Libya
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which expires on 31 October.
Additionally, the Council will hold its bimonthly briefing on the situation in Libya. Deputy Special Representative and Political Officer in Charge of UNSMIL Stephanie Koury will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country. The chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki (Japan), is also expected to brief on the committee’s activities.
Key Recent Developments
The political impasse in Libya continues between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNSMIL, dated 8 August and covering events since 9 April, the parties have not achieved any progress in resolving disagreements about proposed electoral legislation that would allow national elections to be held and reconcile the country’s divided government. The main point of contention concerns the formation of a unified interim government to organise the elections, a move favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC.
The long-running stand-off between the rival governments intensified on 13 August when the HoR voted to end the GNU’s term and designate the GNS as the country’s “legitimate government” until a unified interim government is appointed. The HoR also named its speaker, Aguila Saleh, the commander-in-chief of Libya’s armed forces in a move that would supplant the Presidential Council, which was established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement to serve as the country’s head of state and as “supreme commander” of its military. In a 14 August statement, UNSMIL noted that it was following with concern the recent “unilateral acts” by Libyan political actors, which it said “undermine trust and further entrench institutional divisions and discord”.
Tensions escalated further on 18 August when Presidential Council leader Mohamed Yunus al-Menfi—who is considered a political ally of Dbeibah—issued a decree firing Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Governor Sadiq al-Kabir, who had led the bank since 2011. The CBL is the country’s sole depository for public revenues and is one of the few state institutions servicing both governments. Until recently, al-Kabir was also considered an ally of Dbeibah, but their relationship seems to have soured over the past year as al-Kabir appeared to become more amenable to public spending by eastern authorities, culminating in the HoR’s unilateral approval on 10 July of a supplemental $18.3 billion budget for the GNS, which would be drawn from the CBL. The validity of the Presidential Council’s firing of al-Kabir was called into question, with eastern authorities as well as some analysts saying that it lacks legal basis.
The Presidential Council appointed one of al-Kabir’s former deputy governors, Abdel Fattah Ghaffar, as his successor on an interim basis. While Ghaffar gained control of Libya’s domestic currency transfers, the CBL under his leadership reportedly lost access to foreign reserves and balances held in international financial institutions, which were assessing the CBL’s legal standing. Additionally, in response to al-Kabir’s ouster, the GNS ordered the closure of oil fields and terminals under its control, reportedly causing the country’s oil exports—the largest source of state revenue—to fall by over 80 percent.
UNSMIL facilitated several rounds of talks involving the Presidential Council, HoR, and HSC to resolve the CBL crisis. On 25 September, the mission announced that the parties had reached an agreement on the “procedures, criteria, and timelines” for appointing new CBL leadership by consensus. According to the deal—which was signed the following day on UNSMIL’s premises—the parties agreed to nominate CBL Director of Banking and Monetary Control Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem as new interim governor, while CBL Deputy Governor Mari Muftah Rahil Barrasi would be nominated to continue in his position. The HoR and HSC were given one week to approve the nominees, after which Belqasem would be given two weeks to nominate a new board of governors.
Regarding Libya’s security situation, the 2020 ceasefire agreement continues to hold, although the heightened political tensions have raised concern about the risk of violent confrontation. Most recently, following al-Kabir’s ouster, rival militias in Tripoli mobilised in support of both sides of the dispute, prompting UNSMIL to issue a 22 August press statement expressing grave concern about threats of the use of force to resolve the crisis. The statement called for immediate de-escalation and restraint, emphasising that “dialogue is the only solution to all issues”.
On the humanitarian front, September marked the one-year anniversary of Storm Daniel, which struck the eastern city of Derna and surrounding areas on 10 September 2023, leading to catastrophic flooding that killed nearly 6,000 people, displaced over 44,000, and left approximately 250,000 in need of humanitarian assistance. Reconstruction efforts have achieved considerable progress in the year since, but a 10 September joint statement by a group of international aid agencies warned that humanitarian needs in the area “remain alarmingly high”. Additionally, political corruption and competition pertaining to the use of reconstruction funds have reportedly been one factor fuelling the increased tensions between western and eastern authorities.
In a 28 August press statement, Security Council members expressed concern about recent developments in the country. The statement called on Libyan leaders to de-escalate tensions, refrain from the use of force or economic pressure, and reach a consensus-based solution to the CBL crisis, while avoiding actions that could jeopardise the 2020 ceasefire agreement and the country’s “fragile stability”. The statement also emphasised the need for the Secretary-General to appoint a new Special Representative for Libya “as soon as possible”, as Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL Abdoulaye Bathily resigned in May.
Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo visited Libya from 8 to 11 September. During her trip, DiCarlo met with key Libyan political leaders, including Dbeibah, Menfi, and Saleh, with whom she raised concerns about the country’s deteriorating political and security situation, stressing the need to resolve the CBL crisis, advance a rights-based national reconciliation process, and hold credible and inclusive elections to break the country’s political deadlock.
Through resolution 2240 of 9 October 2015 and subsequent annual renewals, the Council has authorised member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect and seize vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they had reasonable grounds to suspect were being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya. The Council had initially been expected to renew the authorisation again in September, but it appears that France and Malta—the co-penholders on the authorisation—informed Council members that they had decided not to pursue a further renewal and would allow the authorisation to expire at the end of its current mandate on 29 September.
On 30 September, at Russia’s request, the Council held an open briefing on the situation of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean Sea. The Council was briefed by Sivanka Dhanapala, Director of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Liaison Office in New York, and Pär Liljert, Director of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Office to the UN in New York.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a report published on 30 August, UNSMIL and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warn that the lack of accountability and years of impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses committed in the Libyan city of Tarhuna between 2013 and 2022 risk fuelling more instability and further division in the country.
The report details how Al-Kaniyat, a militia group that has been affiliated with both eastern and western authorities, came to exercise effective control of Tarhuna, a city of approximately 150,000 people located 90 kilometres southeast of Tripoli. It documents serious violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations and abuses of international human rights law committed by the group, including unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, forced displacement, and looting. The report emphasises the need for a comprehensive transitional justice and reconciliation process, with meaningful truth-seeking measures and effective reparations for victims—including legal aid and mental health support and guarantees of non-repetition—designed in consultation with those directly affected.
Women, Peace and Security
As the Council’s president for August, Sierra Leone elected to include a focus on women, peace and security (WPS) at the 20 August Council briefing on Libya. Several participants addressed WPS issues during the meeting. In her briefing, Koury noted that women comprise only 30 percent of registered voters in Libya’s local elections, which are expected to take place in mid-October across 60 municipalities. She expressed concern that women’s participation as candidates may also be low, with obstacles such as “intimidation, online violence and verbal attacks” discouraging them from running for office. Ecuador, Malta, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, and Switzerland emphasised the importance of guaranteeing women’s participation in political processes in Libya. Guyana, delivering a statement on behalf of the “A3 plus one” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana), condemned “threats, attacks and the killing of women who are participating in public life, including women human rights defenders” (WHRDs) and urged UNSMIL to prioritise “all activities related to the protection and promotion of human rights, including stronger coordination” in cases of reprisals against WHRDs. Malta also called for lifting any restrictions against women’s freedom of movement and right to work while Switzerland highlighted the dire situation faced by women among Sudanese refugees in southern Libya, citing reports of human trafficking, exploitation and sexual violence.
Key Issues and Options
The key issue for the Council in October is the renewal of UNSMIL’s mandate. As was the case for the current mandate in resolution 2702 of 30 October 2023, the Council is likely to retain the mission’s core tasks as set out in resolution 2542 of 15 September 2020 and paragraph 16 of resolution 2570 of 16 April 2021. Council members may consider updating the mandate, however, to reflect the country’s increasingly volatile political and security contexts, drawing on agreed language from their 28 August press statement.
Additionally, while the Council is not expected to make major substantive changes to the mission’s mandate, one point of uncertainty concerns the length of the renewal. While most members are expected to favour a regular one-year extension, some may call for a shorter technical rollover until the Secretary-General has appointed a new Special Representative to lead the mission.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country. They also remain broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role towards this end.
The upcoming renewal of UNSMIL’s mandate in the absence of a Special Representative may rekindle older disagreements, however. When former Special Envoy Ján Kubiš resigned in November 2021, it took nearly a year to identify a successor, eventually leading to Bathily’s appointment in September 2022. (Resolution 2629 of 29 April 2022 changed UNSMIL’s leadership position from a Special Envoy to a Special Representative.) During this impasse, between September 2021 and July 2022, the Council renewed UNSMIL’s mandate five times through short-term extensions, in part because Russia opposed a regular one-year renewal in the absence of appointed mission leadership. Similar dynamics may shape negotiations over this year’s renewal.
The UK is the penholder on Libya.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 30 October 2023S/RES/2702 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 31 October 2024. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 8 August 2024S/2024/598 | This was the 120-day report on UNSMIL. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 28 August 2024SC/15804 | This press statement expressed concern about recent developments in Libya and called on Libyan actors to refrain from any unilateral actions that increase tensions, undermine trust, and further entrench institutional divisions and discord in the country. |
