Sudan (Darfur)
Expected Council Action
In May, Ambassador Rafael Ramírez (Venezuela), the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected to provide the quarterly briefing to Council members on the Committee’s work. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.
Key Recent Developments
The AU High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), entrusted with mediating between the Sudanese government and the opposition, produced a roadmap agreement for peace in Sudan that was signed by the government on 21 March. The roadmap calls for a cessation of hostilities in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, with separate negotiations to ensue with the Darfur rebel groups and with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) regarding South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The rebel groups have not signed the roadmap. They are concerned that the government is attempting to include them in a national dialogue process designed to prop up the regime rather than initiate real political reform. The opposition forces have further expressed disappointment with the AUHIP, believing that it proposed a roadmap that legitimises the government’s control over a non-inclusive and unfair national dialogue process.
On 12 April, a spokesman for the government, Ahmed Khalifa Al-Shami, announced that Sudanese forces had overrun the final bastion of resistance held by the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) in Srounq in the Jebel Marra region, where government forces had been engaged in heavy fighting with the SLA-AW since January. On 13 April, however, SLA-AW spokesman Shihab al-Din Ahmed Hagar claimed that the group had repelled the attack on Srounq and had inflicted heavy casualties on government forces.
A referendum on the administrative status of Darfur was conducted between 11 and 13 April. The referendum was intended to determine whether the Darfur region would remain as five administrative units (i.e. North Darfur, South Darfur, East Darfur, West Darfur and Central Darfur) or become one administrative unit. The government prefers the status quo, with some analysts maintaining that it will be able to continue to exert greater control over an administratively divided region. Meanwhile, opposition forces argued against holding the referendum, expressing concerns that ongoing fighting and displacement in the region would make participation difficult for many potential voters. On 24 April, the Darfur Referendum Commission announced the results, reporting that almost 98 percent of the participants chose the status quo (i.e. five states). The Justice and Equality Movement, a key Darfur rebel group, has refused to accept the results and called the vote fraudulent.
On 10 February, the Security Council adopted resolution 2265 renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2017. Negotiations on the resolution were difficult. The penholder on this issue, the US, proposed incorporating new language that would link funds from the trade in Darfur gold to armed conflict, in keeping with the findings of the Panel of Expert’s 2015 final report. However, some members disputed these findings, and this language was omitted from resolution 2265. While the Sanctions Committee received the final report of the Panel of Experts in December 2015, the report has yet to be published, as Russia has placed a hold on its publication, reportedly maintaining that the report contains inaccuracies.
On 19 April, the Sanctions Committee met with Leila Zerrougui, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, who said that Sudan had recently signed an Action Plan committing to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.
On 6 April, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). He said that since his last briefing to the Council in January, fighting had continued in Darfur’s Jebel Marra region between government forces and the SLA-AW faction, leading to significant displacement of people. Ladsous recounted the 22 March meeting of the tripartite group—consisting of representatives from the AU, the UN and the government of Sudan—which focused on relations between UNAMID and the Sudanese government. “Concrete steps by the government are required in terms of lifting restrictions on the mission’s operations, including customs clearances, visas and access to Darfur overall”, he said, reporting that the government had taken “some significant steps” on these issues since the meeting.
Council members discussed Darfur under “any other business” on 12 April at the UK’s request. The meeting focused on restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government on UNAMID’s operations, mainly delays in issuing visas for UNAMID staff and in providing customs clearances for supply containers to be shipped to UNAMID. Some members advocated that China, as Council president in April, should meet with Sudan’s permanent representative to the UN to discuss efforts to improve cooperation between UNAMID and Sudan. However, consensus could not be reached on the need for China to intervene on behalf of the Council, although it does appear that some members may be meeting with Sudan in a bilateral capacity to discuss the importance of cooperation with UNAMID.
Human Rights-Related Developments
The independent expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, Aristide Nononsi, carried out his second mission to the country from 14 to 28 April to assess the efforts being undertaken by the Sudanese government to comply with its international human rights obligations. He travelled to Khartoum, Darfur and South Kordofan. The independent expert will present his findings and recommendations to the Human Rights Council in September.
Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to make the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime more effective, given reports of violations of the arms embargo, the travel ban and the assets freeze.
Also a key issue is the need to appoint experts to serve on the Sudan Panel of Experts. Given its misgivings about the final report of the Panel in 2015, Russia has placed a hold on the appointment of the new experts.
Another important issue is whether the final report of the 2015 Panel will be published. While some emphasise the importance of transparency in the work of the Council, there have been instances when final reports of panels were never published. For example, the 2011 final report of the Sudan Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts was never publicly released, apparently because of objections from China regarding accusations that Chinese-made ammunition found in Darfur violated the arms embargo.
Options
While efforts are being made to garner support for the appointment of the full slate of five experts, one temporary option could be to appoint the two individuals who, unlike the other three experts proposed for this year, did not serve on the panel last year. The two new experts would probably not be objectionable to Russia since they had no role in producing the controversial report last year.
A further option would be for members of the Sanctions Committee to visit Darfur to assess the difficulties with implementation of the sanctions regime and report back to the Council on their findings. Based on the results of such a visiting mission, the Council could adopt a resolution or presidential statement that outlines measures that could be taken to improve the effectiveness of the regime.
Council Dynamics
Sharp divisions on Darfur were reflected by the response of Council members to the 2015 final report of the Panel of Experts. The report’s conclusion that the illicit trade in gold is a driver of conflict in Darfur resonated with the UK, the US and other Council members. However, members such as China, Russia and Egypt found this analysis unconvincing; within this group, there further appeared to be some trepidation that linking the gold trade to instability in Darfur and the region could bolster arguments for additional targeted sanctions, which they believe would be counterproductive in the current context.
The UK is the penholder on UNAMID, while the US holds the pen on Darfur sanctions and Venezuela chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.
