In Hindsight: UN-AU Cooperation: A Path Toward Networked Multilateralism or Fragmented Responses?
Introduction
October was a significant month for UN-AU cooperation. The annual consultations of the members of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) took place in New York on 18 October, with the informal dialogue held in a retreat format for the first time on 16 and 17 October in Tarrytown. Council members received an update on the operationalisation of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on financing AU-led Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs) pursuant to a 23 May presidential statement. The Security Council held its annual meeting on the Secretary-General’s report on UN-AU cooperation on 2 October and the AUPSC and the Peacebuilding Commission held their seventh annual consultative meeting in New York on 15 October. Secretary-General António Guterres and AU Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat also met in Addis Ababa on 21 October for the eighth UN-AU high-level conference. This was followed by an AU-UN retreat in Abidjan on 25 and 26 October, which brought together AU and UN Special Representatives and Envoys. These joint activities between the UN and the AU last month reflect how far the relationship has developed over the past decade and a half.
This month’s In Hindsight examines the progress and challenges in UN-AU cooperation and offers ideas for charting the way forward.
Institutionalised Cooperation
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter governs the relationship between the Council and regional arrangements in maintaining international peace and security (For more, see our research report on “The UN Security Council and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter: Toward More Effective Engagement between the Council and Regional Actors”.) In this context, the UN maintains more extensive cooperation with the AU than with any other regional organisation.
In 2017, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat initiated the annual UN-AU High-Level Conference, alternating between New York and Addis Ababa. During the meeting, the two leaders recognised the significant progress in enhancing the UN-AU cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening and deepening the partnership.
The high-level conference complements the UN-AU Joint Task Force (JTF) meetings, which have been held biannually since 2010 at the senior officials level, and the UN-AU Desk-to-Desk (D2D) meetings, working level interactions formally known as the Annual Consultative Meetings on Prevention and Management of Conflicts, which began in 2008. These mechanisms have become a regular feature of UN-AU cooperation, serving as key platforms for discussing and coordinating the efforts of the two organisations in advancing peace and security in Africa.
Furthermore, UN-AU cooperation is now bolstered by frameworks that align with the three pillars of the UN—peace and security, development, and human rights—as well as the AU’s various normative instruments and initiatives. These frameworks include the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, the UN-AU Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the UN-AU Joint Framework on Human Rights, signed in April 2017, January 2018, and November 2023, respectively. Relevant AU instruments and initiatives include Agenda 2063, a blueprint for Africa’s development transformation, and Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030, one of the flagship projects under Agenda 2063 aimed at ridding the continent of conflict and violence.
On its part, the Security Council has deepened its cooperation with its AU counterpart. It has been holding annual consultations with the AUPSC since 2007, alternating between New York and Addis Ababa. Starting in 2016, these consultations have been preceded by an informal seminar that provides a platform for members of the two Councils to exchange views mostly on thematic topics of shared interest. Additionally, since 2017, the President of the Security Council and the Chair of the AUPSC have been holding informal meetings to coordinate the two councils’ monthly work programmes. According to the latest Secretary-General’s report on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) published on 26 August, there were nine informal meetings in the past year. While both councils have agreed in principle to conduct joint field missions, the modalities for implementing this initiative have yet to be worked out.[1] At the informal dialogue the idea of having joint visits at the subsidiary body level was discussed. Another suggestion from this meeting was a follow-up mechanism for the implementation of joint decisions from the annual consultations.
