Lebanon/Syria

Expected Council Action
On 15 December, the next report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, is due.

But, based on media reports about ongoing difficulties which UNIIIC Commissioner Detlev Mehlis is encountering in securing reasonable cooperation by Syria, we expect that the Council will take up the issue of compliance with resolution 1636 before 15 December.

Further extension of the UNIIIC mandate is also expected.

The Council is also expected to endorse the conclusions of the Roed-Larsen report on the implementation of resolution 1559.

Key Facts
On 31 October, the Council adopted resolution 1636 establishing a targeted sanctions’ regime (travel ban and asset freeze) against individuals to be designated as suspects in the Hariri assassination. It also decided under Chapter VII that Syria must fully cooperate with UNIIIC. The resolution, adopted unanimously, signalled a firm expectation that Syria should cooperate promptly and substantively. There was a clear threat of “further action” if the requirements of the resolution were not met.

The Resolution specifies that the initiative, both in terms of implementing the individual sanctions and triggering further Council consideration now lies with Mehlis. UNIIIC is requested to report to the Council at any time if Mehlis considers Syrian cooperation does not meet the requirements of resolution 1636. And Mehlis can also, under paragraph 3 of that resolution, at any time designate an individual as a suspect and report them to the Sanctions Committee, which has very short timelines for consideration of the issue.

At press time, Syria has still not complied with UNIIIC’s request that six Syrian officials should be presented for interview in Beirut.

In a speech on 10 November, the President of Syria Bachar al-Assad seemed to be signalling that Syria would not bow to the request from UNIIIC.  Syria appears not to accept that it has a binding obligation under resolution 1636 to cooperate with UNIIIC on terms set by UNIIIC and that Damascus is not in a position to establish conditions. However, President Assad’s speech did not completely exclude cooperation. A Syrian letter circulated to the Security Council (S/2005/717 of 15 November 2005) is also somewhat ambiguous. It reiterates a willingness to cooperate but it is unclear if this means cooperation in substance.

Nevertheless, at press time Mehlis had still not reported Syria to the Council for non-cooperation under paragraph 13 of resolution 1636.

There have been media reports that suggest Mehlis may not have completely ruled out the possibility of interviewing Syrian officials in a third country.

With respect to the separate issues dealt with in resolution 1559, the second semi-annual report on the implementation of resolution 1559 was released on 24 October. UN Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen indicated that a progressive approach to the disarmament of the militias by the Lebanese government should be seen as satisfactory, but mentioned the transfer of weapons and personnel between Syria and Lebanon in connection with Palestinian militias as a problem.

Key Issues
A key issue at this time is whether, despite the defiant tone of President Assad’s speech, there is actually a prospect of a compromise being worked out which is satisfactory to Mehlis.

A related issue, which may require Council consideration and authorisation if Mehlis is considering interviews in a location other than Lebanon, is the legal framework that would apply, especially if the interviews led to a decision that criminal charges were justified.

The major long term issue for the Council will be the degree of Syrian responsibility in the assassination as opposed to the criminal responsibility of individuals.

Finally, with respect to resolutions 1595 and 1636, it is likely that the Council will need to consider the nature of the trials of the perpetrators. It seems increasingly accepted that international assistance will be sought by the Lebanese authorities.

And regarding resolution 1559, there could be an issue as to whether to take up this matter at all and, if so, whether as a resolution or a statement.

Council Dynamics
Those Council members most determined to hold Syria to its obligations under resolution 1636 are concerned that it might dilute the focus of Council attention if the Roed-Larsen report is taken up at this time. They believe that the Council energy should be concentrated on the priority issue. Others agree that while the report does not need to be considered immediately, it should not be allowed to become stale. And they point out that taking up discussion of the issue is another point of pressure on Syria.

It remains to be seen whether the Council will adopt something in December. On balance, because it will definitely have become stale if it is allowed to roll over to January, there is an expectation of action before the end of the year.

The Council dynamics on resolution 1636 remain muted. Because it was adopted unanimously, as was resolution 1595, there is now a pattern of united Council action which most members will want to retain. Also, another reason for the muted atmosphere is that the Council has effectively empowered Mehlis until 15 December to determine both the substance and the pace of events. Members are therefore waiting for his conclusions.

Of course, the underlying tensions remain between those members who will insist on full cooperation by Syria and those who, because of traditional policy reluctance to contemplate enforcement measures and because of concerns in this case about the stability of Syria, would counsel a more gradual approach.

Options
If Mehlis reports that cooperation is potentially achievable, it is likely that his report will canvass various options or recommendations for the Council.

If he reports that satisfactory cooperation is not achievable, the Council will inevitably be presented with a draft resolution imposing sanctions on Syria. There are a range of possible options:

• Full scope economic sanctions, of the sort imposed on Iraq under resolution 661, are an option. But because of the inevitable hardships on the civilian population there will be resistance to imposing this kind of enforcement measure for a violation-albeit a very serious one-of a resolution requiring compliance with procedural requirements. Such a measure might however be seen as justified if Syria were conclusively determined to have state responsibility for the assassination.
• A more targeted set of sanctions aimed at the regime and the institutions of the state is another option. The precedents in the Libya case are likely to be looked at very closely.
• Another option is a stepped process, involving the imposition of certain targeted sanctions coupled with the establishment of a mechanism-separate from the criminal investigation-to follow on from the UNIIIC once criminal indictments are issued and the evidence is available-to assess and report to the Council on issues of state responsibility under international law-in particular resolution 1373.
• It is possible also that the mix of options will include decisions to be taken by Council members, in their capacities as members of the Sanctions Committee, in the event that Mehlis designates  Syrian  officials as suspects.
  

Historical Background

Other Relevant Facts

Full forecast