August 2015 Monthly Forecast

Posted 31 July 2015
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AFRICA

South Sudan

Expected Council Action

In late August, the Council is expected to hold a briefing, followed by consultations, on the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and on the work of the South Sudan Sanctions Committee. A representative of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Ambassador Cristián Barros (Chile), chair of the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee, will brief. (At press time, the mid-term report of the Panel of Experts was expected on 28 July, and the UNMISS report was expected by 17 August.)

The mandate of UNMISS expires on 30 November.

Key Recent Developments

A security, human rights and humanitarian catastrophe continues to unfold in South Sudan. In recent months, there has been heavy fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the SPLM/A in Opposition, concentrated in oil-producing Unity and Upper Nile states. In addition to continuing reports of atrocities against civilians, there is evidence of recruitment of child soldiers by both sides. There are now more than 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, as well as more than 600,000 refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries. According to OCHA, more than 166,000 IDPs are currently protected in six UNMISS bases across South Sudan. Severe food insecurity confronts 4.6 million South Sudanese.

One civilian died and six others were wounded at UNMISS’s Malakal base on 1 July when they were fired upon by either General Johnson Olonyi’s militia or other SPLM/A in Opposition forces. Later that day, in a statement attributable to his spokesperson, the Secretary-General condemned the attack and called on Riek Machar, leader of the SPLM/A in Opposition, and Olonyi to investigate the incident and hold the perpetrators accountable. (Olonyi is the head of a Shilluk militia that had been aligned with the government but recently joined Machar’s forces.)

On the political front, representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-Plus—which is composed of IGAD, the UN, the AU, several non-IGAD African member states (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa), China, the Troika (Norway, the US and the UK) and the EU—convened in Addis Ababa on 21 July to prepare for a new round of negotiations between the parties, scheduled to commence on 5 August. A draft agreement was presented to the parties which calls for an interim period of 30 months during which Kiir will remain president and the SPLM in Opposition will select a first vice president in a transitional government of national unity. According to the draft, the interim period would culminate in national elections. The expectation is that a final agreement will be signed on 17 August.

On 27 July, US President Barack Obama  met in Addis Ababa with Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn (Ethiopia), President Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya), President Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour (Sudan) and AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma  to discuss the situation in South Sudan.  Media reports indicate that the meeting dealt with the current peace process and potential measures that could be taken against the parties if they do not reach a deal in the coming weeks.

On 23 June, Pagan Amum—one of the 11 high-ranking officials detained by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir at the onset of the South Sudan civil war but subsequently released—was reinstated as Secretary-General of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Kiir’s reconciliation with Amum—as well as with other former SPLM/A detainees—occurred amidst ongoing fighting between government and SPLA in Opposition forces.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted a communiqué on South Sudan on 13 June during its summit in Johannesburg, South Africa [PSC/AHG/COMM.1(DXV)], calling for “urgent steps by the [South Sudan] Sanctions Committee…to designate individuals and entities” that fail to honour their commitments and continue to undermine efforts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict.

On 24 June, the South Sudan Sanctions Committee met with representatives of South Sudan and neighbouring states (i.e., the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda). While it has publicly expressed its disapproval of the sanctions regime, South Sudan expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Committee and its Panel of Experts. None of the regional states explicitly opposed the use of targeted sanctions in South Sudan during this meeting, although some of them have reportedly been ambivalent about the measures.

On 1 July, the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee imposed sanctions (travel bans and assets freezes) on six military figures, including three affiliated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and three affiliated with the SPLA in Opposition. The designated individuals are Gabriel Jok Riak (SPLA Lieutenant General); Simon Gatwech Dual (SPLA in Opposition Major General); James Kuong Chuol (SPLA in Opposition Major General); Santino Deng Wol (SPLA Major General); Marial Chanuong Yol Mangok (SPLA Major General and commander of President Salva Kiir’s special guard); and Peter Gadet (SPLA in Opposition Major General). The designations—proposed by the US and jointly sponsored by France and the UK—are the first ones made under the sanctions regime established in resolution 2206 of 3 March.

