Security Council Elections 2018

Introduction: The 2018 Elections

On 8 June, the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly is scheduled to hold elections for the Security Council. The five seats available for election in 2018 according to the regular distribution among regions will be as follows:

- one seat for the African Group (currently held by Ethiopia);
- one seat for the Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States (the Asia-Pacific Group, currently held by Kazakhstan);
- one seat for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC, currently held by Bolivia);
- two seats for the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG, currently held by the Netherlands and Sweden).

The East European Group is not contesting any seat this year as its seat, held by Poland through 2019, comes up for election every other year. The five new members elected this year will take up their seats on 1 January 2019 and will serve until 31 December 2020.
The 2018 Candidates


Thus Belgium and Germany, having served five terms each, have the most prior Council experience, followed by Indonesia, which has served three terms, then South Africa, which has served on the Council twice. The Dominican Republic and the Maldives are among the 66 UN member states—over 34 percent of the total membership—that have never served on the Council.

African Seats

Three non-permanent seats are allocated to Africa. One seat comes up for election during every even calendar year, and two seats are contested during odd years. Although there have been exceptions, elections for seats allocated to Africa tend to be uncontested, as the African Group maintains an established pattern of rotation among its five sub-regions (Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, Western Africa and Central Africa).

This year, South Africa is running unopposed for the Southern Africa seat.

South Africa

South Africa is a founding member state of the UN. Owing to international opposition to the apartheid regime, South Africa’s participation in the General Assembly was suspended in 1974. The end of apartheid and the democratic elections in South Africa in April 1994 paved the way for the restoration of South Africa’s full membership in the UN. Since then, South Africa has served on the Security Council twice (2007–2008 and 2011–2012) and was endorsed by the AU for the 2019–2020 seat at the organisation’s 30th Ordinary Session in January 2018.

During its campaign, South Africa has stressed that as a strong proponent of multilateralism and global governance, it believes the UN remains the best place to address major international issues, including food security; climate change and natural disasters; and refugees and migration. South Africa has indicated that it hopes to use its term on the Council to prioritise diplomacy, mediation, the pacific settlement of disputes, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding through inclusive dialogue and negotiations, with the ultimate aim of supporting parties to achieve sustainable peace, national unity, and reconciliation. If elected, South Africa plans to encourage effective partnerships between the UN and regional and subregional organisations. South Africa would aim to highlight Africa’s priorities in the area of peace and security, while continuing to work with all AU and UN members in pursuit of effective global governance, multilateralism and reform of the UN system. Additionally, South Africa has expressed its determination...
The 2018 Candidates

to work towards improving the working methods of the Security Council.

South Africa currently contributes 1,231 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, 1,185 of whom are serving with the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) while the rest are serving with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

GRULAC Seat
Two non-permanent seats are allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean, with one coming up for election every year. Since 2008, candidates for the GRULAC seat have run unopposed, even when they lacked the endorsement of the regional group.

The Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a founding member of the UN, and has never served on the Security Council. The Dominican Republic ran unsuccessfully for the Council seat on two previous occasions, in 2001 and 2007. Its candidacy for the 2019-2020 seat was endorsed by GRULAC in August 2017.

In its campaign, the Dominican Republic has emphasised the importance of advancing protection issues, including the protection of civilians; women, peace and security; and children and armed conflict. It has expressed interest in promoting the role of youth in conflict prevention and resolution. Furthermore, the Dominican Republic has highlighted the link between hunger and conflict and the importance of addressing human-made causes of hunger before, during and after conflict. It has emphasised its commitment to mediation efforts in its region; along these lines, it has highlighted its mediating role between the government and the opposition in Venezuela. The Dominican Republic has stressed the importance of promoting sustainable development and Agenda 2030, and the interlinkages of those issues with peace and security. Given its vulnerability to the impact of climate change as a Caribbean country, it has placed particular emphasis on the environmental issues, including the implications of climate change for international peace and security.

The Dominican Republic currently has five nationals serving in the UN Verification Mission in Colombia.

WEOG Seat
Two non-permanent seats are allocated to WEOG and both come up for election every even calendar year. This year, Belgium and Germany are running for the two available seats.

Belgium

Belgium has campaigned on the promise of being a constructive and transparent partner that will use its term on the Council to benefit the entire UN membership and build bridges between members and non-members of the Council. Conflict prevention would be a priority, and Belgium would aim to promote timely action, focusing on mediation and the role of women in the maintenance of peace and security. In UN peace operations, Belgium would work together with regional organisations, troop- and police-contributing countries, and neighbouring countries to those hosting peace operations. Belgium stresses that it would seek to promote greater efficiency of peace operations by defining political objectives clearly; refining mandates and placing the protection of civilians, particularly children, at their centre; and ensuring adequate means for sustaining peace. Other priorities that have been outlined by the Belgian campaign include the elimination of landmines and curbing the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons; fighting impunity, particularly in instances of mass atrocities; and countering terrorism and violent extremism. Belgium would also strive to build consensus on the growing impact of climate change, and would support this as a regular agenda item of the Council while also seeking the appointment of a Special Envoy on the issue.

Currently, Belgium is contributing 108 troops serving in three UN peacekeeping missions: the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), MONUSCO, and the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Belgium has committed to adding an additional 200 troops to its overall contribution to UN peacekeeping operations by the end of 2018.

Germany

Germany views serving on the Council as consistent with its increasing international role. As Europe’s most populous country and largest economy, Germany has highlighted that it has the material resources and political will to shoulder responsibility on the world stage, particularly through its commitment to the UN. It has cited its membership in international forums, such as the G7, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the G20, as well as the Syria Support Group and participation in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, as examples of its dedication to peace and security. Germany has said that it will seek to use all the tools available to the Council to advance the causes of sustaining peace and conflict prevention. Germany’s campaign has also emphasised its contributions of personnel to UN peace missions, notably in Mali. Its campaign has highlighted its active involvement in peace missions for over 30 years; its financial contributions to humanitarian assistance, including for Syrian refugees; and its commitment to human rights.

Germany currently contributes 869 personnel spread across nine UN peace operations, the bulk of whom are serving with MINUSMA.

