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MIDDLE EAST

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
In response to the positive developments in Lebanon, the Council is expected to adopt a presidential statement (or perhaps a resolution), giving encouragement to the “national dialogue process” and welcoming the report from the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Terje Røed-Larsen.  There may also be messages on implementation of the outstanding issues under resolution 1559.

Key Facts
Lebanon’s political and territorial independence, gained in 1943, has been challenged since the 1970’s by the presence of foreign or foreign-sponsored forces. Internal communal divisions, in addition to the presence of Palestinian militias, contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, which then led to military interventions by Syria in 1976 and Israel in 1978.

In the 1980s, Hezbollah, an Iranian-sponsored resistance movement based in Lebanon’s Shia community, emerged. It focused on confronting Israeli forces.

In 1985 Israel undertook a partial withdrawal from Lebanon, but retained a self-proclaimed “security zone” in south Lebanon. In May 2000, Israel finally withdrew and the UN supervised a border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel known as the “Blue Line.”

In the former Israeli security zone in Lebanon, Hezbollah filled the military, security and administrative vacuum, conducting ongoing militant activities and providing social services for the population. Hezbollah justifies its continued action against Israel by the Israeli occupation of the Sheb’a Farms, a small piece of land considered part of Syria under the UN demarcation but claimed as Lebanese territory by many in Lebanon, including Hezbollah.

Although most of the Palestinian guerrillas were expelled during the 1982 Israeli invasion, many resumed their activities after the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut. Palestinian militias are still present in Lebanon and operate mainly from the refugee camps located in the suburbs of Beirut and in the south of the country.

In 1989, the Taef Agreement sponsored by the Arab League facilitated the end of Lebanon’s civil war. It established a framework for the redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon, and required the “disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.”

In 1991 Syria’s grip on Lebanon was reinforced by the Treaty of Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination, which established joint councils to coordinate decision-making and activities related to foreign affairs, economic and social affairs, and defence and security affairs.

In September 2004, the Security Council decided to put an end to Syrian control over Lebanese politics. The trigger was a Syrian-influenced decision by the Lebanese Parliament to extend the term of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud by three years, thereby aborting the electoral process. Resolution 1559, sponsored by the US and France:

• called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon;
• called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
• supported the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory; and
• supported a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon.

Subsequently, the Secretary-General appointed Terje Røed-Larsen as his Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559.

In 2005 there was an intense public reaction in Lebanon following the assassination that February of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who had resigned from the post to protest the extension of the President Lahoud’s term. Public protest and strong international pressure pushed Syria to withdraw from Lebanon in April.

Free parliamentary elections were held in May and June 2005. Hezbollah won eight new seats, giving the group 23 seats and two ministries in the government.

Although the Syrian withdrawal and the parliamentary elections were seen as positive developments, the last report on implementation of resolution 1559, submitted to the Council in October 2005, noted that:

• Lebanon and Syria still had to establish mutual diplomatic relations and demarcate their border.
• The disbanding and disarming of militias remained incomplete.
• The illegal transfer of arms and people across the borders into Lebanon was worrying.

The Secretary-General as well as the Council encouraged the Lebanese government to enter into a dialogue with Hezbollah and the different Palestinian groups to resolve the issue of disbanding and disarming and to re-establish government control over the whole territory.

Recent Developments
In January, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the October 2005 report on implementation of resolution 1559, commending the Lebanese authorities for the inter-Lebanese dialogue, calling on Syria to take measures to prevent the flow of arms and people into Lebanese territory, and calling for free and fair presidential elections in Lebanon.

Issues highlighted in the October 2005 report reappeared in February with reports of new weapons transfers from Syria to the south of Lebanon.

In early March, Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament officially initiated the first round of the Lebanese National Dialogue among the leaders of major political parties.

There has been important progress with regard to the Lebanese National Dialogue. An agreement was reached on 14 March to disarm the Palestinian militias operating outside the refugee camps within six months. In addition, Lebanon and Syria have decided to establish formal diplomatic ties, based on the 1989 Taef Agreement, and to demarcate their common border. Finally, the participants in the Lebanese dialogue agreed that the Sheb’a Farms were Lebanese territories. It seems that Syria may also agree.

The talks still have to tackle the remaining and more sensitive issues of the disarmament of Hezbollah and the position of President Lahoud, who has been under growing pressure to resign.

In March, Røed-Larsen undertook a tour of the capitals of the five permanent Council members and several Middle Eastern countries to gather support for the current Lebanese dialogue and to discuss foreign influence in Lebanon. The tour occurred ahead of the Arab League summit held in Sudan on 28 and 29 March.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council at this time is to find the right balance between encouraging the positive developments with respect to the implementation of resolution 1559 and maintaining pressure to resolve the ongoing problems. These problems come with an additional complication: the need to allow the Lebanese government appropriate flexibility to manage the domestic implications.

