Western Sahara
Expected Council Action
In October, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which expires on 31 October. Ahead of the mandate renewal, Council members will receive a briefing in consultations on the Secretary-General’s annual report on the situation concerning Western Sahara, which member states anticipate receiving by 1 October.
Background and Key Recent Developments
On 30 October 2023, the Security Council adopted resolution 2703, renewing MINURSO’s mandate until 31 October, with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (Mozambique and Russia). The resolution introduced new language welcoming Personal Envoy Staffan de Mistura’s convening of informal consultations with Morocco, the Polisario Front (the entity representing the inhabitants of the Western Sahara region, known as Sahrawis), Algeria, and Mauritania, as well as with members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara—France, Russia, Spain, the UK, and the US—from 27 to 31 March 2023 in New York. These informal bilateral consultations aimed to discuss lessons learned in the political process, deepen the examination of the positions, and continue to seek “mutually agreeable formulas” to advance the political process. (For background, see the brief on Western Sahara in our April 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
On 24 July, the Secretary-General submitted his report on the “Question of Western Sahara”, covering developments from 1 July 2023 to 30 June, pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/78/85 of 11 December 2023. During the reporting period, the situation in Western Sahara was characterised by low-intensity hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front, creating challenges for MINURSO’s operational environment. The report noted that, in late February, the Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Alexander Ivanko, and MINURSO’s Force Commander, Major General Fakhrul Ahsan, proposed a cessation of hostilities to both parties during Ramadan. Morocco reiterated its commitment to the 1991 ceasefire while “underscoring its right to respond to incidents”. The Polisario Front argued that a cessation of hostilities was tantamount to ignoring the current realities on the ground without addressing the “root causes” of the breakdown of the 1991 ceasefire. (In November 2020, the Polisario Front announced that it would no longer respect the ceasefire agreement following a military operation by Morocco in the buffer zone.)
During the reporting period, MINURSO was able to sustain its team sites more regularly and reliably after the Polisario Front committed to “provide safe passage, on an exceptional and provisional basis, to the [m]ission to conduct a logistical ground convoy to resupply its team sites” east of the berm. (The berm refers to an approximately 1,700-mile-long earthen wall that divides the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara from that held by the Polisario Front.) Between September 2023 and June, MINURSO conducted an average of one ground convoy every month to its team sites east of the berm. (For more information, see the brief on Western Sahara in our April 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
In a 30 July letter to Morocco’s King Mohammed VI, French President Emmanuel Macron announced France’s support for resolving the issue of Western Sahara under Morocco’s autonomy plan. The letter said that this plan constituted the “only basis to achieve a just, lasting, and negotiated political solution, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions”. (The plan, which Morocco submitted to the UN in 2007, calls for integrating the territory into Morocco, with the Sahrawi people managing their internal affairs while being represented externally by Morocco.) Previously, France had described Morocco’s plan as “a serious and credible” basis for discussion but had not formally endorsed it. (Refer to the graphic below for trends in member states’ positions on Western Sahara.)
During his visit to Rabat in February, French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Stéphane Séjourné indicated that France supported Moroccan investments in Western Sahara. On 26 April, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire expressed France’s readiness to participate in funding a three-gigawatt power cable linking the city of Casablanca to Moroccan-controlled Dakhla, a city in the Morocco-occupied territory of Western Sahara.
Responding to France’s change in position, the Foreign Minister of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) Mohamed Sidati accused France of violating international law while supporting Moroccan expansionism. The Algerian foreign ministry also criticised France’s decision in a 30 July press release as denying the right of self-determination to the Sahrawis, adding that France made the decision “without clearly measuring out all its potential repercussions”. The ministry announced its decision to withdraw Algeria’s ambassador to France and reportedly also refused to accept its citizens who had been given deportation orders by French authorities. While some European countries, such as France and Spain, have explicitly supported Morocco’s autonomy plan, the European Union (EU) has generally maintained a neutral position. According to media reports, on 11 September several members of the European parliament sent a letter to the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, denouncing France’s position. The letter reportedly said that the “unilateral position of support for one of the parties may open a confrontation in this region, to which the EU is linked in terms of energy supply and the control of emigration”.
