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Iraq

Expected Council Action
The Council is likely to welcome the formation of a new government in Iraq resulting from the December 2005 elections, or at least welcome the results of the elections if it takes longer for the government to be formed.

In the light of these developments, it is also likely that the Council will begin to discuss in February the level and nature of the UN involvement in Iraq and the implications for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

Key Facts
Since the terrorist bombing of the UNAMI headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, the UN presence in Iraq has been kept to an absolute minimum. UNAMI has operated out of the Jordanian capital Amman, and most of its field programmes have been run by local Iraqi staff.

The main UN role in Iraq has been the provision of support for the constitutional development process and assistance for the conduct of electoral events, culminating with the 15 December elections for a new sovereign government. The 20 January announcement by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq of the preliminary results of the December parliamentary elections marked the end of this phase of UN activity and the return of the UN to a very low profile in the country.

Prior to the 2003 invasion, the UN role in relation to the Iraq situation was very substantial:

1. Iraq was a regular subject of Security Council consideration.
2. A Sanctions Committee closely monitored Iraq.
3. The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), created in 1999 under resolution 1284, conducted intrusive and effective inspections to monitor and implement UN disarmament obligations imposed on Iraq.
4. The UN Compensation Commission, established in 1991 by resolution 687, actively processed and decided compensation claims for losses resulting from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.
5. Through the oil-for-food programme, the UN delivered huge volumes of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

After months of tense diplomacy in late 2002 and early 2003, both inside the Council and beyond, the US and the UK abandoned the search for a Security Council resolution for military action on Iraq. In March 2003, the US led a coalition that invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein.

In the lead-up to the invasion, UN personnel were withdrawn and in the immediate aftermath most other UN activities with respect to Iraq effectively ceased.

The invasion of Iraq produced a sharp division within the Council and between many UN member states in ways that had both bilateral and multilateral consequences, not least within the UN.

Despite deep divisions, Council members, with relative quickness, developed a sense that the Council needed to act in a unified way on Iraq. In part, this represented a desire to make a first step towards healing some of the divisions and reasserting the credibility of the Council, but also it was a practical necessity because of many objective changes had occurred:

• The oil-for-food programme became redundant and would need to be phased out, and there were many associated financial issues.
• The sanctions regime likewise needed to be addressed.
• UNMOVIC, although its mandate still continued, had effectively run its course.
• New humanitarian emergency and reconstruction needs had emerged in Iraq.

In response to the changed situation, the Council adopted resolution 1472 on 28 March 2003 which adjusted the oil-for-food programme, called for member states to provide humanitarian assistance, authorised the Secretary-General to develop processes for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and foreshadowed a readiness for a wider UN role in Iraq.

For many member states that had opposed the invasion, this provided a political framework that made it possible for them to reengage and work with US-led coalition forces on reconstruction and humanitarian projects. Similarly it enabled the UN itself to begin to plan for a similar role.

This UN role was specifically recognised in resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, which requested the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and established a UN mandate to:

• coordinate humanitarian assistance;
• contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq;
• create national institutions for representative government;
• encourage international efforts to rebuild the justice and police systems; and
• promote human rights.

It also decided on the termination of the oil-for-food programme within six months, recognised the presence of the coalition in Iraq, created a Development Fund for Iraq, and imposed sanctions against senior members of the previous Iraqi regime.

On 14 August 2003, resolution 1500 welcomed the establishment of the “broadly representative” Governing Council of Iraq, and established UNAMI to carry out the tasks mandated in resolution 1483. Five days later, a bomb destroyed the UN headquarters in Baghdad and 22 people were killed, including Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. A UN withdrawal ensued.

After the establishment of an interim Iraqi government in June 2004, the US pressured the UN to take on a larger role in planning for Iraqi national elections. The Council adopted resolution 1546, endorsing the political timetable and detailing UNAMI’s mandate. The UN responded tentatively due to its ongoing security concerns. In the end, the UN reluctantly agreed to provide technical assistance along with advice in organising elections and drafting the constitution. However, its contribution to the coordination and delivery of assistance for reconstruction, development and humanitarian needs, and for the promotion of human rights and national dialogue has been managed at a distance. Security risks have led the Secretariat to keep the UN presence on the ground to a minimum.

