Overview
April is scheduled to be a relatively quiet month for the Council. No major open debates are envisaged. China has the presidency and is unlikely to initiate any new thematic issues for discussion. However, issues such as Iran and Darfur could easily dominate the month.
Iran
At the time of writing agreement between the P5 had just been announced. The presidential statement adopted on 29 March called on Iran to comply with the steps required by the IAEA in February. It seems that the language initially sought by the US was much tougher than most members had expected, especially given the earlier indication of an “incremental” approach. However, it seems that a compromise was brokered by the UK and France. The thirty-day deadline means that a resumed focus on Iran is inevitable towards the end of April. And, depending on the nature of the Iranian response, events could mean that the Council will take up the issue even sooner.
The Secretary-General Appointment
Discussion of this issue was initiated under the US presidency in February. It will continue to be discussed informally between Council members. There is increasing interest in moving to a more structured framework including some input from the General Assembly. Consultations between the Council president and the General Assembly president are likely. At some point a Council president will have to take the initiative, as the Indonesian Ambassador did in 1996, and produce a paper for negotiation on the actual process to be used by the Council. Council Members will be conscious, of course, that since 1996 the General Assembly has considered the need for changes in the process of selection and that these were adopted by consensus in 1997 in A/RES/51/241. In addition, further proposals have been advanced recently by Canada. Discussion of these aspects will take some time and most members will want to resolve them well in advance of discussion of possible candidates. (Please see our Special Research Report on the Appointment of a New Secretary-General.)
Darfur
This issue will continue to occupy a great deal of attention. The traction that has been achieved recently is in large part due to leadership from the Secretary-General. It is likely that this leadership will be sustained and even enhanced in the coming months. Four major issues will be on his plate:
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Development of a credible and compelling set of options for deployment of a UN force-this is a major task and his personal input will make a real difference.
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Utilising his good offices to put greater energy and more hope into the peace negotiations in Abuja.
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Persuading Sudan to step back from confrontation with the UN and accept—even tacitly if necessary—the need for transition from AMIS to a much more robust UN operation with some elements from Western countries.
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Persuading the Council and potential troop contributors to front up with the robust and well equipped forces that are required, but in a format that is sensitive to the AU concerns about a substantial African identity for the force and takes into account Khartoum’s allergy to NATO operating as such in Sudanese territory.
Lebanon
The Council is likely to welcome and further encourage the recent positive outcomes from the “national dialogue process”. But there will be greater controversy over how far to go with language:
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confirming the lack of legitimate mandate for the President;
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pushing for early presidential elections;
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disarmament and disbandment of militias and ensuring Lebanese Government control over the whole of the country; and
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ongoing Syrian influence, including transfer of arms.
The issue of the Sheb’a Farms, and possible movement on this front between Lebanon and Syria, presents new elements of opportunity as well as some risk. The uncertainties may mean that agreed Council language on this issue will take longer to unfold.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The discussion of DRC and MONUC is likely to focus on how best to encourage the disarming and/or repatriation of foreign fighters from DRC to Rwanda and Uganda.
Cote d’Ivoire has seen some positive political developments in recent weeks, but also some deterioration on the security front. The case for additional troops for UNOCI has been reiterated by the Secretary-General. The atmosphere may be more sympathetic in April.
Sierra Leone
Routine discussion of progress with UNIOSIL had been expected. However, the recent events concerning Charles Taylor have sent a shiver through the whole region. The Council is likely to follow this closely.
Western Sahara
A Moroccan proposal on autonomy is still awaited. The MINURSO mandate expires on 30 April. There is some anxiety that Morocco will present its proposal at the last minute and hope to stampede the Council into early action. It seems more likely that the Council will want time for some careful analysis in capitols and by the Secretariat. In the absence of a credible proposal from Morocco some action on downsizing the force-perhaps a request to the Secretary-General for options-is possible, although no Council members are eager for that.
Ethiopia and Eritrea are likewise facing the possibility of a downsizing of UNMEE. There was some progress in March following the US initiative to bring the parties and the boundary commission together in London. But if there are not further signs of flexibility by both sides in April, the Council may reluctantly conclude that the force and mandate should be adjusted.
Discussion of Haiti, with its parliamentary elections due in April, is likely to be straightforward. Similarly, renewal of the mandate of the 1540 Committee (Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction) is expected to be routine.
