March 2010 Monthly Forecast

Posted 1 March 2010
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MIDDLE EAST

Iran

Expected Council Action
The chair of the Sanctions Committee on Iran is expected to brief the Council in early March. This will only focus on the narrow question of the Committee’s recent work. But Council members are likely to have on their minds the latest IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as the growing talk about possible new sanctions on Iran. It remains unclear whether P5 members are yet ready to engage in substantive consultations with the ten elected Council members about the latter.

Key Recent Developments
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on Iran’s implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement and relevant Council resolutions on 18 February. The report says that Iran has still not supplied the IAEA with information and access necessary to resolve questions about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Going further than previous reports it points out that information available to the IAEA, obtained from a variety of generally consistent and credible sources, “raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile”.

On 8 February the IAEA received a letter noting Iran’s announcement that it would begin producing enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and revising the design information for its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz to include the production of enriched uranium up to 20 percent. On the same day, a second letter notified the Agency that Iran would transfer some low enriched uranium (LEU) to the PFEP the next day. Iran transferred about ten kilograms of LEU on 9 February to prepare a centrifuge cascade for further enrichment to the 20 percent level. A further 1,950 kilograms was transferred on 14 February. (This represents almost all of Iran’s stock of LEU. An IAEA inventory established that a total of 1,808 kilograms of LEU had been produced as of 22 November 2009. It seems that an additional 257 kilograms were produced by 29 January, bringing the total LEU produced to 2,065 kilograms.)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia was alarmed by these developments and found Iran’s noncooperation with the IAEA unacceptable. US Ambassador Susan Rice said on 19 February that the process of considering specific measures was beginning, but that it was necessary to be realistic about the speed with which discussions would progress.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey stated on 18 February that Turkey had presented multiple proposals to Iran, and that diplomacy should continue to be pursued. Davutoglu visited Iran for talks on 16 February. Discussions likely covered the IAEA proposal made last October that Iran would send its LEU abroad in return for 20 percent enriched fuel rods to be used specifically in the TRR for medical purposes. The E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) support that proposal. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated on 16 February that such a swap remained a possibility, but also said that Iran planned to proceed to establish its own capacity for enriching uranium to the 20 percent level.

On 13 February US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia to consult about the Iran situation. Other high-level US diplomats visited the Middle East the same week for similar discussions.

France, Russia and the US wrote to the IAEA on 12 February saying the proposed uranium swap for the TRR remained the most effective way forward. They said that Iran’s intention to itself enrich uranium to 20 percent was unjustified and contrary to multiple Council resolutions.

On 11 February French Ambassador Gerard Araud stated that it was essential to secure China’s support for new sanctions on Iran, even if additional time was required to do so. The same day, Ahmadinejad said that while Iran is nearly able to produce weapons-grade uranium, it is not constructing a bomb. The statement was made at a rally marking the 1979 Iranian revolution, during which security forces were used to disperse opposition protests.

The US expanded its domestic rules imposing sanctions on Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps companies and individuals on 10 February.

China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, stated on 5 February that a uranium swap for the TRR was still possible. He added that the nuclear issue was best solved diplomatically and that discussion should continue among the E3+3. The E3+3 political directors held a conference call the same day.

On 31 January the US disclosed that it was sending defensive missile batteries to several Gulf states and maintaining a ship-based anti-missile capability in the region.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The Universal Periodic Review of Iran took place on 15 February in the Human Rights Council’s Working Group. Members of the Group registered concerns about religious freedom, freedom of expression, the right to demonstrate peacefully and protection of minorities. Iran subsequently accepted 123 recommendations made by the Group, rejecting 45 others, including recommendations to end the death penalty and to make torture an offence under its laws.


Key Issues
A key issue for the Council as a whole is its continued position on the sidelines of the E3+3 discussion, waiting either for the diplomatic track to yield results or to start discussions on additional measures against Iran.

A further issue, if the P5 agree on submitting a new draft sanctions resolution, is what kinds of additional measures should be imposed.

A related issue is whether the Council should address reported violations of the weapons export ban on Iran as a distinct issue.

Underlying Problems
A key underlying issue for the Council is whether or not Iran may still be willing to negotiate in good faith on the proposal to exchange its LEU stockpile for fuel rods to be used in the TRR.

A related problem is the growing distrust between Iran and members of the E3+3. Past attempts by Iran to conceal its nuclear activities and its openly declared disregard for Council resolutions have hindered meaningful communication between the parties. A continuing lack of cooperation with the IAEA in terms of reporting and monitoring further complicates the situation.

Options
As has been the case in the past, it seems that the Council as a whole will have few options on Iran other than those that may be agreed by the P5. At this time options may include:

  • continuing to wait on the sidelines in the hope that progress on the Iran nuclear issue may still occur in the context of the E3+3 negotiations;
  • taking action on any P5 draft resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran which could include additional measures against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a comprehensive arms embargo including all imports, or measures targeting the country’s refined oil and gas sector or financial institutions;
  • establishing a sanctions monitoring group in response to incidents indicating violations of existing sanctions; and
  • pressing the P5 for a more inclusive process which could include an orientation discussion in informal consultations.

Council and Broader Dynamics
The findings of the latest IAEA report are viewed as a significant development by most if not all Council members. This could generate more discussion than the sanctions briefing itself. But some differences remain among Council members as to whether additional sanctions measures will actually be useful in changing Iran’s behaviour. Some fear that any measures of this sort will actually play out in favour of the regime and be counterproductive. Others feel that additional sanctions are the necessary and logical next step in attempting to deal with Iran. (It seems that elements of possible new sanctions have recently begun to be shared in some capitals of Council members, but it seems unlikely that these will be discussed in detail in New York in the short term.)

France, the UK and the US remain in favour of a new round of sanctions, though the UK stresses that the aim is to persuade rather than punish Iran. Russia appears to have become more willing to support multilateral action. It seems that maintaining a unified P5 approach continues to be important for all P5 members.

Several elected members, including Brazil, Lebanon and Turkey, are not persuaded about the utility of imposing additional sanctions and seem to see value in the short term of continuing diplomatic efforts as the best chance of persuading Iran to abide by the Council’s decisions. It is less clear if they would oppose a draft which had the full support of the P5.

Iran’s consistent refusal to abide by previous Council resolutions and the instances currently before the Sanctions Committee of arms shipments violating of the sanctions regime are important considerations for members.

Selected

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UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

  • S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed previous resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear activities.
  • S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed commitment to a negotiated solution within the E3+3 dual-track framework, and called upon Iran to comply with previous Council resolutions.
  • S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) reiterated existing measures against Iran and imposed additional ones.
  • S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran’s arms exports and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.
  • S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of certain items related to nuclear activities and weapon delivery systems, imposed an asset freeze on certain persons and entities and established a sanctions committee.
  • S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

Selected Meeting Record

  • S/PV.6235 (10 December 2009) was the last briefing by the chair of the 1737 Committee.

Selected Letter

  • S/2009/633 (7 December 2009) from the Secretary-General to the Council conveyed the resolution on Iran adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 27 November 2009.

Latest IAEA Reports

Other Relevant Facts

Sanctions Committee Chairman

  • Yukio Takasu (Japan)


Useful Additional Sources

Full forecast

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