Bosnia and Herzegovina
Expected Council Action
In November, the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The Council also expects to vote at the start of the month on the reauthorisation of the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) prior to its 2 November expiration.
Background
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, created two entities within BiH: the predominantly Bosniak and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS). The two entities are linked by a rotating tripartite inter-ethnic presidency and a two-chamber legislative branch with equal representation by the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Both entities also have their own executive and legislative branches.
The Dayton Peace Agreement also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to oversee implementation of the agreement’s civilian and military aspects, respectively. In 1996, IFOR was replaced by the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which in turn was replaced in 2004 by the EU-led Multidimensional Stabilisation Force (EUFOR).
In December 1995, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was established to garner international support for the Dayton Agreement. The PIC Steering Board (SB), which serves as the executive arm of the PIC and provides the High Representative with political guidance, consists of representatives from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, the Presidency of the EU, the European Commission, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which is represented by Türkiye. In 1997, the PIC agreed to grant significant legislative powers to the High Representative. Known collectively as the “Bonn Powers”, these include the ability to take binding decisions and unseat elected officials who are found to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Dayton Agreement or the terms of its implementation.
On 27 May 2021, following the announcement by then-High Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, of his intention to resign, the PIC issued a statement designating Christian Schmidt as his successor. Russia objected to Schmidt’s appointment, arguing that the decision was reached without the support of all PIC members and that Bosnian Serb representatives had not been adequately consulted. Furthermore, Russia argued that the appointment lacked the endorsement of the Security Council. However, the US and European members of the Council maintained that the PIC SB’s authority to appoint High Representatives does not necessitate Security Council approval.
The 1995 GFAP specifies that High Representatives are “to be appointed consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions”. In past practice, among the seven High Representatives preceding Christian Schmidt, only one—Christian Schwarz-Schilling—was appointed without the adoption of a Security Council resolution. Rather than adopting a resolution, Tanzania, in its capacity as Security Council president, issued a letter on 30 January 2006, welcoming the PIC’s decision to nominate Schwarz-Schilling as High Representative.
On 22 July 2021, China and Russia introduced a draft Security Council resolution (S/2021/667) supporting the appointment of Christian Schmidt as High Representative until 31 July 2022, with the “subsequent closure of the OHR”. With a vote of two in favour (China and Russia) and 13 abstentions, the draft resolution failed to be adopted. In response, China argued that the outcome signaled a lack of Security Council support for Schmidt’s appointment, a sentiment Russia echoed, further claiming the position remained vacant. Subsequently, on 28 July 2021, Russia announced that it would cease participation in meetings of the PIC SB, and on 17 February 2022, declared it would suspend financial contributions to the OHR.
Aligning itself with the positions of China and Russia, Republika Srpska has taken a series of steps challenging the authority of the OHR. In June 2023, Republika Srpska’s National Assembly (RSNA) enacted legislation ceasing the publication of the High Representative’s decisions in the entity’s Official Gazette, rendering them invalid within Republika Srpska. In response, on 1 July 2023, Schmidt amended BiH’s criminal code, enabling criminal prosecution of authorities or officials who fail to “apply, implement, enforce or otherwise comply with a decision of the High Representative”. In August 2023, BiH’s Prosecutor’s Office filed charges against RS President Milorad Dodik for failing to implement the High Representative’s decisions. The trial is currently ongoing.
Key Recent Developments
On 26 March, Schmidt issued a decree amending BiH’s Election Law to strengthen election integrity across the country. In response, on 19 April, the RSNA adopted its own election law, which would establish a new entity-level election commission that would oversee all electoral processes within RS.
Amidst these developments, BiH’s Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on 8 May that local elections would take place on 6 October. On 21 May, RS authorities confirmed their participation in the local elections under the supervision of the CEC, affirming adherence to the state-level electoral framework. However, Dodik clarified that this decision “is not an endorsement” of Schmidt’s authority, pledging that RS would enforce its own Election Law in the 2026 general election.
The RSNA’s election law took effect on 17 July. The day before, the PIC issued a statement cautioning that the law could “usurp responsibilities of the CEC and create parallel legal frameworks”, while affirming that “the international community retains the necessary instruments” to uphold BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. On 19 September, BiH’s Constitutional Court annulled the RSNA’s election law, determining that it violated BiH’s constitution.
The latest report of the OHR (S/2024/777) notes that the 6 October elections were conducted in a “peaceful atmosphere without any serious incidents”. Preliminary results indicate that BiH’s major national parties maintained their dominance over most of the country’s town halls, while some of those parties lost important mayorships in urban centres, including Sarajevo and Banja Luka.
On 23 May, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution designating 11 July as the “International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide”. Among Security Council members, China and Russia voted against the resolution, two abstained—Algeria and Mozambique—and the remaining 11 members voted in favour. According to the latest OHR report, the adoption was met with “an aggressive campaign of historical revisionism, repeated denial of genocide in Srebrenica, and glorification of war criminals on the part of the ruling coalition in the Republika Srpska”. On the same day, the RSNA held a session in Srebrenica, during which it adopted a Draft Agreement on the “peaceful disassociation” from the FBiH. The OHR report describes the agreement as “a document that disregards the statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH”. A special session of the RSNA to discuss the agreement, scheduled for 9 July, was cancelled.
Key Issues and Options
The role of the OHR remains a key issue for the Council. Neither China nor Russia recognise Schmidt’s authority as High Representative. A draft Security Council resolution S/2021/667 (proposed by China and Russia in July 2021) supported Schmidt’s appointment as High Representative until 31 July 2022, with the “subsequent closure of the OHR”. Several Council members, including the P3 (France, the UK, and the US), opposed the draft text because it imposed a time frame for the OHR’s closure without referencing the 5+2 Agenda, which is a set of five objectives and two conditions established by the PIC SB that need to be fulfilled prior to the OHR’s closure. One option for the Council is to consider a presidential statement proposing an independent strategic review of the OHR that takes these views into consideration.
Another key issue for the Council is the need to address the separatist rhetoric and actions of RS authorities. The Council may wish to issue a press statement endorsing the continued relevance of the GFAP and noting the continued willingness of the international community and major donors to lend their support.
Council Dynamics
Deep divisions related to BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration and possible accession to NATO—particularly between Russia on the one hand and the US and Council members from Europe on the other—have long coloured Council dynamics on BiH. The European Council agreed to open accession talks with BiH on 21 March after having unanimously voted to grant BiH candidate status in December 2022.
Overall, Council members have similar concerns about BiH’s divisive ethnic politics. Most members are also critical of Dodik’s rhetoric and his recent threats of dissolution, which they view as challenging BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia, however, tends to be supportive of Dodik’s positions.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 2 November 2023S/RES/2706 | This resolution extends the authorization of Multinational Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina mandate. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 15 May 2024S/PV.9626 | This was the semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
| 30 April 2024S/PV.9621 | This was a meeting on BiH requested by Russia. |