In another development, Chad opened a consulate in Dakhla on 14 August. Chad had announced its support for Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2022. On 17 August, the Dominican Republic also announced its intention to open a consulate in Dakhla and reaffirmed support for Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
Key Issues and Options
An immediate issue for the Council is to renew the mandate of MINURSO and consider what changes to the mission’s mandate, if any, are necessary. A key issue for Council members to consider is how to bring all parties to the negotiating table and reinvigorate the political process.
Significant obstacles remain in the peace process. The November 2020 decision by the Polisario Front to abandon the 1991 ceasefire has led to a rise in hostilities over the last few years. At the same time, Morocco controls more than three-quarters of the Western Sahara territory and has made substantial investments in the region, including a $1.2 billion port project in Dakhla. Moroccan settlers account for nearly two-thirds of the approximately half-million residents of Western Sahara.
Another issue of concern for Council members is the human rights situation. Despite multiple requests by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) for a visit to Western Sahara and strong encouragement from the Security Council in its resolutions on MINURSO for the parties to cooperate with OHCHR, it has not been granted access to the territory of Western Sahara since 2015. The Secretary-General’s 24 July report noted that OHCHR continued to receive allegations of human rights violations, including intimidation, surveillance and discrimination against Sahrawi individuals. The report also raised concerns about the conditions for detained Sahrawi prisoners and the prevailing humanitarian situation in the refugee camps in Algeria’s Tindouf province. In November 2023, the Sahrawi Refugee Response Plan was launched for 2024-25, which estimated that approximately 173,000 people living in the Tindouf refugee camps require humanitarian assistance.
Council Dynamics
Council members differ starkly in their national positions on Western Sahara. The US, the penholder on Western Sahara, recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the region in December 2020 during the administration of President Donald Trump and committed to opening a consulate in the disputed territory. President Joe Biden’s administration has continued this position. France has recently shifted its position to fully back the Moroccan autonomy plan as the “only basis” for achieving a political solution. The UK supports a “just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”.
The three African members of the Council do not share a common position. Sierra Leone recognises Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and established a consulate in Dakhla in August 2021. Algeria and Mozambique strongly support the right to self-determination for the Sahrawis and maintain diplomatic relations with the SADR. These members are likely to push for more negotiations to determine the status of Western Sahara and for a focus on the human rights situation in the region. Guyana, which is a member of the “A3 plus one” grouping, withdrew its recognition of the SADR, dating from 1979, in November 2020.
MINURSO’s mandate renewal has not been unanimous since 2017. The division among Council members was apparent during the adoption of resolution 2703. In its explanation of vote, Russia said that recent resolutions extending MINURSO’s mandate have included amendments that “undermine the impartial and non-partisan approach to the problem of Western Sahara”. Russia expressed support for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, emphasising that any final settlement of the issue should be based on mutually acceptable outcomes that provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.
Some members, such as Algeria and Russia, have also opposed the roundtable talks—an initiative launched by former Personal Envoy Horst Köhler, which brought together Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and the Polisario Front. Algeria perceives this initiative as potentially reframing the situation as a “regional conflict” instead of one between Morocco and the Polisario Front, with Algeria and Mauritania viewed as “concerned neighbours”. Algeria insists that it is not a party to the conflict and that it cannot take the place of the Polisario in negotiations but is prepared to step up its role in the political process as a neighbouring state.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 30 October 2023S/RES/2703 | This resolution renewed the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2024. |
| General Assembly Documents | |
| 24 July 2024A/79/229 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on the “Question of Western Sahara”, covering developments from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/78/85 of 11 December 2023. |