Asia-Pacific Seat
One of the two Council seats allocated to the Asia-Pacific Group comes up for election every year. This year, Indonesia and the Maldives are running for the one available seat. The winner will succeed Kazakhstan, joining Kuwait as the two Council members from the Asia-Pacific Group.

Indonesia
Indonesia, a UN member since 1950, has served on the Security Council three times
The 2018 Candidates


Throughout its campaign, Indonesia has highlighted its place in the international community as the world’s third-largest democracy, fourth most-populous country, the largest archipelagic country, and the country with the world’s largest Muslim population. It is also a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 developing countries (G77) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a promoter of South-South cooperation, and a member of the G20 from emerging economies. Indonesia aspires to continue to play a significant role as a moderating voice and bridge-builder among the members of the Security Council and in the broader UN system. Indonesia has emphasized the need for the Security Council to reform to be more democratic, responsive and credible. Indonesia has outlined three top priorities as a global partner. It will seek a “global ecosystem” of peace and stability through promoting the pacific settlement of disputes and strengthening the roles of regional arrangements and UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Second, it will seek synergy between the sustaining peace and development agendas by ensuring peace, security and stability to implement the 2030 Agenda, including in Africa, and forging a global partnership for addressing the security implications of economic, health and environmental challenges. Third, Indonesia proposes to prioritize combatting terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism through establishing a global comprehensive approach and addressing root causes.

Indonesia is currently contributing 2,694 troops spread across nine UN peace missions, with the majority serving with UNAMID and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It has pledged to increase its total contribution to 4,000 by the end of 2018.

The Maldives

The Maldives, a member of the UN since 1965, has never served on the Security Council, and this is its first time running for a non-permanent seat. It announced its candidacy in 2008. If elected, it would succeed Kazakhstan.

The Maldives has campaigned for a Council seat under the slogan “shared solutions, shared destiny” and has put forward five reasons why its candidacy deserves support, namely that it will offer fresh and new perspectives; advocate for tolerance and moderation; work to build bridges and promote consensus; advocate for cross-cutting reforms; and that it will operate in a transparent, effective and accountable manner. The Maldives says that it would bring diversity to the Council as a South Asian, Muslim, small island developing state that is also a member of the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement, and will work to promote the interests of developing countries within the UN system and on the international stage. The Maldives has highlighted its work on initiatives with regard to the security of small states and the human dimensions of climate change, and includes small states and climate change among its thematic priorities if elected to the Council. It pledges to ensure a considerate approach to the vulnerable, and work towards an effective UN system and a balanced Security Council.

Other priorities will include disarmament and non-proliferation, conflict prevention, combatting international terrorism, and promoting human rights.

The Maldives is not currently a troop- or police-contributing country.

Likely Council Dynamics in 2019

Current divisions within the Council over issues including Syria and Israel/Palestine are likely to persist following the departure of the five current non-permanent members and the arrival of the five newly elected members. Although it is difficult to assess how the Council’s dynamics might evolve next year, the priorities raised in the campaigns by the candidates as well as their longstanding interests provide an indication of some general patterns that might emerge.

Belgium has expressed interest in issues concerning the protection of civilians, particularly the children and armed conflict agenda. As such, it may work to have these agendas integrated better into the Council’s country-specific work, and may be interested in chairing the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. Belgium also provides multi-layered support to the countries in the Sahel region. It is currently taking part in three operations in Mali to support peace and security: MINUSMA, the EU Training Mission in Mali, and the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali. As such, it is likely that Belgium would be active on these files while serving on the Council.

Because of its geographical location and vulnerability to the effects of climate change, the Dominican Republic could be expected to join in efforts to promote addressing these matters while on the Council. The Dominican Republic is also likely to take a keen interest in the situation in Haiti, given its proximity. With the possibility that the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) may draw down or even close in the coming years, it is likely that the Dominican Republic will seek to influence this process so as to secure stability. It may also seek to play a role on Colombia, as it contributes personnel to the UN Verification Mission there.

Although Venezuela is not on the Council’s agenda, members have on several occasions discussed the situation in the country in consultations. Having played a prominent role in mediation efforts in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic may want to be active in the Council’s engagement on Venezuela should members decide to address this issue more substantively in the future.

Germany has expressed interest in engaging closely on several issues on the Council’s agenda. High on its list of priorities are the Syrian conflict, Libya, Yemen, and the migration crisis. As Germany contributes the bulk of its peacekeepers to the UN mission in Mali, it can be expected to seek an active role on this file as well. Having expressed keen interest in pursuing issues pertaining to the protection of civilians and the women, peace and security agenda, Germany may seek involvement with the informal expert group on women,
Likely Council Dynamics in 2019

peace and security, currently co-chaired by Peru and Sweden. Given its involvement in the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Germany may continue to promote the sustaining peace agenda.

Indonesia, describing itself as a moderate Muslim country with a keen interest in countering terrorism and violent extremism, if elected, focus its efforts on the Council on the various aspects of its counterterrorism agenda including the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy. It also stresses its promotion of preventive diplomacy and may seek to enhance the Council’s cooperation with regional arrangements, such as ASEAN, as foreseen by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

The Maldives can be expected to pursue issues pertaining to climate change and security. The integration of climate change dimensions in relation to standing issues on the Council’s agenda remains contentious among some members, but the Maldives, if elected, may join several other member states that believe the Council must address the repercussions of climate change on conflict situations on its agenda.

South Africa can be expected to put great emphasis on African issues, which make up the bulk of the Council’s agenda. It has indicated that it will work to promote partnerships between the UN and regional and subregional bodies. In its previous two terms on the Council, South Africa advocated for closer cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), based on the belief that this would enhance the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in addressing challenges to peace and security in Africa. These efforts culminated in the adoption in 2012 of the landmark resolution 2033, which made specific recommendations about strengthening the cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC. It can be expected that South Africa will use its term on the Council to continue to enhance this relationship.

The role of the Council in designing and overseeing the mandates of peacekeeping operations is likely to be an important issue for several of the candidates, as most of them contribute personnel to UN peace missions. It is likely that these member states will continue to build upon ongoing efforts by the Council and the Secretariat to conduct strategic assessments of peacekeeping operations with the aim of increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. As troop- and police-contributing countries, if elected, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia, and South Africa are likely to be interested in fine-tuning the Council’s approach to mandating, and to encourage constructive engagement with other troop- and police-contributors regarding peace operations’ mandates.