The Role of the A3
The three African members of the Security Council (known as the A3) have become the linchpin in fostering cooperation between the Security Council and the AUPSC. The A3 grouping was born out of Africa’s experience in the Security Council during the 2011 Libyan crisis. Despite the AU’s efforts to resolve the crisis through dialogue, it felt that the Security Council had not taken its views seriously. It was felt that the situation might have been different if Africa had presented a stronger, more unified voice within the Security Council.[2]
Since then, the A3 members have steadily strengthened their coordination and unity to advance a common African position in the Security Council. A decade ago, the AU launched the Oran process, an annual high-level seminar designed to help incoming African members of the Security Council prepare to address African peace and security issues in the Security Council by articulating Africa’s common positions in its decision-making process. They are now increasingly speaking with one voice, regularly delivering joint statements in both country-specific and thematic meetings of the Council. While these joint statements were initially limited to African issues, they have since expanded to include other topics as well. The A3 has expanded on two occasions into the A3 Plus, when one of the like-minded Council members from Latin America and the Caribbean joined the group during their respective terms. This arrangement started with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which served as an elected Council member in 2020-2021, and continued with Guyana, currently serving as an elected member in 2024-2025. Discussions are ongoing on how to institutionalise this arrangement.[3]
The A3 has also emerged as a cohesive negotiating bloc, significantly enhancing its influence within the Council. Recognising this, penholders on Council initiatives (usually France, the UK, and the US, otherwise known as the P3) have begun consulting with the A3 in a bid to secure their support in advance of negotiations on the mandate renewal of peace operations or the extension of sanctions regimes.
Traditionally, the A3 members have been the penholder or co-penholder on West Africa and the Sahel, and the Central Africa region—currently Sierra Leone and Switzerland on the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), and Mozambique and the UK on the UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). The A3 Plus is now actively exploring “the possibility of ensuring pen-holding or co-pen-holding on all African dossiers and dossiers of interest to Africa” on the Council’s agenda.[4] This year, Sierra Leone, which chairs the 1533 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Sanctions Committee, became a co-penholder with France on the DRC file. (For more, see SCR’s chart on penholderships.)
In recent years, A3 members have jointly convened Arria-formula meetings and delivered joint press stakeouts to highlight African priorities. They have also increasingly voted together, though on certain issues aligning votes has proved challenging over the years. These include, among others, the renewal of sanctions regimes, the longstanding Western Sahara issue, and other African issues that may involve the direct interest of a given A3 member. There have also been times when pressure from a permanent member has disrupted A3 unity in voting, both on African and non-African files. Most importantly, the A3, individually and collectively, have spearheaded the adoption of Council products on important priority issues for Africa. Recent examples of Council products jointly proposed by the A3 include resolutions 2457 and 2719 on Silencing the Guns in Africa and the financing of AUPSOs in February 2019 and December 2023, respectively. These resolutions are likely to guide UN-AU cooperation in the years ahead.
Challenges of the Partnership
Despite the institutionalised cooperation between the UN and the AU, significant challenges remain in addressing crises across Africa. The two organisations regularly exchange views on various conflicts and crises on the continent, but they may not always share the same perspective on how to handle them. While the UN has increasingly deferred to the AU and its sub-regional mechanisms as first responders, the situations in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel highlight the limitations and difficulties the AU and its regional bodies face in effectively responding to crises on the continent. In turn, there have been differing views among Council members on when the Security Council should act more assertively, especially if regional and sub-regional responses are slow or ineffective.
The strategic interests of permanent Council members and their interpretation of a given crisis often dictate the nature and scope of the Council’s involvement. Some crises, such as the situation in Sudan, have not received as much attention from the Security Council due to competing global priorities, such as the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. Some African members have lamented what they perceive as double standards in the Council’s work. For example, speaking on behalf of the A3 in a Council meeting on 16 March 2022, less than a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Gabon urged the European Union “to show the same compassion, in keeping with international humanitarian law, to Africans fleeing security and climate crises for which they are not responsible” as they did to refugees from Ukraine. Geopolitical rivalries have also hindered Council engagement on some issues, such as in the Sahel, where France, Russia, and the US have strong political and security interests; these interests have influenced the responses of the Council to the coups in West Africa in recent years, as well as its decision to shutter the peacekeeping mission in Mali in 2023. (For more, see our July 2022 In Hindsight titled “The Security Council and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa”.) There also seems to be a growing feeling that the role of other external actors is complicating the crisis response by the AU and the UN on the continent.
