DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In November, the Chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Pascale Baeriswyl (Switzerland), is scheduled to brief Council members in closed consultations on the 90-day report regarding the Committee’s work.
Key Recent Developments
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have escalated markedly in recent months, while concerns regarding increased cooperation between the DPRK and Russia have also continued to grow.
On 8 October, Republic of Korea (ROK) Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyun reportedly told ROK politicians it was “highly likely” that media reports indicating DPRK military officers had been killed in a Ukrainian missile strike near Donetsk were true. Approximately a week and a half later, several media outlets reported that DPRK troops had been sent to eastern Russia for training and appeared to be readying for deployment in Ukraine, citing the ROK National Intelligence Service. On 23 October, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters “there is evidence that there are DPRK troops in Russia”, describing the situation as “very, very serious”.
During a press conference held as part of the recent BRICS summit, which took place in Kazan from 22 to 24 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin neither confirmed nor denied that DPRK troops were in Russia, responding to a question regarding satellite images that appeared to confirm their presence by saying “images, that is something serious, if there are images they are a reflection of something”. On 28 October, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte announced that DPRK troops had been deployed to the Kursk region in Russia, where Ukrainian troops launched a cross-border offensive in early August. The Pentagon estimates that the DPRK has sent approximately 10,000 DPRK troops to Russia.
The deployment of DPRK troops on Russian territory comes after the DPRK and Russia signed a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” on 19 June. Among other matters, the treaty provides that “in case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and [Russia]”.
Since the treaty was signed, the DPRK and Russia have bolstered ties in several different areas. According to media reports, independent groups have continued to document evidence indicating that the DPRK is supplying missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. On 13 September, former Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang for talks that focused on the implementation of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui has also travelled to Russia twice in the last six weeks. In a 26 September statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the denuclearisation of the DPRK as a “closed issue”.
On 30 October, Council members convened for an open briefing regarding the DPRK’s involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. The meeting was requested by Ukraine with support from France, Japan, Malta, Slovenia, the ROK, the UK, and the US and was held under the “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” agenda item. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Miroslav Jenča briefed.
The increasingly close relationship between the DPRK and Russia has prompted the ROK to boost its cooperation with NATO. ROK officials briefed the North Atlantic Council and representatives of Australia, Japan, and New Zealand regarding the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia on 28 October, while the ROK Ministry of National Defence has reportedly indicated that it could send weapons or military personnel to Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, tensions between the DPRK and the ROK have continued to rise. On 4 October, DPRK state media reported that Kim Jong-un said that the DPRK would not hesitate to use “all the offensive forces” it has, including nuclear weapons, if the ROK attempts “to use armed forces encroaching upon the sovereignty of the DPRK”. A week and a half later, on 15 October, the DPRK destroyed rail and road links between the two countries on the northern side of the demilitarised zone. This came days after the DPRK accused the ROK of flying drones carrying political leaflets over Pyongyang. On 17 October, DPRK state media appeared to confirm that the DPRK had amended its constitution and classified the ROK as a “hostile state”, a move first signalled in January when Kim Jong-un announced that the DPRK would no longer pursue reunification with the ROK. The DPRK has also continued to trial its weapons systems, including by launching ballistic missiles, firing rocket launchers, and testing “suicide drones”. On 13 September, the DPRK published photos showing Kim Jong-un inspecting a weapons-grade uranium manufacturing facility. The publication marked the first time that the DPRK has publicly revealed the existence of such a facility. On 31 October the DPRK tested two missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
On 16 October, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the ROK, the UK, and the US announced that they will establish the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, a mechanism intended to monitor and report on violations of the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime. The announcement came approximately seven months after Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. (For more information, see our 22 March What’s in Blue story.) At the time of writing, it appears that the modalities and working methods of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team are still being determined by the participating member states.
Human Rights-Related Developments
The Secretary-General’s latest report on the situation of human rights in the DPRK was issued on 5 August (A/79/277). Among other matters, the report concluded that “available information points to an increase in repression of fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of expression and access to information, with the application of new laws severely constraining this right and introducing severe punishments”.
Key Issues and Options
The deployment of DPRK troops on Russian territory, together with reports of ongoing arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia, has created a major issue for Council members. As more information comes to light, the Council could choose to hold an open briefing to discuss any relevant developments. Given the direct involvement of a permanent member, a more substantive response is likely to be difficult.
Council members are also considering how the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team could assist both the Council and the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. Council members could choose to request an open briefing on the work of this mechanism once it is operational, including in relation to any information it obtains regarding violations of the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime.
The heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula are another issue for the Council. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue or a closed Arria-formula meeting to discuss possible strategies for managing these tensions.
Council Dynamics
The Council is deeply divided over the DPRK. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded countries, including Japan and the ROK, support using sanctions to manage the threat posed by the DPRK and often call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the DPRK to engage in dialogue and abandon its weapons programmes, while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some of these members call for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened it by blocking Council action on the file. They also highlight evidence of arms transfers between the DPRK and Russia and note that these transfers violate Council resolutions.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US for heightening tensions and have accused it of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have also contended that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation and have expressed their support for a draft resolution circulated by China in October 2021 that would provide sanctions relief to the DPRK if adopted.
| Sanctions Committee Document | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |
