This is Security Council Report’s fifth Special Research Report on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It examines the work of this relatively recent addition to the UN system with a particular focus on the country-specific contexts of its work. In case studies on Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Liberia and Guinea the report looks at how the PBC has worked in the countries on its agenda and what value it has added to the work of the UN in those countries.

Another key theme in the report is the relationship between the Security Council and the PBC. The report notes that while originally the Council, by adopting resolution 1646, signaled its clear interest in the PBC, it has since been somewhat reluctant to engage in developing a more substantive relationship with the body it created. The report examines past and current Council practice and working methods vis-à-vis the PBC and suggests possible ways of maximising the potential of the PBC to provide real benefits for the Council and thus strengthening its ability to contribute to lasting peace.
This Special Research Report examines the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)—a relatively recent addition to the UN system—mainly in the country-specific contexts of its work: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic (CAR) and Guinea. It will strive to provide new insights into the important issue of Security Council working methods based on how the Council interacts with the work of the PBC and absorbs this relationship into the broader focus of the Council.

Security Council Report has been following the PBC through a series of Special Research Reports since its creation in late 2005. The last such report was published in November 2009. Like the previous three Special Research Reports, the 2009 study focused largely on internal UN processes and organisational issues relevant to the setting up of the PBC and its reporting mechanisms. These issues remain important, but more than seven years after its establishment, it may be useful to examine how the PBC has worked in the countries on its agenda, and what value it has added to the work of the UN in those countries. Another aspect examined in this report is the relationship between the Security Council and the PBC, a body the Council originally insisted on having an oversight of but has since not interacted with enthusiastically.

Background and the 2010 PBC Review

The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report) had stressed the “pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms” and identified peacebuilding as a key element of this approach (S/2000/809).

It highlighted a “fundamental deficiency” in the way in which the UN approached the issue and recommended that the Secretariat develop a plan to “strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.”

However, the key intellectual influence leading to the creation of the PBC was the 21 March 2005 Secretary-General’s report entitled In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005).

Like the Preamble to the UN Charter, the report was suffused with optimism:

We have it in our power to pass on to our children a brighter inheritance than that bequeathed to any previous generation. We can halve global poverty and halt the spread of major known diseases in the next 10 years. We can reduce the prevalence of violent conflict and terrorism. We can increase respect for human dignity in every land. And we can forge a set of updated international institutions to help humanity achieve these noble goals. If we act boldly—and if we act together—we can make people everywhere more secure, more prosperous and better able to enjoy their fundamental human rights.

The report noted how countries emerging from violent conflict often lacked sufficient and coherent international support and resources for peacebuilding to avoid a relapse into conflict during the immediate post-conflict period. Countries emerging from conflict, it noted, are more likely than not to have a relapse into violent conflict, but consistent international support can prevent this from happening.

As a result, among the decisions of the 2005 World Summit was the establishment of three new UN peacebuilding bodies: the PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). They were intended to convene and coordinate the UN system and interested member states towards supporting the peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict or fragile and vulnerable states through the mobilisation of political, financial and technical resources (A/RES/60/1).

Security Council resolution 1645 of 20 December 2005 (adopted concurrently with General Assembly resolution 60/180) created the PBC as an inter-governmental advisory body with an Organisational Committee of 31 member countries to coordinate and reinforce the UN peacebuilding architecture. The two resolutions underlined a number of points as guiding principles:
development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing;
• there needs to be a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace; and
• there is a need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and for assisting them in laying the foundation for sustainable economic growth.

As indicated in the two founding resolutions, the PBC was to be the spearhead of “the vital role of the United Nations in preventing conflicts, assisting parties to conflicts to end hostilities and emerge towards recovery, reconstruction and development and in mobilizing sustained international attention and assistance”.

The resolutions established a complex membership for the PBC Organisational Committee:
• seven members of the Security Council, including permanent members;
• seven members from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC);
• five top providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds, programmes and agencies, excluding those already selected from the Security Council and ECOSOC;
• five top providers of military personnel and police to UN missions, excluding those already selected from the Security Council and ECOSOC or selected based on assessed and voluntary contributions to the UN; and
• seven members determined by the General Assembly with consideration given to equitable regional distribution and post-conflict experience.

That same day, 20 December 2005, in a move that surprised most General Assembly members, the Council also adopted resolution 1646, stating that all five permanent members would be members of the Organisational Committee and that the PBC would, in addition to reporting to the General Assembly, submit its annual report to the Council.

The General Assembly and the Council concurrent founding resolutions also stated that the new PBC arrangement should be reviewed within five years to determine whether the PBC was fulfilling its mandate.

In a 21 June 2006 letter to the Secretary-General, the President of the Council requested the advice of the PBC on the situations in Burundi and Sierra Leone (PBC/1/OC/2). The Organisational Committee met for the first time on 23 June 2006 and selected both Burundi and Sierra Leone to be the first countries to be considered by the PBC at its second meeting, held on 13 July 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2). By the time of the PBC’s mandated review in 2010, the Council had referred two other countries—Guinea-Bissau in October 2007 (S/2007/744) and the Central African Republic in May 2008 (S/2008/383)—to the PBC.

The co-facilitators of the review—Ambassadors Anne Anderson (Ireland), Claude Heller (Mexico) and Baso Sangqu (South Africa)—were appointed in December 2009. After months of extensive consultations, they submitted their report, entitled “Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture” (S/2010/393), on 19 July 2010. The report was forthright. It said, “the hopes that accompanied the founding resolutions have yet to be realized.” It noted that if the expectations upon its setting up had been met, there probably would have been a “wider demand from countries to come on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda.” There would also be, the report continued, “a clearer sense of how the engagement of the Commission had made a difference on the ground.” Peacebuilding in this context “would have a higher place among United Nations priorities” and stronger relationships would have been forged among the PBC and the Security Council, the General Assembly and ECOSOC. Had the PBC functioned well, the report noted, the PBO would carry more weight within the Secretariat, and international financial institutions and others inside and outside the UN system would see the PBC as a key actor. Alas, the report concluded, “it must be squarely acknowledged that this threshold of success has not been achieved.”

According to the report, something more was required if the vision and ambition of the PBC were to be met. A new level of attention and resolve and a conscious re-commitment to peacebuilding were necessary if the PBC were not to “settle into the limited role that [it] has developed to date.” Six issues that should be factors in the recommitment were identified:
• recognition of the complexity of peacebuilding;
• the imperative of national ownership;
• recognition of the ‘illusion’ of sequencing;
• the urgency of resource mobilisation;
• the importance of the contribution of women; and
• the need for connection with the field.

A field perspective was particularly important, according to the report, since it would bring a number of issues into relief, in particular: national ownership in the planning process and capacity-building; developmental aspects of peacebuilding; the need for coherence and coordination; and the importance of the regional dimension.

During the review period, while the report was being prepared, Heller updated Council members regularly in consultations under “other matters” on the progress of the PBC review (Mexico served on the Council in 2009-2010). Yet, after the report was published the Council never chose to discuss it formally. During the 13 October 2010 open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding organised by Uganda, several speakers referred to the report. But two different reports, “Progress report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict” (S/2010/386) and “Report of the Secretary-General on women’s participation in peacebuilding” (S/2010/466), were listed as documents for that debate. Several days after the debate, on 29 October, the Council adopted resolution 1947 which welcomed the PBC review report, reaffirmed “the importance of the peacebuilding work carried out by the United Nations and the need for sustained support and adequate resources for this work” and called for another comprehensive review five years after the adoption of the resolution (following the same procedure, as set out in resolution 1645). The resolution underlined the role of the PBC as a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body to address the needs of countries emerging from conflict and to help them achieve sustainable peace.

It also asked all relevant UN actors to “take forward, within their mandates and as appropriate, the recommendations of the report with the aim of further improving the effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission.”
On 23 November 2010, the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the report and underlining the same points highlighted in Council resolution 1947 (A/RES/65/7). On the same day, the PBC’s Organisational Committee met and issued a “roadmap” for implementing the review’s recommendations in 2011. The roadmap called on the PBC to consider mechanisms and approaches that could help align relevant actors in the field, including host governments, UN missions, regional organisations and civil society. It also called on the PBC to adopt “flexible and adaptable” instruments of engagement, based on national assessments and analyses by national stakeholders and others in the field.

Country-Specific Configurations

According to resolutions 60/180 of the General Assembly and 1645 of the Security Council adopted on 20 December 2005, a country may be added to the agenda of the PBC by a request from the Security Council or the Secretary-General or, in “exceptional cases where the country is on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict” by a request from the General Assembly, ECO-SOC, or the concerned country itself. Five of the PBC-agenda countries—Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, CAR and Liberia—are also on the agenda of the Security Council, and the Council referred all of them to the PBC. Guinea, the last to be added to the PBC agenda, on 23 February 2011, is not and directly requested the PBC to be placed on its agenda.

The Security Council happened to be holding a debate on Sierra Leone on the same day that the PBC was established, 20 December 2005 (S/PV.5334). It had before it the Secretary-General’s final report (S/2005/777) on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Daudi Mwakawago, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNAMSIL, spoke of the mission’s work in managing Sierra Leone’s “gradual rise from the ruins of a devastating, decade-long conflict and its remarkable turnaround that now leads towards a future filled with hope and the promise of better life for its population.” UNAMSIL, he said, had helped disarm, demobilise and reintegrate over 72,000 combatants, as well as oversee the return of more than a half million refugees and close to two million internally displaced persons. It had furthermore helped in the restoration of governmental authority across the country. During the debate, several speakers—including the permanent representative of the UK, the lead on Sierra Leone in the Council as well as its most important bilateral partner—made references to the possibilities offered by the PBC. The permanent representative of the Philippines noted that the Council and the General Assembly had just adopted the resolutions creating the PBC and pointed out that “Sierra Leone would be the ideal first candidate for assistance from the Peacebuilding Commission because of the good foundation already laid and its great potential for success.”

Resolution 1645 stipulated that the PBC “shall meet in various configurations” and that each configuration “shall include as members, in addition to members of the Committee, representatives from the country under consideration.” As soon as countries began being placed on its agenda, the PBC proceeded to establishing the “country-specific configurations” for the handling of each of these countries. A configuration would become the principal hands-on tool for the PBC in addressing a country and its main interface with the respective government (with the PBC as a whole providing overall policy guidance and being the decision-making body). Each configuration comprises the 31 PBC Organisational Committee members plus the World Bank and IMF, as well as regional financial institutions. The configurations were also conceived to include countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in either relief efforts or political dialogue. Also included in this design were relevant regional and subregional organisations; the major financial, troop- and civilian police-contributors involved in the recovery effort; and the senior UN representative in the field and other relevant UN representatives. In addition, a representative of the Secretary-General was to be invited to participate in all meetings of the respective configuration. The design of a country-specific configuration that emerged creates a unique platform for cooperation among all key peacebuilding actors, including but not limited to UN structures.

Each of the country-specific configurations is headed by a member state which is willing to take on a leading role and a strong commitment to the respective PBC agenda country. A practical proactive approach has developed with the configuration chair typically organising informal meetings and numerous visits to the respective country.

An issue of real significance in terms of the impact in the field is the membership of the country-specific configurations. The underlying concept was that primarily states that are directly engaged in the countries under consideration, and therefore have important interests and expertise—political, historical, developmental and economic, or humanitarian—should be part of these country-specific configurations. To date, however, this potentially valuable guiding principle has not always been realised in practice and even some configuration chairs do not fully meet this test.

Chairing a configuration means a huge commitment on the part of the individual and may add considerable strain, since the configuration may consume a lot of his or her professional time. Most chairs, it must be remembered, are at the same time permanent representatives of their countries, and those duties entail considerable responsibilities.
The Role of the Peacebuilding Support Office

The PBC’s founding resolutions (A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645) requested that the Secretary-General “establish, within the Secretariat, from...existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission.” The resulting PBSO comprises the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch; the Policy, Planning and Application Branch; and the Financing for Peacebuilding Branch. The PBSO is responsible for assisting and supporting the PBC, administering the PBF and for helping the Secretary-General coordinate all UN agencies in their peacebuilding efforts.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office Strategy 2012-2013, a planning document broadly setting out the vision and objectives of the PBSO, calls for the office to help build stronger coherence and create synergies between the PBC and other parts of the UN, within the UN system and between the wider UN and international system. The strategy notes that the PBSO recognises that work in the field and by lead departments drive successful peacebuilding efforts and that the PBSO’s role is coordination and support. The PBSO is able to fulfil this role through its advisory function to the PBC, managing the PBF policy processes with the UN and the wider international system and improving communication and understanding of peacebuilding among stakeholders. The strategy highlighted three key areas of focus:

• increasing the peacebuilding impact of key national and international actors at the country level through the PBC and PBF;
• strengthening UN system leadership, coherence and coordination on key peacebuilding policy priorities; and
• improving communication and understanding of peacebuilding through the PBC, UN and external actors.

On 31 August 2012, the PBSO published Resource Mobilisation for Peacebuilding Priorities: The Role of the Peacebuilding Commission, a paper offered as a contribution to the PBC’s efforts in resource mobilisation for countries on its agenda. It included a long list of recommendations to the configuration chairs and members of the country-specific configurations. It noted that “peacebuilding activities and financial needs assessments for countries on the PBC agenda should go beyond the funding scope of the PBF to facilitate scaling-up and/or leveraging of new and additional funding from other sources”, an implicit criticism of some of the configurations that have not embarked on fundraising activities beyond the occasional funding by the PBF disbursed by the Secretary-General.

Several configuration chairs interviewed by SCR, on the other hand, pointed out that they have had little or no support from the PBSO and that PBSO coordination of PBC work is poor. Configuration chairs, they said, feel “lonely” and they have to rely on the staff of their diplomatic missions to arrange their travels and accompany them on their visits to the country whose configuration they chair. They suggested that it might be helpful to have the PBSO experts providing advice and support in a more pro-active way, but that this has seldom been the case. It may well be, they suggested, that the PBSO’s staff does not include proper country-specific experts, and they pointed out that this would need to change if the PBC is to be more effective.

Judy Cheng-Hopkins (Malaysia) is Assistant Secretary-General of the PBSO. She was appointed on 17 April 2009.

The Role of the Country-Specific Configuration Chairs

The chairs of the PBC country-specific configurations are in most cases accredited as permanent representatives to the UN in New York. But by undertaking the responsibilities of a configuration chair, these diplomats become key international interlocutors for the government of the configuration country and an important international advocate on behalf of that country. And the advocacy takes the chair far beyond the UN system, to include international and regional organisations, multilateral and regional financial institutions, countries in the region, and often their own government.

The rules regarding the election of configuration chairs are flexible and the practice is still evolving. Chairs do not need to be prior members of the configuration or of the PBC Organisational Committee. The configuration members usually elect the chairs, and the name is then passed on to the Organisational Committee.

The chairs of the first two country-specific configurations—Sierra Leone and Burundi—were selected from the Organisational Committee. At the third meeting of the Committee on 9 October 2006, Ambassador Ismael A. Gaspar Martins (Angola), the PBC Chair at the time, was asked to preside over the Sierra Leone configuration “until such time as the Committee was in a position to appoint another chairperson.” Ambassador Frank Majoor (Netherlands) was elected shortly thereafter. He was in turn succeeded by Ambassadors John McNee (Canada), elected on 25 February 2009, and Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), elected on 15 August 2011. The Burundi configuration was set up later in 2006, with Ambassador Johan Lövold (Norway) becoming its first chair. Since then, Ambassador Anders Lidén (Sweden) was elected on 17 July 2008, Ambassador Peter Maurer (Switzerland) served as chair from 2009 to 2010 and the current chair, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), took over in June 2010. Guinea-Bissau has had the same configuration chair since it was placed on the PBC agenda on 19 December 2007, Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti (Brazil). The Central African Republic (CAR) also had one chair to date, Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium) from 12 June 2008, when it was placed on the agenda, until 1 June 2012 when Grauls resigned (at press time, the configuration has continued without a chair). Liberia has had two chairs, Ambassador Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein (Jordan) from its placement on the agenda on 16 September 2010 until 7 March 2012 and Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden) since 17 April 2012. Guinea, coming to the PBC most recently, on 23 February 2011, has had one chair, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg).

While configuration chairs have brought their individual styles and relationships to their work, the methodology has essentially
been the same. It has involved initially leading field missions to the country of their configuration, agreeing on priorities with the host government and fashioning an instrument of engagement or working principles based on the agreed priorities. (The different instruments of engagement, largely due to efforts by the chairs, have over the years evolved from the more rigid “frameworks” to more flexible statements of mutual commitments.)

The chairs have then followed up with subsequent missions, some more frequently than others: Burundi, which has suffered from several violent outbursts since it was added to the PBC agenda, has had considerably more frequent field visits by its configuration chairs than Sierra Leone, which has been on the PBC agenda for the same length of time.

Of utmost importance is the relationship between a configuration chair and the Secretary-General’s representative on the ground and how the field missions integrate the PBC’s efforts into their work. This problem bears directly on the PBC’s effectiveness in the field.

The successive Sierra Leone configuration chairs have seemed to have a very good working relationship with the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), and these chairs have appeared to be effective even though their countries—The Netherlands and Canada—do not have embassies in Sierra Leone.

Conversely, when the relationship is not smooth, the work of the PBC configuration suffers: Grauls, the chair of the CAR configuration, tendered his resignation on 1 June 2012 after a disagreement about the timing of a donors’ conference with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Margaret Vogt.

The case of Burundi provides yet another example of the complex dynamics on the ground. The leadership of the different Security Council-established missions in Burundi have had, over the years, a tense relationship with the government, including a much earlier than expected termination of a peacekeeping operation (in 2006) and a record turnover in the post of the Secretary-General’s top representative on the ground, largely due to the government’s pressure for their removal. During the same period, the PBC configuration and its successive chairs have enjoyed a rather productive relationship.

All the countries that are on the agenda of the PBC are politically fragile and have image problems internationally due to their past experience of political or economic meltdown and in some cases widespread violence or state collapse. A few have gone through difficult political upheavals just before or already while being on the PBC agenda. In the course of the past year disturbing developments in two of the PBC agenda countries seem to have taken the international actors involved in peacebuilding largely by surprise.

The first of these developments was the 12 April 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau perpetrated by military officers who seized power and imprisoned interim President Raimundo Pereira, former prime minister and presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Junior and several other senior officials, aborting preparations for presidential run-off elections scheduled for 22 April 2012. The coup appeared not to have been anticipated by the PBC nor, for that matter, by any other component of the UN system, including the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and more disturbingly, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). The chair of the Guinean-Bissau configuration, Ambassador Viotti, had visited the country from 1-3 September 2011, and in her briefings to the Security Council on 28 March 2012, had hailed the “important strides towards sustainable peace” that Guinea-Bissau had made (S/PV.6743).

The CAR had in recent years been considered a low-intensity and fairly routine issue on the Council agenda. The Council received briefings on CAR twice a year, on the occasion of the Secretary-General’s periodic reports. The chair of the configuration also briefed regularly since the CAR was added to the PBC agenda in 2008. His last briefing was in December 2011 and he resigned, as mentioned, on 1 June 2012.

The December 2012 Secretary-General’s report on CAR, covering the previous six months, sounded a fairly optimistic note (S/2012/956). It pointed out that during that period, “the political environment has evolved significantly”. Referring to different factions, including some rebel groups, the report stressed, “National stakeholders resumed dialogue, which led to the consensus adoption of an election management body.” Yet events on the ground suggested a very different state of affairs. In December 2012, several rebel groups—jointly known as the Séléka—underwent a military offensive and were soon close to the capital, Bangui.

In December and January, the Council received four briefings and issued as many press statements on CAR. On 24 January 2012 it adopted resolution 2088 in which, among other things, it praised “the swift efforts made by Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS), by the African Union and the countries in the region to solve the political and security crisis”, renewed the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), expressed its hope that a configuration chair will be appointed promptly and asked for additional reporting from the Secretary-General.

The Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council

Although the Security Council was instrumental in creating the PBC, the relationship between the Council and this new body, which is considered to be a subsidiary of both the Council and the General Assembly, has not been very dynamic.

The two bodies have interacted in the context of the five countries overlapping the two agendas and during thematic debates of the Security Council on peacebuilding. The Council has regularly referred to the PBC in its resolutions, both the thematic ones and while renewing or revising mandates of missions in countries on the agendas of both bodies. The chairperson of the PBC has regularly been invited to speak at debates on the annual report of the PBC and during the debates on post-conflict peacebuilding. (The configuration chairs usually spoke at these debates in their national capacity to address the situation in their respective configuration country.)
Sierra Leone and Burundi, having been on the PBC’s agenda the longest, provide the richest illustration of the interaction between the two bodies.

All Security Council resolutions renewing or establishing new missions for Sierra Leone since the PBC was set up have taken into account the work of the PBC, underlining the important role of the commission in the peacebuilding work in the country. The Council has also heard statements from the chairs of the Sierra Leone configuration at least a dozen times, mostly during the consideration of the Secretary-General’s reports on the country under the rubric “The Situation in Sierra Leone”.

The Council has had an even more frequent interaction with the chairs of the Burundi configuration, a volatile country that has required more PBC fact-finding missions and briefings to the Council by its successive configuration chairs than any other PBC agenda country. All the resolutions (as well as two presidential statements) on Burundi since it became part of the PBC’s agenda have mentioned the work of the country-specific configuration, and its chairs have briefed the Council at least 13 times, including during one private meeting.

These briefings over the years have become the key tool in the Council’s engagement with the PBC regarding the countries on both bodies’ agendas. The configuration chairs have also on occasion sent letters to the President of the Council. This pattern has held for all the other configurations that were later added by the PBC with the exception of Guinea, which is not on the Council’s agenda.

While the configuration chairs of countries on the Council agenda have routinely briefed the Council on the occasion of a briefing on the Secretary-General’s periodic report on that country, in most of these briefings, the configuration chair would be thanked for his or her time and the Council would then leave the chamber to discuss the matter in consultations.

There had been an attempt to change this practice. When in 2010 the Council was updating its key document on working methods, the 2006 note from the President (S/2006/507), several elected members, in particular Austria, Brazil and Mexico, wanted to add provisions that would allow configuration chairs to participate in consultations. Some permanent members, however, were strongly opposed and the relevant passage of the Note reads: “As appropriate, the members of the Council intend to invite the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in formal Security Council meetings at which the situation concerning the country in question is considered, or on a case-by-case basis, for an exchange of views in an informal dialogue” (S/2010/507). To date, the Council has only availed itself of the advice of a configuration chair during consultations regarding that country situation when the chair also happens to be an elected member of the Council.

Since the PBC became operational, the Council has not sought the advice of the configuration chairs outside of the routine reporting cycles, though, possibly, this situation may have been an oversight on the part of both bodies.

During the 18-24 May 2012 Security Council visiting mission to West Africa, some Council members appeared to have been alarmed that at no time in their meetings with national interlocutors in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the work of the PBC mentioned. The Terms of Reference for the trip had included as one of the objectives for the visit to Liberia “to welcome and assess the performance of the Peacebuilding Commission” and with respect to Sierra Leone “to emphasize the important role of regional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, as well as the country-specific configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, in supporting Sierra Leone to achieve its peacebuilding, security and long-term development goals contribution to security sector reform, rule of law and national reconciliation” (S/2012/344). It appears that during the trip, that aspect was simply overlooked by the traveling Council members and that none of the interlocutors on the ground made a point of bringing it up.

Upon returning, Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (UK) found this so striking that he wrote to the Council President on 12 June 2012, offering ideas about how the Council might strengthen the role of the PBC in those countries and on improving the quality of its interaction with the PBC and requesting a meeting with the relevant configuration chairs.

Eventually, that meeting was held in the format of an informal dialogue on 13 July and involved all configuration chairs. An important focus of this meeting was how the quality of the interaction between the Council and the PBC chairs might be improved. According to the sixth annual report of the PBC, the configuration chairs who attended the meeting urged the Council to “clearly articulate its expectations” of what value the PBC might add to the work of the Council in the countries on the PBC agenda (S/2013/63).

An open debate on the annual report of the PBC organised by Colombia during its presidency in July 2012 provided an opportunity for a public exchange of views on this matter (S/PV.6805). Several speakers provided specific ideas on how the Council could make use of the PBC’s value added.

Ambassador Jose Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal) pointed out that Council members should collectively work on improving the working methods of the Council to be able to regularly draw upon the advice of the configuration chairs. He continued, “there is certainly room for the Council to seek, and make a better use of, the PBC’s advice, especially when discussing the renewal of mandates, but also as an early warning for potential setbacks in peace consolidation in specific countries.”

Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland, chair of the Burundi configuration) pointed out that if taken to its full potential, the relationship between the Council and the PBC country-specific configurations could lighten and supplement the work of the Council. Configurations, he said “can thus act as a sort of safety net on the Council’s behalf. If the situation in the countries on the PBC’s agenda is stable, the Council does not need to worry about them. On the other hand, if it deteriorates, the PBC is there to alert the Council.”

Lyall Grant highlighted three areas where he felt the PBC could add value to the work of the Security Council in PBC agenda countries: supporting strong national ownership of peacebuilding, promoting coherence in international support for peacebuilding and providing informed briefings for the Security Council. “I believe that the PBC can add genuine value to Council deliberations for the countries on its agenda by complementing the briefings given by senior United..."
The Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council (con’t)

The 11-year civil war in Sierra Leone—spearheaded by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had been backed by the then-President of Liberia, Charles Taylor—officially ended in 2002. An estimated 70,000 people were killed in the war, which devastated the country. On 8 October 1997, in resolution 1132, the Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council junta, which had toppled President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997. On 5 June 1998, in adopting resolution 1171, the Council expanded the measures to include a travel ban on members of that regime and their families and imposed similar measures on the RUF. On 22 October

Case Study on Sierra Leone

On 21 June 2006, two days prior to the first meeting of the Organizational Committee of the PBC, the President of the Security Council wrote to the Secretary-General requesting that the PBC provide advice on the situation in Sierra Leone (PBC/1/OC/2). In response to that request, Sierra Leone was placed on the agenda of the PBC at the second meeting of the Organizational Committee held on 13 July 2006 (PBC/1/OC/ SR.2), with Ambassador Frank Majoor (Netherlands) as chair of the country-specific configuration.

Background
An 11-year civil war in Sierra Leone—spearheaded by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had been backed by the then-President of Liberia, Charles Taylor—officially ended in 2002. An estimated 70,000 people were killed in the war, which devastated the country. On 8 October 1997, in resolution 1132, the Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council junta, which had toppled President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997. On 5 June 1998, in adopting resolution 1171, the Council expanded the measures to include a travel ban on members of that regime and their families and imposed similar measures on the RUF.
1999, it furthermore adopted resolution 1270 establishing the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Almost six years later, on 31 August 2005, in resolution 1620, the Council commended UNAMSIL for its contributions made to the recovery of Sierra Leone from conflict and decided that the peacekeeping operation would transition to a political mission, the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). The Council asked the Secretary-General to establish UNIOSIL as of 1 January 2006 and gave it a largely peacebuilding mandate that would include assisting the government of Sierra Leone in:

- building state capacity to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth;
- building the capacity of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007;
- enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management;
- strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system; and
- strengthening the security sector.

At the end of a debate discussing the final Secretary-General’s report on UNAMSIL—held, incidentally, on 20 December 2005, the same day the Council adopted resolution 1645 establishing the PBC—the Council adopted a presidential statement noting with satisfaction the effective exit strategy applied by UNAMSIL and stressed the importance of development partners’ continuing their support of Sierra Leone during this new phase (S/PRST/2005/63).

Largely peaceful, free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Sierra Leone on 11 August and 8 September 2007, bringing the then-opposition All People’s Congress (APC) leader, Ernest Bai Koroma, to power. On 4 August 2008, the Council adopted resolution 1829 replacing UNIOSIL. The Council asked the Secretary-General to establish UNIOSIL for its contributions made to the recovery of Sierra Leone from conflict and decided that the peacekeeping operation would transition to a political mission, the UN Integrated Mission in Sierra Leone (UNISIL). The Council asked the Secretary-General to establish UNISIL as of 1 January 2006 and gave it a largely peacebuilding mandate that would include assisting the government of Sierra Leone in:

- building state capacity to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth;
- building the capacity of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007;
- enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management;
- strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system; and
- strengthening the security sector.

In February and March 2009, Sierra Leone experienced a rash of political violence between the two main parties, the ruling APC and the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), culminating in the near-destruction of the latter’s headquarters and radio station in Freetown and the alleged rapes of six women. There were fears that the events might ignite another civil war, and UNIPSIL undertook mediation efforts that brought the leaders of the two parties to sign a joint communiqué on 2 April 2009 in which they committed themselves “to work jointly in preventing all forms of political incitement, provocation and intimidation that could lead to a recurrence of the disturbances.”

In the next period the country proceeded to continue its recovery from conflict and the process of consolidating peace. Though it continued to experience multiple problems, including in areas considered critical for peace consolidation such as youth unemployment, illicit drug trafficking and corruption, it remained generally stable.

Sierra Leone conducted largely peaceful general elections on 17 November 2012. Koroma was re-elected with 58.7 percent of the valid votes cast. On 30 November 2012, the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the success of the elections and urging all political parties to accept the results (S/PRST/2012/25).

PBC Engagement

The first-ever PBC field trip to a country on its agenda was a visit to Sierra Leone led by the configuration chair, Ambassador Majoor, from 19-25 March 2007. The mission was intended to:

- obtain first-hand information about the situation on the ground and assess challenges to peacebuilding;
- discuss with the government and other stakeholders the priority areas for peacebuilding, the development of an integrated framework for peacebuilding and how the PBC could best support national peacebuilding efforts; and
- consider ways to focus the attention of the international community on peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone and to communicate the main principles and purposes of the PBC.

In its report, the mission noted that the positive political developments in Sierra Leone needed to be matched by progress in the economic and social spheres (PBC/1SLE/2). The report noted that the majority of the population lacked access to justice, employment and security. It also highlighted that the root causes of past civil war remained and that the role of the PBC in supporting the government in its peace-consolidation efforts was important. The PBC and the government agreed to develop an integrated strategic framework for the PBC medium-term engagement with the country.

On 3 December 2007, the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework was issued (PBC/2/SLE/1). It was a detailed document, formulated jointly by the PBC and the government. It underlined three principles to guide the relationship between the Sierra Leone government and the PBC:

- national ownership;
- mutual accountability; and
- sustained engagement.

The framework was designed with the following key criteria in mind:

- that it was critical for Sierra Leone to avoid a relapse into conflict;
- that it be of short- to medium-term duration; and
- that it required mutual action from the government and its international partners.

The peacebuilding priorities identified in the framework included:

- youth employment and empowerment;
- justice and security sector reform;
- consolidation of democracy and good governance; and
- the energy sector.

It held both the government and the PBC to a number of mutual commitments. The government agreed to develop and implement programmes for youth employment, establish mechanisms for meaningful justice and security sector reform and embark on serious anti-corruption efforts, among other things. It pledged to galvanise “attention and sustained levels of financial resources and technical assistance” to support the implementation of the framework, including through the development of multi-donor, sector-wide funding mechanisms, such as multi-donor trust funds.

On 19 June 2008, the PBC conducted the first biannual review of the framework governing its engagement with Sierra Leone (PBC/2/SLE/8). The review reiterated the prior commitments of both the government...
and the PBC and emphasised the need for greater support from the PBC to the government with respect to advocacy and resource-mobilisation to help Sierra Leone mitigate the effects of a global food crisis and rising oil prices.

In June 2009, the government of Sierra Leone published its Agenda for Change as a new blueprint for revamping the economy, identifying four priority areas in need of improvement:

- energy supply and management of water resources;
- agricultural productivity and food security;
- transportation and infrastructure; and
- the human resource base.

At a high-level special session on Sierra Leone on 10 June 2009, the PBC embraced this blueprint as the strategic vision that would guide international engagement in Sierra Leone (PBC/3/SLE/6). As a result, the then-Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNIPSIL, Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany), aligned the UN’s Joint Vision for Sierra Leone—which had been issued on 30 May 2009 as a roadmap for joint planning, implementation and coordination of all UN programmes in the country—with the Agenda for Change, adopting the core priorities of the latter. These included promoting good governance and the rule of law, combating illicit drug trafficking and addressing youth unemployment. All the UN agencies and programmes in the country were integrated under the leadership of Schulenburg.

A report from the 8-12 March 2010 visit to Sierra Leone by the country-specific configuration during which the delegation consulted widely with national and international partners on a range of peacebuilding noted that the two instruments—the Agenda for Change and the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone—had created a comprehensive overarching strategy for peace consolidation and economic development (PBC/5/SLE/2).

In 2011, the PBC decided that its engagement in the area of governance should be focused on support for national actors to help them prepare the country for free and fair general elections scheduled for 17 November 2012.

In March 2011 Schulenburg wrote a memo on the transition of UN operations in Sierra Leone, making a case for ending UNIPSIL in 2013 and transferring responsibilities to a UN Country Team presence. Schulenburg argued that Sierra Leone had now become a symbol of stability in West Africa, though it still had problems. Its journey towards building a strong national identity and unity, of creating a new modern national state and of developing national institutions that could respond to the aspirations of its people was still ongoing. He stressed that the defining event for the transition in the UN presence should be the 17 November 2012 elections.

Unexpectedly, on 6 February 2012, the Secretary-General withdrew Schulenburg following a request by Sierra Leone. Addressing the Council as outgoing head of mission on 22 March, Schulenburg reported on a number of contentious recent developments in Sierra Leone, including violent attacks on the opposition presidential candidate Julius Maada Bio and arms and munitions imports by the government, worth millions of dollars, for a paramilitary police force already notorious for attacks against the opposition. He stressed the importance of the free and fair conduct of the forthcoming elections as “the major test for the country’s nascent democracy” for Sierra Leone going forward (S/PV.6739). On 4 May the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen (Denmark) as Executive Representative of the Secretary-General.

On 12 September 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2065 extending the mandate of UNIPSIL until 31 March 2013. The resolution authorised UNIPSIL to assist Sierra Leone through the elections and also to perform a number of post-election tasks, including the preparation of a transition plan and exit strategy. The resolution asked the Secretary-General to deploy a technical assessment mission to Sierra Leone in order to provide a report, by mid-February, with proposals and recommendations for UNIPSIL’s drawdown.

A formal meeting in New York of the PBC country-specific configuration was—in an unusual move—shown live on the UN webcast on 2 October 2012. The meeting, at which several members made statements, focused on the forthcoming 17 November elections in Sierra Leone.

As requested in resolution 2065, an interagency technical assessment mission led by the Department of Political Affairs deployed from 14-25 January 2013 to review progress in the implementation of the UNIPSIL mandate and provide proposals for the transition, drawdown and exit strategy of the mission.

On 26 March 2013, resolution 2097 was adopted renewing UNIPSIL’s mandate for twelve months, articulating a specific timeframe for the mission’s drawdown process, which should be completed by 31 March 2014. The resolution notes three key tasks for UNIPSIL to perform for the remainder of its mandate, in coordination with the UN Country Team and other partners: conflict prevention and mediation support for the upcoming constitutional support process (in which UNIPSIL is expected to play a role, with the UN Country Team taking over following UNIPSIL’s drawdown); security sector reform support; and support to the strengthening of human rights institutions.

During negotiations on the resolution, the issue of the PBC’s engagement in Sierra Leone was discussed. While Council members did not reach agreement on a specific timeframe for the conclusion of the work of the Sierra Leone configuration during and beyond the drawdown of UNIPSIL, it seems likely that it will continue through late 2014.

The Role of the Chairs of the Configuration
Sierra Leone has had three configuration chairs: Ambassador Frank Majoor (Netherlands), Ambassador John McNee (Canada) and Ambassador Guerrino Rishchynski (Canada). Both countries are important donors and have an impressive track record in international development work.

Majoor led a field trip to Sierra Leone (as mentioned previously, the first-ever PBC field trip to a country on its agenda) from 19-25 March 2007. A second trip to Sierra Leone by a 14-member PBC delegation, likewise led by Majoor, took place from 1-7 June 2008.

On 25 February 2009, McNee replaced Majoor as configuration chair. Following the wave of political violence between supporters of the two main political parties in February and March, and the mediation undertaken by UNIPSIL that led to both parties signing a joint communiqué on 2 April, on 6 April McNee issued a statement (PBC/3/
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SLE/4). The statement welcomed the joint communiqué and noted that the communiqué demonstrated that “political differences within young and fragile democracies can and should be resolved peacefully”. He then visited Sierra Leone from 20-24 April to follow up on the implementation of the communiqué. There is no published report from the visit, but in its third annual report, of 8 September 2009, the PBC noted that the findings of the configuration chair showed that Sierra Leone continued to make progress in peace consolidation, though the gains remained fragile (S/2009/444).

Following the trip to Sierra Leone, on 12 May McNee visited Washington to explore opportunities for PBC cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank. He visited Sierra Leone two more times, from 8-12 March 2010 and from 24-27 May 2011.

On 15 August 2011, Rishchynski succeeded McNee as configuration chair. He visited Sierra Leone in late January, 2012, meeting with President Koroma, Schulenburg and other national stakeholders. He discussed the rising political tensions in the country, as well as the continuing problem of youth unemployment.

Rishchynski visited Sierra Leone again from 15-20 February 2013, leading a PBC mission that focused on the outlook for Sierra Leone over the post-election phase and outstanding peace consolidation issues, as well as the role of the UN with a focus on UNIPSIL’s transition and the support that the PBC could potentially provide. During the visit, the mission engaged with the Mano River Union—a regional association that fosters economic cooperation among Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea—to discuss further collaboration towards the adoption of a regional approach to peacebuilding.

All Sierra Leone configuration chairs addressed the Security Council repeatedly. Majoro spoke on Sierra Leone at the Council for the first time on 22 December 2006, on the occasion of the adoption of resolution 1734 renewing UNOSIL (S/PV.6080). His subsequent briefings took place on the occasion of the consideration of the relevant Secretary-General’s reports: on 14 December 2007 (S/PV.5804); 7 May 2008 (S/PV.5887); and 9 February 2009 (S/PV.6080).

McNee also briefly the Council regularly during its consideration of the successive reports of the Secretary-General on UNIPSIL: on 8 June 2009 (S/PV.6137); 14 September 2009 (S/PV.6187); 22 March 2010 (S/PV.6291); 28 September 2010 (S/PV.6391); and 24 March 2011 (S/PV.6504).

The current chair, Rishchynski, has briefed the Council on four occasions: 12 September 2011 (S/PV.6609); 22 March 2012 (S/PV.6739); 11 September 2012 (S/PV.6829); and 13 March 2013 (S/PV.6933). Rishchynski also participated in an informal dialogue with Council members on 13 July 2012.

Rishchynski’s 13 March briefing highlighted a number of observations based on the PBC’s recent visit to Sierra Leone. He also stated that in the near term, the PBC will be focusing on supporting the transition, including “by advocating for any necessary resources to fill gaps created by UNIPSIL’s drawdown”, noting that in the longer term the PBC will need to align its engagement with the new priorities articulated in the Agenda for Prosperity, in partnership with the government and the UN.

The three configuration chairs have usually also intervened in thematic debates on post-conflict peacebuilding and debates on the annual reports of the PBC.

The Security Council and the Sierra Leone PBC Configuration

The Security Council has consistently referred to the work of the PBC in its decisions relating to Sierra Leone. The first resolution on Sierra Leone adopted by the Council after it was added to the PBC agenda was resolution 1734 of 22 December 2006, which extended the mandate of UNOSIL by 12 months. It noted the country-specific configuration meetings of 12 October and 13 December 2006, which had discussed the priority areas for peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone as well as gaps in those areas. Similarly, resolution 1793 of 21 December 2007, which extended the mandate of UNOSIL for a further nine months, noted the adoption on 12 December 2007 of the Peace-building Cooperation Framework, highlighting, inter alia, five priority areas in the peace-consolidation process to be addressed by the government of Sierra Leone with the support of the PBC, the UN and bilateral and multinational partners. The resolution emphasised active support for the work of the PBC and the PBF and called on the government of Sierra Leone to “continue its close engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission.”

Resolution 1829 of 4 August 2008, which set up UNIPSIL, mandated it to coordinate with the PBC and support its work, as well as implement the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework and projects supported through the PBF, thus acting as a bridge between the Council and the PBC in their peace consolidation efforts in the country. The resolution welcomed “progress in the implementation of the...Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework” and encouraged the government of Sierra Leone to “continue its close engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission by implementing the recommendations of the first biannual review of the Framework.” The same is true of resolutions 1886 of 15 September 2009, 1941 of 29 September 2010, 2005 of 14 September 2011 and 2065 of 12 September 2012 (all renewing the mandate of UNIPSIL). Resolution 2065 called on the PBC “to keep the Council regularly updated on progress made and to review its engagement with Sierra Leone following the successful completion of the elections and in line with the drawdown of UNIPSIL.”

Resolution 2097 requested for the PBC to continue its work in collaboration with UNIPSIL and the UN Country Team, in particular in the area of resource mobilisation for the Agenda for Prosperity. It also called for the PBC to review its engagement with a view to scaling down its role in Sierra Leone.

PBC Impact: Resource Mobilisation and Advocacy

In December 2006, the PBC recommended the allocation of at least $25 million to Sierra Leone in support of its peacebuilding program. On 1 March 2007, the Secretary-General formally announced that an allocation of over $35 million from the PBF had been made towards Sierra Leone.

In the next period, investments by PBC partners in the key areas of youth unemployment and energy have been significant. In 2010, for example, the key development partners working on youth employment in Sierra Leone as part of the UN’s Joint Vision—the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, the World Bank and the EU—set aside $46 million for “joint response” to youth unemployment. The project aimed at
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creating about 200,000 jobs by 2012. No report on the project was available at press time, but clearly youth unemployment remains a key problem.

The African Development Bank (ADB)—an important PBC partner—allocated $5.7 million in 2010 from its Fragile States Facility to Sierra Leone to support various peacebuilding-related programmes in the country. The Joint Progress Report on the Agenda for Change June 2010–June 2011 recorded roughly similar donations: of $391,469,749 raised, the World Bank contributed $91,725,394; the UK $85,175,053; the European Commission $80,401,020; the UN $52,388,219 and the ADB $24,221,388, among others.

According to figures provided in the fifth annual report of the PBC (S/2012/70), the contributions for 2011 directly derived from the PBC appeared relatively modest: $1 million from Australia, $685,000 from Italy, $500,000 from Canada and $200,000 from the US. The report noted, however, that contributions indirectly derived from the success of the PBC in keeping the attention of the international community on Sierra Leone well after the end of the conflict was difficult to assess. Sierra Leone, it said, enjoyed a level of financial support above the average level of assistance to post-conflict countries. For instance, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sierra Leone and the PBF attracted an additional $9.28 million in 2011. As the report noted, since 2006, Sierra Leone has received nearly $45 million from the PBF.

The key expectation on the part of Sierra Leone with respect to the work of the PBC was resource mobilisation. The results, in the words of government officials, have been somewhat disappointing. In the 12 July 2012 open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding the Sierra Leone Representative called the PBC record on resource mobilisation “mixed” (S/PV.6805 and Resumption 1).

In his latest report on Sierra Leone published on 27 February 2013, the Secretary-General stressed the important future role of the PBC during the transition period: “I also encourage the Peacebuilding Commission to help to sustain international support for Sierra Leone and to engage in resource mobilization efforts, including through the Peacebuilding Fund, to address part of the shortfall on a cost-sharing basis” (S/2013/118).

Case Study on Burundi

On 21 June 2006, two days prior to the first meeting of the Organisational Committee of the PBC, the President of the Security Council wrote to the Secretary-General requesting that the PBC provide advice on the situation in Burundi (PBC/1/OC/2). In response to that request, Burundi was placed on the agenda of the PBC at the second meeting of the Organisational Committee held on 13 July 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2), with Ambassador Johan Løvald (Norway) as chair of the country-specific configuration.

Background

Burundi has been riven by conflict since gaining independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962. As in neighbouring Rwanda, the country has been plagued by ethnic tension between the dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority. In 1972, communal fighting, mainly along the Hutu-Tutsi lines, led to the death of at least 100,000 people. In the next two decades, fighting broke out along these lines again, resulting in tens of thousands

UN DOCUMENTS ON BURUNDI

Security Council Resolution S/RES/2090 (13 February 2013) extended the mandate of BINUB until 15 February 2014. S/RES/1959 (16 December 2010) reconfigured BINUB into the new UN office, BNUB. S/RES/1958 (22 December 2008) extended the mandate of BINUB until 31 December 2009. S/RES/1791 (19 December 2007) extended the mandate of BINUB until 31 December 2008 and welcomed the PBC’s close engagement in Burundi. S/RES/1792 (22 October 2007) requested the Secretary-General to establish a UN Integrated Office in Burundi, which was requested to conduct its activities taking the role of the Peacebuilding Commission into account. S/RES/1545 (21 May 2004) established ONUB. Secretary-General’s Report S/2006/429 (21 June 2006) was the seventh report of the Secretary-General on ONUB, proposing the establishment of a UN integrated office. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6918 (13 February 2013) was a meeting at which resolution 2090 was passed. S/PV.6909 (24 January 2013) was a briefing by Special Representative Onanga-Anyanga and by Ambassador Paul Seger, the chair of the PBC’s country-specific configuration for Burundi. S/PV.6799 (5 July 2012) was a briefing by Karin Landgren, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and outgoing head of BNUB, and Ambassador Paul Seger, the chair of the PBC’s country-specific configuration for Burundi. S/PV.6677 (7 December 2011) was a briefing by Landgren and Seger. S/PV.6538 (17 May 2011) was a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office in Burundi as well as the chair of the Burundi configuration of the PBC, Ambassador Seger. S/PV.6539 (9 December 2010) was a briefing by BINUB’s head, Charles Petrie, on upcoming elections, and by the chair of the Burundi configuration of the PBC, Peter Maurer. S/PV.6236 (10 December 2009) was a briefing by the head of BINUB, Youssef Mahmoud, and the chairperson of the country-specific configuration on Burundi of the PBC, Peter Maurer. S/PV.6138 (9 June 2009) was a briefing on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on BINUB during which Per Örneus, speaking on behalf of the chairperson of the country-specific configuration on Burundi of the PBC, briefed the Council. S/PV.6037 (11 December 2008) was a briefing by Charles Nqakula, Facilitator of the Burundi Peace Process and Minister of Defence of South Africa, and Anders Lidén, the chairman of the Burundi configuration of the PBC. S/PV.5966 (26 August 2008) was a debate on Burundi in which members were briefed by the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi Youssef Mahmoud; the chair of the PBC country specific configuration on Burundi, Anders Lidén of Sweden; and Ambassador Augustin Nsanze of Burundi. S/PV.5897 (22 May 2008) included a briefing to the Council by the chair of the Burundi configuration of the PBC on his visit to the country that month. S/PV.5793 (6 December 2007) included a briefing to the Council by the chair of the Burundi configuration of the PBC Johan Løvald of Norway. Peacebuilding Commission Documents PBC/5/BDI/2/2 (8 November 2012) were the conclusions and recommendations of the PBC on the annual review of its engagement with Burundi. PBC/5/BDI/2 (26 August 2011) was the fifth review of the Strategic Framework. PBC/5/BDI/2 (21 April 2011) was the outcome of the fifth review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. PBC/2/BDI/10 (23 June 2008) was the first review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. PBC/1/BDI/4 (21 June 2007) was the Burundi Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy, or strategic framework. PBC/1/OC/SR.2 (13 July 2006) was the second meeting of the Organisational Committee placing Burundi and Sierra Leone on the PBC agenda.
killed. After the 21 October 1993 assassination of the first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, between 30,000 and 50,000 people were killed in the next two months. A long period of instability followed, especially after an airplane carrying the next President, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda (both Hutus) was shot down over Kigali, Rwanda, on 6 April 1994. (This assassination sparked the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda and a wave of ethnic violence in the Great Lakes region.)

The government and 17 rebel and political groups signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi on 28 August 2000. Conflict, however, largely continued until an ethnically inclusive government was established on 1 November 2001. In an effort to consolidate the political stabilisation achieved in Burundi by that point, the AU deployed the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) on 2 April 2003. On 21 May 2004, the Security Council adopted resolution 1545, establishing the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB).


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Political stability, however, remained elusive. The anti-government forces Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération (Palipehutu-FNL) continued to fight until the Dar-es-Salaam Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 7 September 2006. The agreement, while reducing the level of violence, did not eliminate it completely and the situation was exacerbated further by splits within the FNL.

Even though the situation in Burundi remained unstable, on 13 April 2006, a month prior to an expected renewal of ONUB’s mandate, the government requested that the UN presence in the country be restructured by January 2007 from a peacekeeping operation to one that would support reconstruction and development priorities.

In light of this request, a joint UN-Burundi technical team travelled to Sierra Leone from 12 to 19 May to familiarise itself with the work of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). In his June 2006 report, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) to replace ONUB (S/2006/429). On 21 June 2006, the President of the Security Council wrote to the Secretary-General, requesting that the PBC provide advice on the situation in Burundi (PBC/1/OC/2). In response to that request, Burundi was placed on the agenda of the PBC at the second meeting of the Organisational Committee, held on 13 July 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2).

The Security Council created BINUB in resolution 1719 of 25 October 2006, to help support the government of Burundi in its effort towards long-term peace and stability and to coordinate the work of the UN in the country. BINUB was assigned to support demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and to reform the security sector in the wake of the 7 September 2006 ceasefire agreement. BINUB’s mandate also included the promotion and protection of human rights and provision of support to the government for measures to end impunity through the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and special tribunal, as well as support for poverty-reduction efforts in the short, medium and long term as part of the peacebuilding process. BINUB commenced its work on 1 January 2007.

On 4 September 2007, rival FNL factions clashed in Bujumbura, leaving 20 fighters dead and forcing thousands of residents to flee the capital. On 28 February 2008, 46 opposition members wrote to the Secretary-General to request protection after receiving death threats, alleging that there was a “death list” of 350 opposition members. On 26 May, the government and the FNL rebels signed a ceasefire, enabling FNL leader Agathon Rwasa to return from exile in Tanzania, after renewed fighting in April between government forces and the rebels, left at least 100 people dead. Another sign of increasing national reconciliation came on 16 April 2009, when ex-FNL leader Godefroid Niyombare became the first-ever Hutu chief of staff of the armed forces. In a ceremony supervised by the AU, the FNL announced that it had given up armed struggle and officially transformed itself into a political party.

On 28 June 2010, Nkurunziza was re-elected while running unopposed after opposition candidates boycotted the elections. Widespread violence followed the election. In October 2010, there were reports that the police had executed 22 members of the FNL, allegations the government denied. Rwasa, the former rebel turned opposition leader who boycotted the elections, went into hiding and eventually started rearming the FNL in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Despite these developments, on 3 November 2010, Foreign Minister Augustin Nsanze said the new government was “confident” that remaining security problems would be resolved in a “short time.” Nsanze also said that the government preferred that BINUB not continue and that it was looking towards a new relationship with the UN, shifting from “monitoring and reporting” to “consultation and cooperation.” Following consultations between the UN and Burundi, the Secretary-General recommended that the existing mission be restructured. As a result, in resolution 1959 of 16 December 2010 the Council asked the Secretary-General to establish the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) “as a significantly scaled-down United Nations presence, for an initial period of 12 months beginning on 1 January 2011... to support the progress achieved in recent years by all national stakeholders in consolidating peace, democracy and development in Burundi.”

By 2011, there were reports of increased state repression and spreading violence. In May of that year, four people were killed when gunmen opened fire on a restaurant in Bujumbura next to a local branch of the ruling party; in September 2011, dozens of gunmen attacked a bar in Gatabu, killing 36 people; and in November, human rights groups claimed that more than 300 people had been killed in the previous five months, including members of the FNL and other opposition members. The trend continued in 2012. In November 2012, a group calling itself the Murundi People’s Front Abata-bazi launched attacks on government forces from across the border in the DRC. Fears of renewed civil war grew as a result.

On 13 February 2013, the Council adopted resolution 2090, extending the mandate of...
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BNUB until 15 February 2014 (S/PV.6918). The Council asked the Secretary-General to provide a briefing by the end of July 2013 and a report by 17 January 2014 on the implementation of BNUB’s mandate.

The PBC Engagement

PBC engagement with Burundi has focused on the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi agreed between the government and the PBC on 21 June 2007 (PBC/1/BDI/4). The framework was meant to tie in with the five-year plan included in the September 2006 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper published by the government, which outlined a number of priority areas, including:

- the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the Palipehutu-FNL;
- good governance and political openness;
- transitional justice;
- security sector reform and rule of law;
- promotion of human rights and action to combat impunity;
- land reform and socioeconomic recovery;
- mobilisation and coordination of international assistance;
- the subregional aspects; and
- the gender dimension.

The first review of the framework, published on 9 July 2008, reported little progress (PBC/2/BDI/10). It noted “institutional paralysis” in the country and argued that the complexity and dynamic character of the challenges in Burundi “require a firmer and more continuous commitment to overcome the principal peacebuilding risks.” It recommended that the government clarify the duties of ministers and deputy ministers, as well as investigate cases of economic embezzlement and transfer such cases to courts. It called on the government to “honour its commitments to good governance, particularly with respect to dialogue and consultation, action against corruption and decentralization.” On the positive side, the report commended Burundi for its decision to participate in peacekeeping in Somalia.

The fifth, final review of the Strategic Framework published on 26 March 2011 concluded that there had been little progress on all of the issues the framework had been focused on (PBC/5/BDI/3). On good governance, the report noted that, “new cases of corruption are regularly identified.” It also highlighted a number of troubling developments in the security and human rights situation, particularly during the 2010 elections. The report said that the electoral period was characterised by an increased number of human rights violations, including summary executions, torture and political assassinations. Overall, the document said, the human rights situation in the country had grown “somewhat tense” in the aftermath of the arrests of key opposition figures by the government. It also noted cases of torture, abuse and summary executions committed by members of the National Intelligence Service, the National Police Force and the National Defence Force. The report noted that the “scope of activity of the media and opposition political parties has narrowed, and in some cases freedom of expression, movement and assembly and the freedom to hold and participate in demonstrations have been reduced.”

On 21 April 2011, the country-specific configuration adopted a new document spelling out the areas in which the PBC would continue to support the government in its peacebuilding efforts as well as its expectations of the government’s approach to the process (PBC/5/BDI/2). The document said that the PBC engagement “will continue to be based on the core principles of national ownership, mutual accountability and sustained partnership”, narrowing the PBC’s role to a number of tasks, including the consolidation of the culture of democracy and dialogue, good governance, human rights and the rule of law. Specifically, the country-specific configuration focused on the fight against corruption, strengthening of the human rights instruments, support for transitional justice mechanisms and reconciliation. It also sought to address socioeconomic reintegration of vulnerable groups, issues raised in the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper released in August 2012 (such as peacebuilding and resource mobilisation) and regional integration. The configuration envisaged aligning its future engagement with Burundi’s poverty reduction strategy and its peacebuilding components and mobilising resources to “build capacities and strengthen institutions.” It pledged its actions in the country to be “outcome-oriented” and said the PBC will help create an environment “conducive to sustainable development and trade.” Subsequently, the government integrated the remaining peacebuilding issues in the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

The statement of mutual commitments agreed to by the government and the configuration to guide the work of the PBC in support of the peacebuilding elements of the poverty reduction strategy, was adopted by the PBC on 18 July 2012 (PBC/6/BDI/2). The document was officially released on 8 November 2012 and covers a period of 12 months. In the future, there is a plan to outline further arrangements in an exchange of letters.

The configuration chair, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland) last visited Burundi from 14-16 January 2013. In a meeting of the PBC Burundi steering group on 22 January, Seger identified two main political concerns in Burundi: the need to include opposition parties in the process leading up to the 2015 elections and problems with a draft law on the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission currently before the legislature. The draft has been criticised by some as not meeting international standards and focusing only on reconciliation while ignoring justice aspects. In particular, a special tribunal as called for in the 28 August 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi is absent from the draft, and it excludes international commissioners.

The relationship between the government and the country-specific configuration as well as with the UN more broadly, has not been easy. A persistent area of tension between the configuration and the government was highlighted during a high-level event on peacebuilding in Burundi on 23 September 2011 (held on the margins of the General Assembly). Foreign Minister Nsanze openly criticised what he viewed as the overemphasis of the PBC on the political sphere in its involvement in Burundi and recommended that the engagement should focus on the socioeconomic sphere.

In its annual report for 2011, the PBC noted that the “remaining economic and political challenges” in Burundi included the corrosive political chisims in the country, which often manifested themselves through attacks against members of the opposition, as well as an apparent unwillingness on the part of the opposition to engage in “solution-oriented political work” (S/2012/70). The report
emphasised the need to combat poverty and create job opportunities, especially for the youth and the groups affected by the conflict, noting that this would be a key element for creating sustainable stability and national cohesion.

As of early 2013, the country-specific configuration planned to continue to focus both on socioeconomic development and on political-institutional issues. On the political-institutional side, the plan is to assist with political dialogue, reconciliation and transitional justice, rule of law and good governance.

There has also been a pattern of tense relations between the government and the successive UN missions in Burundi. On 31 March 2006, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of ONUB, Carolyn McAskie (Canada), was recalled following a request by Burundi. On 29 August 2006, the government likewise demanded the withdrawal of the acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of ONUB, Nureddin Satti (Sudan), for describing the political and security situation in Burundi as “catastrophic”. On 26 December 2009, the government requested that the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General to Burundi and head of BINUB, Youssif Mahmoud (Tunisia), be recalled on grounds of alleged political meddling, Charles Petrie (France/UK) was appointed on 25 March 2010 and resigned as of 1 November 2010, and was succeeded by Karin Landgren (Sweden) who was appointed head of BNUB on 31 December 2010. Following her appointment on 27 April 2012 as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon) was appointed to head BNUB on 7 June 2012. These developments most likely created additional challenges for the peacebuilding work in Burundi, though against their backdrop, the country-specific configuration seems to have been the most resilient UN actor in Burundi.

The Role of the Chairs of the Configuration

The Burundi country-specific configuration has to date had four chairs, beginning with Ambassador Johan Løvald (Norway). He was succeeded on 17 July 2008 by Ambassador Anders Lidén (Sweden) and then, as of 29 June 2009, by Ambassador Peter Maurer (Switzerland). The current chair, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), was elected in June 2010.

From the start, country visits and interaction with financial institutions have become a key element of the approach taken by the configuration chairs. Shortly after becoming chair of the configuration, Løvald led an 18-member PBC delegation to Burundi from 9-15 April 2007. Among other things, the mission assessed the challenges to peacebuilding, discussed with the government and other stakeholders gaps within priority areas for peacebuilding and the development of an integrated framework or strategy for peacebuilding. The delegation communicated the main principles and purposes of the PBC to stakeholders on the ground and assured the government that its aim was “maintaining sustained international attention and support for Burundi’s sustainable peacebuilding efforts, with full respect for national ownership.” It stressed that the PBC could bring together all relevant actors, marshalling resources and playing an advisory role regarding integrated peacebuilding strategies.

From 5-7 September 2007, at a period of heightened political tensions, Løvald conducted a fact-finding visit to the country. He voiced concern about the general uncertainty, the stalemate in the national parliament, its troubling budgetary situation and the deterioration of the political situation. A delegation of seven members of the country-specific configuration travelled to Burundi on another field mission from 10-15 May 2008 to obtain first-hand information about the situation on the ground, especially on renewed hostilities between government and rebel forces.

As part of the effort to mobilise resources for Burundi, Løvald visited Washington, D.C. from 27-29 February 2008 to discuss the priorities of Burundi with the Bretton Woods institutions and the US government.

Løvald briefed the Security Council at least five times to report on his activities and advocate on behalf of Burundi: on 31 January 2007 during an open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding (S/PV.5627); on 21 May 2007 in a private debate on Burundi; on 17 October 2007, during consideration of the annual report of the PBC (S/PV.5761); as well as on 6 December 2007 (S/PV.5793) and 22 May 2008 (S/PV.5897) prior to the consideration in consultations of the Secretary-General’s report on Burundi.

Subsequent chairs have likewise used visits to the country combined with outreach to international (and regional) financial institutions and periodic briefings to the Council.

Lidén visited Burundi twice, from 21-24 October 2008 and from 25-27 May 2009. He or his Deputy Permanent Representative briefed the Security Council three times prior to consultations on Burundi: on 26 August 2008 (S/PV.5966); on 11 December 2008 (S/PV.6037); and on 9 June 2009 (S/PV.6138).

Maurer visited Burundi twice: from 10 to 11 November 2009 and from 24 to 28 February 2010. He briefed the Council on 25 November 2009 during the consideration of the third annual report of the PBC (S/PV.6224) as well as on 10 December 2009, prior to the consideration in consultations of the Secretary-General’s report (S/PV.6236).

On 10 May 2010, his deputy addressed the Council before consultations (S/PV.6309). Maurer also addressed the Council during the consideration of the third PBC annual report on 25 November 2009 (S/PV.6224).

Seger first visited Burundi from 30 June to 3 July 2010, in the midst of the electoral process. He introduced himself to the government as the new configuration chair and enhanced the PBC’s engagement with the government, the National Independent Electoral Commission, political actors and national and international stakeholders. On 6-7 October 2010, Seger visited the World Bank and the IMF headquarters in Washington, D.C. in order to establish initial contacts with their Burundi-related offices. He travelled to Burundi again from 14-22 February 2011; from 31 October to 5 November; and from 18-25 April 2012.

Seger last travelled to Burundi from 14-16 January 2013 when he met with President Nkurunziza, the president of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the president of the Independent National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), and other national and international stakeholders. On 17 January, Seger also met in Nairobi with the director of the World Bank’s Centre on Conflict, Security and Development.

At the time the Burundi configuration was created, the Council was briefed on the Secretary-General’s reports on Burundi in consultations, thereby denying the configuration...
chair the opportunity to participate as only Council members and UN Secretariat staff are allowed inside the consultations room.

In order to hear a first ever country-specific briefing from a PBC chair and overcome this procedural hurdle, on 21 May 2007 the Council held a private debate on Burundi at which the first configuration chair, Løvald, participated. The two other briefings by Løvald, on 6 December 2007 and 22 May 2008, were held in public and the representative of Burundi also spoke at the latter (S/PV. 5793 and S/PV.5897), after which the Council proceeded to be briefed in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report and discussed the matter in consultations.

The first two briefings (26 August 2008 and 11 December 2008) by the next configuration chair, Lidén, were delivered under the same format, while the last briefing (9 June 2009) also included a public briefing by the head of mission. The two subsequent briefings (10 December 2009 and 10 May 2010) under Maurer followed this latter format.

Seger has so far briefed the Council on five occasions prior to consultations on Burundi: on 9 December 2010 (S/PV.6439); on 17 May 2011 (S/PV.6538); on 7 December 2011 (S/PV.6677); on 5 July 2012 (S/PV.6799); and on 24 January 2013 (S/PV.6909). He also addressed the Council in two interactive dialogues, on 2 February 2011 and on 13 July 2013 and spoke at the open debate on the fifth annual report of the PBC on 12 July 2012 (S/PV.6805 and Resumption 1).

**The Security Council and the Burundi PBC Configuration**

Security Council resolutions on Burundi in the period since the country was placed on the PBC agenda have regularly acknowledged the role of the PBC and encouraged the implementations of the different strategic documents elaborated jointly by the government and the PBC to guide the peacebuilding work in the country.

Resolution 1719, adopted on 25 October 2006, created BINUB and first integrated the PBC as part of the overall design of a mission. The Council made several references to the role of the PBC in Burundi in the resolution. It welcomed the holding, on 13 October 2006, of the first country-specific meeting of the PBC on Burundi and, “taking note of the Chairman’s summary of that meeting,” requested that, once established, BINUB should focus on supporting the government in coordination with donors and should “take account of...the role of the Peacebuilding Commission.” The resolution listed the key PBC priority areas that would later form part of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding.

Resolution 1791, adopted on 19 December 2007, extended the mandate of BINUB until 31 December 2008, welcomed “the Peacebuilding Commission’s close engagement on Burundi,” including the finalisation with the government of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and the adoption of the monitoring and tracking mechanism, and looked forward to “its implementation in the same spirit of partnership.” Extending the mandate of BINUB for another year on 22 December 2008, resolution 1858 welcomed “the continued engagement” of the PBC in Burundi and mentioned the recent visit of the delegation led by the configuration chair. The resolution welcomed engagement with the country, took note of the briefing by the configuration chair, and encouraged the government of Burundi, the PBC, and its national and international partners to “honour the commitments they have made under the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding.”

All subsequent resolutions on Burundi similarly addressed, supported and acknowledged the role of the PBC in the country. They also called on the government and its international partners to honour their commitments made over the years in the context of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. In resolution 1959 of 16 December 2010, the Council asked the Secretary-General to establish BNUB “as a significantly scaled-down United Nations presence, for an initial period of 12 months beginning on 1 January 2011, with the key tasks...to support the progress achieved in recent years by all national stakeholders in consolidating peace, democracy and development in Burundi.” It also requested the PBC, with support from BNUB, to “continue to assist the government of Burundi in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and security, reintegration and long-term development in Burundi, including ensuring that progress is made in the implementation of rule of law and that peacebuilding objectives are fully taken into account in the future strategic planning processes.” It furthermore asked the PBC to “provide advice to the Security Council on these issues.”

Resolution 2090 of 13 February 2013, extended the mandate of BNUB for another year, welcomed the holding of the 29-30 October 2012 Geneva donors’ conference and called on the actors involved to ensure an effective follow-up of commitments taken at the conference.

As the Burundi configuration was the first of the PBC country-specific configurations to interact with the Council, it provides an interesting illustration of the inherent procedural contradictions that affect the relationship. The stated role of the PBC vis-à-vis the Council, is to provide advice. The Council thus has sought to receive briefings from the configuration chair approximately twice a year. But, in line with Council practice, the Council discussed Secretary-General’s reports on Burundi in consultations, which are only open to Council members and UN Secretariat staff, thereby excluding the configuration chair.

In a first attempt to overcome this procedural dilemma, the first report after the establishment of BINUB considered on 21 May 2007 in a rarely used meeting format of a private debate in which the configuration chair was asked to participate. Later, prior to the discussion of the next report, on 6 December 2007, the Council held a 15-minute public meeting in which it heard a briefing from Løvald, to then hear another briefing by the head of BINUB and discuss Burundi in consultations without the participation of the configuration chair. On the next three occasions, the configuration chair briefed in public, followed by a statement by Burundi, prior to the consultations in which the Council would hear a briefing from the head of BINUB and discuss matters. From 9 June 2009 on, the practice has been modified to also include the briefing by the head of BINUB in a public meeting.

**PBC Impact: Resource Mobilisation**

On 29 January 2007, shortly after Burundi was included on the PBC agenda, the Secretary-General formally announced that an allocation of over $35 million from the PBF had been made towards Burundi.

A donors’ roundtable for Burundi, held in Bujumbura on 24-25 March 2007, resulted in pledges amounting to $681.24 million, which was higher than had been expected.

It is important to note, however, that donor support for Burundi since the signing
of the Dar-es-Salaam Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement on 7 September 2006 had already been generous (in 2006, donor funding rose by more than 13 percent as compared with 2005, to over $415 million). On 23 June 2008, the PBSo issued a document entitled “Mapping of Resources and Gaps for the Implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi”. The document underlined the proposal resulting from the second PBC mission to Burundi (10-15 May 2008), which had endorsed the government’s request for donors and international financial institutions to begin to consider Burundi as essentially a post-conflict country, for which some terms of foreign assistance should be relaxed, and for the PBC to advocate this position. It noted that by June 2008, 44 donors had committed resources to the PBF. The main donors were Sweden ($42.3 million), the UK ($35.9 million), Norway ($32.12 million), Japan ($20 million), Canada ($18.7 million) and the Netherlands ($18.5 million), accounting for more than 60 percent of deposited funds.

The PBC has mobilised resources at crucial moments for Burundi. On 14 October 2009, with high-level officials from Burundi joining in via video-link, the country-specific configuration met to discuss preparations for the 2010 elections, particularly in terms of creating a suitable environment for peaceful, free and fair elections, as well as financial mobilisation. A document prepared by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the government of Burundi for a project called “Support to the Electoral Cycle in Burundi”, with a budget of $43.7 million, was also presented during the meeting. As the 2010 elections in Burundi approached, and following an assessment of preparations for the elections and an existing electoral budget gap, the country-specific configuration members provided $38.6 million and the PBF another $3 million (S/2011/41).

The March 2011 Fifth Review of Progress in the Implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi (PBC/5/BDI/3) reported that “with a view to supporting” the government in the process of demobilising combatants from the Palipehutu-FNL and FNL dissidents, the PBC had established a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The World Bank awarded a grant of $10 million, and over $22 million was raised overall, which was managed through the Security Council on 26 July. On 11 December 2007 the President of the Security Council wrote to the PBC asking it to take up the situation in Guinea-Bissau (S/2007/744). As a result of this request, on 19 December 2007, Senate of Guinea-Bissau became the third country to be added to the PBC agenda with Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti (Brazil) as chair of the country-specific configuration.

Case Study on Burundi (con’t)

The Government of Guinea-Bissau requested in an 11 July 2007 letter to the Secretary-General that the country be placed on the agenda of the PBC. The Secretary-General brought this letter to the attention of the Security Council on 26 July. On 11 December 2007 the President of the Security Council wrote to the PBC asking it to take up the situation in Guinea-Bissau (S/2007/744). As a result of this request, on 19 December 2007, Guinea-Bissau became the third country to be added to the PBC agenda with Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti (Brazil) as chair of the country-specific configuration.


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Background

Guinea-Bissau has gone from one crisis to the next since it declared independence from Portugal in 1973 after prolonged armed conflict. The bitterness of the war of liberation was such that the new independent government, controlled by a revolutionary council, carried out reprisal attacks on African soldiers who had fought alongside Portuguese. To date, reconciliation and inclusive national dialogue as part of a belated transitional justice effort remain key underlying issues.

Guinea-Bissau has suffered a number of coups d’états since independence—including after the country was added to the agenda of the PBC—with several of the same protagonists making repeated comebacks.

Luís Severino de Almeida Cabral, a co-founder of the independence movement turned political party Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), became president following independence. He was ousted in 1980 in a bloodless military coup led by Prime Minister João Bernardo Vieira, who ruled through 1999, winning the first multi-party presidential elections in 1994. On 6 June 1998, when Vieira dismissed the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mané, for alleged arms trafficking to the Casamance separatist movement in Senegal, a civil war erupted. An agreement between the two warring parties was signed on 1 November 1998.

On 21 December 1998, the Security Council adopted resolution 1216, requesting that the Secretary-General make recommendations on a possible role for the UN in the Guinea-Bissau peace process. On 6 April 1999, the Council passed resolution 1233, supporting the Secretary-General’s proposal to establish the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS).

Vieira was eventually ousted in a coup led by Mané on 7 May 1999, who promptly installed the President of the National Assembly, Malam Bacai Sanhá, as interim president. A multi-party presidential election was won in second round ballot voting opposition candidate Kumba Yala on 16 January 2000. President Yala, however, was forced from office on 14 September 2003 in another bloodless coup led by General Veríssimo Correia Seabra. Following a multi-stakeholder agreement, an interim civilian government was installed on 28 September 2003 and new parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled. Parliamentary elections were held on 28 March 2004, but violence made a comeback when a military mutiny over unpaid salaries led to the assassination of Seabra and an aide on 6 October 2004.

On 19 June and 24 July 2005, the country held first and second round presidential elections, with three former presidents among the main contenders. Vieira defeated Sanhá in the runoff and was inaugurated on 1 October 2005. Shortly after, on 28 October 2005, he dismissed the government of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, and appointed PAIGC defector Aristides Gomes. The PAIGC, which had expelled Vieira back in 1999, and to which both Sanhá and Gomes belonged, unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the move before the Supreme Court.

As instability continued, combined with a worsening economic situation, the international community strove to address the situation by organising a more focused approach. The International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, composed of France, Gambia, Guinea, Senegal and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), was set up and held its first meeting in New York on 21 September 2006. A donors’ roundtable in November pledged $262.5 million for development projects.

On 6 January 2007, an assassination of a former navy chief of staff, Mohamed Lamine Sanhá, led to renewed violence. After former Prime Minister Gomes Júnior accused Vieira of the assassination, the government issued a warrant for his arrest. Claiming that his life was in danger, Gomes sought refuge in the UNOGBIS compound on 10 January where he remained for 17 days until the Secretary-General’s representative in Guinea-Bissau persuaded the government to drop the arrest warrant against him.

Political instability continued throughout 2007. Around that time, a serious new concern and one that attracted international attention emerged: it was the rapidly growing drug trafficking with Latin American cartels using Guinea-Bissau as a transit point for drugs on their way to Europe and taking advantage of the desperate economic situation (for example, the unpaid members of the military and public service), the relative proximity to South America, the porous borders and weak state security institutions. Against this backdrop, the government requested and the Security Council recommended that the PBC take Guinea-Bissau on as one of its agenda countries.

From the point in 1998 when the Security Council first asked the Secretary-General for recommendations regarding the role the UN might play in Guinea-Bissau, through the entire tumultuous period until the 2007 request to the PBC, Guinea-Bissau was a low intensity item for the Council. With the exception of Brazil, an elected member in 2004-2005 intent on increasing the level of attention given to Guinea-Bissau, the country was not a priority for other Council members. Even the mandate of UNOGBIS would usually be renewed by an exchange of letters rather than a resolution and the mission would be led for much of that period by a Representative of the Secretary-General, a rank lower than an Executive or Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This began to change to some extent only when the role of Guinea-Bissau as a drug transit point became an issue. (According to a November 2007 estimate by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the value of the drug trade in Guinea-Bissau was likely as high as its annual national income.) On 11 December 2007 the Security Council followed on the 11 July 2007 request from the government of Guinea-Bissau and asked the PBC to add Guinea-Bissau to its agenda.

Political and economic stability has, however, remained an unattainable goal. Parliamentary elections were held in Guinea-Bissau on 16 November 2008. International electoral monitors indicated a high voter turnout of 70 to 80 percent and a calm and orderly voting process that gave PAIGC a majority and paved the way for the appointment of Gomes Júnior as prime minister. But early on 23 November, mutinous soldiers unsuccessfully attacked the presidential residence, while Vieira escaped unharmed.

Political violence increased in 2009 following the assassination of the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Tagme Na Waie, on 1 March. Accusing the President of orchestrating the assassination, the military assassinated Vieira the next day denying
that the move amounted to a military coup. On 3 March, the President of the National Assembly, Raimundo Pereira, was sworn in as interim president, with the task of organising elections, which were eventually set for 28 June. Political violence against high-profile personalities in Guinea-Bissau resurfaced on 5 June following the assassination of presidential candidate Baciro Dabó and Helder Proença, a former government minister and member of parliament. (The local authorities later said that both politicians had been resisting arrest over involvement in an alleged coup attempt.)

Presidential elections were held as scheduled on 28 June, with Sanhá of the governing PAIGC party and Yala of the opposition Social Renewal Party winning the highest number of votes during the first round. After a run-off on 26 July, won by Sanhá with 63 percent of the votes, he was inaugurated as president on 8 September 2009.

In the meantime, on 26 June 2009, the Security Council adopted resolution 1876 to replace UNOGIBIS as of 1 January 2010 with the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNILOBIS) with an aim to harmonise the work of all UN agencies, funds and programmes operating in the country under one central body to achieve better efficiency and effectiveness.

Attempts to return to political normalcy in Guinea-Bissau, where the situation had started to improve since the election, suffered another serious setback when a military insurrection took place on 1 April 2010. The mutiny was orchestrated by the Army Chief of Staff, General António Indjai, with the apparent support of the former Navy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral José Américo Bubu Nabitch, who had recently returned to the country from exile in Gambia. (He had sought refuge in Gambia after being implicated in a failed coup attempt in 2008. Upon returning to Guinea-Bissau, he lived under protective asylum within the premises of the headquarters of UNILOBIS.) Indjai initially detained Gomes Júnior together with the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Zamora Induta (Gomes Júnior was soon released). In June, President Sanhá appointed the leader of the 1 April military insurrection, Indjai, as the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

The EU indicated on 2 August 2010 that it would end its security sector reform (SSR) mission (launched in June 2008 and known as EU SSR) in protest against the appointment of Indjai, a perennial coup maker as well as a prime suspect in an international cocaine trafficking ring. On 20 September, President Sanhá wrote to ECOWAS requesting assistance to re-launch the reform of the defence and security sectors. ECOWAS and CPLP stepped in with joint efforts to support the reform process. On 21 March 2011, Angola established SSR assistance programme, the Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG), which took over from the EU SSR, jointly announcing with ECOWAS a pledge of $95 million towards the army pension fund.

Since February 2011 UNIOGBIS had been providing technical and financial support for the vetting and certification of police and internal security agencies. In September, the mission opened the first of a planned one dozen “model police stations” slated to be inaugurated in the next two years around the country. Overall, during 2011 Guinea-Bissau seemed to be making modest progress in addressing some of its key problems, in particular in its security sector.

In late 2011 there were a series of peaceful demonstrations against the government over its perceived lack of action on serious human rights and rule of law-related issues, including the 2009 assassinations of top political figures. The demonstrators called for the dismissal of Gomes Júnior, whom they blamed for stalling the investigations into the killings, and condemned Sanhá for not heeding their call to dismiss the prime minister. (Gomes Júnior had made international headlines around the same time when on 10 September he promised to welcome Muammar Qaddafi “with open arms” in Guinea-Bissau notwithstanding the international warrant issued for his arrest.)

The overall situation in the country remained relatively stable until November when due to a sudden illness Sanhá had to be medically evacuated out of the country. On 26 December there was a failed coup attempt. Although the government initially denied that this was a coup, on 30 December Gomes Júnior claimed there had been a plot to assassinate him and Indjai. Twenty-four military officers and one civilian were detained. Two high-ranking police officers were assassinated around that time.

Sanhá died of natural causes on 9 January 2012 and presidential elections were scheduled for 18 March. Gomes Júnior ran against several other candidates, receiving 49 percent of the votes thus failing to win outright. The main opposition candidate, Yala, got 23 percent, and immediately announced that he would be boycotting the second round of elections, claiming the ruling PAIGC had rigged the results.

On 28 March 2012, Viotti, as chair of the Guinea-Bissau PBC country-specific configuration, and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNILOBIS, Joseph Mutaboba, provided a regularly scheduled briefing to the Security Council (S/2012/254). Mutaboba provided a rather upbeat picture of the situation despite the events of late 2011 and early 2012. He described the 18 March elections as peaceful and orderly without major security incidents reported, admitting, however, that the killing of a former military intelligence chief, Sanhá Djaló, by uniformed individuals, “marred” the day. He also mentioned that another former official, Zamora Induta, who had met Djaló just hours before his assassination, subsequently sought refuge inside the EU premises, claiming fear for his life.

Viotti pointed out that since her last briefing on 3 November 2011 (S/PV.6648), “Guinea-Bissau has made important strides towards sustainable peace.” She added that during that period the country maintained political stability and sustained economic growth. She praised the institutions of Guinea-Bissau for being able “to withstand two potentially destabilising events, which occurred a few days apart: the incident of 26 December 2011 and the demise of President Malam Bacai Sanhá, on 9 January.”

The events that unfolded, leading up to the 12 April 2012 coup, took UN actors largely by surprise. Other observers of Guinea-Bissau were less sanguine. On 5 April, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, president of the ECOWAS Commission, sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General drawing attention to “disturbing developments that could jeopardise the holding” of the run-off polls scheduled for 22 April (S/2012/254). As a result of the controversies arising from the 18 March first round presidential elections, ECOWAS appointed on 2 April President Alpha Condé...
of Guinea to mediate the electoral dispute in Guinea-Bissau. In his letter, Ouédraogo noted the election boycott threat, as well as the “mounting suspicion and tension” between the armed forces and MISSANG.

On 9 April 2012, Gomes Júnior also wrote to the Secretary-General raising an alarm that Guinea-Bissau “could come to face a new cycle of internal political instability, owing to the non-acceptance of the electoral results.” The letter favourably characterised MISSANG as “a factor assisting with political and military stabilisation in the country” but it called on the Security Council to consider the “dispatch of a peacekeeping force to Guinea-Bissau...to be charged with extensive powers aimed at the maintenance of political stability in the country and in defence of the democratic gains which the people of Guinea-Bissau obtained at great sacrifice.” The Secretary-General only transmitted these two letters to the Council on 23 April (S/2012/254).

On 10 April 2012, Angola announced that it would withdraw MISSANG. On 12 April, the self-styled Military Command orchestrated a coup and arrested Gomes Júnior and interim President Raimundo Pereira. The Council condemned the events in a press statement the next day (SC/10607) and in a presidential statement on 21 April (S/PRST/2012/15) in which it also demanded the “immediate and unconditional release of the interim President Raimundo Pereira, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and all officials currently detained” and welcomed the decision of the AU to suspend Guinea-Bissau from the organisation.

On 18 May, the Council adopted resolution 2048, imposing a ban on foreign travel of the Military Command, targeting five military officials: General António Injai (a.k.a António Indjai), Major General Mamadu Ture (a.k.a. N’Krumah), General Estêvão Na Mena, Brigadier General Ibraima Camará (a.k.a. “Papa Camará”), and Lieutenant Colonel Daba Nauanal (a.k.a. Daba Na Walna). The resolution established the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee to monitor the implementation of the sanctions and to review on a case-by-case basis requests for the travel ban to be suspended or lifted if an exemption would “further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau and stability in the region.” The resolution failed to establish a Panel of Experts to assist the sanctions committee. Ambassador Mohamed Loulichki (Morocco) was appointed chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee.

On 23 May 2012, the Military Command announced that it had set up a transitional civilian government under Prime Minister Rui Duarte Barros that included two army officers to steer the country to elections within a year under a deal brokered by Ecowas. Shortly after this, 600 troops were deployed by Ecowas to Guinea-Bissau as part of the Ecowas mission in Bissau (ECOMIB) established to enable MISSANG to withdraw without incident.

The political and security situation in the country, however, remained volatile. On 21 October 2012, an attack on a military base near the capital resulted in six deaths. The transitional government accused Induta, Gomes Júnior, Portugal and the other members of the CPLP of being behind what was described as an attempted coup.

An Extraordinary Summit on Guinea-Bissau (and Mali) was convened by Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria, on 11 November 2012. The summit strongly condemned the alleged 21 October coup attempt, urging the AU and other partners to actively participate in the implementation of the 7 November agreements signed by the Ecowas Commission President and the transitional government: a memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the roadmap for the defence and security sector reform programme and the status of mission agreement formalising the deployment of ECOMIB. The meeting also called on the AU to recognises the transitional government of Guinea-Bissau.

On 13 December 2012, Council members issued a press statement expressing “serious concern” over the lack of progress in the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. The statement noted that stabilisation can only be achieved through genuine dialogue and effective civilian oversight of the military and condemned the armed attacks of 21 October, expressing deep concern over the reports of killings and serious human rights violations in the aftermath of those attacks (SC/10857).

On 16-20 December an AU-led joint assessment mission visited Guinea-Bissau, bringing together five key international and regional players—the AU, Ecowas, CPLP, EU and UN—to assess the political and security situation in the country. The mission also explored avenues for building consensus and promoting cooperation among all five organisations. At press time, the final report of the joint assessment mission was yet to be issued.

On 9 November, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the transitional government sent a letter to the Secretary-General requesting the replacement of Mutaboba as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNIOGBIS for allegedly not serving the interests of the transition programme currently underway.

In a 27 December 2012 letter to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General announced that as of 1 January, Mutaboba would be succeeded by José Ramos-Horta (S/2012/973). The appointment of Ramos-Horta, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former president and prime minister of Timor-Leste, is likely to boost the visibility of UNIOGBIS on the national and international scene. The fact that Ramos-Horta comes from a country that has recently emerged from conflict and is a fellow member of CPLP may enhance his effectiveness in helping the country come out from the chronic crisis.

Guinea-Bissau was taken up by the Security Council again on 5 February (S/PV.6915) and 6 March 2013 in consultations, the former focusing on the renewal of UNIOGBIS’s mandate and shortly followed by the adoption of resolution 2092 on 22 February while the latter focused on progress of the implementation of resolution 2048 on the restoration of constitutional order. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, briefed the Council both times, with Viotti also briefing on 5 February.

Resolution 2092 renewed UNIOGBIS’s mandate for an additional three months without introducing any major changes to allow Ramos-Horta time to conduct an assessment of the situation on the ground. The assessment will provide a basis for discussions on a new UNIOGBIS mandate in a resolution expected to be adopted in May of this year. These discussions may also touch on the subject of the 2048 Sanctions Committee, particularly in relation to the establishment of
The PBC Engagement

The 11 December 2007 letter from the President of the Security Council (S/2007/744) highlighted the following areas where “the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission would be particularly useful”:

• governmental capacity to institute effective oversight and management of national finances and comprehensive public sector reform, including effective anti-corruption policies and programmes;

• the development, by the government of Guinea-Bissau and the international community, of effective, accountable and sustainable security systems and the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, taking particular account of the dangers posed by drug trafficking and organised crime; and

• the development of democratic accountability and preparations for elections in 2008.

Following an exploratory mission to Guinea-Bissau in January 2008 and discussions with key stakeholders, on 25 March the chairs of the PBC and its Guinea-Bissau country-specific configuration wrote to the President of the Security Council expanding on the list of peacebuilding challenges in the country previously identified by the Security Council (S/2008/208). As a matter of priority Guinea-Bissau also needed to:

• confront problems with salary arrears;

• improve the living conditions of the armed forces;

• combat drug trafficking and organised crime;

• promote human resources development and youth employment;

• address the needs of vulnerable groups;

• rehabilitate infrastructure, particularly in the energy sector; and

• adopt measures to jump-start an economic revival.

The PBC, the letter said, intended to tackle these problems “through a two-pronged approach, interweaving immediate and rapid actions with a medium- and long-term engagement, bearing in mind the need to rank priorities according to the degree of urgency, importance and value added to peace consolidation efforts.”

The PBC, the UN country team and the government then launched the process of developing a document that would map the work of the PBC with Guinea-Bissau, resulting in the 31 July 2008 Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding (PBC/3/GNB/3). It was conceived of as a flexible tool that could be modified jointly by the government and the PBC in response to developments in Guinea-Bissau.

The document noted that in keeping with the principle of national ownership the government of Guinea-Bissau had identified the following key priorities for the consolidation of peace in the country:

• elections and institutional support to the Electoral Commission;

• measures to jump-start the economy and rehabilitate infrastructure, in particular in the energy sector;

• security and defence sector reform;

• strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the rule of law and fighting drug trafficking;

• public administration reform; and

• social issues critical to peacebuilding.

Implementation, however, remained largely elusive as any progress in these areas has been repeatedly thrown off course by persistent instability. In fact, since adding Guinea-Bissau to its agenda, the PBC has at times been preoccupied far more with crisis management than implementing the framework.

Work has had to be put on hold and planned events postponed.

Since the April 2012 coup, the work of the PBC on the ground has come to an almost complete standstill and projects implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund have been suspended.

The Role of the Chair of the Configuration

Guinea-Bissau has had one chair, Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti of Brazil, a country that has a strong presence in Guinea-Bissau and is a fellow member of CPLP, an organisation in which it carries considerable weight.

Viotti has been the longest-serving of all the country-specific configurations chairs. Of all the chairs, she has also witnessed the highest number of setbacks to peacebuilding in a PBC agenda country.

On several occasions, Viotti responded to political upheavals by issuing appeals to the international community to continue assisting the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau.

She visited the country repeatedly, starting with the 23–25 January 2008 PBC exploratory mission that she led and during which she met important stakeholders. She undertook two additional trips to Guinea-Bissau in 2008, from 6–11 April and from 10–12 September. In 2009, she travelled twice, from 16–18 April and from 7–12 September. During the 18–21 January 2010 visit by the country-specific configuration, Viotti was represented by Ambassador Regina Dunlop, Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN (due to the earthquake in Haiti and the role played by Brazil as a leading contributor to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti and a Security Council member at the time, Viotti was unable to participate). Viotti travelled again from 1–3 September 2011, and she has not returned to the country since the 12 April 2012 coup.

Viotti briefed the Council in public meetings on Guinea-Bissau at least 14 times. In her first briefing, on 26 March 2008, during the Council’s consideration of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2008/181) on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of UNOGBIS, Viotti provided an oral update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and shared her analysis based on a recent trip to the country (S/PV.5860). The head of UNOGBIS also briefed, and the meeting was followed by consultations. Her subsequent briefings on 25 June 2008 (S/PV.5923), 8 April 2009 (S/PV.6103), 23 June 2009 (S/PV.6149) and 5 November 2009 (S/PV.6212) followed similar formats. Her briefing on 7 October 2008 was different as it was part of a Council debate (S/PV.5988). In 2010 and 2011 Viotti briefed on four occasions: on 5 March 2010 (S/PV.6281); 15 July 2010 (S/PV.6359); 28 June 2011 (S/PV.6569); and 3 November 2011 (S/PV.6648). Because Brazil was an elected Council member at the time, Viotti also participated in the consultations. Since Brazil left the Council on 31 December 2011, she briefed on 28 March 2012 (S/PV.6743), 19 April 2012 (S/PV.6754), 26 July 2012 (S/PV.6818) and 5 February 2013 (S/PV.6915). She participated in the 12 July 2012 interactive dialogue on peacebuilding (S/PV.6805) with Council members and addressed the Council during most of the thematic debates.
Case Study on Guinea-Bissau (con’t)

The Security Council and the Guinea-Bissau Configuration

From the start, the Council underlined the value it placed on the work of the Guinea-Bissau country-specific configuration. Since the adoption of resolution 1876 on 26 June 2009, which referenced the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau and encouraged the government of Guinea-Bissau to "continue close engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission towards its accelerated implementation," the Council has followed the work of the PBC in Guinea-Bissau closely, incorporating it in all the presidential statements, press statements and resolutions on the country since.

On 26 June 2009, the Council adopted resolution 1876 mandating the transition of UNOGBIS to UNIOGBIS. The new mission, which began operation on 1 January 2010, was specifically intended to assist "the Peacebuilding Commission in its work in addressing critical peacebuilding needs in Guinea-Bissau." It was to focus on security sector reform, the problem of drug trafficking and combating the deep-rooted sense of impunity among the military and political elite.

On 23 November 2010, the Security Council adopted resolution 1949, extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS to 31 December 2011. The resolution expressed deep concern at the continuing instability in Guinea-Bissau, in particular the lack of civilian oversight and control of the armed forces and the continued detentions without due process following the events of 1 April 2010. The resolution called on the PBC to "continue to support the implementation of Guinea-Bissau's peacebuilding priorities as well as to continue to provide advice to the Security Council on how to remove critical obstacles to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau", in particular regarding security sector reform and drug trafficking. The resolution requested that the PBC keep the Council updated on progress it has made in helping the country to address these problems.

In resolution 2092, adopted on 22 February 2013, the Security Council noted the challenges posed by the recent events in Guinea-Bissau to the "smooth implementation of the mandate conferred by the Council to the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)...as well as activities of the Peacebuilding Commission." It additionally took note of "the need expressed by the Secretary-General to realign the United Nations system’s activities in the areas of state-building and peacebuilding."

For two years, in 2010 and 2011, the configuration was uniquely positioned in terms of its potential to influence the decisions by the Council on Guinea-Bissau because its chair, Brazil, served as an elected member of the Council. As such, unlike the other configuration chairs, Viooti participated in all Guinea-Bissau related Council discussions and decision-making throughout 2010 and 2011. Because Brazil also has a strong field presence in Guinea-Bissau and carries considerable weight in the CPLP, other Council members generally deferred to Brazil on matters relating to Guinea-Bissau.

PBC Impact: Advocacy and Resource Mobilisation

Persistent instability in Guinea-Bissau has so far profoundly hampered the work and any lasting impact of the PBC, nowhere more so than in raising funds for various peacebuilding projects, including security sector reform. Serious funding commitments have been difficult amidst the frequent unconstitutional changes of government. Prior to the 12 April 2012 coup, the Peacebuilding Fund had contributed $6 million in 2010 and $16.8 million in 2011 for peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. It is unclear what role remains for the PBC in the country under the current situation.