With UN peace operations in Africa rapidly declining, partly due to resistance from host governments and local communities, the space for AUPSOs and other regional forces has expanded. However, the operating environment has become more complex with the emergence of other external actors like the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group)—a Russian private security firm now directly overseen by the Russian Ministry of Defense. While AUPSOs and regional forces are being viewed as potential alternatives to such actors, recent experiences have shown that these operations may face the same challenges as UN peacekeeping missions on the continent.
The Silencing the Guns initiative enjoys broad support at the UN, but there are questions about the AU’s contradictory approach to implementing it. The AU’s master roadmap for implementing the initiative outlines measures such as imposing arms embargoes on parties involved in conflicts and curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Yet, the AUPSC has been calling for lifting existing Security Council arms embargoes in conflict zones already flooded with weapons.
The A3’s role in advancing common African positions is generally welcomed by other Council members. Nonetheless, the group’s tendency to support African countries under the Council’s purview based on solidarity has at times complicated negotiations on mandate renewals and the extension of sanctions regimes. This situation has given host countries to UN peace operations and those targeted by sanctions enormous leverage during negotiations. The A3 usually take their cue from the AUPSC, but there have been instances when they appeared to contradict Addis Ababa, as in the case of Sudan. While the AU was touting its roadmap to resolve the Sudan crisis, the A3 was initially reluctant to agree on a Council product supporting Sudan’s national position.
Observations
UN-AU cooperation has made significant strides, especially over the past decade, but realising the partnership’s full potential requires moving beyond formalities and ritualistic engagements. To do this, the two organisations will need to strengthen the various cooperation platforms created over the years to allow for a frank exchange of views and to forge a shared perspective on addressing pressing peace and security issues on the continent.
While it is sensible for the Security Council to defer to the AU and its regional mechanisms when they are capable of making an impact, it must be ready to take decisive action whenever those conditions are not met. In other words, the partnership should not be a pretext for the Security Council’s inaction, particularly in the face of gross violations and crimes against humanity.
The mantra of “African solutions to African problems” enjoys widespread support at the UN. However, there is a growing sense that it has sometimes been misused to shield regimes with poor governance and human rights records. Therefore, the African solidarity advocated by the A3 in the Security Council will only have real significance if it is anchored in the objectives and principles outlined in the AU Constitutive Act, particularly the principle of non-indifference, which marked a pivotal shift from the Organization of African Unity, the precursor to the AU.
Adopting resolution 2719 marked a significant milestone in the UN-AU partnership, but its successful implementation will require both organisations to be pragmatic. The AU may need to manage the expectations of certain member states advocating for full UN funding of AUPSOs and show a commitment to sharing the financial burden. In the Security Council, navigating the influence of some powerful members who strongly oppose applying resolution 2719 to potential cases such as Somalia, despite support from the host country and the AU, is likely to be a challenge. If members are able to rise above the politics of this issue, the resolution, which outlines clear parameters for decision-making and authorisation, will prove a useful guide.
The key challenge moving forward will be whether UN-AU cooperation can truly embody networked multilateralism—as the Secretary-General envisaged in his A New Agenda for Peace—by fostering a coherent and effective response to crises in Africa or will instead become a reflection of a fractured and dysfunctional multilateral landscape. The multiple and complex peace and security threats on the African continent certainly cry out for the former to be the path forward.
[1] In 2017 and 2018, the Security Council extended three invitations to the Chair of the AUPSC to participate in its field visits in Africa. However, he did not participate in any of these visits. The main reason was the AU’s desire to agree on the modalities for the joint visit before implementing the decision. It seems that the AUPSC wants all of its members to participate in joint visits, which might be difficult to do from the Security Council’s perspective because of technical and logistical constraints. The A3 had proposed draft modalities in 2018 for the AUPSC’s consideration but there was no reaction from Addis Ababa.
[2] AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security, “The Oran Process and Africa’s Global Peace Agenda”, 18 June 2024 https://youtu.be/sbiwIK03iRo?si=H8VrLt0MGnvPf-gl
[3] African Union, “Conclusions of the 10th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, Oran Process”, 17-18 December 2023. d682ab_c555b7655584412c893eeba2270e44c8.pdf (africanunion-un.org)
[4] Ibid.