The conflict prevention and sustaining peace agenda is a common priority among this year’s candidates, which is also in line with the Secretary-General’s renewed emphasis on these issues. Several candidates, most notably Germany and Indonesia, have been playing an active role in the PBC and could be expected to further advance this work if elected to the Council. Over the past several years there has been noticeable interest in strengthening the PBC, triggered in part by the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture (the PBC, Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund). Subsequently, both the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted comprehensive resolutions on peacebuilding: these also established the notion of “sustaining peace” and the understanding of peacebuilding as activities to be undertaken to prevent conflict as well as during peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Over the course of the past several years, a growing number of the Council’s elected members have emphasised the interlinkages between development and international peace and security. This trend is likely to continue next year since several candidates have stressed the importance of this issue and have supported the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The tendency of elected members to widen the scope of the Council’s work on conflict prevention has led to some difficult dynamics among its members. The P3 have been receptive to Council discussions of links between specific aspects of development and peace and security. However, China and Russia have been more cautious in this regard and have advocated keeping the Council’s agenda more narrowly focused on issues that primarily involve situations of armed conflict.

Similarly, the Council has increasingly acknowledged climate change as a root cause of conflict in several areas on the Council’s agenda. Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany and the Maldives have all stressed that the Council must address climate change and security and will likely advocate for this if elected. Some members are resistant to integrating this issue into the Council’s work, however.

There appears to be a strong desire among most candidates to enhance the transparency and inclusiveness of the Council’s work. This has been a prominent trend in candidates’ agendas during recent election cycles. Although there have been some positive developments regarding the working methods of the Council, most elected members have continued to draw attention to aspects of the Council’s work that need further improvement. These include inadequate time to negotiate Council outcomes and the limited interactivity of Council meetings. In their campaigns, most members have pledged to listen to stakeholders not on the Council and to take their perspectives into account. One continuing member, Peru, and one candidate, the Maldives, are members of Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT), an initiative launched in May 2013 by a group of member states focusing on the Council’s working methods, particularly those that enhance non-members’ interaction with the Council. The goals of ACT are likely to resonate with the Council members that are not part of the group but are nevertheless committed to enhancing the accountability, effectiveness and legitimacy of the Council.

The five departing Council members serve as the chairs of six sanctions committees and three other subsidiary bodies. Over the past few years, there has been a trend towards increased transparency in the work of the sanctions committees, including public briefings by the chairs, engagement with regional actors, and several field visits (although there has also been resistance by permanent members in some cases). This will be the third time that the Council elections are held more than six months prior to the start of the new elected members’ terms, in line with General Assembly resolution A/RES/68/307 making it likely that the process of selection of chairs will take place considerably earlier than was the case until 2016. After the 2016 elections, Council members agreed on a note by the president (S/2016/619)
concerning transitional arrangements for newly elected members, which, among other matters, called on Council members to agree provisionally on the appointment of chairs of subsidiary bodies by 1 October. In 2016, such agreement was reached only on 31 October, though this was still significantly earlier than in previous years. In 2017, the Council incorporated the provisions of its 2016 note on transitional arrangements into a comprehensive document on working methods, Note by the President S/2017/507. Later that year, the Council agreed on the selection of chairs by the end of the first week of October. It will be interesting to observe how the process will unfold this year and what positive impact it might have on the management of the Council’s subsidiary bodies.

The Process of Election

A country must obtain the votes of two-thirds of the member states present and voting at the General Assembly session in order to secure a seat on the Council, regardless of whether the election is contested. This means that at least 129 votes are required to win a seat if all 193 UN member states vote. Member states that abstain are considered not voting. A member state can be excluded from voting as a result of arrears in payment of financial contributions, in accordance with Article 19 of the UN Charter. At press time, Libya was the only member not permitted to vote in the General Assembly because of its arrears.

Elections to the Council, as with other principal organs of the UN, require formal balloting, even if candidates have been endorsed by their regional group and are running unopposed. If no candidate obtains the required number of votes in the first round, voting in the next round is restricted to the candidates that received the most votes in this restricted ballot, the number of countries included is limited to twice the number of vacant seats; for example, if one seat is available, only the two countries that received the most votes in the first round can contest the next round. Any votes for other candidates during this restricted voting round are considered void. This restricted voting process can continue for up to three rounds of voting. If a candidate at that point still fails to garner the required number of votes, unrestricted voting is reopened for up to three rounds. This pattern of restricted and unrestricted voting continues until a candidate is successful in securing the required two-thirds majority.

In theory, it is possible that a country running unopposed might not garner the required number of votes of those present in the General Assembly in the first round of voting. Such a country may then be challenged in subsequent rounds and could ultimately fail to obtain a seat. However, this is unlikely and has never happened.

Regional Groups and Established Practices

For purposes of elections to the Security Council, the regional groups have been governed by a formula set out in General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVIII), which was adopted in 1963 and took effect in 1966. The main feature of the resolution was to amend the UN Charter to increase the number of Council members from 11 to 15. Under this resolution, the seats previously assigned to the African and Asia-Pacific states were combined. In reality, however, the candidates for election to the African and Asia-Pacific seats operate separately, and this report reflects that customary practice.

Article 23 of the Charter, which sets the number of Council members, also specifies the criteria that the members of the General Assembly are to apply when considering which countries should be elected to serve on the Council. It provides that due regard shall be “specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”.

The Charter does not define equitable geographic distribution, stipulate how it should be achieved, or suggest the composition of appropriate geographical groups. The principle of equitable geographic distribution gave rise to the establishment of electoral groups as a vehicle for achieving that goal, however. The regional groups, as they now operate, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Group</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Group</td>
<td>54 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Group</td>
<td>54 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European Group</td>
<td>23 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRULAC</td>
<td>33 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEOG</td>
<td>28 members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regional Groups and Established Practices

African Group
Most of the groups have informal understandings on internal selection processes that are not codified into actual rules. The African Group is an exception to this in that it has adopted the rules of procedure of the AU’s Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System for the selection of candidates to occupy the three African seats on the Council. Subregional groups within the African Group tend to follow a rotation system, though there have been some departures from this scheme. Theoretically, under this system every country in Africa should eventually get a turn to be a candidate for a seat on the Council.