The sixth annual report of the PBC noted the suspension, as a result of the coup, of all key donor support, including that of the African Development Bank, the EU, the World Bank and the IMF (S/2013/63). The economy of the country has collapsed, with the growth rate estimated to have declined from 5.3 percent in 2011 to -1.5 percent in 2012. By the end of the year, the transitional government faced a $50 million budget deficit. Contributions by Nigeria ($10.6 million), Côte d’Ivoire ($2 million) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union ($5.5 million) barely allowed the government to pay the salaries of the military and civil servants. The report noted that the coup underlined the fact that the role of the PBC in “political accompaniment” is utterly limited in the absence of “broader, more vigorous and continuing national commitment and efforts to address the root causes of instability.”

Case Study on the Central African Republic

By a letter dated 6 March 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the CAR requested the Chair of the PBC to inscribe the CAR on its agenda. On 30 May 2008, the President of the Security Council requested the PBC to prepare recommendations on the situation in the CAR (S/2008/383). The areas on which the Council would particularly welcome the advice included: the organisation and holding of an inclusive political dialogue; actions on the part of the national authorities and the support of the international community for the development of an effective, responsible and sustainable reform of the national security sector system; and the re-establishment of the rule of law, including respect for human rights, and good governance in all regions of the country. The CAR became the fourth
country to be added to the PBC agenda on 12 June 2008 (S/2008/419), with Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium) as chair of the country-specific configuration.

MINURCA supported legislative elections in November and December 1998 and began preparations for presidential elections scheduled for 19 September 1999. Despite several postponements, the elections were deemed a success. President Patassé was re-elected with 51.3 percent of the vote and subsequently invited several members of the opposition into the cabinet. Nevertheless, political tensions remained high, and hostility between the army and the elite Presidential Guard threatened to reignite conflict. The UN had difficulty raising the necessary donor funds for SSR, including restructur- ing the armed forces, strengthening civilian police capacity and demobilisation and rein- tegration of soldiers in accordance with the Bangui Agreements.

In resolution 1271 of 22 October 1999, the Security Council extended MINURCA's mandate a final time until 15 February 2000 (President Patassé implored the Council to extend the mission through the end of 2000 to no avail). Following the conclusion of MINURCA, the Secretary-General established the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which was to consolidate progress towards peace and reconciliation. The Security Council issued a presidential statement on 10 February 2000 hailing significant progress made by the government of the CAR toward implementing the Bangui Agreements and welcoming the Secretary-General's decision to establish BONUCA (S/PRST/2000/5).

Unrest in the CAR, however, persisted, and violent clashes between supporters of the government and the opposition continued. On 28 May 2001, a bloody coup attempt was defeated with the assistance of troops from Libya, and rebels from the DRC. Following the failed coup, then Army Chief of Staff General François Bozizé was sacked. Bozizé subsequently refused to answer any questions before a special inquiry commit- teee looking into the coup attempt, sparking a political crisis that resulted in a failed attempt to arrest Bozizé on 3 November 2001. He fled to Chad, which refused to extradite him, and began an insurgency. On 15 March 2003, Bozizé seized power while President Patassé was attending a meeting abroad. Having sus- pended the constitution and dissolved Par- liament, Bozizé promised to hold elections. After initially excluding himself from running and postponing the promised elections for two years, Bozizé contested the 13 March 2005 presidential elections. He led the first round polls after securing 43 percent of the votes and was elected president after garner- ing 64.6 percent in the 8 May 2005 run-off elections.

In June 2006, a massive humanitarian crisis began after thousands of people fled lawlessness in northwest CAR for southern Chad. That same month, the UN reported...
that 33 people were killed in a rebel attack on an army camp in the north. On 29 August 2006, a court in Bangui found former President Patassé guilty, in absentia, of fraud and sentenced him to 20 years of hard labour. Two months later, in October 2006, anti-government rebels seized Birao, a town in the northeast, forcing President Bozizé to cut short an overseas trip. In December, acting under a bilateral agreement, French fighter jets fired on rebel positions as part of the support for government troops trying to regain control of areas in the northeast. On 2 February 2007, the rebel Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC), led by Abdoulaye Miskine, signed a peace accord with President Bozizé in Libya for a cessation of hostilities and the initiation of a dialogue process for national reconciliation.

On 22 May 2007, the ICC announced that it would probe crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed since 1 July 2002. On 25 September 2007, the Security Council adopted resolution 1778, establishing the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) as a UN civilian and police operation working alongside a EU military force (EUFOR). It was mandated to contribute to the protection of civilians and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law and regional peace.

The security situation in the CAR further deteriorated in March 2008, after a group of fighters belonging to the Lord’s Resistance Army crossed the border from the DRC. On 21 June 2008, the CAR government and two major rebel groups signed the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a move seen as essential for a planned national political reconciliation conference. However, the FDPC did not sign, as reportedly its leadership in Libya feared arrest in connection with proceedings at the ICC. On 12 June 2008, the PBC placed the CAR on its agenda.

As the end of EUFOR was approaching, MINURCAT took over its military responsibilities in both the CAR and Chad under resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009. MINURCAT’s main priorities included security and protection of civilians, human rights and the rule of law, with particular attention on reducing sexual and gender-based violence and bolstering regional peace efforts. On 19 January 2010, Chad requested that MINURCAT be withdrawn. UN officials, civil society and even Grauls in a 28 June 2010 briefing to the Council following a visit to CAR (S/PV.6345), all warned that the withdrawal of MINURCAT would leave a security vacuum.

The Secretary-General offered two options for mitigating the impact of MINURCAT’s withdrawal (S/2010/409). The first was to establish a UN peacekeeping force that would remain in the area until the CAR government developed sufficient capacity to ensure security. The second option was to provide international assistance to train and equip the military and strengthen capacity for ensuring security and rule of law in the northeast in conjunction with longer-term SSR and DDR efforts. During a 22 July 2010 meeting with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bozizé expressed his preference for a capacity-building option over the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General also expressed his preference for this option. In his following report on MINURCAT of 14 October, he urged member states to respond favourably to the request of the CAR for assistance to ensure that there is no security gap after the departure of MINURCAT (S/2010/529).

Despite the lack of sufficient security arrangements, MINURCAT was eventually withdrawn by the end of 31 December 2010. Presidential and parliamentary elections, initially slated for 25 April 2010, were postponed several times, finally being held on 23 January 2011. President Bozizé was re-elected after receiving 66 percent of the vote in the first round of elections held on 27 March. The results were widely contested, and the outcome was immediately rejected by three of the five candidates, who called the balloting a “masquerade”. Second calls for redressing electoral irregularities, three electoral commission officials were arrested on 10 February 2011 as part of a fraud investigation. The election was also marred by repression with the government preventing key opposition figures from travelling out of the country, which would have allowed them to raise funds from the sizable CAR diaspora. Violence was renewed in the CAR after a coalition of anti-government groups took up arms on 10 December 2012. The Séléka rebels—formed by factions of the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix, the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblment and the Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Koéro—took control of several major towns in the CAR and advanced on Bangui, demanding that President Bozizé step down after failing to implement the 21 June 2008 Libreville Peace Agreement, which promised payments to former insurgents and the release of political prisoners. There was also the unresolved issue of the disputed polls of 2011. By late December 2012, the Séléka rebels were close to overtaking the capital, and Bozizé was appealing to France, which maintained about 250 troops in Bangui, to intervene militarily to stop the insurgents, an appeal that was summarily turned down. Earlier, media reports indicated that, at the request of Bozizé, 2,000 troops from Chad went into the CAR on 18 December to help the army fight the rebels.

On 19 December 2012, the Council issued a press statement condemning attacks by armed groups and demanding all armed groups cooperate with the DDR process (SC/10867). On 24 December, the PBC issued its own press statement in which it condemned “in the strongest possible terms”, the resurgence of violence in the country following the activities of the Séléka in its occupation of the cities of Ndélé, Sam Ouan-dja, Bamingui, Bria, Kabo, Batangafo and Bambari. The statement noted that these activities “undermine the fragile progress made in the country’s peacebuilding efforts” that the CAR government had pursued by engaging with the PBC since July 2008. The statement called for restraint, the cessation of all violence and “an immediate return to the negotiating table by all parties.” The Council issued similar press statements on 27 December 2012 (SC/10874) and 4 January 2013 (SC/10877) reiterating its demand that the rebels “immediately cease hostilities, withdraw from captured cities and cease any further advance towards the city of Bangui.”

Restraint came only after the intervention of thousands of African troops, including hundreds from South Africa, in the first week of January 2013. A ceasefire and a political agreement were signed between the government and the rebels on 11 January in Libreville, Gabon, under the auspices of the Economic Community of the Central African States, ECCAS, after three days of negotiations. The parties agreed that Bozizé would remain in power until the end of his term in 2016, and a government of national
Council reacted with two press statements in a press statement issued the same day (SC/10880). On 17 January, Bozizé named the opposition leader, Nicolas Tiangaye, as prime minister (Tiangaye had the backing of the Séléka). Séléka leader, Michel Djotodia, was named first deputy prime minister in charge of national defense. Other senior rebels were also appointed to the communications and forestry ministries.

On 24 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2088, extending BINUCA’s mandate until 31 January 2014. BINUCA is to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and security sector reform processes—the delays in which were recognised as partially responsible for the current crisis—and to use its good offices to assist the parties in implementing the 11 January Libreville agreements. The Secretary-General was requested to report on the situation on the ground and provide an assessment of the implementation of the mission’s priorities by 31 March (the deadline was subsequently extended to 30 April), possibly allowing for an adjustment to the mandate.

Yet the fragile peace agreements did not stabilise the country for long. Renewed fighting between the Séléka rebels and the government broke out in mid-March as the rebels claimed that the government had not fulfilled its promises under the 11 January Libreville agreements. As the situation deteriorated, the Council reacted with two press statements issued on 20 and 22 March (SC/10948 and SC/10955). The rebels seized Bangui on 24 March, forcing President Bozizé to flee to Cameroon. Massive looting in the city followed the takeover. Djotodia announced the annulment of the constitution and said he would rule by decree until the 2016 elections. On 25 March, the AU Peace and Security Council suspended the CAR from participation in AU activities and imposed sanctions on seven Séléka leaders. The Council issued an additional press statement (SC/10960), condemning seizure of power by the Séléka and taking note of the AU decisions taken the same day.

ECCAS, though relatively quiet at the outbreak of renewed violence, held a summit meeting in N’Djamena, Chad, on 3 April. Although the summit did not invite or recognise self-appointed interim President Djotodia, it allowed Prime Minister Tiangaye, who was appointed in the aftermath of the Libreville agreements and designated by Djotodia to head an interim government, to attend on behalf of the CAR (Bozizé did not attend). The ECCAS summit called for the creation of a transitional institution that would draw up a new constitution and prepare for elections within 18 months. According to media reports, Djotodia has accepted the solution.

**PBC Engagement**

On 8 October 2008, the PBC country-specific configuration for the CAR adopted its peacebuilding priorities at its second formal meeting (PBC/3/CAF/SR.2). The configuration was to focus on three priority areas:

- SSR, including mobilising resources to fund a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme;
- promoting good governance and the rule of law; and
- fostering national economic development through the establishment of “development poles”. (The development poles or development hubs seek to eliminate regional disparities, in particular in poor rural areas, by solidifying regional and local projects with national economic growth efforts.)

These priorities, which aligned with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted by the CAR in September 2007, became the basis of the key instrument governing the relationship between the PBC and the CAR, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic 2009–2011, published on 9 June 2009 (PBC/3/CAF/7). The framework enumerated the principles guiding the PBC with respect to peacebuilding in the CAR:

- national ownership of the government with respect to peacebuilding in the country;
- sustainable peacebuilding as “a solid partnership based on mutual respect and responsibility between the government and the people of the Central African Republic and their international partners”;
- the design and implementation of peacebuilding actions “based on systematic and continuous consultations between the stakeholders”;
- sustained, long-term and predictable commitment by the PBC country-configuration partners;
- properly coordinated activities to build on recent peacebuilding actions and successes, without duplicating existing activities; and
- the promotion and protection of human rights.

It was agreed that biennial reviews of the Framework would be held at the country level and would seek to evaluate progress achieved in the various priority areas. The Framework noted the disabling poverty of the CAR, stating that the country is landlocked, with extremely poor infrastructure. Despite being endowed with significant natural resources, such as sizeable watercourses, forests and minerals, the Framework noted that the CAR’s economic and social indicators were “very disturbing.” More than two-thirds of the population was desperately poor (subsisting on less than a dollar per day). This poverty, it said, concentrated in rural areas, “continues to deepen and is marked, inter alia, by limited access to basic services and a lack of economic and employment opportunities.” The problem had been compounded by the long period of instability that the country had gone through, leading to the further worsening of the main economic and social indicators.

The Framework also noted that the key risk to peacebuilding in the country was the lack of security and state authority over most of its territory, identifying bandits and armed political movements as the main cause. In addition, “tensions” between the army and rebel groups and the population had eroded the confidence of the people in the security and defence forces. There were also incursions by armed groups from neighbouring countries, which use the CAR as a base or a transit route, contributing to acts of violence and instability in the country.

The first biennial review of the Framework, on 7 January 2010, reported modest progress, with implementation of various projects on SSR, rule of law and development having commenced (PBC/4/CAF/2). The document noted certain achievements in institutional and legislative preparations for the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled.
for April 2010. In its 11 February 2010 conclusions and recommendations following the review, the PBC recalled the urgent need for a coherent reintegration strategy as an integral part of DDR programme and the continued need for financial assistance from the international community in order to implement the peacebuilding activities (PBC/4/CAF/5).

The second review, published on 18 November 2011, reported that “progress, albeit slow, has been achieved on various fronts” and that peacebuilding was moving in the right direction, despite certain setbacks and challenges (PBC/5/CAF/3). It noted progress in some areas: despite several postponements elections were finally held and a national human rights commission was being set up. With respect to DDR, verifications of ex-combatants took place in the northwest, yet progress remained slow despite available funding. The review also noted that the CAR had achieved the heavily indebted poor country completion point in June 2009, making it eligible for debt relief from the IMF. A second-generation poverty reduction strategy paper was presented to international partners and the 10-year plan for the reform of the justice sector was under way, with the support of the UNDP. On the critical matter of SSR, however, it noted that the process had essentially come to a standstill after an October 2009 round table, which did not attract new donor commitments. Very little progress was recorded concerning the development poles or hubs, as well.

The Role of the Chair of the Configuration

The CAR country-configuration has, in practice, only had one chair to date. Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium) was elected chair on 12 June 2008 and served through 31 May 2012, when he resigned. Since, the successive Chairs of the PBC, in 2012 Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh) and in 2013, Ambassador Ranko Vilović (Croatia), have in the interim technically filled the vacancy.

Shortly after the inclusion of the CAR on the agenda of the PBC, on 10-11 July 2008 Grauls travelled along with two PBSO staff members to the CAR to establish an initial dialogue with the government and assess the main issues and challenges. He met with several key figures, including the president and the prime minister, and held initial discussions on the priority areas for the PBC.

Soon after, Grauls led a 10-member PBC mission to the CAR from 30 October to 6 November 2008 (PBC/3/CAF/3). The mission interacted with the government and various other stakeholders on peacebuilding priorities and challenges for the CAR and the nature and scope of international support the country would require.

Grauls’s third visit to the CAR was from 21-23 May 2009 to officially present the framework for peacebuilding to all actors of local society. He subsequently briefed the Council on 22 June (S/PV.6147), noting that the PBC would now focus its attention on two issues critical to stability and peace: the drafting and implementation of a DDR programme properly integrated into the SSR programme, and the preparation for national elections in 2010. Grauls said the short-term challenges were the implementation of the recommendations of the inclusive political dialogue, and in particular, the establishment of the DDR programme; the organisation of general elections in 2010; and the mobilisation of resources.

Grauls once again visited the CAR on 27-28 August 2009. The focus of the visit was to review progress made in the implementation of the Framework, focusing on DDR and SSR, preparations for the 2010 elections, and the development hubs.

A PBC delegation headed by Grauls, undertook a mission to the CAR from 3-10 December 2009 (PBC/4/CAF/1). The mission noted some mild achievements in SSR and the preparation for the elections while finding no progress on the development hubs. With respect to DDR, it was stressed that international funds were readily available to make progress on the issue, which was stalled due to internal political and security difficulties.

Grauls undertook another mission to Bangui from 9-12 June 2010. He noted a standstill on SSR, and particularly DDR. He discussed with the government his intention to organise an event to mobilise resources for peacebuilding in the CAR, taking advantage of the positive momentum, which would be created by the successful holding of elections.

Another visit took Grauls to CAR from 6-10 April 2011, just over a week after the holding of the second round of legislative elections on 27 March 2011. One main issue discussed was the ongoing elaboration by the government of a second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II), and the inclusion therein of a peacebuilding dimension. Grauls was not convinced that some specific peacebuilding priorities were being adequately incorporated, and had concerns that readily available international expertise was being excluded from the process. He also noted some progress in the areas of SSR and DDR.

Grauls also travelled to Washington, D.C. twice as configuration chair on 24 February and 29 July 2010 to meet with officials of the US State Department, the World Bank, and the IMF, to discuss developments and their relative activities in the CAR, and to request donations for peacebuilding efforts.

Grauls briefed the Council as CAR configuration chair for the first time on 2 December 2008, laying down the priorities of the country configuration (S/PV.6027). He continued to brief the Council regularly when it considered the Secretary-General’s reports on the CAR: on 10 March 2009 (S/PV.6091), 22 June 2009 (S/PV.6147), 15 December 2009 (S/PV.6240), 28 June 2010 (S/PV.6345), 8 December 2010 (S/PV.6438), 7 July 2011 (S/PV.6575) and 14 December 2011 (S/PV.6687).

In his briefings to the Council, Grauls regularly highlighted his serious concerns. In his briefing to the Council on 28 June 2010 (S/PV.6345), following a trip to the country earlier that month, Grauls warned that the departure of MINURCAT at the end of the year could leave a security void that could eventually lead to renewed conflict in the CAR. (These concerns, which would materialise in December 2012 and March 2013, were also highlighted in the PBC report on its fourth session to the Council of 28 January 2011 (S/2011/41).)

In a 7 July 2011 briefing, Grauls highlighted the dire conditions of the population, in particular for women and children, and called for a mechanism to monitor the situation (S/PV.6575). In his briefing to the Council on 14 December 2011, Grauls called the lack of financing for DDR efforts a “major and pressing” challenge, noting that it was the promise of support for reintegration that had enabled the government to disarm and demobilise the rebels in the west of the country (S/PV.6687). Implementation of that
pledge was important. He highlighted that the PBF and the World Bank should consider ways to contribute. In the same briefing, Grauls also stressed that the SSR process—and in particular DDR—remained one of the most critical issues in the CAR.

In its annual report for 2011, the PBC underlined the critical role that the configuration chair had been playing in the peacebuilding process in the CAR to move the process forward (S/2012/70). The report said that the field visits undertaken by Grauls “remain an important tool for maintaining the dialogue with national counterparts, including civil society and the Joint Steering Committee for the Peacebuilding Fund.” The visits, the report noted, provided an opportunity for the chair to interact with representatives of the international community based in the CAR in an effort to strengthen coordination among all actors.

During his tenure as configuration chair, Grauls convened regular meetings of a small number of key UN actors in the three priority areas for peacebuilding in the country. While these meetings have been suspended since his resignation as configuration chair, the informal meetings were useful in maintaining the attention of the United Nations system on the CAR, beyond the frequent meetings of the PBC. The informal and more compact nature of this mechanism, complementing the full configuration meetings, enabled more targeted discussions resulting in more specific and concrete steps on the way forward. These meetings were also a way for the configuration and CAR officials to interact with various individuals. For example, the configuration heard briefings by Hilde Johnson, the Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF and Walter Källin, the Secretary-General’s Representative on the human rights of internally displaced persons, on their visits to the CAR.

On 5 April 2012, seemingly without properly coordinating with the PBC, the CAR government and BINUCA held a hastily arranged donors’ conference. The conference, however, was not successful; only two countries made commitments, Australia ($200,000) and Luxembourg ($124,378). Donors expressed concern at the lack of movement on key political issues, including reform of the electoral law and the continued detention of opposition figures.

Shortly after, Grauls notified the PBC that he was resigning as configuration chair effective 1 June. A successor to Grauls had not been found at press time. Several European countries have been mentioned as possible candidates. Reportedly, the EU had expressed interest in chairing the configuration (before the 24 March 2013 seizure of power by the Séléka) yet some member states and UN officials are of the opinion that only UN member states can chair a PBC configuration.

The Council and the CAR Configuration
To date, the Security Council underlined the work of the PBC in the CAR in three presidential statements issued since the CAR was placed on the commission’s agenda:

On 21 December 2009, the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the support provided by the PBC to the CAR and called on the donor community to enhance its support to “sectors identified as critical for sustainable peace and development in the Central African Republic,” as set out in the PBC’s strategic framework for peacebuilding (S/PRST/2009/35).

In its presidential statement of 7 April 2009, the Council welcomed the support provided by the PBC to the CAR and looked forward to the finalisation of the Integrated Strategic Framework (S/PRST/2009/5). It called on the donor community to work with the PBC to identify sectors that are critical for long-term stability and development in the CAR and to intensify their support in those sectors.

On 14 December 2010, the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the efforts of the PBC in advising and advocating for coordinated international support to address core peacebuilding priorities (S/PRST/2010/26). It also welcomed the finalisation of the Framework.

While renewing MINURCAT’s mandate in resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009, the Council called on the PBC, among other actors, to provide the necessary support to SSR in the CAR.

In resolution 2031, adopted on 21 December 2011, the Council extended BINUCA until 31 January 2013, while noting with concern the absence of a credible and viable national SSR strategy. While welcoming the adoption of a national DDR strategy with the assistance of BINUCA, the Council urged the government to “redouble its efforts towards ensuring national ownership and full implementation of the strategy, in line with the wider security sector reform, and to define a timeline and draw up specific reintegration programmes in order to be able to seek support from bilateral and multilateral partners.” The Council requested the PBC, with the support of BINUCA, to continue to assist the CAR in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development in the country, including by ensuring that progress is made in the enforcement of rule of law, and that peacebuilding objectives are fully taken into account in the future strategic planning processes. It then requested that the PBC provide advice to the Security Council on these issues.

On 24 January 2013, in a resolution that welcomed the Libreville ceasefire agreement earlier that month and renewed BINUCA’s mandate until 31 January 2014, the Council encouraged the PBC, among other stakeholders, to assist in addressing peacebuilding challenges in the country and said it looked forward to the “rapid appointment” of a new country-configuration chair (S/RES/2088).

PBC Impact: Advocacy and Resource Mobilisation
This critical aspect of the PBC’s work has been somewhat hampered by the lack of traction with respect to good governance, in particular the widely disputed elections in 2011, and the fragile security situation which eventually erupted in December 2012 and reappeared in March 2013. Moreover, as noted above, the apparent lack of coordination between the government and BINUCA with the PBC with respect to a critical donors’ conference most likely contributed to a marked lack of success for an important resource mobilisation effort in April 2012. Grauls’s ensuing resignation had then brought the work of the PBC with respect to the CAR to a standstill. This was not the first failure to enlist donor support, as a SSR donor’s round table held in Bangui in October 2009 also failed to obtain pledges, and resulted in a standstill in SSR activities according to the PBC. These failures are likely part of a noticeable trend of relatively little attention and resources allocated by the international community to the CAR, as compared to other countries in Central Africa.

However, the country configuration...
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was able to achieve some notable successes under the chairmanship of Grauls. The configuration put much effort in coordination with other partners in the CAR mapping out peacebuilding activities in order to avoid duplication of efforts and resources. With respect to resources, the two visits undertaken by Grauls to Washington, D.C. in 2010 led to an agreement between the PBC and the World Bank to strengthen their cooperation. As a result, a high-level event at the margins of the General Assembly was co-hosted by the country configuration and the World Bank on 20 September 2010. During the event, the Bank pledged $20 million to the CAR. In addition, after the holding of elections in 2011, the PBC was successful in securing $7.5 million to fill in the gap left in the electoral budget.

Case Study on Liberia

In a 27 May 2010 letter to the Secretary-General, the government of Liberia asked that the country be added to the PBC agenda. The Secretary-General transmitted the request to the Security Council in a letter dated 14 June, and on 19 July the President of the Security Council asked the PBC to “provide advice on the situation in Liberia” with a view to adding it to its agenda (S/2010/389). A PBC delegation, led by the US, visited Liberia from 16-27 August and consulted with the government and other key stakeholders in order to identify the main risks to and gaps in peace consolidation in Liberia. Shortly after, on 16 September 2010, Liberia became the fifth country to be placed on the PBC agenda, and the Organisational Committee elected Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein (Jordan) as the configuration chair.

Background

Following the 18 August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Liberia emerged almost completely destroyed from two decades of political instability marked by coups d’état and prolonged civil war. The war killed an estimated 200,000 people out of a total population of 3 million and displaced another 1.8 million people. An estimated 20 percent of children in Liberia were suffering moderate to severe stunting by the end of the war, and only 46 percent and 30 percent of the population had access to safe drinking water and sanitation, respectively. National institutions like the army and police were completely destroyed during the war.

President Charles Taylor, who had been indicted on 7 March 2003 by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for “bearing the greatest responsibility” for the atrocities perpetrated in neighbouring Sierra Leone during its civil war (1991-2002), went into exile in Nigeria on 9 July 2003. (Taylor was subsequently captured, tried and convicted and at press time was appealing a 50-year sentence.) As envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the National Transitional Government was established with Charles Gyude Bryant acting as Chair as of 14 October 2003 and Vice-President Moses Blah ensuring the interim.

On 19 September 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1509 creating the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to support the implementation of the agreement, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation of combatants as well as to provide security at key government installations, such as ports and airports, and other vital infrastructure.

As scheduled in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the National Transition Government organised free and fair elections on 11 October 2005, with UNMIL safeguarding the peace. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf defeated George Weah in the second round of elections held on 8 November 2005 and was inaugurated on 16 January 2006. She was later re-elected on 8 November 2011.

When it was placed on the PBC agenda on 16 September 2010, Liberia was the first country that at the same time had a peacekeeping mission. In a 19 July 2010 letter, the President of the Security Council asked for the advice and recommendations of the PBC on the issues that were also priority areas for UNMIL:
• strengthening the rule of law;
• supporting the security sector reform; and
• supporting national reconciliation.

The PBC Engagement

In a meeting on 15 November 2010 in New York, the PBC and the government of Liberia adopted a statement of mutual commitment (PBC/4/LBR/2). President Johnson Sirleaf thanked the PBC for the “unprecedented” speed with which its engagement with Liberia had been formalised and highlighted “the need to promote national reconciliation through dialogue across geographical and ethnic divides; the need to create institutions, legal frameworks and processes; as well as the need to adopt measures for improving the security and socioeconomic well-being of all Liberians.”

The statement of mutual commitment provided the framework for the PBC’s engagement with Liberia. The government committed to taking the lead on the necessary measures to assume security responsibilities and to promote the rule of law and work towards national reconciliation. The PBC committed to “political advocacy and support, resource mobilisation and fostering
The Role of the Chair of the Configuration

The Liberia configuration has had two chairs, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) from 16 September 2010 until 7 March 2012, and Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), who held the post since 17 April 2012. Unlike most other configuration chairs, Prince Zeid represented a country that was not a donor to Liberia and did not have a diplomatic representation in the country. Jordan, however, has been a troop-contributor to UNMIL, and Prince Zeid further brought to the post his 16-year international experience, including that of a UN peacekeeper.

Sweden has a significant field presence in Liberia, where it leads the justice and security donor coordination group. That group serves as a more focused and complementary channel of support to the Liberian National Police, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation, and the corrections and justice systems. Like all other configuration chairs, Tillander is based in New York. Unlike the other PBC configuration chairs, however, he is not accredited as permanent representative to the UN. He may also be able to achieve a greater synergy with UNMIL since Karin Landgren, the head of the mission is also from Sweden.

Field visits, as has been the case with all other configurations, became an important engagement tool from the start. Prince Zeid undertook a first visit to Liberia from 7-15 November 2010 to familiarise himself with the country, the stakeholders and specifically to gain first hand familiarity with aspects of the three peacebuilding priorities identified by the government: strengthening the rule of law; the security sector reform; and national reconciliation. While in Monrovia on 15 November, he participated via videoconference in the adoption of the statement of mutual commitments between Liberia and the PBC.

He travelled to Liberia again from 18-22 February 2011 and made a one-day stopover in Brussels to meet with EU officials representing the European External Action Service, the European Council Working Party on Africa, and the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation. (Just prior to that trip, Prince Zeid had travelled to Washington, D.C. to consult with the US Government and World Bank officials on their activities in Liberia.)

Prince Zeid led another PBC delegation to Liberia from 12-17 June 2011, to take stock of developments in the three priority areas and in a 29 July letter, he provided the Council with a report on his findings.

On 7 March 2012, Prince Zeid stepped down as chair of the configuration, and on 17 April, the Organisational Committee named Tillander as the new chair.

Tillander first visited Liberia as configuration chair from 14-18 May 2012. He visited the border crossing with Sierra Leone and the regional justice and security hub in Gbarnga. During the visit, he met with President Johnson Sirleaf, as well as key national and international stakeholders. At about the same time (19-20 May), Security Council members visited Liberia and held extensive consultations with the government of Liberia, UNMIL and civil society groups. Although the PBC is a subsidiary body of the Council, there was no interaction between the two visits.

Tillander visited Liberia again from 24 July to 3 August; 18 to 27 November 2012, including a stop at Ecowas headquarters in Nigeria; and from 11 to 15 February 2013. He also undertook trips to Brussels to meet with the EU and to Tunis to meet with the AfDB (17-19 October 2012), as well as trips to Washington, D.C. for meetings with the World Bank and US officials.

Both configuration chairs have briefed the Council on several occasions. Prince Zeid was the first PBC configuration chair to brief Council members in an interactive dialogue (10 December 2010).

On 16 March and 13 September 2011, he briefed the Council on the occasion of the presentation of the periodic report of the

Coordinated action among all relevant stakeholders.” The PBC engagement was intended to “consolidate the country’s peacebuilding efforts and strengthen the government’s capacity to gradually assume the many critical functions that UNMIL and the United Nations country team is currently performing in security sector reform and the rule of law, as well as help to advance national reconciliation.”

The statement was aligned with the 7 July 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper developed by Liberia. The engagement between the government and the PBC was to be based on the principles of national ownership and leadership, international partnership in support of national efforts, and joint responsibility.

A review of the mutual commitments published on 13 March 2012 (PBC/6/LBR/1), covering the period 1 November 2010 to 31 July 2011, reported modest progress in several areas, including judicial reform, and stated that the mutual commitments “remain valid.” The review identified the “main achievements” of the configuration—which are based on “a plan that is prioritised, sequenced and aligned with national strategies”—as follows: enhanced coordination and coherence; national ownership of the process; national budgetary considerations factored into planning; inclusive and participatory planning and implementing processes; and established linkages between the field and the PBC.

The review also reported “increased political will” for judicial reform, a major evolution in the legal framework for the security sector and progress towards a more concerted approach to national reconciliation. However, it reported that though the professional capacity of the justice and security systems were being actively developed, greater attention would need to be paid to ensuring that underlying these efforts was “a vibrant political society to better guarantee the legitimacy of these institutions.” The review noted that a critical component of building such a society would be to address the “historical divide in Liberian society that underlies most of the root causes of the conflict.”

The review concluded that emphasis needed now to be placed on the government’s “primary responsibility for peace consolidation and development” (PBC/6/LBR/2). In particular, priority should be given to “the political will” of the government to facilitate the work of the Law Reform Commission and the Land Commission to better enable them to realise their mandates. The PBC re-committed to “political advocacy and support, resource mobilisation and fostering coordinated action among all relevant stakeholders.” The review noted that engagement by the PBC would help to consolidate the country’s peacebuilding efforts, strengthen the government’s capacity to gradually assume the functions that UNMIL and the UN country team were currently performing in security sector reform and the rule of law and advance national reconciliation.

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Secretary-General on UNMIL, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and mission head Ellen Margrethe Løj (S/PV.6495 and S/PV.6610).

Tillander briefed the Council twice: during an informal dialogue with PBC configuration chairs on 13 July 2012, and prior to the 11 September 2012 discussion of the periodic UNMIL report of the Secretary-General, alongside the new head of mission, Karin Landgren (S/PV.6830). He also spoke in his national capacity during the 12 July 2012 open debate on the PBC annual report (S/PV.6805 and Resumption 1).

In September 2012, jointly with the New York UN Quaker Office, Tillander held a meeting with a number of civil society organisations involved in peacebuilding in Liberia, to exchange views and share perspectives. In December 2012 in New York, again with the UN Quaker Office, Tillander facilitated a meeting of the Liberian Minister of Internal Affairs with a number of civil society organisations.

The Security Council and the Liberia Configuration

In important ways, the Liberia configuration represents a significant shift in the trajectory of the PBC. Unlike the other countries on the PBC agenda, Liberia had a peacekeeping mission with 8,119 troops, 129 military observers and a significant police force of 1,313 deployed across the country as of 31 January 2012. Liberia is the first case where the PBC is intended, among other goals, to assist in the transition of the mission from peacekeeping to a political mission and the configuration was intentionally positioned by the Security Council to be part of the transition plan for UNMIL. Resolution 1938 of 15 September 2010 had requested the Secretary-General to draw up, in coordination with the government of Liberia, “a joint transition plan on the transfer of responsibility for internal security” from UNMIL to the appropriate national authorities. The resolution welcomed the government’s request to the PBC to actively engage in supporting security sector reform, rule of law and national reconciliation. Resolution 2066 of 17 September 2012 outlined the gradual drawdown of the military strength with the accompanying increase in police capacity (a reduction in its military strength to 3,750 by July 2015, with the first phase—reduction of 1,990 troops—to be implemented by September 2013 and an increase of its police component to 1,795 to support the transition).

The Security Council has referenced the role of the PBC in all its resolutions on Liberia since the country was added to the agenda of the PBC. It first did so in resolution 1938 of 15 September 2010, which welcomed Liberia’s request for the engagement by the PBC and called on UNMIL to coordinate its work with the PBC. Subsequently, resolution 1961 of 17 December 2010 welcomed the engagement of the PBC in Liberia, whereas resolution 2008 of 16 September 2011 welcomed the contribution of the PBC to security sector reform, the rule of law and national reconciliation. Resolution 2025 of 14 December 2011 also welcomed the engagement of the PBC in Liberia, whereas resolution 2066 of 17 September 2012, while commending the PBC for its contribution to security sector reform, rule of law and national reconciliation, urged it to continue to report to the Council on the findings of its missions and its recommendations on how it can accelerate progress in these areas.

At the time when Liberia became a PBC agenda country, the Council tended to discuss Liberia in consultations. In order to allow frank interaction with the configuration chair while at the same time respecting the closed nature of consultations, on 10 December 2010 Japan organised an informal interactive dialogue with Prince Zeid. During that meeting the configuration chair gave comprehensive impressions on Liberia, UNMIL, and the various peacebuilding challenges the country faced. More recently, the Council has chosen to hear the briefings by the head of UNMIL on the periodic reports from the Secretary-General in public and to invite the configuration chair to also brief on those occasions.

PBC Impact: Advocacy and Resource Mobilisation

According to President Johnson Sirleaf on the occasion of the adoption of the statement of mutual peacebuilding commitments on 15 November 2010, PBC had been generous to Liberia. In 2008, for example, after submitting to the PBC a priority plan to address critical peacebuilding gaps, Liberia was given $15 million under the PBF’s Immediate Response Facility to assist work on national reconciliation and conflict management, promoting peace and strengthening Liberia’s capacity for peace consolidation.

According to the previously mentioned 13 March 2012 review of the mutual commitments, the PBF had made an initial contribution of $20.4 million to the Liberia configuration to fund various peacebuilding projects.

The PBC has engaged in dialogue with all significant foreign actors in Liberia, including Australia, Norway, the US and the EU. It also coordinated efforts of different stakeholders involved in elaborating the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The outreach and advocacy on behalf of Liberia by the configuration chair has included the EU, the ADB, the World Bank, the US and ECOWAS, among other efforts.

PBC work in Liberia has generally been considered as being the smoothest and most effective among the configurations. The reason for this situation, in addition to the consistent buy-in on the part of the government and a relatively stable political situation is probably the fact that there are some very useful synergies on the ground: the configuration is chaired by Sweden, which has a considerable field presence in Liberia and has invested heavily in the PBC’s priority areas. The current configuration chair, Tillander, needs to rely less heavily on frequent visits to the country as he can play a coordinating role from New York through the Swedish embassy in Monrovia. Coincidentally, as indicated earlier, the current Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIL is also from Sweden. Moreover, Liberia is the first case where the PBC was explicitly mandated to assist in a transition from a peacekeeping mission to a political mission. Unlike the other country-specific configurations, the Liberia configuration was intentionally positioned by the Security Council to be part of the transition plan for UNMIL. Finally, of the six countries on the PBC agenda, Liberia has been the longest on the agenda of the Security Council, dating back to as early as 22 January 1991 (SC/22133), and enjoyed comparatively uninterrupted consideration by the Council since.
On 21 October 2010, Bakary Fofana, a minister of state in the transitional government that ruled Guinea from 21 January 2010 to supervise the 27 June 2010 electoral process, wrote to the chair of the PBC requesting its support for efforts towards “sustainable peace and security, which still remain fragile in our country.” The letter made explicit reference to the fact that “the current stability within the army” remained fragile and “will require sustainable solutions that target the reform of the defense and security forces following the elections.”

