Lebanon
Expected Council Action
In March, Council members are expected to hold consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which on 11 August 2006 called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Derek Plumbly, who took up the post of Special Coordinator for Lebanon on 4 February, will provide his first briefing to Council members in informal consultations. A representative from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will also brief.
No formal action is expected. The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August 2012.
The spill-over effects in Lebanon from the crisis in Syria are likely to be on Council members’ minds.
Key Recent Developments
At press time, the Secretary-General’s next report on the implementation of resolution 1701 was due in late February and was expected to portray the situation in southern Lebanon as relatively stable despite several security incidents.
Two explosions occurred in Tyre on 16 November 2011, targeting a hotel and a liquor store. The Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon expressed concern about stability in the country, particularly in the south. A similar incident occurred on 28 December 2011, targeting a restaurant in Tyre. Media reports indicate the targeted areas were frequented by UN staff. There were no casualties in these incidents.
On 9 December 2011, a bomb exploded on a road regularly travelled by UNIFIL personnel, injuring five French peacekeepers and two civilians (similar incidents occurred in May and July of last year). On 11 December, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé expressed concern that Damascus may have orchestrated the attack. Syria denied it was behind the attack.
Several border incidents occurred. On 29 November 2011, rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Israel returned fire with artillery shells. UNIFIL called for restraint and investigated the incident. There were no casualties. On 11 December a rocket that was fired from Lebanon towards Israel landed in Lebanese territory, injuring a woman. UNIFIL investigated.
On 19 December media reports indicated that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) discovered and dismantled four rockets in southern Lebanon.
The UNIFIL force commander held a tripartite mechanism meeting with the LAF and the Israeli army on 22 February on additional security measures along the Blue Line to help reduce border tensions. In particular, this meeting focused on the Israeli plan to replace its current technical fence with a wall near Kfar Kila.
The strategic review of UNIFIL requested in resolution 2004 was recently carried out by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in consultation with UNIFIL, Lebanon, Israel and troop-contributing countries. This review is linked to the strategic dialogue between the peacekeeping force and the Lebanese army, which aims to move security tasks from UNIFIL to LAF. (Plumbly has indicated that part of his focus as the new Special Coordinator will be a strong working relationship with the UNIFIL force commander with an emphasis on the strategic dialogue.)
At press time, the review’s recommendations were not finalised but were expected to highlight the lack of political progress between Israel and Lebanon, underscoring the importance of safeguarding security in southern Lebanon in light of the regional political climate. The findings of the review will be transmitted by the Secretary-General in a letter to Council members separate from the 1701 reporting cycle. However, it is possible the forthcoming 1701 report may provide a very preliminary update on the review process.
The Secretary-General’s report is also expected to track ongoing issues such as Israeli-occupied northern Ghajar, demarcation of the Blue Line, Israeli over-flights, maritime issues and security along the line of buoys and how the Syrian situation continues to impact Lebanon.
Media reported on 7 February that Syrian troops were laying mines along the border in northern Lebanon to stop weapons smuggling into Syria and to prevent refugees or military defectors from entering Lebanon. (There are approximately 6,900 Syrian refugees registered by the UN in Lebanon.)
Analysts note that the Syrian situation has the potential to significantly upset the fragile political balance in Lebanon. On 10 February there were rallies across Lebanon against the crackdown in Syria. Gunfire broke out in Tripoli between Alawite supporters and Sunni opponents of Assad—the groups have fought sporadically since the end of the civil war in 1991—resulting in three dead and 20 injured. The LAF restored order.
Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who heads a Hezbollah-led cabinet, has established a policy to “disassociate” Lebanon from major international decisions on Syria. This policy is an attempt to mitigate political fallout resulting from support by Hezbollah and the 8 March political coalition for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and support by the 14 March political coalition, led by former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, for the Syrian protestors.