On 8 July, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous and UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Yoka Brandt briefed Council members under “any other business” on the human rights situation in South Sudan. Brandt reiterated the horrific crimes described in a 17 June UNICEF press statement, which detailed reports of boys being “castrated and left to bleed to death”, children being bound together before having their throats slit and “others [being]…thrown into burning buildings” during the May fighting in Unity state. Ladsous made an urgent appeal to Council members to send a letter to IGAD and the AU expressing concern about the situation and calling for the public release of the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS); to adopt a presidential statement that threatens targeted sanctions against senior military and political leaders within a week; to implement an arms embargo on South Sudan; and to authorise an independent commission of inquiry that would build on the work of the AUCISS and review allegations of crimes committed since September 2014 (i.e., when the AUCISS concluded its work).

At press time, the Council had not acted on the measures suggested by Ladsous in the 8 July consultations, with the partial exception of the request for a statement about targeted sanctions. On 9 July, Council members issued a press statement on South Sudan in which they condemned violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in Unity and Upper Nile states in April and May. The statement expressed determination to support efforts to hold accountable those responsible for these violations. Council members “recognized the need for an urgent assessment and reinvigoration of the political process to develop and implement a comprehensive solution to end the crisis”. The statement further reiterated Council members’ commitment to designate for sanctions political and military leaders threatening the peace, security and stability of the country, in addition to the six military leaders sanctioned on 1 July.

On 24 July, the AU PSC held a meeting at ministerial-level in Addis Ababa during which it discussed the AUCISS report. While it did not publicly release the report, it adopted a communiqué [(PSC/MIN/COMM.(DXXVI)] stating that it was creating an ad-hoc sub-committee consisting of Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda “to consider the  report of the AUCISS and the Separate Opinion.”  The sub-committee is expected to make recommendations on the way forward that will be considered at a summit level meeting of the AU PSC by the end of August.

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien visited South Sudan from 22-25 July.  In remarks to the press in Juba at the conclusion of his trip, he stated that he had urged Kiir “to help ensure the restrictions on barges transporting vital life-saving supplies on the River Nile be lifted without delay.”  He described the plight of civilians whom he had met, and warned that more would suffer if the conflict did not end. He praised the efforts of aid workers in South Sudan, expressing concern that “aid workers are being harassed… [and]…targeted” and that 27 of them had lost their lives during the conflict, which started in December 2013.  

Human Rights-Related Developments

The UNMISS Human Rights Division released a report on 29 June on the escalation of fighting in Greater Upper Nile. The report, which covers events from April to early June, emphasises that the recent escalation of fighting has been marked not only by allegations of rampant killing, rape, abduction, looting, arson and displacement, but also by a new brutality and intensity, including civilians being burned alive in their homes, gang rapes and the abduction of boys for possible participation in the fighting. According to testimonies referred to in the report, at least 172 women and girls were abducted in Unity state, while at least an additional 79 were subjected to sexual violence including gang rape by government forces and affiliated armed groups. Also in Unity, at least 67 civilians were killed and 40 were missing. Due to the surge in fighting, an additional 28,000 IDPs have sought refuge in UNMISS protection of civilians sites in Unity, according to the report.

During its 29th session, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution without a vote on 2 July on the fact-finding mission to improve human rights, accountability and reconciliation for South Sudan (A/HRC/RES/29/13). The resolution expresses grave concern at the ongoing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties, including extrajudicial killings, targeted violence on the basis of tribal or ethnic affiliation, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment and use of children, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and attacks on schools and hospitals and UN and associated peacekeeping personnel. It strongly urges the government of South Sudan to implement its revised action plan to end and prevent violations committed against children, and for the SPLA in Opposition to immediately end violations and abuses against children. It also requests the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to undertake a fact-finding mission and comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights, and to assess the effectiveness of steps taken by the government of South Sudan to ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is how it can support the current political process, especially in light of the IGAD-Plus efforts currently underway to have the parties sign an agreement by 17 August.

Related to this is linking the targeted sanctions to an overall political strategy, including how to tie the threat of future measures to developments in the political process, how to encourage countries in the region and other influential states to support these measures and how to convince the South Sudanese people that targeted sanctions are not a form of collective punishment.