The PBC, however, preferred to wait for the outcome of the twice delayed 7 November 2010 second round presidential elections, which brought Alpha Condé to power, and for the new government to renew the request in a 24 January 2011 letter before making a formal response. The letter was shared with members of the PBC on 1 February, and the Organisational Committee decided on 23 February to place Guinea on its agenda. It selected Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), as chairperson of the Guinea configuration.

**Background**

On 23 December 2008 a military junta—the Conseil National de la Démocratie et du Développement (CNDD)—seized power within hours of the death, due to illness, of President Lansana Condé, who had ruled Guinea since 3 April 1984. Led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, the CNDD initially promised to hold national elections in late 2009, before Camara strongly hinted in the media that, contrary to earlier assurances, he was thinking of running in elections to be held at the end of a two-year transitional period.

On 28 September 2009, soldiers fired on opposition supporters while they were holding a demonstration in the national stadium, killing 157 and injuring upwards of 1,200. The violence sparked international condemnation, sanctions by the AU and the EU and a media intervention effort by President Blaise Compaoré. Following a failed assassination attempt on 3 December, Camara was flown out of the country for medical treatment. CNDD Vice-President and Defence Minister Brigadier General Sékouba Konaté was installed as acting president. Konaté met on 13-14 January 2010 with Camara and Compaoré to negotiate the Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou, which paved the way for the appointment of a six-month transitional government led by a civilian Prime Minister Jean-Marie Dora on 21 January, the holding of elections on 27 June and assurances that military would not contest the upcoming elections, and the handing over power to President Condé on 21 December.

Despite a failed assassination attempt on Condé on 19 July 2011 and repeated delays for parliamentary elections now scheduled for 30 June 2013, Guinea seemed to be on a more stable course. On 5 October 2012, Condé announced a cabinet that, for the first time, was entirely civilian and included a minister for human rights.

On 27 February 2013, however, an opposition-led protest march over the upcoming parliamentary elections, followed by a general strike the next day, and the excessive use of force by security forces, led to an outbreak of violence, including inter-communal clashes between the Peuhl and Malinke communities. More demonstrations followed in March, with nine people killed and over 300 injured overall. In early April, the country’s president decided to postpone the elections by several weeks (from 12 May to 30 June 2013). At press time, the opposition was poised to start a new wave of demonstrations to protest the postponement.

**The PBC Engagement**

Guinea is the only country on the agenda of the PBC that was not referred by the Security Council. It is also the only PBC country that is not on the agenda of the Security Council and is not host to any Council-mandated missions.

In its 24 January 2011 letter to the PBC re-stating its wish to be added to the agenda of the PBC, Guinea identified three peace-building priorities:

- promotion of national reconciliation and unity;
- security and defence sector reform; and
- youth and women’s employment policy.

Lucas visited Guinea from 3-10 April 2011 to explore the feasibility of integrating the three priorities put forward by the government into an engagement document, which would help formulate a future statement of mutual commitments. A UN technical mission followed in May 2011. Following the two missions, an initial draft of the statement of mutual commitments was shared with the government of Guinea on 23 June 2011 and with the members of the country-specific configuration on 1 July 2011. Lucas again visited Guinea from 4-6 September 2011. The statement of mutual commitments was adopted on 23 September 2011 in the presence of President Condé in New York (PBC/5/GUI/2), following negotiations between the PBC and the government in consultation with other key stakeholders, including the UN system, civil society and the private sector, bilateral and multilateral partners and regional organisations. It was intended to be a flexible instrument that can be adjusted in light of developments in the country and was supposed to be reviewed at six-monthly intervals. The report of the first review was published on 19 June 2012 (PBC/6/GUI/3) and covered the period from September 2011 to March 2012. It reported “remarkable progress” and hailed the reforms and initiatives adopted by the government.

The review recommended the following:

- early legislative elections that are free, transparent, politically and technically credible, peaceful and acceptable to and accepted by all;
- acceleration of the consultation process for national reconciliation;
- continued reform of the defence and security sector, especially with regard to the bolstering of civilian control, and the reform of the justice sector;
- investment in employment and in critical social sectors in order to improve living conditions; and
- a commitment to improve coordination among international partners in support of Guinea’s peacebuilding and development efforts.

The country-specific configuration has twice issued statements following on troubling developments in Guinea: on 20 July 2011 in response to the failed assassination attempt on President Condé and on 6 March 2013 following the wave of political protests. In the latter statement, the country configuration appealed to all parties to exercise restraint and “engage in the dialogue...”
process that was launched by the President of the Republic in a constructive manner, with a view to the organization of elections which are free, transparent, credible at both the political and technical levels, peaceful, acceptable and accepted by all”. (Earlier, on 1 March, the Secretary-General had made a similar appeal.)

Case Study on Guinea (con’t)

The Role of the Chair
Luxembourg does not have a field presence in Guinea. Trips to the country have been key in the approach taken by the configuration chair. Lucas has regularly visited Guinea and has also maintained close contact with the Group of Friends of Guinea (representatives of the international community in Conakry—the former “Contact Group”), the UN Resident Coordinator in Conakry, Anthony Oehmeng-Boamah, and the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and its head, Said Djinnit.

Following a first, exploratory visit from 3-10 April 2011 during which Lucas was able to familiarise herself with the political, social and economic situation in Guinea, and initiate a dialogue with the government, the UN actors and the civil society, she visited the country regularly.

Lucas visited Guinea next from 4-6 September 2011 with the main objective of the trip being to finalise negotiations on the engagement document of the configuration. She soon followed up with an extended visit from 24 October to 8 November 2011, including a stop in Dakar to meet with UNOWA, to follow up on the UN response for technical and financial assistance to the SSR process in Guinea. The 11-15 March 2012 visit was conducted by the country-specific configuration in the context of the periodic review of the statement of mutual commitments. Her most recent trip, from 17-19 February 2013, allowed her to take stock of the state of preparation of the elections and of outstanding issues, as well as to assess the means at the disposal of the country configuration to support the organisation of the elections.

Since Guinea does not have a peacekeeping or political mission, to date, Lucas has never specifically addressed the situation in Guinea in a public debate of the Council. She has, however, referred to her experience as configuration chair in a number of interventions, most notably on thematic issues of peacebuilding. She spoke during the Council debates on post-conflict peacebuilding on 31 October 2011 (S/PV.6643) and 20 December 2012 (S/PV.6897). During the open debate on the PBC annual report on 12 July 2012, speaking in her national capacity, she shared her experience as configuration chair (S/PV.6805 and Resumption 1). She was also part of the 13 July 2012 informal dialogue between members of the Council and PBC country configurations chairs. She has often referenced Guinea in many other statements before the Council on other agenda items, including the 28 October 2011 open debate on women and peace and security (S/PV.6642), the 30 November 2011 debate on working methods (S/PV.6672 and Resumption 1), and the 21 February 2012 high-level debate on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace and security in West Africa and the wider Sahel (S/PV.6717 and Resumption 1).

The Security Council and the Guinea Configuration
As Guinea is not on the agenda of the Security Council, the configuration chair has not had to brief the Council on the situation in Guinea. However, the Council has discussed Guinea on several occasions under the agenda item “Peace consolidation in West Africa”: on 21 January 2009 (S/PV.6073); 7 July 2009 (S/PV.6157); 12 January 2010 (S/PV.6256); 13 July 2010 (S/PV.6358); 17 December 2010 (S/PV.6455); 8 July 2011 (S/PV.6577); and 16 January 2012 (S/PV.6703). Following the 28 September 2009 stadium massacre, Council members were briefed in consultations on 30 September and 21 October by then Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Haile Menkerios, and issued two presidential statements on Guinea. The 28 October 2009 statement strongly condemned the violence, expressed the intention of the Council to follow the situation closely, and requested the Secretary-General “to update it as appropriate on the situation on the ground, the potential implications for the subregion, the international investigation of the killings of the 28 September 2009 and the measures taken by ECOWAS and by the African Union” (S/PRST/2009/27). On 21 December 2009, Council members were briefed in consultations by the Department of Political Affairs on key elements contained in the report of the international commission of inquiry on the 28 September violence. On 16 February 2010, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it welcomed “the recent positive developments in Guinea while remaining concerned by the situation” and indicating its intention “to remain seized of the situation and to react as appropriate to any threat or action against the transition” (S/PRST/2010/3).

The Council continued to follow closely the process leading up to presidential elections. It issued a press statement on 17 September 2010 (SC/10035) following a briefing in consultations by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé-Brook Zerihoun. Council members were then briefed in consultations on the outcome of the 7 November 2010 presidential run-off election by the head of UNOWA, Said Djinnit, on 18 November. In remarks to the press after the meeting, the President of the Council indicated that members had welcomed the high voter turnout for the run-off election, deplored the violence that erupted following the announcement of the results and took note of the provisional results announced by the electoral commission. The President stated that members of the Council have “urged all parties to follow the existing legal procedure, resolve their differences peacefully and respect the final decision of the country’s Supreme Court”.

Regarding possible future Council attention to the situation in Guinea, an important development was the election of Luxembourg to the Security Council for the 2013-2014 term. As Guinea configuration chair, Lucas has been one of the strongest voices arguing for deeper and more substantive engagement between the Council and the PBC configuration chairs.

PBC Impact: Resource Mobilisation and Advocacy
Prior to being placed on the PBC agenda on 23 February 2011, Guinea benefited from PBF support totaling $12.5 million, invested in the areas of security sector reform, human rights, promotion of political dialogue and mediation support.

Once on the agenda, and with peacebuilding priority areas further defined, the configuration chair took steps aimed at mobilising resources for peacebuilding activities and establishing synergies with other regional and international actors, such as the World Bank, the IMF and also the AfDB.
The six case studies above reveal the various challenges faced by the PBC agenda countries and illustrate how the PBC is trying to tackle these challenges and deliver on its promise. How successful, overall, the PBC turns out to be on the ground, depends on a number of factors, some within the control of the PBC, some outside. Among those factors within the PBC control, the following are worth flagging:

- the ability of the country-specific configuration to engage with the host government and achieve a full buy-in for all activities conducted with the input generated by the PBC;
- the ability of the country-specific configuration to simultaneously establish a meaningful relationship with civil society stakeholders in the country and with the pre-existing international NGO presence in the country;
- the ability of the country-specific configuration to relate to and mobilise regional and multilateral financial institutions, as well as to convince member states to align development and technical assistance programmes for the PBC agenda country to the instruments governing PBC engagement with that country, such as the statements of mutual commitment or joint strategies;
- the ability to establish a good working relationship with the UN mission on the ground, including a positive working relationship between the configuration chair and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (or equivalent) and head of mission; and
- the ability and capacity of the PBSO to provide meaningful and practical support to the configuration chairs.

Several factors, largely dependent on the Security Council, can determine the effectiveness of the PBC on the ground and as such could also enhance the efforts of the Security Council to attain a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and beyond. Worth mentioning in this context may be:

- engagement on the part of the Security Council (if the country is on the agenda of the Council) in the form of substantive interactions between the configuration chair and the Council, including most notably in Council consultations (current practice includes consultations with the head of the UN mission but not the configuration chair);
- including in Council resolutions and statements on those countries elements tailored to enhance the country-specific and more generic effectiveness of the PBC;
- encouraging the UN mission on the ground to integrate the efforts of the PBC into its work;
- including PBC-related issues in the terms of reference of Council visiting missions to the PBC agenda countries also on the agenda of the Security Council;
- considering the annual report of the PBC on a more timely basis and routinely inviting chairs of the country-specific configurations to participate; and
- holding regular interactive dialogues with the chairs of the six country-specific configurations.

Security Council-Peacebuilding Commission Dynamics

The relationship between the Security Council and the PBC as a whole is multi-faceted due to the significant overlap in membership between the two bodies. The dynamics between the Security Council and the PBC, however, do not necessarily always help maximise the impact on the ground. From 2010 through 2012, eleven out of the fifteen members of the Council were also on the PBC Organisational Committee, with all five permanent members of the Council permanently on the PBC. But this has not always produced strengthened institutional ties between the two bodies, at least from the perspective of the PBC and its country-specific configurations. Some Council members have shown a greater interest in the work of the PBC than others; South Africa, which left the Council at the end of 2012, was a member of all PBC country-specific configurations, and as one of the three facilitators of the PBC five-year review, was intensely interested in the work of the PBC. Among the P5 members, the UK has probably shown the more consistent and informed interest.

There is general support among Council members for discussions about peacebuilding, although some members seem anxious to see more concrete results in country-specific contexts. Some members note that there remains a need for greater coherence and coordination among the multiple international actors engaged in peacebuilding processes, as reflected most notably in statements by China, South Africa and the US during the 12 July 2012 Council debate on the PBC.
As of 2013, a number of newly elected Council members have shown a clear interest in the work of the PBC and are likely to exert a positive influence by trying to strengthen interaction between the Security Council and the PBC. Luxembourg has been chair of the country-specific configuration for Guinea since February 2011, and Ambassador Lucas has been vocal in calling for strengthened institutional ties between the Council and the PBC. Since 2010, Australia has shown increased interest in the work of the PBC; it supported the agricultural sector in Sierra Leone through the PBC and also invested in the 2010 election in Burundi through the Peacebuilding Fund. The Republic of Korea organised the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan from 29 November to 1 December 2011, leading to the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, which is seen by some Council members as a good model for the PBC to adopt. Rwanda has shown a consistent interest in the work of the PBC, and its Ambassador, Eugène-Richard Gasana, served as the PBC chair in 2011.

Security Council resolution 1646 which decided that the permanent members will be members of the PBC Organisational Committee and that the PBC would submit its annual report to the Council, did not produce consistent engagement between the Security Council and the PBC. In fact, the permanent members have mostly showed a limited interest in the PBC. The discussions of the annual report of the PBC have sometimes taken place with considerable delay after their publication and most debates on the annual reports have been organised by elected members (with the exception of China who held two such debates in 2008 and 2011). Furthermore, the Council never chose to discuss formally the report from the five-year review of the PBC.

**The Relationships on the Ground**

In the course of our research, a key concern regarding the PBC, expressed by officials of several of the agenda countries, was that they were getting less out of the PBC than they had bargained for, particularly with respect to resource-mobilisation (fundraising) and the effort to attract serious external investors. It appears that high expectations combined with this perception have limited the leverage that the PBC can wield in these countries. This is an important underlying problem since most of the PBC agenda countries state two key reasons for being on the agenda of the PBC: to benefit from its potentially considerable fundraising capacity and to benefit from its wider advocacy in political and other spheres.

However, it may be helpful to keep in mind two basic facts:

- the PBC is an inter-governmental body, and membership is voluntary; and
- in principle, the PBC is a partnership of countries interested in assisting, through official development assistance and international political advocacy, specific countries that opt to be placed on its agenda.

In this context, a country-specific configuration is primarily an expanded political body of member states based in New York that helps to mobilise international funding for peacebuilding programmes. The country-specific configurations could be seen as the channel through which such advocacy and assistance are conveyed, with the configuration chair acting as a kind of special envoy or special advocate.

Another key factor is the relationship between the PBC country-specific configuration and the UN peacebuilding or political missions. This relationship is not defined or structured and depends to a great degree on personalities. Where personal relationships do not work well the tendency may be for parallel programmes and channels to develop.

A good working relationship and synergy between the head of the UN mission and the configuration chair helps to enhance the effectiveness and minimise any potential conflict.

It goes without saying that the PBC and the UN field missions are at their most effective when they are able not only to synchronise their efforts but also work to mutually reinforce each other. The chair of the country-specific configuration in New York is particularly well-placed to support the role and views of the head of the mission and to afford him or her the opportunity of seeking international consensus, including beyond the UN system, on critical issues regarding the implementation of Security Council mandates.

**Looking Ahead**

A persistent issue in discussions about the PBC relates to how the Council could devise effective working methods that would properly support the work of the PBC and, conversely, take a better advantage of the advisory role of the PBC. The PBC’s Working Group on Lessons Learned has over the last two years devoted a considerable amount of time and thought to this matter. The Council has been more reluctant though some members have begun to acknowledge the utility of taking a closer look at possible synergies and the ways in which engagement with the PBC could provide real benefits for the Council and strengthen its ability to contribute to lasting peace. The PBC seems to be the natural platform upon which the Council could draw. The Council could also tap into a deeper thematic perspective provided by the PBC on critical peacebuilding priorities of socioeconomic and political dimensions.

Ways in which this interaction could materialise, might include direct, informal engagement on the part of the “penholder” (i.e. the Council member leading the drafting on a particular country situation) with the configuration chair who most likely has acquired unmatched familiarity with the PBC agenda country and can serve as a valuable resource to the penholder and the Council as a whole. In this context, the Council could proactively identify areas for the configuration chair to address in meetings or briefings with the Council. Configuration chairs could also on occasion be encouraged to visit the country shortly prior to the Council discussions of that situation.

There are, furthermore, multiple ways that could enhance the effectiveness of the PBC that go beyond the relationship between the Council and the PBC. For countries that form part of the different country-specific configurations it might be useful aligning the international development support provided by some of them bilaterally with the work of the PBC. This is already done by some states but some governments appear to think of the PBC as merely a New York-based entity. The synergy between the configuration and its member states seems to be the best when states opting to be part of any PBC configuration align their development and technical assistance programmes for the PBC agenda country to the instruments governing PBC engagement with that country, such as the statements of mutual commitment or joint strategies.

Moreover, for the PBC to be effective, countries chairing the configurations should...
ideally have a strong bilateral relationship with, and significant development assistance programmes in, the subject country. This was in fact envisaged in the two founding resolutions of the PBC, which state that the country-specific configurations should be made up of, among others, “major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort”, though it has not always been realised in practice.

With some PBC relationships about to reach their seventh anniversary, with the five-year review completed and another one due in three years, and in the overall climate of reduced financial resources, perhaps some serious resolve could emerge within the Security Council to strengthen substantive interaction with the PBC. After all, in surprising the General Assembly with resolution 1646, the Security Council showed a marked interest in the composition of the PBC. An effort should be made to demonstrate that 1646 was not only about self-interest, but hopefully about substantive interaction and contribution to advance the promise of peacebuilding.
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