Colombia
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council is expected to receive a briefing from Special Representative and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Carlos Ruiz Massieu on recent developments in Colombia and the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on the mission, which was circulated to Council members on 26 September (S/2024/694). A civil society representative is also expected to brief. Switzerland, the Council’s president in October, will apparently encourage a focus on issues relating to women, peace and security (WPS) at the meeting.
The Council is also scheduled to renew the verification mission’s mandate ahead of its 31 October expiry.
Key Recent Developments
The Security Council’s latest quarterly briefing on Colombia, held on 11 July, provided a unique opportunity to assess peacebuilding efforts in the country. Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego represented his country at a Council meeting for the first time. The Council also heard a briefing from Diego Tovar, an ex-combatant from the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and signatory to the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concluded in 2016 between the government of Colombia and the former FARC-EP. This marked the first time that a former FARC-EP member briefed the Council in person.
The period preceding the July meeting witnessed frequent rhetoric from Petro about challenges in implementing the 2016 agreement, including accusations of a lack of cooperation from certain state ministries. These complaints also coincided with discussions about a politically contentious proposal by the president to convene a constituent assembly. (For background, see the brief on Colombia in our July 2024 Monthly Forecast.) Petro did not reference the proposed constituent assembly at the July meeting, and it appears that discussions on the issue have tapered off.
In his remarks at the Council meeting, the President announced his intention to pursue a “rapid action response plan”, calling it a “faster method for enacting laws in Congress” that would allow him to accelerate implementation of the peace agreement. He named several key aspects of this plan, including purchase and distribution of land and investment in the development programmes with a territorial focus (PDET). Petro added that the 15-year timeframe envisioned for the implementation of the 2016 accord should be extended by seven years. The President’s lengthy statement covered many other issues, including the difficult conditions faced by former combatants who laid down their arms. He referred to former territorial area for training and reintegration (TATRs) as “concentration camps”, noting that its inhabitants are closed off due to threats posed by armed groups that engage in illicit economic activity.
On 3 July, Petro announced that he had appointed Juan Fernando Cristo as Minister of the Interior and tasked him, among other things, with coordinating compliance with the 2016 peace agreement. Cristo had previously served in the same function during the administration of former President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, playing a key role in negotiating the 2016 accord and in the early stages of its implementation. Several interlocutors, including Council members at the 11 July session, welcomed the appointment as a positive sign of the government’s renewed focus on advancing implementation of the agreement. On 24 September, Cristo said that the government will present the “rapid action response plan” to Congress in the following week.
The past quarter witnessed both progress and challenges in the implementation of the 2016 agreement. In August, Petro led a joint session of the National Commission on Security Guarantees (NCSG) and the High-Level Unit of the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (SISEP) to promote territorial implementation of the public policy to dismantle illegal armed groups and criminal organisations, which the NCSG presented on 7 September 2023.
A session of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI)—the main forum for dialogue between the parties on the implementation of the accord—was held on 10 September with the participation of government officials such as Cristo, Tovar (who represents signatories to the 2016 agreement at the CSIVI), and international interlocutors. Ruiz Massieu welcomed the session in a post on X (formerly Twitter) and called for “the regular operation of this highest instance of the architecture of the Agreement to give a definitive boost to its comprehensive implementation”—a message also conveyed by Tovar at the 11 July Council meeting.
Persistent insecurity continued to pose the main challenge to the 2016 accord’s implementation, including to the reintegration of former combatants. In August, 44 ex-combatants and their families were displaced from the Miravalle TATR in the Caquetá department. It was announced in June that the TATR is facing security threats from the dissident group of the former FARC-EP that identifies itself as the Estado Mayor Central Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (EMC FARC-EP).
The government’s dialogue efforts with armed groups operating in the country, carried out as part of Petro’s “total peace” policy, continue to produce mixed results. Nine such dialogues are currently underway. The process with the guerrilla group Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)—which had been the most advanced to that point—stalled in May following the government’s decision to hold a regional dialogue with one of the ELN’s regional fronts. On 3 August, the bilateral ceasefire between the government and the ELN, which had been observed for a year, expired, absent agreement from the sides on its extension.
Talks have continued with groups characterised as political by the government, including several factions of the EMC, representing roughly 40 percent of the dissident group, as well as with the armed group Segunda Marquetalia, which consists of former FARC-EP dissidents who signed the 2016 agreement but took up arms again. The government has also established dialogues with groups characterised as criminal that focus on ceasing violence in exchange for judicial benefits. Two new such dialogues started recently with the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC). Some analysts have emphasised that dialogue with the AGC—Colombia’s biggest criminal group with presence in 30 percent of the country—is crucial to the success of the “total peace” policy.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 4 September press release, the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Olivier De Schutter, warned of Colombia’s vicious cycle of poverty and conflict, stressing that peace in the country can only be achieved by addressing class divisions and discrimination against the poor. Following his visit to Bogotá, Soacha, Ciudad Bolívar, Cali, and Buenaventura, De Schutter noted that poverty is fuelling conflict in Colombia, as limited job opportunities leave the poor vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups, and coca farmers have few alternatives but to cultivate illicit crops. He stated that conflict, in turn, exacerbates poverty by hindering people’s access to education, work, and healthcare. The Special Rapporteur urged the full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement to address the illegal drug trade and help coca growers substitute crops. “[Farmers] also need improved access to credit and markets, and to obtain a decent price for their produce”, he said.
Key Issues and Options
A key priority for the Council in October is to renew the verification mission’s mandate. Members could choose to adopt a straightforward renewal, without altering the mission’s tasks.
They may also consider if recent developments require any alteration to the mission’s mandate, including in light of the expiration of the government’s ceasefire with the ELN. Through resolution 2694 of 2 August 2023, the Council tasked the mission with monitoring and verifying the implementation of the bilateral ceasefire, approving 68 additional international observers to that end. The Secretary-General’s report notes that, even after the ceasefire’s expiry, the mission’s deployment in the field allowed it to continue to monitor and follow up on developments, to maintain contact with local communities, and to facilitate preventive action when situations of “imminent armed contact” arose. The report appears to suggest the importance of retaining such capacities, noting that they “constitute a key asset”, especially considering the current “delicate juncture in the peacebuilding process”.
An overarching priority for the Council remains supporting the full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. As Petro reached the half-way point of his term in office, they increasingly emphasised the need to take concrete action to that end. There appears to be lack of clarity on some issues that the president raised at the 11 July meeting, including the details of the “rapid action response plan” and the extension of the period envisioned for the 2016 agreement’s implementation. Ahead of October’s Council session, Council members may choose to interact informally with Cristo or Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Gilberto Murillo Urrutia to receive further information on those issues.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their support for the peace process in Colombia and for the verification mission’s work. Past negotiations on the extension and modification of the mission’s mandate have generally gone smoothly, although some issues required discussion. For instance, during the negotiations on resolution 2694, China raised concerns about possible budgetary implications that led to the authorisation of 68 additional observers, instead of the 70 initially proposed.
In negotiating resolution 2704 of 30 October 2023, which most recently extended the verification mission’s mandate, China and Russia opposed the addition of language proposed by some members on issues relating to women, children, and youth. This approach is consistent with other files, as China and Russia often challenge the inclusion of language on WPS and other thematic issues in Council products.
The UK is the penholder on Colombia.
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 26 September 2024S/2024/694 | This was the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on the UN Verification Mission in Colombia. |