An Iraqi constitution was approved by referendum in October 2005. Various aspects were controversial, especially for the Sunni community. Accordingly, the final version contained provisions for review by a Constitutional Review Commission. Inevitably, this issue will return to the fore once the new government is in place.  The issue could lead to new requests for UN assistance.

Key Issues
The key issue for Council members will be the nature of future UN involvement in Iraq. Clearly the wishes of the new Iraqi government, once installed, will play a major role in consideration of this issue, as will the Secretariat’s ongoing concerns about security.

The Council also has various residual issues relating to Iraq, mostly administrative in nature:

• The UN Compensation Commission has virtually completed consideration of claims resulting from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.
• UNMOVIC still exists but without any substantial ongoing functions.
• Issues relating to letters of credit raised against the UN Iraq Account created under resolution 986 (1995) need to be resolved.
• Resolution 1483 imposed sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s former regime’s officials and state agencies, and resolution 1518 created a sanctions committee. An assessment needs to be made whether to continue with these mechanisms.
• Finally, resolution 1483 established the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), which holds the proceeds of petroleum export sales from Iraq, the remaining balances from the oil-for-food programme and other frozen Iraqi funds. The Fund is supervised by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) acting as an audit body. With the establishment of a permanent sovereign Iraqi government, these arrangements may need to be revisited.

Council Dynamics
Council members are keen to maintain a consensus to avoid the reappearance of tensions that were present within the Council before the US-led military campaign in March 2003.

Despite a broad consensus within the Council on almost all aspects of its involvement in Iraq, some members (France, Russia and Greece) have been more vocal on the necessity for the Council to direct its primary focus toward national reconciliation and dialogue rather than security issues. Members also hold differing views on whether the presence of foreign forces in Iraq is a positive or negative factor for the country’s stabilisation.

The US and the UK actively support greater UN involvement in Iraq. Other members agree in principle, in varying degrees, but also give weight to the Secretariat’s reluctance to reinforce UNAMI’s presence on the ground given the security situation.

Options
In February, the Council is likely to adopt a presidential statement to welcome the results of the elections and encourage the formation of an inclusive government-or welcome the new government.

On the UN role, the Council options may be to:

• start discussions on the future UN role in Iraq;
• informally convey to the Secretary-General, either in informal consultations or at the monthly lunch, that the general view is in favour of a more proactive UN presence;
• formally decide, perhaps in a presidential statement or a letter from the president, that the Council favours more substantive participation in the ongoing constitutional processes and involvement in all aspects of Iraqi reconstruction, including development, human rights, institution-building, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); or
• wait for the government to be formed before taking action on the UN role.

Underlying Problems
The persistent violence, including ongoing hostage-taking and deadly attacks on civilians continue to reinforce the Secretariat’s concerns about becoming more engaged.

Iraq’s population is roughly 75 percent Arab, 15 percent Kurdish and 5 percent Assyrian and Turkoman. While 65 percent of Iraqis are Shia Muslims, Baath Party rule privileged the Arab Sunni minority. Since the beginning of the political process, the majority of Iraqis have voted along religious and ethnic lines. These sectarian divisions will continue to make governing this federal system difficult. Disputes are likely to arise over regionalism, control of oil revenues and amendments to Iraq’s constitution.

UN documents

Historical Background

Other Relevant Facts

Useful Additional Sources

• UNAMI website
• Iraq news
• Iraq file, Global Policy Forum
• Iraq Outlook: Who Will Be Iraq’s Next Prime Minister? Eurasia Group, 14 December 2005.
• Jonathan Morrow, Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 155 November 2005.
• Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, International Crisis Group, Middle East briefing No. 19, 26 September 2005.

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