Sudan and South Sudan
Expected Council Action
In April, the Council is likely to hold its twice-monthly consultations on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan in accordance with resolution 2046. The Council is also expected to discuss in consultations the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which expires on 31 May.
It is unclear whether there will be any outcome to the deliberations on Sudan-South Sudan this month, especially given the divisive nature of the Council’s discussions on this issue in the recent past.
Key Recent Developments
On 8 March, the defence ministers of Sudan (Abdul Raheem Mohammad Hussein) and South Sudan (John Kuong Nyuon) met in Addis Ababa and signed an implementation agreement focusing on security arrangements agreed to by the parties on 27 September 2012. The implementation agreement outlines tasks and deadlines related to making operational the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) between Sudan and South Sudan. On 12 March, Sudan and South Sudan additionally adopted an implementation matrix that provides a timeline for tasks to be completed by the parties related to security arrangements (including those outlined on 8 March), the administration of Abyei, nationality issues, oil production, trade and other matters.
The Council met in consultations on 12 March to discuss Sudan/South Sudan issues and was briefed by Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan. In light of the 8 and 12 March agreements, Ladsous discussed the technical aspects of establishing the JBVMM, stating that UNISFA would need more troops to fulfil its mandate to support the JBVMM. Menkerios said that the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) had agreed to negotiate directly with Sudan on the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states but that, to date, Sudan had not been willing to engage in such negotiations with the SPLM-N. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP) scheduled talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N on at least two occasions in the first half of March to no avail.
During the meeting, Russia tabled a draft press statement welcoming the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements. However, the US, which had been leading negotiations on a draft presidential statement on Sudan and South Sudan since mid-February, was unwilling to endorse the statement. (It appears that the draft presidential statement was in part intended to express concern with delays in the implementation of the 27 September agreements, in addition to addressing the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the situation in Abyei.)
Speaking to media at the stakeout after the meeting, Ambassador Susan Rice (US) argued that the proposed press statement was “divorced from the larger set of issues”, as it did not mention the situations in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, nor did it address recent cross-border incidents. She added that the US objected to the draft press statement because Russia was “unwilling to commit to a swift issuance” of the presidential statement. In response, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin (Russia), also addressing the media at the stakeout, said that Russia was “working for the Security Council to try to make a positive contribution to the talks between Sudan and South Sudan” and that the US reaction “was not reasonable”.
On 14 March, South Sudan instructed pipeline operators and oil firms to restart oil production for international transport via Sudan. (South Sudan shut down its oil production in January 2012, after accusing Sudan of stealing $815 million worth of its oil.)
South Sudan withdrew its troops to its side of the SDBZ on 17 March in concurrence with the 8 and 12 March agreements. The Sudan Tribune reported on the same day that Sudan submitted a letter to the UNISFA Force Commander, indicating that it had withdrawn its armed forces from the border areas. Also on 17 March, however, South Sudan accused the Sudanese Armed Forces and affiliated militias and ethnic groups of a cross-border incursion into Northern Bahr el Ghazal state.
From 16-19 March, the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body that the parties use to address border-related security concerns, convened in Addis Ababa. During the meeting, Major General Yohannes Gabremeskel Tesfamariam (Ethiopia), the Force Commander and head of UNISFA, reported that Sudan and South Sudan had withdrawn their troops from the border and that national monitors from both countries were in transit to the headquarters of the JBVMM in Kadugli, South Kordofan state.
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, chairperson of the AU Commission, welcomed in a 20 March press release the JPSM meeting and the efforts undertaken by the parties to make the SDBZ operational. In the press release, she also urged the Security Council “to authorise the additional 1,126 personnel…requested by UNISFA, to facilitate force protection for the monitors of the JBVMM.”
Also on 20 March, Hussein, the Sudanese defence minister, indicated that Sudan would be willing to negotiate directly with the SPLM-N so long as the negotiations were “based on the [2005] Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the protocol for the two areas [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] as a reference”. (This condition might be an effort by Sudan to avert discussion of the broader demands of the Sudan Revolutionary Front—an umbrella group including the SPLM-N and some of the key Darfur rebel groups—which has vowed to overthrow the current regime.)
The Council held an informal interactive dialogue on 27 March with Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AUHIP, on Sudan and South Sudan. Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar, also a member of the AUHIP, participated, although Mbeki was the primary briefer. Mbeki told Council members that he was optimistic about the prospect for improved relations between Sudan and South Sudan since the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements. He was also hopeful that Sudan and the SPLM-N would hold direct negotiations in the near future, although Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir had yet to concur with his defence minister’s comments on 20 March and give his approval to such negotiations. Mbeki added that there was a possibility that al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir would meet in early April to resolve their differences related to the establishment of the Abyei Area Council and the Abyei Area Police. It seems that he claimed as well that economic sanctions against Sudan were unhelpful.
Key Issues
A key issue is whether Council members can overcome their differences and speak with a unified voice on Sudan-South Sudan issues in a manner that enhances their influence on the calculations of the parties.
On the ground, given their failure to honour several previous agreements, a key issue is whether Sudan and South Sudan can continue to make progress in implementing the arrangements agreed to on 8 and 12 March.
Another important and ongoing issue is how to address the fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states between Sudan and the SPLM-N and the resulting and ongoing humanitarian crisis.
A related issue is whether Sudan and the SPLM-N will engage in direct talks and make progress in negotiations on a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access to the two states.
Options
Options for the Council on Sudan-South Sudan issues include:
- requesting a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of the 8 and 12 March agreements by 10 June, the deadline set for the full operational capacity of the JBVMM in these agreements;
- travelling to Sudan and South Sudan to meet with officials from both governments and to impress upon the parties the importance of fulfilling prior commitments; and
- mandating the Secretary-General to launch a commission of inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
Council Dynamics
Sudan-South Sudan issues have remained divisive within the Council, as reflected by the consultations on 12 March. Some members, notably the US, hold Sudan largely responsible for its poor relations with South Sudan. Russia and others advocate for what they consider a more balanced approach.
In February, the US circulated a first draft of a presidential statement to Council members, followed by a revised second version, in an effort to achieve the consensus needed to adopt the statement. However, the contentious consultations on 12 March appear to have generated new difficulties in negotiations on the statement. At press time, it seems that the Council’s discussions on this statement have reached an impasse.
While Council members are encouraged by the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements, they underscore the importance of implementing these agreements, recalling the history of non-implementation of previously signed agreements. In this sense, members will view as a positive development recent efforts by the parties to disengage their troops from the border and move their national monitors to the JBVMM headquarters in Kadugli.
The ongoing conflict and related humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states remain a continuing source of distress in the Council. Council members are eager for Sudan and the SPLM-N to engage in direct talks without preconditions.
With respect to UNISFA, at least one member appears wary of the suggestion that more troops may be needed by the mission to carry out its mandate to support the JBVMM. (This may result in part from concerns about the budgetary implications of expanding the size of the mission.)
The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues, although Russia took the lead in circulating a draft press statement acknowledging the 8 and 12 March agreements.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 2 May 2012 S/RES/2046 | This resolution was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 28 September 2012 SC/10779 | This press statement welcomed the 27 September agreements between Sudan and South Sudan |
| Security Council Letter | |
| 11 March 2013 S/2013/148 | This was a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council that contained the 8 March agreement. |