In most years, this means that the UN membership at large has little choice regarding the African candidates. However, there have been exceptions. The election in 2011 was unusual in that three candidates (Mauritania, Morocco and Togo) ran for two seats. This happened because Mauritania decided to contest the Northern Africa/Arab swing seat with Morocco, rather than wait its turn in the rotational cycle. Morocco prevailed, as did Togo, which won the seat allocated by the African Group to the Western Africa subregion. In 2000, when Sudan was the endorsed candidate, Mauritius decided to contest the seat and won election to the Council.

The African rotation generally follows a systematic cycle based on the following principle:
- Northern Africa and Central Africa rotate running for one seat every odd calendar year;
- Western Africa runs for one seat every odd calendar year; and
- Eastern Africa and Southern Africa rotate running for one seat every even calendar year.

Nonetheless, the picture can become complicated, as some countries that can claim to straddle more than one geographic region have at times chosen to shift from one subgroup to another. Challengers can emerge within the same subregional grouping, upsetting the rotation. Candidate countries can often be persuaded to drop out to avoid a competitive election. However, there have been times when rival candidacies have emerged and continued all the way through to the election. In addition, within a subgroup some countries may choose to run more often, while others choose to run infrequently or not at all.

The process of selecting a candidate in the African Group usually follows a defined path, in accordance with the AU rules of procedure cited above. First, the subregional groups select the potential candidate countries and forward their names to the African Group for endorsement. The group submits the candidates to the Committee on Candidatures of the African Group in New York, which transmits the information to the AU Ministerial Committee on Candidatures. This committee follows its written rules of procedure in selecting candidates. The African Group and the AU are made up of the same members. (For over three decades the sole exception was Morocco, which had been a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity [OAU], the AU’s precursor, but which withdrew from membership in the OAU in 1984 after the organisation admitted the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. In January 2017, Morocco joined the AU.) Subregional organisations may add their endorsement before the list goes to the AU Ministerial Committee. The AU Executive Committee makes the final decision during an AU summit meeting. Despite the written rules of procedure for candidate selection, some countries have in the past submitted their candidature directly to the AU Ministerial Committee on Candidatures, bypassing the process in New York.

Overall, the system of rotation tends to favour unopposed elections. There have been times when this has resulted in the election of candidates that might have struggled in a contested election and whose presence on the Council was perceived as counterproductive. A factor that seems to be coming into play is the growing desire by some member states in the region to be elected more often than strict adherence to the rotation system would allow. Nigeria was elected for the 2014-2015 term after having been a Council member in 2010-2011. South Africa was on the Council in 2007-2008, again in 2011-2012, and is running for the 2019-2020 term. Although some have argued against the “miniaturisation” of the Council by including too many small states, smaller countries have stated that they too contribute to international peace and security and should have the opportunity to serve on the Council.

Asia-Pacific Group
In 2011, the Asian Group officially changed its name to the Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States, also known as the Asia-Pacific Group. The name change was made to account for the fact that more than 26 percent of the group’s members are Pacific Island countries.

In the Asia-Pacific Group, there are no formally established practices of rotation to fill the two seats, one of which becomes available every year. While it has the same number of countries as the African Group, the Asia-Pacific Group’s wide geographic span—from the Middle East to Polynesia—has led to much looser regional coordination.

Until the mid-1990s, there was a fairly consistent South Asian presence on the Council, with Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan rotating seats. In practice, South Asian countries rarely run against each other. One exception occurred in 1975 when India and Pakistan contested the same seat and eight rounds of voting were needed before Pakistan prevailed.

Since 1958, Japan has also been a regular presence on the Council. When it completed its last term at the end of 2017, Japan had accumulated 22 years on the Council, the most of any non-permanent member. Since 1966, it has never been off the Council for more than six consecutive years. With a total of 20 years on the Council, Brazil comes in second.

The absence of a formal rotation system has meant that there is frequently competition for the Asia-Pacific seat regardless of whether a candidate declares itself far in advance or not. While larger member states have tended to declare their candidacy closer to the election year, smaller candidate countries have tended to announce their decision to run many years ahead of time. The only subgroup within the Asia-Pacific Group that endorses its candidates is ASEAN, made up of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Regional Groups and Established Practices

Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.

**The Arab Swing Seat**
There is an established practice that spans the Asia-Pacific and African Groups. As discussed in Annex 2 below, General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVIII) provided five seats for “Asia and Africa”, and in practice the seats have been divided into three seats for Africa and two for Asia. In 1967, after Jordan ended its two-year term in what had been the Middle East seat, there was a year with no Arab state on the Council, which coincided with the Six-Day War. It appears that at some point there was an informal agreement, although there are no known records, that one seat would be reserved for an Arab state and that Asia and Africa would take turns every two years to provide a suitable candidate. As a result, this seat is often called the “Arab swing seat”. An Arab country has always occupied a seat on the Council since 1968.

**Eastern European Group**
The Eastern European Group is the smallest regional group, consisting of 23 member states, with an election for one seat every odd calendar year. This is the group that has expanded the most in recent decades, with 15 new members added since 1991 due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the splitting of both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Today, 11 of its countries are EU members, four are candidates for EU membership, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a “potential candidate”. An Eastern European seat was included in the permanent members’ “gentlemen’s agreement” in 1946 (see Annex 2), but soon thereafter, the meaning of that agreement was contested, with the Soviet Union and the West vying for 20 years to place their preferred candidates in this seat. It also became a hotly contested seat among new member states that did not have a clear regional grouping. (For example, in 1955, when there was no Asian seat, the Philippines competed with members of the Eastern European Group for a seat. When the voting remained deadlocked between Yugoslavia and the Philippines after 36 rounds, the two countries agreed to accept a split term: Yugoslavia served on the Council in 1956 and the Philippines in 1957.)

**Latin American and Caribbean Group**
After the expansion of the Council and the reorganisation of the regional groups that occurred as a result of General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVIII), the Latin American Group took in the Caribbean states, several of which were members of the British Commonwealth, and became the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC). It currently has 33 members.

Like most of the other groups, GRULAC has no formal rules regarding rotation. For much of the last 60 years, non-Caribbean countries have tended to dominate regional representation. Historically, the group was often able to reach consensus on “clean slates”. However, the group has also produced two of the most protracted and bitterly contested voting sessions in UN history. The 1979 contest between Colombia and Cuba went to 154 rounds and into the following year before Mexico was elected as a compromise candidate in the 155th round (the process took from 26 October 1979 until 7 January 1980). In 2006, elections for the GRULAC seat on the Security Council were inconclusive after 47 rounds of voting over several weeks. With the General Assembly unable to decide between Guatemala and Venezuela, Panama agreed to stand and was elected on the 48th round as the compromise candidate, in a process lasting from 16 October until 7 November.

As a result of this experience, an informal understanding developed among GRULAC members to avoid contested elections, starting with the 2007 elections for the 2008-2009 term. Since then, Mexico (2008), Brazil (2009), Colombia (2010), Guatemala (2011), Argentina (2012), Chile (2013), Venezuela (2014), Uruguay (2015), Bolivia (2016), Peru (2017), and now the Dominican Republic have all been unopposed candidates for Council seats. One GRULAC seat is up for election each year.

**Western European and Others Group**
With 28 members, WEOG is the second-smallest regional group, and two seats become available to it every even calendar year. Strictly speaking, it is not a geographical group, as it comprises Western Europe plus “others”, but its members share broadly similar levels of economic development and political values. The “others” subgroup is made up of three members of what was previously called the British Commonwealth Group. The British Commonwealth Group grew rapidly in the late 1950s as states in Africa and Asia became independent. Most of these newly independent states joined the Asian and African Groups and GRULAC. Australia, Canada and New Zealand became the “others” in WEOG. Israel is the other non-European state that participates in WEOG, having been a temporary member since 2000. With France and the UK as members and the US attending meetings as an observer, WEOG includes three of the five permanent members of the Council. The Holy See is also an observer in WEOG.

WEOG practices what might be called an open-market approach to elections, which produces a regular pattern of contested candidatures that is likely to remain highly competitive in the coming years.

There are several subgroups within WEOG: the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), and the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). There are informal understandings within the Nordic countries and CANZ subgroups that have encouraged members to support each other’s campaigns. In its first term on the Council (1951-1952), Turkey served as the Middle Eastern Council member. It occupied the Eastern European seat twice (1954-1955 and 1961) and has since run for the WEOG seat.
The 2017-2018 Split Term

In the 2016 elections, three candidates—Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden—ran for the two available WEOG seats. During the first round of voting, on 28 June, Sweden received more than the necessary two-thirds majority of votes to be elected (134), while Italy and the Netherlands were tied after five rounds of voting, whereupon the meeting was suspended. On 29 June 2016, the Chair of WEOG sent a letter (A/70/964) informing the president of the General Assembly that Italy and the Netherlands had agreed to split the 2017-2018 term in view of the inconclusive results for the remaining non-permanent seat. The letter indicated that the Netherlands had withdrawn its candidacy in favour of Italy, which was consequently endorsed by WEOG as the group’s only candidate. On 30 June 2016, in a stand-alone vote, Italy was elected to the seat. According to the agreement, Italy relinquished its seat on 31 December 2017 and the Netherlands ran as the sole and endorsed WEOG candidate in a by-election held on 2 June 2017, the same day as the regular elections for non-permanent members of the Council for the 2018-2019 term.

Russia and Egypt, a non-permanent member during the 2016-2017 term, wrote to the president of the General Assembly outlining their concerns over the arrangement between Italy and the Netherlands (A/70/971 and A/70/974). Both letters said that they viewed the agreement to split the term as an exceptional case that should not set a precedent. They argued that a practice of split terms would have a negative impact on the functionality and efficiency of the Security Council in its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Russia, in its letter, noted that the last time a decision was taken on splitting a term had been more than 50 years earlier, following which the Council’s workload had greatly increased, and said it was “gravely disappointed by the inability of the Western European and other States to designate a candidate by consensus, which has led to the current stalemate”.

Article 23(2) of the UN Charter states that the non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. Split terms started to appear in the late 1950s due to disagreements regarding regional rotation and associated Cold War politics, as well as to accommodate the aspirations of newly independent countries. Two candidates would occasionally agree to split the term following multiple rounds of inconclusive voting. The member that was elected first would relinquish its term after one year on the Council, thus enabling the holding of a by-election to fill the vacant seat. By-elections are in line with Rule 140 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which states: Should a member cease to belong to a Council before its term of office expires, a by-election shall be held separately at the next session of the General Assembly to elect a member for the unexpired term.

The practice of splitting terms ended in the mid-1960s when the non-permanent membership of the Council was enlarged from six to ten members and regional representation was introduced. (For further background, see “Security Council Elections: Italy and the Netherlands Agree to a Split Term”, What’s in Blue, 29 June 2016: www.whatsinblue.org/2016/06/security-council-elections-italy-and-the-netherlands-agree-to-a-split-term.php.)

Becoming a Candidate

Most candidate countries follow a fairly standard path in announcing and pursuing their bids for the Council, with the exception of candidates from the African Group, which has a more complex process, as described earlier. If the country is a member of a subregional group, it will often first inform members of that group of its intention to run and seek support. The endorsement of the subregional group then becomes an important factor in the next step.

A candidate country formalises its intention to seek a Council seat by notifying the rotating monthly chair of its respective regional group in New York. This is done in writing, specifying the two-year term the country seeks. The chair then incorporates that information into the UN candidacy chart in New York informing them of the candidacy. Most candidate countries then prepare a circular note to all missions in New York informing them of the candidacy. Most also send a note to the Secretariat or the president of the General Assembly, or both, although this is not required by the General Assembly’s rules of procedure.

As the relevant election year approaches, the regional group may decide to give its endorsement, and nearer to the election date, the chair of the regional group will inform the president of the General Assembly whether elections will be contested or not. This becomes a guide to help the Secretariat prepare documentation for the election process.

Campaigning for the Council

Candidates seek voting pledges from member states, often years in advance of the election, and may continue to do so up until the day of the vote. Campaigning for the Council can involve significant investments of time and financial resources, although funds brought to bear vary greatly depending on a number of factors, including the wealth of the candidate and whether the candidacy is contested. (Candidates predictably tend to spend less in unopposed elections.)
Commitments are sought in writing, orally or both. Member states that promise to vote for a particular candidate do not always keep their word, and as votes are cast by secret ballot, it is not possible to determine which member states have reneged on their pledges. There are several reasons why pledges may be broken. In some cases, there may have been inadequate communication within the pledging government. A high-level official in the capital may pledge the country’s vote to a particular candidate but fail to convey the commitment to the permanent mission to the UN in New York, where the votes are cast. Additionally, if there is a change in government, the new government may not consider itself bound by the pledges of a previous administration. Given the secrecy of the ballot, there are incentives to pledge to all candidates in a competitive election. Knowing that commitments are not always secure, some candidate countries repeatedly cultivate those countries that have already promised to vote for them, seeking reassurances that they have not changed their minds. Candidates often seek pledges from member states at many levels of government.

As candidate countries generally focus their campaigns on influencing the voting decisions of diplomats in member state capitals and at UN headquarters, the foreign minister and permanent representative to the UN play significant roles in the campaign process. Additionally, particularly in contested elections, many candidates employ special envoys who try to secure voting pledges from high-level officials in various capitals. These envoys are usually former senior government officials or diplomats. Depending on their campaign strategies and resources, candidate countries may use multiple envoys, often focusing their efforts on particular regions where they lack strong diplomatic representation.

To secure voting commitments from member states, candidate countries may volunteer, or be asked for, certain inducements. For example, a candidate may offer development assistance to a member state in seeking its vote, or it may promise that while on the Council it will bring attention to or avoid an issue of concern to that member state. Such quid pro quo arrangements are a not uncommon element of the campaign process.

The promotion of candidacies by arranging trips to the candidate’s capital or holding workshops on issues of interest (normally not particularly controversial issues) in attractive locations has been used by several candidates in recent years to raise the profile of their campaign and attract permanent representatives (who will cast the actual vote) to these events. “Swag bags” filled with items imprinted with the logo of the candidate that are handed out within UN circles are intended to increase the outreach of the campaign. Customarily, on the day of the elections, permanent representatives are offered gifts by most candidates, even those headed for an unopposed election.

As contested elections may continue for several rounds, candidates try to ensure that member states that voted for them in the first round continue to do so, while also attempting to secure support from member states that did not commit to voting for them in the first round.

As a result of such bids for second round or subsequent votes, some member states have stated when they commit their vote to a candidate that they do so for the duration of the electoral process, regardless of the number of rounds. However, in protracted elections that come down to two candidates vying for a single seat, member states will often eventually shift their vote if it appears that their candidate of choice is losing ground and appears unlikely to prevail.

### UN Documents on Security Council Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Documents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2017/507 (30 August 2017) was the updated compendium of Security Council working methods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2016/619 (15 July 2016) was a note by the Council president concerning transitional arrangements for newly elected Council members, which among other matters called on Council members to agree provisionally on the appointment of chairs of subsidiary bodies by 1 October.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Assembly Documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/RES/71/323 (8 September 2017) was on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly which decided that on the day of the election in the General Assembly or in the Main Committees, the campaign materials distributed in the General Assembly Hall or in the Committee meeting room shall be limited to a single page of information regarding the candidates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/71/PV.86 (2 June 2017) was the record of the 2017 election of five non-permanent members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/PV.108 (30 June 2016) was the record of the 2016 elections for the remaining non-permanent member from WEOG.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/PV.974 (30 June 2016) was the letter from Egypt expressing its understanding that the agreement between Italy and the Netherlands to split the 2017-2018 term would not lay the ground for future practice and would have no legal or procedural implications on future elections to the Security Council.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/971 (30 June 2016) was the letter from Russia expressing the position that the exceptional case of the agreement between Italy and the Netherlands to split the term would not set a precedent, arguing that this practice would have a negative impact on the Security Council’s efficiency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/964 (29 June 2016) was the letter from the chair of WEOG stating that Italy and the Netherlands had agreed to split the term, with Italy serving in 2017 and the Netherlands in 2018, requiring a by-election for the remainder of the term.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/PV.107 (28 June 2016) was the record of the 2016 elections of the non-permanent members for the remaining candidates from WEOG when Italy and the Netherlands announced that they would split the term.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/PV.106 (28 June 2016) was the record of the 2016 elections of four non-permanent members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/70/PV.33 (15 October 2015) was the record of the 2015 elections of non-permanent members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/69/PV.25 (16 October 2014) was the record of the 2014 elections of non-permanent members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/RES/68/307 (18 September 2014) decided that elections of the non-permanent members of the Security Council would take place about six months before the elected members assume their responsibilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/59/881 (20 July 2005) was a note verbale from Costa Rica containing information on elections from 1946 to 2004.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/RES 1991 A (XVIII) (17 December 1963) was the resolution adopting amendments to the Charter on the composition of the Council and establishing the allocation of seats to various regions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAOR 1st Session, Part I, 14th Plenary Session and Part II (12 January 1946) was the first election of non-permanent members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UN Charter, in Article 23, specifies the number of non-permanent members to be elected, as amended in 1963:

The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council…

Article 23(2) also stipulates the length of their term:

The non-permanent members…shall be elected for a term of two years.

The practical impact of rotation occurring every two years is mitigated by staggering the cycle, so that the General Assembly elects five members each year for the stipulated two-year period. This was determined by rule 142 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Despite the specification of a two-year term, there have been exceptions when members have served shorter terms. There have been one-year terms, either to establish the required rotational cycle or to break electoral deadlocks.

Article 23(2) also contains a provision that ensures no member can become a de facto permanent member by being re-elected to serve continuously in the Council:

A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

This is further reinforced by Rule 144 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which also states that a retiring member of the Council is not eligible for immediate re-election.

