Iraq
Expected Council Action
In May, Special Representative Ján Kubiš will brief on developments in Iraq and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). UNAMI’s mandate expires on 31 July.
In addition, the Council may reach agreement on a draft resolution circulated by China and Russia in mid-April addressing the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, in light of several allegations since August 2015 that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has used mustard gas in Iraq and Syria.
Key Recent Developments
Since Kubiš last briefed the Council on 16 February, a serious political crisis has developed in Iraq. There have been large-scale protests, led by influential Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, against the government’s patronage system. The protesters have demanded an end to the sectarian quota system that determines cabinet posts. The system has become unsustainable in an economy which is on the verge of collapse because of the government’s reliance on oil revenue in a context of plunging oil prices. The situation is exacerbated by the high cost of fighting ISIS and popular discontent with failing public services.
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi attempted to put forward a reform cabinet of technocrats to counter corruption and curtail the power of political actors opposed to reform efforts. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki—of the Shi’a Dawa party, which Abadi also belongs to—has posed a significant obstacle to popular demands for reform and to the stability of the current government. There are reports that Maliki was positioning himself to reclaim the premiership as parliamentarians fought over the proposed technocratic cabinet’s negative implications for their own leverage. However, it seems Malaki’s efforts were averted when both Iran and the US intervened in early April to signal their support for Abadi.
On 26 April, parliamentarians approved nominees for six of the less controversial ministries of health, labour and social affairs, water resources, electricity, higher education, and culture. At press time, Abadi was expected to submit nominees for the remaining cabinet posts by 28 April. However, it seemed there remained concern that the line-up of proposed technocrats may change to reflect previous sectarian political groupings seeking to maintain power. In addition, Abadi said he was not seeking to replace the defence and interior ministers, two portfolios that wield significant power and reflect entrenched interests in the government.
Malaki is seen as being aligned with the Shi’a militia Hashd al-Shaabi—or the popular mobilisation forces (PMF)—that are nominally under the command and control of the government. The PMF is popular in the Shi’a community for its pivotal role in maintaining Baghdad’s security and effectively reclaiming many areas from ISIS. However, the PMF has been accused of reprisal violence against Sunnis, kidnappings, lootings, attacks on mosques, killings, and refusing to allow Sunni residents back to their homes once areas have been liberated from ISIS.
Regarding anti-ISIS operations, there have been further government gains in Anbar province, including retaking Ramadi and Hit. Iraqi government forces have undertaken these offensives with the cooperation of local Sunni tribal fighters and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, backed by air support from the US-led anti-ISIS coalition. The PMF has not been included in these offensives, in deference to the US position that Iraq’s use of Shi’a militias in Sunni areas stokes sectarian tension and deepens the distrust of the Shi’a-led government among Sunni leaders.
Recently the government has been gearing up to retake Mosul, which was captured by ISIS in June 2014. The PMF has insisted it will play a role in that offensive, despite objections from the US-led coalition and Iraqi government forces. Meanwhile, Sunni tribal leaders have signalled their unwillingness to participate in the Mosul offensive alongside the government if Shi’a militias are involved. At press time, planning for the Mosul offensive had been put on hold due to a lack of sufficient ground support.
Despite the government’s military gains against ISIS, the situation of civilians has not seen a corresponding improvement. OCHA reports that the violence between armed groups and government forces has resulted in 3.4 million internally displaced persons and ten million people who require humanitarian assistance. The UN has also reported new waves of displacement in Anbar province since the beginning of the year, presumably as a result of civilians fleeing the anti-ISIS offensives.
Meanwhile, many thousands of civilians are unable to flee and are trapped on the front lines of battle. The World Food Programme estimates that 60,000 civilians are trapped in ISIS-controlled Fallujah, besieged by government forces that restrict supply routes into the city. The UN does not have humanitarian access to Fallujah, where civilians are facing acute shortages of food and medicine. Separately, the UN Refugee Agency has expressed concern about restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of internally displaced Iraqis fleeing ISIS-controlled areas that are disproportionate to any legitimate security concern.
