Somalia
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council will hold a briefing, followed by consultations, to discuss the situation in Somalia. In addition, the Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which expires on 31 October.
In accordance with resolution 2748 of 15 August, which reauthorised the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) until 31 December, the Secretary-General is expected to provide a comprehensive update by 11 October on the overall mission design and financing options for the proposed successor mission to ATMIS. The Security Council is expected to hold a private meeting to discuss this update with the AU and Somalia, with the participation of the UN Secretariat.
The Chair of the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki (Japan), is also expected to brief on the work of the committee.
Key Recent Developments
In a letter circulated to Council members on 3 September, the Secretary-General provided an update on the engagements between the UN and the Somali government on the modalities and timeline for UNSOM’s transition to the UN Country Team (UNCT), in line with the Council’s request in a 16 May letter. A joint technical committee comprising senior officials from Somalia’s federal government and the UN has been established to outline the planning process for the transition, and has discussed, among other issues, joint programming between UNSOM and the UNCT, possible implications of UNSOM’s transition for the financing of UN activities in the country, and the importance of resource mobilisation efforts. (For background, see the brief on Somalia in our June 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
The letter further shared a proposal from Somalia which envisions a two-year phased handover of responsibilities from UNSOM to Somali institutions and the UNCT, commencing in November. The proposal called for restructuring UNSOM’s mandate with a limited scope that will include supporting state-building efforts, such as through inclusive constitutional review and electoral processes. It suggested a mid-term review for the mission after one year to make necessary adjustments and for the periodic Security Council briefings on Somalia to be reduced to an annual closed session.
On 15 August, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2748, which requested the Secretary-General, jointly with the Chairperson of the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) and in consultation with Somalia and international stakeholders, to submit a report on the overall mission design for the proposed successor mission by 15 November. It also requested that the report include an estimate of the required resources and costs for the follow-on mission and articulate a range of options for financing it, including support by international partners, the framework established by resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), other suitable alternatives, or some combination of these options. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in our August 2024 Monthly Forecast and 15 August What’s in Blue story.)
Tensions continued between Ethiopia and Somalia, which were sparked by the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed republic in northern Somalia, on 1 January. The MoU reportedly allows Ethiopia, which is a landlocked country, to obtain access to the Gulf of Aden in exchange for formal recognition of Somaliland. In light of this agreement, several Somali officials have expressed the view that Ethiopia should withdraw its troops deployed in Somalia by the end of December, when ATMIS is set to complete its drawdown and exit. This position has led to disagreements, however, between Somalia’s federal government and some federal member states, which have opposed this view underscoring the vital role that the Ethiopian forces play in maintaining security within their respective territories.
Türkiye mediated between Somalia and Ethiopia by hosting two rounds of discussions with the foreign ministers of both countries in Ankara. The talks, however, have yet to achieve a breakthrough. The third round of discussions, formerly expected to be held on 17 September, has been postponed indefinitely. (For background, see the brief on Somalia in our August 2024 Monthly Forecast and 28 January and 22 June What’s in Blue stories.)
Amidst these developments, Somalia has sought closer ties with Egypt, which has offered to “contribute to the elements” of the follow-on mission to ATMIS, as welcomed by the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in its 1 August communiqué. On 14 August, both countries signed a defence cooperation agreement, following talks between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Cairo; the details of the agreement have not been made public. In an 11 September interview with Al Jazeera, Somali Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar confirmed that Somalia has received supplies of weapons and ammunition from Egypt. He indicated that Egyptian forces could be deployed in Somalia “shortly” to train Somali national forces.
Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have been strained over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The project heightened tensions stemming from concerns over its potential impact on the flow of the Nile River, a vital resource for both nations. (For background and more information, see the In Hindsight in our October 2021 Monthly Forecast, titled “The GERD and Water Security” and 15 September 2021 What’s in Blue story.)
