DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In May, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Román Oyarzun (Spain), is due to brief Council members in consultations on the Committee’s work.
Key Recent Developments
Following the Council’s decision on 2 March in resolution 2270 to expand sanctions against the DPRK (for further details, please refer to our 26 February What’s in Blue story), Pyongyang has maintained its defiant posture. In a 4 March Council letter, it called the resolution “the most undisguised and the most hideous international crime aimed to isolate and stifle an independent and righteous sovereign state under unjustified pretexts”, and on 10 and 18 March it conducted additional missile launches. Council members condemned the launches in a press statement, stressing the Council’s intention to ensure full implementation of resolution 2270 and “act as appropriate”.
On 5 April, the Republic of Korea (ROK) informed the Council that since 31 March the DPRK had been sending jamming signals “dangerously affecting” the Global Positioning System (GPS) in the ROK. It characterised the GPS jamming as a security threat and a clear violation of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. On 9 April, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully conducted a ground test of an engine for an intercontinental missile capable of striking the US mainland with a nuclear warhead. Also, in a series of letters to the Council, the DPRK denounced the ROK-US ongoing joint military exercises and the US’ “hostile policy” against it and threatened to use nuclear force to defend itself. (The exercises, which began on 7 March, will end on 30 April.)
On the occasion of the 15 April commemoration of the birthday of its founding leader, Kim Il-sung, the DPRK attempted to launch an intermediate ballistic missile. In a press statement, Council members condemned the attempt as a clear violation of relevant Council resolutions and urged all member states to redouble their efforts to implement their obligations under the resolutions.
Subsequently, the ROK warned that the DPRK appeared to be preparing for another nuclear test, possibly ahead of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s congress in May, its first since 1980. Following a tri-lateral meeting in Seoul on 19 April, Japan, the ROK and the US made clear that any further provocations by the DPRK would be met with a firm response. Also, at the end of a bilateral meeting with China in Beijing on 21 April, the US said the two countries were united in their firm opposition to further DPRK provocations.
Despite these and the Council’s previous warnings against any further provocations, the DPRK on 23 April announced that it had successfully conducted a submarine launch of a ballistic missile. Council members strongly condemned the launch in a 24 April press statement.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 16 March, Oyarzun held an open briefing for UN member states with the coordinator of the outgoing Panel of Experts, Hugh Griffiths, to explain the new measures imposed by resolution 2270. Oyarzun emphasised the importance of implementing the resolution and reminded member states that national implementation reports are due by 2 June.
On 24 March, the Council renewed the mandate of the Committee’s Panel of Experts. The adoption was originally scheduled for 17 March but was delayed after China insisted as a condition for the adoption that four of the ships listed in resolution 2270 as operated and controlled by Ocean Maritime Management (OMM)—and therefore subject to the asset freeze—be removed from the list. Following assurances from China that the ships had no association with OMM and would no longer use DPRK crew, the Committee on 21 March agreed to remove the ships.
On 29 March, as mandated by resolution 2270, the Committee designated additional goods for the list of prohibited items.
On 31 March, the Committee met to discuss implementation of resolution 2270. The chair proposed that a template for national implementation reports be posted on the Committee’s website for use by member states on a voluntary basis. (At press time, a draft circulated by the chair for approval was under silence.) The Committee also considered two requests for guidance—one from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) concerning the need to resolve the impact of some of the new financial measures on the UN’s ability to transfer funds to the DPRK for its humanitarian operations there and to clarify the procedures regarding participation of DPRK representatives in UN fora, and one from Australia regarding the long-term management of vessels seized under the terms of resolution 2270. (At press time, a draft response to DPA was under silence.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 23 March, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK condemning in the strongest terms the human rights violations committed in the country; urging the government to take immediate steps to end all such violations and abuses; and extending the mandate of the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK for one year. The resolution also asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights to designate, for a period of six months, two independent experts to explore appropriate approaches to seek accountability, as recommended in the special rapporteur’s latest report, in particular where such violations amount to crimes against humanity, and to recommend practical mechanisms of accountability to secure truth and justice, including through the ICC. It requested that the special rapporteur include the experts’ recommendations as an annex to the next report to the HRC.
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the growing threat by the DPRK to international peace and security as it continues to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Another main issue is whether the tightening of sanctions currently underway will achieve the stated objectives of preventing the DPRK from making further progress and inducing Pyongyang to engage with the international community on the issue of denuclearisation.
A further issue is the need to ensure effective implementation of the new sanctions by all member states while avoiding adverse humanitarian consequences or negative effects on legitimate livelihood activities, as specified in resolution 2270.
Options
One option for the Council is to change the format of the chair’s briefing from a closed to an open meeting to provide a forum for Council members to publicly express their concerns about the DPRK’s actions and remind member states about the importance of implementing resolution 2270.
At the Committee level, the main option is to work closely with the Panel of Experts to assist states with implementation of the new sanctions measures and provide additional guidance, when needed, without delay.
A further option is to implement the recommendations in the Panel of Experts’ latest report aimed at encouraging member states to submit national implementation reports, including for individual Council members to submit their reports as soon as possible “as models of good practice”.
Council Dynamics
Council members appear united in their concern about the DPRK’s continuing provocations and possible fifth nuclear test and are closely monitoring the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Although there are so signs yet of any changes in Pyongyang’s bellicose posture, members anticipate that more time is needed before the full impact of resolution 2270 will become apparent. The main focus now is therefore on ensuring full implementation of the new measures by all member states. It seems generally agreed that China is increasingly serious about implementing the sanctions, and there is also an expectation that the toughening of the Chinese position will enable the Council to respond more effectively to any further provocations by the DPRK. In recent public statements the US hinted that it is already considering additional measures that might be imposed against the DPRK in the event of another nuclear test.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 24 March 2016 S/RES/2276 | This was a resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, and deciding that the Panel’s mandate should apply with respect to measures imposed in resolution 2270. |
| 2 March 2016 S/RES/2270 | This was a resolution condemning in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by DPRK on 6 January 2016 and its ballistic missile launch of 7 February 2016, and demanding that it comply immediately with its international obligations. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 2 March 2016 S/PV.7638 | This was the adoption of resolution 2270. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 24 April 2016 SC/12335 | This condemned the 23 April ballistic missile launch |
| 15 April 2016 SC/12326 | This condemned the DPRK’s failed missile launch. |
| 18 March 2016 SC/12293 | This was a press statement condemning the ballistic missile launches of 10 and 18 March 2016. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 5 April 2016 S/2016/315 | This was the ROK letter regarding the GPS jamming. |
| 4 March 2016 S/2016/214 | This was the DPRK letter on resolution 2270. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 4 April 2016 S/2016/308 | This was a letter from the Committee chair containing the list of additional prohibited goods. |
| 21 March 2016 SC/12296 | Four ships were delisted following assurances from China that the ships would no longer use crew from the DPRK. |
| Human Rights Council Documents | |
| 23 March 2016 A/HRC/RES/31/18 | This was a resolution on the human rights situation in the DPRK. |
| 19 January 2016 A/HRC/31/70 | This was a report to the Human Rights Council by the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. |
| 24 February 2016 S/2016/157 | This was the Panel of Experts’ final report. |