In addition to the provisions stated above, the Charter specifies the criteria that the members of the General Assembly shall apply when considering which countries should be elected to serve on the Council. It provides in Article 23 that due regard shall be:

…specifically paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

“Contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security” is often interpreted in this context as the personnel or financial contributions for peacekeeping operations and peace processes. “Contribution to the other purposes of the Organization”, by contrast, is a very wide term. In recent years, most discussions regarding Article 23 at the General Assembly have focused on the criteria of equitable geographical distribution, with issues

Useful Additional Resources


Bruce Russett, ed., The Once and Future Security Council (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).


related to the candidates’ contribution to international peace and security being left aside.

A key procedural provision of the Charter that is relevant to Security Council elections is Article 18(2). This requires a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly on important questions. Under that article, election to the Council is defined as an important question.

In addition, Article 18(3) defines the required majority by reference to members present and voting. This refers to members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members who abstain from voting are considered not voting.

Relevant Rules of Procedure
Voting, especially during elections to the Security Council, can sometimes produce tense and dramatic situations on the floor of the General Assembly. In such circumstances, understanding the relevant rules of procedure can become very important.

Rule 88 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly indicates that once the president of the General Assembly announces the commencement of voting, the process can only be interrupted on a point of order regarding the conduct of the vote. Furthermore, explanations of vote are not permitted when votes are cast by secret ballot.

Elections are governed by Rules 92, 93 and 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.

Under Rule 92, elections to the Council are held by secret ballot. Nominations are not required. Countries simply declare their intention to run, sometimes many years ahead, either by circular note to all members of the UN or to the chair of their regional grouping, or both.

Rule 93 sets out the procedure that applies when there is only one vacancy to be filled and no candidate obtains the required two-thirds majority in the first ballot. It provides that:

...a second ballot shall be taken, which shall be restricted to the two candidates obtaining the largest number of votes... if a two-thirds majority is required, the balloting shall be continued until one candidate secures two-thirds of the votes cast...

What this first part of Rule 93 means is that if there are more than two candidates and there is no clear winner on the first ballot, the lower-polling candidates drop out and the contest then continues to a second ballot between the top two candidates. The effect of Rule 93 is that voting simply continues until one candidate prevails, either by securing the required majority or because the other withdraws.

If neither candidate receives the required majority on the second and third ballots, Rule 93 says that after the third inconclusive ballot, votes may be cast for “an eligible... Member”. This allows new candidates to come into the process, and the fourth ballot is therefore technically referred to as an unrestricted ballot. (It also allows any candidate excluded after the first restricted ballot to come back again.)

If a result is not achieved after three of these unrestricted ballots, Rule 93 requires that the pool again be reduced to the top two. This cycle then repeats until a result is achieved. The emergence of new candidates during the unrestricted stage is rare but not unprecedented. If a trend is starting to emerge in one direction after a succession of inconclusive ballots, it is not unusual for the candidate with fewer votes to withdraw.

Rule 94 is similar to Rule 93 but is applied when there are two or more seats to be filled: When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates obtaining in the first ballot the majority required shall be elected.

Rule 94 also specifies that if additional rounds of voting are required, the pool is reduced by a formula that says that remaining candidates should not be more than twice the number of places available.

Annex 2: Historical Background

When the UN was established in 1945, the Charter provided for 11 members of the Security Council: five permanent members and six elected members.

Article 23(2) included a provision that in the first election of Council members, three members would be chosen for a period of one year so that in the future three new members could be elected annually. This was decided by drawing lots for the one- and two-year terms.

In the first election, on 12 January 1946, the following countries were elected: Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands and Poland. The pattern of geographical distribution was: two seats for Latin America, one for the Middle East, one for Eastern Europe, one for Western Europe, and one for the British Commonwealth.

The interpretation of what equitable geographic distribution should mean in terms of seats was based on an informal agreement among the permanent members, sometimes known as the London Agreement. From the start there was a lack of agreement about what had been agreed to. The US saw the 1946 formula as applying only to the first election, while the Soviet Union maintained that there had been a gentlemen’s agreement of a more general nature for the future meaning of geographic distribution.

The Charter clearly specifies a two-year term for elected members of the Council, but in addition to the 1946-1947 period, split terms started to occur in the late 1950s until the Council was enlarged in 1966. This was in part driven by fallout from the disagreement over regional rotation and associated Cold War politics. But the aspirations of newly independent countries was also an important factor. The first example of this was seen in 1955 when the Philippines and Poland contested a seat. After four inconclusive ballots, Poland withdrew and Yugoslavia declared its candidacy. However, the stalemate continued, and after two months and more than 30 rounds of voting, it was informally agreed that the Philippines would withdraw and that Yugoslavia would resign after one year, at which point the Philippines would run as the only candidate for that seat. Over the next few years, this became a common occurrence.

By the early 1960s, there was a growing acceptance that the original composition of
the Council had become inequitable and unbalanced. Between 1945 and 1965, UN membership rose from 51 to 117 member states, with the proportion of Asian, African and Caribbean states increasing from 25 percent to about 50 percent. On 17 December 1963, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1991 A (XVIII), which contained amendments to the Charter to address the issue by increasing the number of elected members to ten. The resolution also dealt with the issue of geographic distribution, which was resolved as follows:

- five elected members from the African and Asian states—(this was subsequently subdivided in practice into two seats for the Asian Group and three seats for the African Group);
- one from the Eastern European states;
- two from the Latin American states (this included the Caribbean); and
- two from the Western European and other states (this included Australia, Canada and New Zealand.)

At the same time, Article 27 was altered so that resolutions of the Council required the vote of nine members instead of seven. This also meant that for the first time the permanent members could be out-voted by non-permanent members, although only on procedural questions, which are not subject to vetoes by permanent members.

---

**Annex 3: Results of Recent Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council**

The left-hand column lists the year and the UN General Assembly Session in which the voting was held, as well as the number of the plenary meetings (the ordinal numbers) and the date of meetings. The middle column reflects the highest number of votes and abstentions in a given round of elections. (The number of votes cast to fill the different seats in a given round is not always the same.) Candidate countries that won the election are in bold. A table with the complete results from 1946 on can be found at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org).