A major issue will likely be how far to press the question of the status of the President Lahoud. His term will end in September 2007, but there seems to be a growing view within the Council that his mandate is illegitimate and that the Council should say so explicitly.

A related issue is whether the Council should now press for new presidential elections. France, the UK and the US would like to see presidential elections happening soon.

The disarmament and disbanding of militias is an even more important issue for the Council. Some progress has been made in this regard. It will likely be addressed in Røed-Larsen’s report. There may be debate about the sustainability of this current progress and the corresponding need for the Council to speak about this subject again, which is directly related to the issue of extending government control throughout the Lebanon’s territory.

The Council will also address the issue of the political independence of Lebanon and withdrawal of all foreign forces. There are still fears that Syria is seeking to maintain influence, variously through the continuing transfer of arms, the possible existence of Syrian intelligence services on Lebanese soil and the presence of a pro-Syrian president.

Finally, the possible resolution of the Sheb’a Farms problem raises a whole new issue, with elements of real opportunity as well as some risk. In a technical sense, if a formal demarcation can be agreed between Syria and Lebanon, it immediately raises a need for the UN to play a role in adjusting the “blue line.” This process would need the engagement of the Israelis, who currently occupy the territory.

Council Dynamics
France, the US and the UK followed perhaps by a few non-permanent members (Denmark and Greece) will advocate strong language if there is any new evidence of Syrian involvement in Lebanese internal affairs. There is likely to be pressure for some language on arms transfers.

On the status of the Lebanese president, new presidential elections, the demilitarisation of the militias and national control of the entire territory, this group is also likely to want specific language included. China, Russia and Qatar may be reluctant, urging that this should be left to the national dialogue. Eventually a compromise presidential statement can be expected, reflecting what is expected from Syria as well as Lebanon.

The Council members are likely to readily agree to language encouraging the recent positive developments and to promoting Lebanon’s political progress. All members seem to agree that the national dialogue should be encouraged as it seems to be bearing fruit.

The implications of the emerging agreement on the Sheb’a Farms may also be a subject for discussion in the Council. Some members may wish to specifically take note of it in the statement. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether there will be any willingness to refer to this development.

Options
The range of options for the substantive content of a Council statement is detailed above. In light of the significance of the developments that are occurring, and the huge preparatory effort that Røed-Larsen and his team have put into the regional consultations, it is possible that some Council members will feel that it is appropriate that this be marked in a resolution rather than a presidential statement.

Underlying Problems
A major underlying issue, in the context of the controversy over the legitimacy of President Lahoud’s mandate, is the designation of a successor. It seems that there is no obvious candidate likely to be easily accepted by the key decision-makers. This may lead to a degree of caution about pushing for the position to be vacated prematurely.

The status of the Sheb’a Farms is a major underlying problem affecting a whole range of issues relevant to implementation of resolution 1559.

In the UN context, this area is seen as Syrian territory under Israeli occupation. However, for more than a decade the Lebanese claim to the land has provided a justification for the argument by Hezbollah that Israel has still not fully withdrawn from Lebanese territory and consequentially that Hezbollah’s mission to oppose Israel’s occupation of Lebanon is not yet complete. This has led not only to the militarisation of the adjacent areas by Hezbollah militias, with the consequent problems for Lebanese government control of the whole of its territory, but also to ongoing attacks on Israel by the militias, with consequent threats to wider international peace and security.

If Lebanon and Syria were to agree on a different formula to draw the border in this region, and if Lebanon had undisputed sovereignty and Israel could be persuaded to withdraw from it, this development could greatly assist in resolving the wider strategic problem presented by Hezbollah.

At the time of writing there are many uncertainties, including on Syrian and Israeli positions.  Israel would be certain to insist on guaranteed effective control of the territory by the Lebanese national army.

At present, in the absence of a resolution of this issue, both the military strength and the electoral success of Hezbollah as a political party make it difficult for the Lebanese government to fully implement the provisions of resolution 1559.

UN Documents

Historical Background

Useful Additional Sources

• Global Policy Forum web page on the Security Council and Lebanon and Syria 
• Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, ICG, Middle East Report No. 48, 5 December 2005
• Inside Syria and Lebanon, Middle East Report, No. 236, Fall 2005
• Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria, ICG, Middle East Report No. 39, 12 April 2005
• Hezbollah, Q&A Council on Foreign Relations

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