March 2012 Monthly Forecast

Posted 29 February 2012
Download Complete Forecast: PDF
MIDDLE EAST

Iran

Expected Council Action
In March, the chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee (1737 Committee), Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), is expected to provide the Council with a regular quarterly briefing. The report is likely to be routine. Other Council members will then be given the opportunity to address the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. No Council action is expected following the briefing.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts (which assists the Committee in carrying out its mandate and analyses information regarding the implementation of measures in the four resolutions sanctioning Iran since 2006) expires on 9 June. 

Key Recent Developments
A senior IAEA team arrived in Tehran on 29 January and held talks over three days with Iranian authorities. The objective was reportedly to resolve outstanding substantive issues, as raised in the IAEA Director General’s report of 8 November 2011 regarding concerns about “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” Following the visit, Director General Yukiya Amano reiterated the IAEA’s commitment to intensifying dialogue. Iran’s Fars news agency said that the talks between Iran and the visiting team of inspectors “were held in a positive and constructive atmosphere.” Technical and legal issues were reportedly discussed although the IAEA said little substantively about the trip. The team was not permitted to visit any nuclear sites.

In a letter dated 15 February, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, replied to the 21 October 2011 letter from the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. (Ashton’s letter had said that if Iran were prepared to “engage seriously in meaningful discussions…about the nature of its nuclear programme” then the E3+3—which comprises the P5 members and Germany—would be willing to agree on a next meeting at a convenient venue.) Iran’s letter did not set out any preconditions and seemed to mention a willingness to discuss the country’s nuclear development. In response, Ashton said she was cautious but optimistic that talks could resume. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for evidence of a “sustained effort by Iran to come to the table.” French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said that the letter remained “ambiguous.” 

On 21 February, IAEA inspectors completed a further two-day visit to Iran. In a statement on 22 February, the IAEA said that the team had requested access to the military site at Parchin, but that Iran again had not accepted this request. Amano described the refusal as “disappointing,” while a White House spokesperson said the US regretted the “failure of Iran to reach an agreement with the IAEA.”

In its latest report of 24 February following the inspectors’ two recent visits to Iran, the IAEA confirmed that no agreement had been reached with Iran on a structured approach to resolving outstanding issues. The report said that the IAEA “continues to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”

On 23 January, the 27 states of the EU decided to impose further sanctions on Iran, including a full ban on Iranian oil exports. (Under the agreement, EU members will not sign new oil contracts with Iran and will end existing contracts by 1 July.) On 19 February, Iran announced that it would stop exporting oil to the UK and France, saying it would sell the oil to “new customers.” Prior to these developments, the EU bought approximately 20 percent of Iran’s oil. 

On 31 December 2011, US President Barack Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which imposed new economic sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. (Under the legislation, by 28 June, any “foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country” that purchases petroleum from Iran would be prevented from opening US accounts or making financial transactions in the US.) However, the President has the power under the legislation to: delay the sanctions if he determines that there is an insufficient supply of petroleum from other countries; exempt any country that has “significantly reduced its volume of crude oil purchases from Iran”; and delay the imposition of sanctions if he determines that such a waiver would be in the “national security interest of the United States.” By the end of February, it seemed that Japan would reach an agreement with the US whereby it would make an 11 percent cut to oil imports from Iran, which would qualify as “significantly” reducing its purchases and thereby exempt it from US sanctions.

Following the enactment of the US sanctions, Iran threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of the world’s traded oil travels. In response, the US said it would ensure free movement through the international transit passage while the UK Defence Secretary said any attempt to block the strait “would be illegal and would be unsuccessful.”

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke publicly for the first time on the impact of the new sanctions on 3 February, saying they would “not have any impact on our determination to continue our nuclear course.” On 21 February, the deputy head of Iran’s armed forces said that Iran would be prepared to take pre-emptive action “if we feel our enemies want to endanger Iran’s national interests.” The previous day, Iran undertook military exercises to protect its nuclear sites, which it maintains are for peaceful purposes. The statements came amid growing speculation that Israel might seek to strike Tehran’s nuclear facilities before Iran enters what Israel’s Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, calls a “zone of immunity,” after which the Iranian government would be able to complete its nuclear ambitions without “effective interruption.”