### 2007 UNGA62

**26th 16-10-07**

- **3 ROUNDS**
  - Round 1: 190 votes, 4 abstentions
  - Round 2: 190 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted
  - Round 3: 189 votes, 9 abstentions, restricted

**Burkina Faso** 185, **Viet Nam** 183, **Libyan Arab Jamahiriya** 178, Costa Rica 116, Croatia 95, Czech Republic 91, Dominican Republic 72, Mauritania 2, Senegal 1

### 2008 UNGA63

**28th 17-10-08**

- **1 ROUNDS**
  - Round 1: 192 votes, 6 abstentions

**Mexico** 185, **Uganda** 181, **Japan** 158, **Turkey** 151, **Austria** 133, Iceland 87, Iran (Islamic Republic of) 32, Madagascar 2, Australia 1, Brazil 1

### 2009 UNGA64

**20th 15-10-09**

- **1 ROUND**
  - Round 1: 190 votes, 7 abstentions

**Nigeria** 186, **Gabon** 184, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** 183, **Brazil** 182, **Lebanon** 180, Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1, Liberia 1, Sierra Leone 1, Togo 1, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1

### 2010 UNGA65

**28th 12-10-10**

- **3 ROUNDS**
  - Round 1: 191 votes, 5 abstentions
  - Round 2: 191 votes, restricted
  - Round 3: 184 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted

**India** 187, **Colombia** 186, **South Africa** 182, **Germany** 128, Portugal 122, Canada 114, Pakistan 1, Swaziland 1

**Portugal** 150, Canada 32

### 2011 UNGA66

**37th 21-10-2011**

- **17 ROUNDS**
  - Round 1: 193 votes, 2 abstentions
  - Round 2: 193 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted

**Guatemala** 191, **Morocco** 151, **Pakistan** 129, Togo 119, Mauritania 98, Azerbaijan 74, Slovenia 67, Kyrgyzstan 55, Hungary 52, Fiji 1

**Togo** 119, Slovenia 97, Azerbaijan 90, Mauritania 72
### Annex 3: Results of Recent Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38th 21-10-11</td>
<td>193 votes, 1 abstention, restricted</td>
<td>Togo 131, Slovenia 99, Azerbaijan 93, Mauritania 61</td>
<td>Round 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 votes, 1 abstention, restricted</td>
<td>Slovenia 98, Azerbaijan 93</td>
<td>Round 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 98, Slovenia 93, Hungary 1</td>
<td>Round 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 96, Slovenia 95, Estonia 1</td>
<td>Round 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 100, Slovenia 91, Estonia 1</td>
<td>Round 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>191 votes, 1 abstention, restricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 110, Slovenia 80</td>
<td>Round 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>191 votes, 1 abstention, restricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 113, Slovenia 77</td>
<td>Round 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39th 24-10-11</td>
<td>193 votes, restricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 110, Slovenia 83</td>
<td>Round 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 110, Slovenia 82</td>
<td>Round 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 111, Slovenia 81</td>
<td>Round 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 110, Slovenia 80</td>
<td>Round 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 votes, 1 abstention, restricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 110, Slovenia 81</td>
<td>Round 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, restricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 117, Slovenia 76</td>
<td>Round 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, restricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 116, Slovenia 77</td>
<td>Round 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 24 abstentions, unrestricted</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 155, Slovenia 13, Hungary 1</td>
<td>Round 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2012 UNGA67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th 18-10-2012</td>
<td>193 votes, 8 abstentions</td>
<td>Argentina 182, Rwanda 148, Australia 140, Luxembourg 128, Republic of Korea 116, Finland 108, Cambodia 62, Bhutan 20, United Republic of Tanzania 3, Barbados 1, Cuba 1, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 votes, restricted</td>
<td>Republic of Korea 149, Luxembourg 131, Finland 62, Cambodia 43</td>
<td>Round 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2013 UNGA68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34th 17-10-2013</td>
<td>191 votes, 5 abstentions</td>
<td>Lithuania 187, Chile 186, Nigeria 186, Chad 184, Saudi Arabia 176 (declined), Senegal 2, The Gambia 2, Lebanon 1, Croatia 1</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st 6-12-2013</td>
<td>185 votes, 4 abstentions</td>
<td>Jordan 178, Saudi Arabia 1</td>
<td>Round 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2014 UNGA69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25th 16-10-2014</td>
<td>193 votes, 10 abstentions</td>
<td>Angola 190, Malaysia 187, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 181, New Zealand 145, Spain 131, Turkey 109, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1, Brazil 1</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, restricted</td>
<td>Spain 120, Turkey 73</td>
<td>Round 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 votes, 1 abstention, restricted</td>
<td>Spain 132, Turkey 60</td>
<td>Round 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2015 UNGA69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33rd 15-10-2015</td>
<td>192 votes, 14 abstentions</td>
<td>Senegal 187, Uruguay 185, Japan 184, Egypt 179, Ukraine 177</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2016 UNGA70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>106th 28-06-2016</td>
<td>191 votes, 8 abstentions</td>
<td>Ethiopia 185, Bolivia 183, Sweden 134, Netherlands 125, Kazakhstan 113, Italy 113, Thailand 77, Colombia 1, Cuba 1, Belgium 1</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted</td>
<td>Kazakhstan 178, Netherlands 99, Italy 92, Thailand 55</td>
<td>Round 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>190 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted</td>
<td>Netherlands 96, Italy 94</td>
<td>Round 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107th 28-06-16</td>
<td>191 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted</td>
<td>Netherlands 96, Italy 95</td>
<td>Round 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108th 30-06-16</td>
<td>190 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted</td>
<td>Netherlands 95, Italy 95</td>
<td>Round 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>184 votes, 6 abstentions, unrestricted</td>
<td>Italy 179, Netherlands 4, San Marino 1</td>
<td>Round 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2017 UNGA71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86th 02-06-2017</td>
<td>192 votes, 5 abstentions</td>
<td>Poland 190, Côte d’Ivoire 189, Kuwait 188, Peru 186, Equatorial Guinea 185, Netherlands 184, Argentina 1, Guinea 1, Morocco 1</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The material in this publication is subject to copyright ownership. Material in this publication may be freely used as in the public domain. You are free to copy, distribute, or make derivative works of the work under the following conditions: you must attribute the work to Security Council Report, Inc.; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one.