A number of key issues face the Council in regard to its oversight of UNMISS, such as:

  • addressing ongoing restrictions on access imposed by the government and the opposition in the midst of the deteriorating humanitarian situation;
  • maintaining security and ensuring basic living necessities in the overcrowded protection of civilians sites; and
  • determining when and how IDPs can be safely escorted from UNMISS sites to their places of origin and ensuring their safety and security once they return, given the high levels of violence.
Underlying Problems

Several challenges confront the mediation. Ensuring that the actors in the unwieldy IGAD-Plus collaborate effectively and develop synergies in the mediation process is proving difficult. Another concern is the apparent fragmentation of the opposition. On 21 July, Machar relieved two of his leading commanders, Major Generals Peter Gadet and Gathoth Gatkuoth, from their duties. A number of opposition generals are reportedly growing disillusioned with Machar and are acting with some independence, which could mean that key powerful actors are not represented at the negotiating table. The inclusivity of any transitional arrangement, the quality of the reconciliation process and the manner in which justice and accountability issues are handled will be critical in determining the future of South Sudan. Given that Kiir and Machar are likely to play a key role in the transitional government, they will need to compromise and overcome their grievances for the political process to have a chance to work. To date, they have not demonstrated this type of leadership.

Options

Options for the Council include:

  • dispatching a small emergency mission with a mandate to visit South Sudan and, convening an informal meeting in the region with IGAD-Plus representatives as well as with Alpha Konaré, the AU High Representative for South Sudan, to boost the mediation and convey stern messages and emphasise that the Council is serious about further sanctions, including on top leadership, if immediate progress is not seen;
  • imposing an arms embargo on South Sudan;
  • authorising an independent commission of inquiry to investigate alleged crimes since September 2014 ; and
  • encouraging UNMISS to develop a communications strategy to emphasise that targeted sanctions are aimed solely at individuals and not at particular communities in South Sudan, given the inter-communal rifts that have been exacerbated by the crisis.
Council and Wider Dynamics

At press time, the AU has seemed intent on taking a significant role in the IGAD-Plus mediation, especially since the 2 June appointment of Konaré, former president of Mali and first Chairperson of the AU, as its High Representative for South Sudan. Among Council members, the US appears especially keen on engaging actively in the mediation, while China prefers to assume a more low-key approach.

The Council achieved the necessary consensus to designate six military figures for sanctions on 1 July, but nonetheless there are differing perspectives among members on these measures. The P3 believe that the targeted sanctions can exert pressure on key actors to pursue peace and discourage them from committing further human rights violations, while making clear that there will be accountability for such actions. Chile, Lithuania, New Zealand and Spain appear to have positions similar to the P3.

In line with the AU PSC’s 13 June communiqué, African members on the UN Security Council supported the 1 July designations, although some of these states have reservations about the timing and potential effectiveness of the measures. Angola is in an awkward position. It agreed to the 1 July designations in line with the PSC position, but it is also a member of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which opposes sanctions on South Sudan.

Russia has expressed considerable scepticism about the potential effectiveness of targeted sanctions in South Sudan but decided not to block the 1 July designations, in large part because of the AU PSC’s support of sanctions and the apparent desire of the African members of the UN Security Council to support the AU PSC’s position. Venezuela’s position is similar to Russia’s. China has recently maintained a low profile on this issue, although it has made the point that sanctions are a means to an end rather than an end in themselves.

Several members have expressed support for an arms embargo in consultations. However, there have been divisions within the US administration on this matter, even though an arms embargo was threatened in resolution 2206. It is possible that the US might be more amenable to this tool if the current negotiations fail to produce a positive result. Russia appears unlikely to support an arms embargo at this point.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.

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UN Documents on South Sudan

Security Council Resolutions
28 May 2015 S/RES/2223 This was a resolution renewing the mandate of UNMISS for six months.
3 March 2015 S/RES/2206 This was a resolution creating a sanctions regime for South Sudan.
Secretary-General’s Report
29 April 2015 S/2015/296 This was the report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan.
Security Council Press Statements
9 July 2015 SC/11964 This condemned human rights violations in South Sudan.
3 June 2015 SC/11916 This expressed concern over the expulsion of Humanitarian Coordinator Toby Lanzer.
17 May 2015 SC/11897 This condemned renewed violence in Unity state.
Sanctions Committee Document
1 July 2015 SC/11958 This detailed the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee’s imposition of sanctions (travel bans and assets freezes) on six military figures.

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