies, was eventually settled through an UNSMIL-mediated process that led to an agreement on compromise candidates to lead the bank. In a 9 October press statement, Council members welcomed the agreement, called on the parties to take steps toward establishing a unified national budget to ensure the stability of Libya’s financial system, and reiterated their support for a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process to enable the holding of free and fair elections “as soon as possible”.
During the Council’s most recent 60-day briefing on the situation in Libya, held on 9 October, Deputy Special Representative and Political Officer in Charge of UNSMIL Stephanie Koury—who has been leading the mission since Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL Abdoulaye Bathily stepped down in April—announced that she intended to “build on recent positive achievements and advance an inclusive political process in the coming week aimed at breaking the political deadlock, addressing long-standing conflict drivers and moving towards national elections” in the country.
On 31 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2755, extending UNSMIL’s mandate for three months, until 31 January 2025, with a “further automatic extension” of an additional nine months, until 31 October 2025, if a new Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL has been appointed by 31 January 2025. (For more information on the mandate extension, see our What’s In Blue story of 30 October.)
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Security Council is how to promote justice and accountability for atrocities committed in Libya. November’s briefing by Khan will allow Council members to take stock of the ICC’s work toward this end, presenting the first opportunity for members to review the court’s progress on its roadmap to transition from the investigative phase to the judicial phase of its activities in the country.
In addition to Khan’s briefing, Council members could learn more about the significance of the court’s recently unsealed arrest warrants for individuals affiliated with the Al Kaniyat militia by inviting a civil society representative who was impacted by the militia’s crimes to address the Council.
Members that are party to the ICC could also continue the practice of holding a joint press stakeout in connection with the meeting.
More broadly, supporting political momentum towards national elections to unify Libya’s divided governments remains another key issue for the Council. In this context, an important objective for the Council is to help foster common political ground between the country’s rival governments to reach an inclusive agreement on electoral laws. Council members could consider holding a closed Arria-formula meeting with representatives of the rival governments to hear their perspectives and better inform the Council’s decision-making.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country.
Members are divided, however, on the work of the ICC. Ecuador, France, Guyana, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the UK are states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, while Algeria, China, Mozambique, Russia, and the US are not. These distinctions largely reflect how members view the court’s work on Libya, with the notable exception of the US, which is supportive of the ICC’s efforts regarding the country despite not being a party to the Rome Statute.
Following the ICC’s March 2023 announcement that it had issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia has been increasingly critical of the court, describing it as a Western political instrument and urging the Council to recall the situations in Libya and Sudan that had previously been referred to it.
The UK is the penholder on Libya.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 30 October 2023S/RES/2702 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 31 October 2024. |
| 26 February 2011S/RES/1970 | This resolution referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions (assets freeze and travel ban) and established a sanctions committee. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 8 August 2024S/2024/598 | This was the 120-day report on UNSMIL. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 9 October 2024SC/15848 | This press statement welcomed the agreement reached between Libyan actors on the Central Bank of Libya and its endorsement by the House of Representatives and High State Council. |