On 11 January, an Iranian academic who also worked at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility was killed by an explosive device attached to the car in which he was travelling. (It was the sixth assassination of scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear programme since 2007 for which Iran blamed Israel and the US.) Secretary Clinton “categorically” denied any US involvement in the attack. Following the incident, Iran unsuccessfully called on the Security Council to condemn the killing.

Key Issues
The key issue for Council members is Iran’s compliance with its obligations under existing Council resolutions and with the IAEA as a non-nuclear-state under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although the Council has been divided over how to address the issue, a key objective for members is ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme is for non-military purposes. 

A related issue for the Council is stability and security in the region, including in the Strait of Hormuz, and the prevention of hostile actions that might lead to broader conflict.

A key issue is the transparency of the 1737 committee’s and its panel of experts’ work (the report from May 2011 has yet to be published). The laborious progress made towards the finalisation of Implementation Assistance Notices, which would serve as guides to member states on carrying out Council-imposed sanctions, is also an important issue for many Council members.

Options
Due to the divisions among the veto-wielding Council members concerning further rounds of sanctions or other action against Iran, Council members generally consider that options to resolve Iran’s non-compliance are best pursued through other means. (These have included unilateral sanctions and attempts at resuming the E3+3 negotiations with Iran.)

In terms of the Sanctions Committee’s options, its members—who make decisions by consensus under a “no-objection procedure”—could agree to publish the panel of experts’ final report from 2011. It could also take on board some of the panel’s recommendations concerning how the implementation of sanctions could be made more effective. It seems the recommendations include:

   •   designating a limited number of additional individuals and entities;
   •   compiling national lists of items related to procurement for prohibited missile activity;
   •   updating relevant provisions of resolution 1929, which imposed the most recent set of sanctions on Iran; and
   •   requesting member states to implement robust internal compliance procedures when doing business with Iran. 

A further option for the committee would be to finalise the five Implementation Assistance Notices that are under its consideration and publish them on its website. 

Another option for the committee—as mentioned by the chair during his last briefing to the Council and propagated by at least two other elected members—would be to hold an open informational meeting in which the panel would also participate. This meeting could better inform members at large of the 1737 committee’s and the panel of experts’ mandate and activities.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There are deep divisions among Council members concerning the best means of addressing Iran’s nuclear programme. Several Council members consider that given the differences among the P5, any action in the coming months is likely to occur outside of New York. 

While the US has not completely ruled out the prospect of future Council sanctions, Ambassador Susan Rice (US) has said, “barring something unforeseen, I think it will be a little while before there is an appetite for further action” at the UN. Russia has emphatically ruled out the prospect. China has said that it does not want to see Iran become a nuclear-weapons power but has been highly critical of the US and the EU’s attempts to isolate Tehran through sanctions. China has urged a resumption of the negotiations on Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. It seems that the attention of most Council members will be on a credible and timely resumption of the E3+3 talks, including substantive discussions on Iran’s nuclear programme and the “serious concerns” voiced by the IAEA over potential nuclear militarisation.

Sign up for SCR emails
UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

  • S/RES/1984 (9 June 2011) extended the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the Iran Sanctions Committee for one year.
  • S/RES/1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. The resolution reaffirmed past Council decisions, imposed new measures on Iran and established a panel of experts to assist the Iran Sanctions Committee in carrying out its work.
  • S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed previous resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear activities.
  • S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed commitment to a negotiated solution within the E3+3 dual-track framework and called upon Iran to comply with previous Council resolutions. (The E3+3 consists of China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US.)
  • S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) reiterated existing measures against Iran and imposed additional ones.
  • S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran’s arms exports and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.
  • S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of certain items related to nuclear activities and weapon-delivery systems, imposed an asset freeze on certain persons and entities and established a sanctions committee.
  • S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.  
Security Council Meeting Record
  • S/PV.6697 (21 December 2011) was the quarterly briefing by the Chair of the 1718 Committee. 

Latest IAEA Reports

Latest IAEA Resolution

Other Relevant Facts

Sanctions Committee Chairman

Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

Full Forecast

Subscribe to receive SCR publications