Meanwhile, Somalia and Ethiopia have continued to exchange hostile rhetoric. In a 28 August press statement, Ethiopia’s foreign ministry described the ATMIS transition as “fraught with dangers to the region”. The statement accused Somalia of “colluding with external actors aiming to destabilize the region” and called for the “legitimate concerns” of the troop-contributing countries to be taken into account while planning the follow-mission to ATMIS. On the other hand, media reports quoted Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi as saying during an interview that Somalia could resort to establishing “contacts with armed rebels” in Ethiopia who are fighting against the government if Ethiopia attempted to implement the MoU it signed with Somaliland. He added, however, that the situation had not reached that stage, indicating that “there is a hope there will be a solution”.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 9 August, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Isha Dyfan, strongly condemned the 2 August attack at Lido Beach in Mogadishu carried out by Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida. The attack resulted in the deaths of 37 civilians and injured more than 210 others. Dyfan remarked that, “[t]his attack is unacceptable, and more so because the deliberate targeting of civilians is contrary to humanitarian principles and constitutes a serious breach of international law that protects civilians in times of armed conflict”. She urged the Somali government to identify those responsible and ensure they are held accountable.
On 4 October, Dyfan is expected to present her report on Somalia’s human rights situation to the UN Human Rights Council. Dyfan conducted two official visits to the country, the first from 6 to 19 November 2023 and the second from 5 to 11 May.
Key Issues and Options
One of the key issues for Council members in October is the future of UNSOM, whose mandate expires on 31 October. In renewing the mandate, Council members are likely to be guided by the outcome of the joint technical committee and Somalia’s proposal for UNSOM’s transition to UNCT and the phased handover of responsibilities to Somali institutions.
A related issue is how to continue supporting the Somali government in achieving its national priorities, including the constitutional review and electoral processes. Some members might also raise the issue of maintaining regular reporting to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia. Additionally, addressing the increasing tension between the federal government and some federal member states is a matter of concern for several Council members.
The other important issue for members is the escalating tension between Ethiopia and Somalia, which may undermine regional peace and security, including Somalia’s ongoing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, and ATMIS’ transition process. One option for Council members would be to issue a press statement encouraging the parties to exercise restraint and make efforts towards de-escalating tensions and support initiatives in this regard.
Council Dynamics
Council members support the Somali government’s priorities and recognise the many challenges the country faces, including the persistent insecurity caused by the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. They also support ongoing efforts to fight the group. Some members, however, believe that a security approach will not be sufficient and underscore the need to make progress in governance, justice, and economic reforms. Other Council members emphasise the need for progress in implementing the Somali Transition Plan, including national force generation.
Although Council members seem to agree on continuing security support for Somalia post-ATMIS, views differ on how such efforts should be financed. Somalia, an incoming elected Council member for the 2025-26 term, and several members have suggested financing the follow-on mission in accordance with resolution 2719. However, other Council members, such as the US, are apparently not keen to consider the mission in Somalia under resolution 2719. In its explanation of vote following the adoption of resolution 2748, the US said that “resolution 2719 can only be realistically implemented after instituting an interim bridging approach over the course of the next two years, and provided that AU is ready to implement it”. During the negotiations, some members argued that such a bridging mechanism could imply additional obligations for financial contributors to ATMIS. The European Union, a major financial contributor to ATMIS, advocates a sustainable financing model based on diversified contributions and a significant element of cost-sharing, including the possible use of the AU Peace Fund and Crisis Reserve Facility. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in the August 2024 Monthly Forecast, and 9 and 15 August What’s in Blue stories, and listen to our 8 July podcast episode.)
Council members remain concerned about the escalating tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. In its remarks during the 24 June Council meeting, the US stressed the need to ensure that “regional tensions [do] not interfere with planning for and the deployment of a post-ATMIS mission”. It also alluded to security and financial risks associated with any changes in troop contributors. (For background, see the 22 June and 18 February What’s in Blue stories.)
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 15 August 2024S/RES/2748 | This resolution extends the authorisation for the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) until 31 December, and requests the Secretary-General, jointly with the AU Commission Chairperson and in consultations with Somalia and international stakeholders, to report on the overall mission design for the proposed successor mission by 15 November. |
| 21 December 2023S/RES/2719 | This was a resolution on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). |
| 31 October 2023S/RES/2705 | This resolution extended the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) for one year. |