On 10-11 February, Mikati met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris. Mikati was informed that France was considering reducing its troop contribution to UNIFIL. (France has the largest contingent of peacekeepers in UNIFIL, approximately 1,300 troops.) While in Paris, Mikati also met with Hariri.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Lebanon in mid-January, consulting with Beirut on the extension of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s activities beyond its initial three-year mandate, which ends on 1 March. (Resolution 1757 provides that if the Tribunal’s activities are not completed at the end of three years, then it will be extended for a further period to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with Lebanon and the Security Council.) The mandate was extended for a further three years by the Secretary-General to 1 March 2015.
Lebanon paid its portion of the 2011 Tribunal budget on 30 November 2011 (it is responsible for 49 percent of the annual budget, and the remaining 51 percent is from voluntary contributions). Hezbollah had called for Lebanon to cut its ties with the Tribunal yet Mikati had said he “could not be prime minister of a country that did not comply with its international obligations.” It seems the funds were paid through the budget of the office of the prime minister, averting a possible collapse of the government if Mikati were to have resigned. Funding the Tribunal will likely continue to be divisive for Lebanon in 2012.
On 1 February, the Tribunal’s trial chamber decided to try in absentia the four men indicted in July 2011 for the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Trial activity is not anticipated until late this year. (The Lebanese prosecutor general had previously reported to the Tribunal that Lebanese authorities had failed to detain any of the accused, who are all Hezbollah members.) Daniel Bellemare, the Tribunal’s prosecutor, will not seek a second term due to health reasons. Bellemare’s term ends on 29 February and at press time the appointment of the new prosecutor had not been announced.
Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to encourage Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo—cessation of hostilities—toward a ceasefire. But the current regional political climate makes the likelihood of near-term progress on this issue remote.
An emerging issue for the Council is how to keep UNIFIL adequately resourced as troop-contributing countries face financial constraints that may result in lower troop levels (UNIFIL has an authorised strength of 15,000 troops, with approximately 12,000 on the ground at any given time. This level may decrease during the course of the year.)
Other issues include regular Israeli over-flights and its occupation of Ghajar in violation of resolution 1701 and the fact that Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.
Options
The Council’s most likely option is to take no action, as has been the practice since April 2008 (the last time the Council issued a presidential statement on resolution 1701).
Council Dynamics
Council members agree that UNIFIL is an important stabilising factor between Israel and Lebanon—especially in light of current developments in Syria. However, achieving a permanent ceasefire seems remote, and Council members realise that relative calm in southern Lebanon might be the only achievable goal in the medium term.
Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key concerns but seem to accept that progress is only likely in the nexus of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track. (The Lebanese national dialogue process has stalled over the issue of Hezbollah’s arms; it last met in November 2010. The Israel-Syria peace track seems indefinitely postponed given the current Syrian crisis.)
Council members see the strategic review of UNIFIL as relevant and timely given the financial constraints faced by troop-contributing countries. However, any potential troop downsizing is of particular concern given the three recent attacks against UNIFIL convoys and the impact of the Syrian situation on Lebanon. In this regard, the review is seen to be in line with good peacekeeping practices to optimise resources to tasks.
Council members are supportive of the UNIFIL-LAF strategic dialogue, which aims at moving forward tasks that UNIFIL can transfer to the LAF, a key provision of resolution 1701.
Council members underscore the importance of the Tribunal’s independence and do not foresee a Council role in its activities.
France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.
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Security Council Resolutions |
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Secretary-General’s Reports |
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Security Council Press Statements |
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Security Council Letters |
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Other Relevant Facts
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Special Coordinator for Lebanon |
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Derek Plumbly (UK) |
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Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 |
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Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway) |
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UNIFIL Force Commander |
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Maj. Gen. Paolo Serra (Italy) |
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Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 January 2012 |
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Authorised: 15,000 troops |
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Duration |
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March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2012 |
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Cost |
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1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012: $545.47 million (A/C.5/66/14) |