Even in areas already liberated from ISIS, UN officials are increasingly concerned that lagging re-stabilisation efforts could undermine progress. UNAMI has said that for military advances against ISIS to hold, the government, in cooperation with the UN, would have to work quickly to restore the rule of law and basic services and thus give civilians confidence that it was safe to return. This is particularly important in relation to the Sunni provinces, which have a strained relationship with the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad.
Further complicating the humanitarian situation are warnings that the Mosul dam could collapse, a catastrophic scenario for 500,000 to 1.5 million Iraqis living in the path of the potential flood. The Mosul dam is not controlled by ISIS, but is very near ISIS-controlled territory. An Italian company has been contracted to maintain and reinforce the dam.
At press time, the Security Council’s 2242 Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security was expected to consider the situation in Iraq at a 29 April meeting. Several UN officials are expected to brief the 2242 Group, including the deputy head of UNAMI Lise Grande and Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Kate Gilmore.
Human Rights-Related Developments
Gilmore, following a week-long visit to Iraq in April, said the international community’s focus on military action needs comparable investment in non-military relief. She added that the international community must not allow itself to be made complicit with the failed leadership of Iraq. A 25 April press statement by Gilmore added that Iraq must immediately take concrete steps to plan for “the day after” the defeat of ISIS, grounded in equality, the rule of law and a vision that has earned the confidence of all the country’s diverse communities. “All the leaders of Iraq, at every level, in both word and action, need to demonstrate a far greater commitment to peace, equality and to the rule of law,” the statement said. “Unchecked corruption, lack of accountability for past and present crimes, the problem of militias, the growing number of internally displaced people, the partial or total destruction of entire villages and towns, violence against women, and the need for constitutional and legislative reforms are some of the many pressing human rights concerns in Iraq that need priority attention,” the statement added. Gilmore also urged the international community to provide more support to humanitarian needs, the rebuilding of essential infrastructure, and towards justice and reconciliation in Iraq.
Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is promoting a genuinely inclusive government accountable to the Iraqi people. A related issue is determining how the Council and UNAMI can support Prime Minister Abadi’s reform process and encourage greater cooperation on financial, security and humanitarian issues between Abadi’s dominant Shi’a Dawa party and Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians, and thereby build confidence in the central government and fortify Iraq’s response to ISIS.
Options
Options seem limited since the security response to ISIS is happening outside the Council’s purview. However, an option is to adopt a statement calling for the government to work towards enhanced security and humanitarian coordination with Kurdish and Sunni leaders, and for UNAMI to support the government in that effort. In such a statement, the Council could also condemn human rights violations by ISIS and by Iraqi security forces, including the PMF.
Such a statement could also call on the government to cooperate with UNAMI in areas that may require enhanced mission activities, such as human rights, rule of law, electoral assistance, security sector reform, stabilisation activities in areas liberated from ISIS, best practices for child protection and gender policies and contingency planning in light of the Mosul dam’s possible collapse.
Council Dynamics
Council members uniformly support UNAMI and believe that the mission’s mandate is sufficiently broad and flexible to allow Kubiš to fulfil the mission’s good offices role. However, the Council has been largely disengaged from grappling with the underlying political divisions among Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish populations, beyond bland calls for an inclusive government. It has been similarly disengaged from directly addressing the humanitarian crisis, in stark comparison to its engagement with the humanitarian crises in Syria and Yemen.
The US is the penholder on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the penholder on Iraq-Kuwait issues.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 29 July 2015 S/RES/2233 | This resolution renewed UNAMI for a year. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 16 February 2016 S/PV.7623 | Special Representative Ján Kubiš briefed the Council and presented the Secretary-General’s reports on UNAMI (S/2016/77) and on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property (S/2016/87). |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 26 January 2016 S/2016/77 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on UNAMI. |
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 29 July 2015 S/RES/2233 | This resolution renewed UNAMI for a year. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 16 February 2016 S/PV.7623 | Special Representative Ján Kubiš briefed the Council and presented the Secretary-General’s reports on UNAMI (S/2016/77) and on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property (S/2016/87). |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 26 January 2016 S/2016/77 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on UNAMI. |
